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Abstract 
 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in  
Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918 
 
During the Hundred Days, British Second Army fought a successful War of 
Liberation alongside French and Belgian forces in the Groupe d’Armées des 
Flandres (GAF). The Army’s achievements, deployed within a coalition army 
group under foreign command, have been overlooked in histories of the final year 
of the war 
 
Although their initial role was to secure the flank of the Belgian Army for the 
Liberation Offensive, General Plumer’s troops fought and won two major battles, 
the breakthrough at Ypres 1918 and the breakout following Courtrai. Second 
Army’s performance led to it being appointed the strike force for the GAF, 
assisting allied forces to clear the coast and liberate occupied Belgium. Plumer’s 
methodological leadership of combined arms operations enabled this weakest of 
Haig’s armies to overcome stubborn enemy resistance. An unseen consequence 
was the major dispute between Haig and Foch, involving British and French 
governments, over the return of Second Army to Haig’s command. 
 
The strategic German withdrawal, aided by the Flanders terrain and notorious 
weather, forced the final advance to follow a staccato rhythm. While the British 
troops exploited successfully their advantages in firepower through ‘fire and 
movement’ tactics, fighting this modern warfare came at the cost of heavy 
casualties.  
 
 
 
 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
iii 
 
Dedication 
 
To the citizen soldiers of British Second Army who 
fought in the Liberation Offensive in Flanders, 1918. 
 
 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I owe a debt of appreciation to the staff of the museums and archive sources I 
have visited, and to the other contacts I have made during my research, for their 
help, consideration and patience; and to members of the Centre for First World 
War Studies at the University of Birmingham, notably the research group 
supervised by Dr John Bourne. I have benefited in particular from the support of 
Dr Bourne, who has been crucial in guiding me from the jumping off point through 
to the final objective. I am also grateful to the staff and students of the University 
of Leeds MA in Military History course (2001-3) where this all began; to Professor 
Peter Simkins for his inspiration, and for making the initial suggestion of Second 
Army in 1918 as a topic deserving of new research; and to Patricia Skeet who 
translated a number of French language primary documents. 
 
Finally, this study would not have been possible without the ongoing support of 
my family, who helped to create the necessary time and space when I could see 
none. 
 
 
 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
v 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter One ..................................................................................................... 26 
British Second Army: July-September 1918 .................................................. 26 
Operations in Flanders ................................................................................................................... 29 
The Commander ............................................................................................................................... 70 
Gas  ................................................................................................................................... 79 
The War in the Air ............................................................................................................................ 86 
Chapter Two ..................................................................................................... 92 
Groupe d’Armées des Flandres ...................................................................... 92 
The German Army .......................................................................................................................... 102 
The Belgian Army .......................................................................................................................... 104 
The French Army ........................................................................................................................... 108 
British Second Army ..................................................................................................................... 108 
Chapter Three ................................................................................................ 134 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 ............................................................................... 134 
Breakthrough: The First Day - 28 September 1918 ..................................... 134 
II Corps  ................................................................................................................................. 158 
XIX Corps  ................................................................................................................................. 165 
X Corps  ................................................................................................................................. 171 
XV Corps  ................................................................................................................................. 172 
Chapter Four .................................................................................................. 183 
The Battle of Ypres ........................................................................................ 183 
Advance to Contact: 29 September – 3 October 1918 ................................ 183 
29 September  ................................................................................................................................. 183 
30 September  ................................................................................................................................. 194 
1 October  ................................................................................................................................. 204 
2 October  ................................................................................................................................. 213 
Chapter Five ................................................................................................... 226 
The Battle of Courtrai .................................................................................... 226 
Breakout: 14 – 19 October 1918 ................................................................... 226 
II Corps  ................................................................................................................................. 235 
XIX Corps  ................................................................................................................................. 240 
X Corps  ................................................................................................................................. 242 
XV Corps  ................................................................................................................................. 245 
15 October  ................................................................................................................................. 248 
16 October  ................................................................................................................................. 259 
17 October  ................................................................................................................................. 265 
18 October  ................................................................................................................................. 271 
19 October  ................................................................................................................................. 276 
Chapter Six .................................................................................................... 282 
Second Army Operations 20 October – 11 November ................................ 282 
War of Movement: From the Lys to the Schelde ......................................... 282 
Action of Ooteghem: 25 October 1918 ...................................................................................... 305 
Action of Tiegham: 31 October 1918 ......................................................................................... 312 
Chapter Seven ............................................................................................... 323 
War of Liberation ........................................................................................... 323 
The Liberation of Flanders ........................................................................................................... 323 
Fall Out: The Ending of the Groupe d’Armées des Flandres ................................................ 339 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 361 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
vi 
 
Appendices .................................................................................................... 391 
Appendix A  Orders of Battle ................................................................................................... 391 
Appendix B  Maps ...................................................................................................................... 391 
Appendix C  Terminology and Abbreviations ...................................................................... 391 
Appendix D  Letter from Foch to Allied Commanders, 19 October 1918........................ 391 
Appendix E  Two letters from Haig, 25 October 1918 ......................................................... 391 
Appendix F  Outtersteene Ridge, 18 August 1918 .............................................................. 391 
Appendix G  Gas Warfare in Flanders, 1918 ......................................................................... 391 
Appendix H  Air Warfare in Flanders, 1918 ........................................................................... 391 
Appendix I  British Army Medical Categories ..................................................................... 391 
Appendix J  The Operational Readiness of Second Army ................................................ 391 
Bibliography  ................................................................................................................................. 391 
 
  
 
 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Somewhere within the pages of many of the personal photograph albums kept 
by German officers would be found an aerial photograph of Ypres… These 
photographs give us a sense of the feeling that must have weighed on any 
German commander who had been posted to that front for any length of time: 
so tantalisingly near and yet so frustratingly far.1 
 
While the phrase War of Liberation is not one closely associated with the First World 
War, during those final months on the Western Front, British and Dominion troops 
advanced alongside French and American allies to drive the German Army out of 
northern France. Further north a British Army fought alongside French and Belgian 
forces to liberate Belgium from four years of occupation.2  
 
In Britain little public knowledge remains of this campaign; its story is buried even 
deeper than the forgotten history of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and its 
successful series of victories during the final ‘Hundred Days’ of the war.3  
 
                                                         
1
 B. Stichelbaut and P. Chielens, The Great War Seen From the Air: In Flanders Fields 1914-1918 (Brussels: 
Mercatorfonds, 2013), p. 12. 
2
 Belgium had not been party to the build up to war and had sought to remain neutral; despite this it had been 
attacked by Germany as a consequence of the latter’s Schlieffen Plan for the concentration of forces to carry out a 
decisive defeat of the French army. For a recent summary see M. MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: How 
Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War (London: Profile Books Ltd., 2013), pp.584-92.   
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The campaign of the ‘Hundred Days’, 8 August to 11 November 1918, was, in 
terms of sheer scale, the greatest in British military history. It was also, 
arguably, the campaign in which ground forces under British command 
exercised the most influence on the history of the world in the twentieth 
century.4 
 
In 1964 John Terraine had concluded that these ‘stupendous victories’, which did so 
much to hasten the final armistice, ‘form… a little-known chapter of British military 
history’.5 It is a chapter still to be fully appreciated within public knowledge of the First 
World War, and within it can be found the story of the Groupe d’Armées des Flandres 
(Army Group, Flanders) (GAF), composed of Belgian and French forces, and British 
Second Army.  
 
The Official History of the War represents the only detailed record of Second Army’s 
operations during this period.6 Individual war diaries and unit histories record the 
campaign from a necessarily limited perspective rather than presenting an overall 
picture. While many military historians and others have written about the allied 
victories of 1918 and the achievements of the BEF and its commanders, there is little 
                                                                                                                                                                                
3
 This amnesia can be addressed via G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory – The First World War: Myths and Realities 
(London: Headline Book Publishing, 2001); or for an earlier overview, J. Terraine, To Win A War: 1918, The 
Year of Victory (London: Cassell, 2008; first published by London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978). 
4
 J. P. Harris with N. Barr, Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days Campaign, 8 August – 11 
November 1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1998). 
5
 From his editor notes in J. Terraine, ed., General Jack’s Diary: War on the Western Front 1914-1918 – The 
Trench Diary of Brigadier-General J. L. Jack, D.S.O. (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, original 1964 edition). 
6
 For the purposes of this study the key volumes are, J. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918  
Vol. IV, 8
th
 August - 26
th
 September (Official History)  (HMSO, 1947); J. Edmonds with R. Maxwell-Hyslop, 
Military Operations France and Belgium 1918  Vol. V 26
th
 September – 11th November (Official History), 
(HMSO, 1947). 
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or no reference to the liberation of Belgium or British Second Army.7 For the first time 
since the Official History, this study tells that story. 
 
The onset of the centenary of the First World War has produced a growing number of 
new titles and reprints. In 2011 David Stevenson wrote a comprehensive work on the 
final year of the war,8 examining all aspects of the conflict and its principal 
combatants, from the front line to the home front. The chapters which deal with the 
fighting on the Western Front include references to Flanders and the GAF, 
acknowledging the strategic achievements of the campaign; the wide-ranging nature 
of the book leaves no space however for a detailed coverage. More recently, Nick 
Lloyd has written specifically about the Hundred Days,9 but there are few references 
to Second Army and the fighting in Flanders, though he does point out the 
implications for the German high command of the breakthrough at Ypres on 28 
September. 
 
Missing from the range of research and writing undertaken on the Hundred Days is a 
description of, or in some cases a recognition of, British Second Army fighting two 
                                                         
7
 Examples include P. Hart, 1918, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008);  M. Brown, 1918 Year of Victory,  
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1998);  M. M. Evans, 1918, The Year of Victories, (London: Arcturus, 2002), W. 
Groom,  A Storm in Flanders: The Ypres Salient 1914-1918: Tragedy and Triumph on the Western Front, 
(London: Cassell, 2003); J. H. Johnson,  1918: The Unexpected Victory, (London: Cassell & Co, 1997); J. 
Toland,  No Man’s Land: The Story of 1918, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980); N. Lloyd, Hundred Days: The End 
of the Great War (London: Viking, 2013). The one notable exception in providing coverage of the campaign in 
Flanders is by Harris with Barr, Amiens to the Armistice, though even here it can be argued that the detail 
concentrates primarily upon the other theatres of the Western Front. 
8
 D. Stevenson, With Our Backs To The Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London: Penguin Books, 2012;  
first published London: Allen Lane, 2011). 
9
 N. Lloyd, Hundred Days:  The End of the Great War, (London: Viking, 2013). 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
4 
 
major battles plus supporting operations, and advancing 53 miles across Belgium 
before the Armistice on 11 November 1918.10 
 
… The [British Second] Army swept forward with a magnificent dash and 
elation that carried the very spirit of victory over the arena of the long conflict – 
over the mortal resting-place of those who died that this day might come.11 
 
A series of victories in battle by a British Army, commanded by one of the most 
respected and successful British generals of the war,12 has become forgotten over 
time. The Liberation Offensive,13 the campaign to liberate occupied Belgium in the 
Hundred Days, has received little attention.  
 
This amnesia is paradoxical given the almost iconic status afforded to the city of 
Ypres within remembrance of the War, and the price paid by British forces in its 
defence.14  
 
                                                         
10
 J. Edmonds with R. Maxwell-Hyslop, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Vol. V 26
th
 September – 
11
th
 November (Official History), (HMSO, 1947). 
11
 B. Brice, The Battle Book of Ypres: A Reference to Military Operations in the Ypres salient 1914-18 
(Stevenage: Spa Books in association with Tom Donovan Military Books, 1987; first published 1927), p. 49; a 
book that celebrates the achievements of British troops fighting in the Ypres Salient. 
12
 For example, see the chapter on General Herbert Plumer’s record in J. Terraine, The Western Front 1914-1918  
(Hutchinson, 1964) (Pen &Sword, 2003); also P. Simkins, ‘Herbert Plumer’, in Beckett, I. F. W. and Corvi, S. J. 
ed., Haig’s Generals (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006). 
13
 The term Liberation Offensive is one recognised in Belgium: see B. Stichelbaut and P. Chielens, The Great 
War Seen from the Air, p. 259. 
14
 An early example of the original status attached to Ypres in Britain is provided by B. Brice, The Battle Book of 
Ypres: A Reference to Military Operations in the Ypres Salient 1914-18 (Stevenage: Spa Books in association 
with Tom Donovan Military Books, 1987; first published 1927); a later view is provided by W. Groom, A Storm 
in Flanders: The Ypres Salient 1914-1918: Tragedy and Triumph on the Western Front (London: Cassell, 2003). 
There is also an interesting examination of the Salient over the course of the war including both contemporary 
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[The Ypres Salient] was arguably the most hated battleground of the whole war 
in the eyes of the British Tommy… this zone of Belgium to the east of Ypres 
was fought over in every year of the war…15 
 
The Salient was created through the desperate fighting during the first Battle of Ypres 
in 1914, and defended in the subsequent battles in 1915 (‘Second Ypres’). It was the 
launching point for ‘Third Ypres’ in 1917 (popularly termed ‘Passchendaele’), and the 
centre of resistance to Ludendorff’s offensive in the Battles of the Lys during the 
Spring of 1918 (sometimes referred to as ‘Fourth Ypres’).16 However, each of these 
battles (or series of battles) has become remembered for reasons not directly 
associated with the city, Flanders or Belgium.  
 
The Battle of Ypres, 1914, saw the desperate defensive fighting by the original BEF, 
which saved this final piece of Belgium at the expense of the near destruction of the 
‘Old Contemptibles’.17 The spring of 1915 brought The Second Battles of Ypres, most 
usually remembered for the first use of poison gas on the Western Front. The initial 
success of this German offensive also led to the removal of Smith-Dorien as the 
Commander of British Second Army and the promotion of Herbert Plumer in his 
stead. Passchendaele, the Battles of Ypres 1917, has become synonymous with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
photographs of the battlefield and the same sites in the 1960s: J. Giles, The Ypres Salient: Flanders Then and 
Now (London: Picardy Publishing Ltd, 1979; first published by London: Leo Cooper Ltd, 1970). 
15
 From the introduction by M. Brown to The Wipers Times: The Complete Series of the Famous Wartime Trench 
Newspaper (London: Little Books Ltd., 2006), p. xv. 
16
 Map 14 shows the area of concentration of the fighting around Ypres and the Salient during the course of the 
war; it was over these well-trod battlefields that Second Army would finally break through the German lines in 
the Battle of Ypres 1918. 
17
 It is alleged that the Kaiser had dubbed the small British Army in 1914 a ‘contemptible little army’ – the 
original BEF proudly adopted the term as a compliment. 
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‘mud and blood’ school of British recall of the First World War, the futility of a heavy 
loss of life for the gain of a few miles. Military experts often highlight the Battle of 
Messines 1917, because of the British success and the commander responsible, 
Plumer. The Battles of the Lys, 1918, are used to highlight the success of the German 
storm troop tactics and programmed artillery preparations.18 
 
In Britain it seems that the name ‘Ypres’ is recognised primarily because of the war 
cemeteries and memorials the city is host to; the reasons for the scale of this British 
sacrifice, the determination to defend the city and retain this foothold in Belgium, are 
hazy or forgotten.19  
 
For most of the Hundred Days, Second Army operated under foreign command and 
largely independently of the other British forces, making it easy to overlook its role. In 
addition, its initial task was restricted to that of providing the flank guard for an attack 
by the Belgian Army with French support. Such circumstances have caused it to 
become the ‘forgotten army’ within assessments of the British armies during the final 
period of the war.  
 
                                                         
18
 For descriptions of these battles, examples include, ‘First Ypres’: I. F. W. Beckett, Ypres: The First Battle 
1914 (Pearson Education Ltd, 2004), or A.  Farrar-Hockley, Ypres: Death of an Army  (Cerberus Publishing, 
1967); ‘Second Ypres’: J. Dixon, Magnificent But Not War – The Second Battle of Ypres 1915 (Barnsley: Leo 
Cooper, 2003); ‘The Battle of Messines’ and ‘Third Ypres’: R. Prior and T. Wilson, Passchendaele: The 
Unknown Story (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), P. Liddle, ed., Passchendaele in Perspective: the 
Third Battle of Ypres (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1997), N. Steel and P. Hart, Passchendaele: The Sacrificial Ground 
(London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2007; first published 2000); The Battles of the Lys: M. Kitchen, The 
German Offensives of 1918  (Stroud, Gloucester: Tempus 2005); for an example of the arguments praising the 
German successes in the Spring of 1918 see B. I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German 
Army 1914-1918 (New York: Praeger, 1989).  
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It is a paradox that the commander of Second Army, General Herbert Plumer, has 
been acknowledged to be one of the most successful British generals during the 
war.20 Plumer left no private papers – these were destroyed at his instruction before 
he died – a probable factor in why there has been less attention paid to his role during 
the final year of the war. There is much more material available regarding other 
British Army and Corps commanders who were prominent during this period. 
 
At the start of 1918, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig had negotiated for Plumer’s 
return from Italy as part of a trade-off after failing to obtain requested reinforcements 
and replacements for his armies; in return for Haig’s agreement to release Second 
Army’s then commander General Rawlinson as his representative at Versailles. 
Haig’s original release of Plumer to Italy in the autumn of 1917 receives little 
reference in his diaries.21 It can be equally perplexing to understand why, having 
succeeded in bringing Plumer back to the Western Front, within six months Haig had 
once again transferred him to foreign command. Haig had relied on Plumer to lead 
the defence in Flanders against German attacks in spring 1918, but was then 
prepared to release Second Army to undertake what was, as proposed, a subordinate 
role within a coalition force. Haig’s diaries say very little about this arrangement and 
the reasoning behind it. Six weeks later, having apparently acquiesced quietly to the 
release of Second Army, Haig demanded that the Army was returned to his command 
                                                                                                                                                                                
19
 Steel and Hart refer to the ‘beleaguered city of Ypres’ as ‘a symbol of British resolve to honour their pledge to 
restore the national integrity of Belgium and defeat Imperial German ambitions’: Steel and Hart, Passchendaele: 
The Sacrificial Ground , p. 19. 
20
 P. Simkins, ‘Herbert Plumer’, in I. F. W. Beckett, and S. J. Corvi, ed., Haig’s Generals (Barnsley: Pen & 
Sword Military, 2006), pp. 141-163. 
21
 Given Haig’s willingness elsewhere in his diary writings to comment upon similar manoeuvrings regarding 
senior officers, the lack of comment on Plumer’s transfer to Italy appears to be a surprising omission. 
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as a matter of urgency.22 The rationale behind the decision to create the GAF, the 
reasons for the incorporation of Plumer and Second Army, and the subsequent 
argument regarding the return of the Army to Haig’s command, have all received 
limited attention from historians.  
 
The denigration of British army command during the First World War has been a 
feature of modern commentary and public perception.23 This study considers whether 
the record of Second Army during the 1918 Flanders campaign supports Plumer’s 
standing as one of, or perhaps the most, consistent and successful commanders of a 
British army in the First World War.24  
 
Second Army operated for most of the final months of the war as part of an allied 
Army Group. With any coalition there will be internal politics with implications for 
military operations. Plumer had experience in Italy of working within such an 
environment, and he was to have every opportunity to show his ability to operate in a 
highly charged political situation, with his subsequent appointment in charge of British 
forces following the Armistice, and his later posting in Palestine. Although many 
British historians have commented upon the allied relationships at a strategic level 
                                                         
22
 See the relevant sections of G. D. Sheffield and J. Bourne, ed., Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-
1918 (Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 2005). 
23
 ‘….the historiography of the Western Front during the middle years of the twentieth century was dominated in 
Britain by debates over the standard of senior command….’. D. Todman,  ‘The Grand Lamasery Revisited’, in G. 
Sheffield and D. Todman, ed.,  Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s experience 
1914-18  (London: Spellmount Ltd, 2004), p. 40; the Introduction to this book is also a useful summary of 
prevailing attitudes and misconceptions. 
24
 As well as his initial record at Second Ypres in 1915 and the high point of Messines in 1917, there are 
Plumer’s second stage successes during Third Ypres, 1917, his record in Italy during the latter part of 1917, and 
his leadership during the German offensives in Spring 1918, all highlighted as evidence of this general’s abilities. 
There are further comments and references to his performance later in this study. 
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throughout the war,25 particularly those between Haig, the politicians at home in 
Britain, and the French military command, there is very little reference to the 
relationship with the Belgian leadership. Operational links at corps level and below 
have also been overlooked. 
 
After four bruising years of conflict, there was still a final price to pay for the 
achievements of the Hundred Days: ‘As far as the British were concerned, they not 
only suffered more casualties in 1918 than in any other year of the war, but also, 
remarkably, than in the whole of the second war’.26  
 
In his 2013 book, The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century,27 
David Reynolds draws comparisons between our respective memories of the First 
and Second World Wars; and how our memory of the former has been shaped by the 
impact of the later conflict.  
 
The British were unique in treating the First World War as an almost totally 
negative experience by which to accentuate the positives of the Second.28 
 
This contrast has led to the loss of life in the First World War becoming its 
overwhelming legacy – particularly when viewed through the prism of the Second 
World War which is remembered primarily as a ‘good fight’ to defeat unambiguous 
                                                         
25
 Most notably, W. J. Philpott,  Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front 1914-18  (London: 
Macmillan, 1996); see also, E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First 
World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
26
 M. Brown, 1918: Year of Victory (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1998). 
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evil.29 Hence the military achievements of 1914-1918, and the successful prosecution 
of the war by the British Army in the second half of 1918, have been eclipsed in our 
memory of the war. 
 
Despite the failures of the peace that followed, it was important for the Allies to win 
the war.30 While acknowledging the underlying considerations relating to the 
prevention of a German hegemony in Europe, the attack on Belgium created 
legitimate and moral arguments in support of Britain’s entry into the war. The victories 
of Second Army were therefore a direct contribution towards achieving a principal war 
aim and satisfying public demand for a Belgium free of German invaders. Victory also 
supported strategic concerns regarding Britain’s economy and ability to trade.31 
Britain continued to stand by its French and Belgian allies who had no other option 
but to fight to remove the German occupiers from their lands.32 For this, if for no other 
reason, there was a moral case in support of Britain’s role in the war.33 Belgium was 
central to this. 
 
There has been very little reference in the War’s historiography to Anglo-Belgian 
relationships after 1914, particularly military liaison. Information about or references to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
27
 Reynolds, The Long Shadow. 
28
 Reynolds, The Long Shadow, p. 305 and p. 428. 
29
 Reynolds draws this point from a paper by Hannah Arendt: ‘Nightmare and Flight’, Essays in Understanding, 
1930-1954, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 1994), p. 134. 
30
 These arguments are addressed in, for example, Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. 
31
 For examples of the different views on the importance of the breach of Belgium’s neutrality for the subsequent 
decision of the British Government to declare war on Germany, see N. Ferguson, The Pity of War  (London: 
Allen Lane, 1998), who sees underlying reasons based upon flawed political and economic considerations (Some 
Conclusions, pp. 443-4); or Sheffield,  Forgotten Victory, who views the invasion of Belgium as the clinching 
argument for Britain’s entry to the war (Chapter 2, pp. 40-42). 
32
 See the preface of M. Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of the Western Front (London: Pan Macmillan, 
2001; first published, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1993), p. xvi. 
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the Belgian Army, particularly English language studies, rarely go beyond the initial 
valiant resistance to the German invasion – and often the focus is on the alleged 
atrocities of the invaders, rather than the performance of the Belgian forces. The 
operations by the GAF in 1918 provide an insight into the actions of the Belgian 
command, and the development of the Belgian Army. 
 
The joint offensive made particular demands upon Second Army commanders and 
troops. This study examines the implications of these, how Second Army responded, 
and with what success. The Army Group had the potential to produce a sum greater 
than its parts; alternatively, Second Army could have been restricted in its actions by 
the demands of its partners. When allied forces again fought for the future of Europe 
a generation later, lessons could have been learned from this earlier experience of 
coalition warfare. 
 
The roots of modern war in terms of strategy, tactics and weaponry are contained in 
the final battles of 1918. A feature of the more recent historiography regarding the 
Western Front has been the range of objective and reasoned analyses of how the 
British Army performed and why.
34
 These assessments do not all reach the same 
conclusion, witness the generally positive views of writers such as Paddy Griffith and 
Gary Sheffield, in comparison to the more critical Tim Travers (who stresses the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
33
 This point is made in Reynolds, The Long Shadow, pp. 421-2. 
34
 Some prime examples include: S. Bidwell and D. Graham,  Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of 
War 1904-1945  (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982, 1985); P. Griffith,  Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The 
British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18  (Yale University Press, 1994); P. Griffith, ed., British Fighting Methods in 
the Great War (London: Frank Cass, 1996); T. Travers,  The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western 
Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003; first published, 
London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
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worsening condition of the German Army during 1918), and Robin Prior and Trevor 
Wilson (who tend to view the subsequent British army successes as being due more 
to accident than design). Studies on the organisation and tactics of British forces 
during the final months of 1918 have tended to concentrate on Fourth Army, the 
Battle of Amiens (and the deployment of 400 tanks) and the breaching of the 
Hindenburg Line (undoubtedly a fine piece of arms); highlighting the successes of the 
Dominion troops, notably the Australians and the Canadians. These works have 
emphasised to varying degrees the ‘combined arms’ nature of the British Army’s 
offensive, and the development of a ‘modern’ style of warfare.35 The circumstances in 
which Second Army operated had certain obvious differences – for example, it had no 
tanks of its own, and faced particular challenges from the terrain and climate of 
Flanders. However, the Army was subject to the same direction and guidance on 
tactics and operations as other British armies. Given that ‘surely the [British] Army 
learned from its experience…’,36 then there should be evidence that this applied to 
Second Army. 
 
Its performance provides evidence of the BEF’s learning curve and the improved 
integration of arms and tactics by 1918. The opening of the Battle of Ypres, 1918 was 
a combined arms attack37 – the previous night had seen squadrons of the Royal Air 
Force’s II Brigade undertake reconnaissance missions and bombing raids on enemy 
                                                         
35
 For an example refer to J. B. A. Bailey,  ‘The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare’, in M. Knox 
and W. Murray, ed., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
36
 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, p.65. 
37
 This summary of the Battle of Ypres is drawn primarily from  J. Edmonds,  Official History, Vol .V;  
supplemented by other secondary works, primarily  J. P. Harris with N. Barr, Amiens to the Armistice. 
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supply dumps and communications.38 The British troops attacked following a surprise 
artillery barrage concentrated on enemy batteries and specified targets, utilising 
smoke and gas shells to neutralise defenders. A field artillery creeping barrage was 
complemented by a bombardment from heavy artillery to disrupt communications and 
any attempts by the Germans to move reserves forward. The successful advance 
was supported by the swift forward manoeuvring of artillery to exploit early gains, 
regular ground attacks by the RAF, and flexible troop deployment including advance 
squads, encircling attacks, and immediate fire support by Lewis-Gun teams.39 
 
In common with other British formations, Second Army faced challenges in the 
maintenance of its fighting strength and the quality of troop replacements. More than 
any other British Army, Plumer’s force was composed of a number of units which had 
suffered severely during the German offensives earlier in the year; subsequently 
being re-formed or re-established, some only months or even weeks before the Battle 
of Ypres.40  
 
Second Army’s campaign in Flanders took place within the context of the ‘Liberation 
Offensive’ waged by the GAF. This was a key moment in Belgian history, not least for 
those civilians who experienced it (an aspect of the First World War neglected by 
British historians and deserving of more investigation). 
                                                         
38
 The next week saw the RAF drop almost 7,000 bombs on German sectors: figures taken from analysis of the 
records of Second Army operations (TNA WO158/218, Operations on the Second Army Front). 
39
 See Chapter Three. 
40
 One example is 28 Brigade, 9
th
 (Scottish) Division (referred to in, for example, J. Terraine, ed., General Jack’s 
Diary: War on the Western Front 1914-1918 – The Trench Diary of Brigadier-General J. L. Jack, D.S.O. 
(London, Cassell & Co., 2000 edition); Jack only assumed command of 28 Brigade on 8 September 1918, with 
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This study is also an opportunity to revisit some of the myths regarding the First 
World War. The unique elements of coalition warfare and the liberation offensive 
provide the opportunity for a different perspective on some of the preconceived ideas 
in Britain on the war, its conduct, and its outcomes. Gail Braybon, in her review of 
modern historiography, identifies two key approaches to research into the war; 
adopting a ‘comparative European perspective’ and seeking for detail within ‘the vast, 
multi-faceted edifice of war history’.41 The Flanders campaign offers the scope to 
pursue both these forms of examination – setting this analysis within a study of 
military history. Military history can both embrace and be informed by the cultural, 
social and economic histories of the period in question – and a military study without 
these perspectives can be considered to be incomplete.  
 
In their book on the British Army’s approach to war during the first half of the twentieth 
century,42 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham discuss the role of the historian 
relative to the perspective of those who lived (and died) during the fighting. They point 
out the very limited view of the direct participants: ‘Once a battle started, no one knew 
much more than was within his sight and hearing; nor would they until an historian 
reconstructed the scene’. There are also ‘discontinuities’ between a series of battles 
over time: ‘Improvements in methods between one battle and the next went almost 
                                                                                                                                                                                
its new battalions and other constituent units still in transit. Details of other units and formations re-established 
from cadre are contained in chapter two. 
41
 G. Braybon, in the Introduction to G. Braybon, ed., Evidence, History and the Great War: Historians and the 
Impact of 1914-18  (Berghan Books, 2003), p.1 – however this book, despite its variety of writers and themes 
from across Europe, contains very little reference to Belgium (only three references under ‘Belgium’ in the index, 
and one chapter on Belgian film post-1918) – thus highlighting the overlooked nature of the 1918 campaign in 
Flanders. 
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unnoticed because so many survived or fought in but one episode of a long ordeal… 
[soldiers] could not write historically about the changes in the way battles were 
fought’. Accordingly, this study examines what was happening both before and during 
the actions of Second Army. While the Official History represents the one serious and 
detailed review of the final campaign in Flanders, the work has flaws. Bidwell and 
Graham point out that ‘… as that memorial is dull and seldom visited it has not 
preserved the memory of how the victory was won, what it took to win it or why the 
sacrifice was necessary’.43  
 
The research for this study has the advantage of assessing the story of Second Army 
through the prism of the detailed writing on the First World War, and the British Army, 
from the past forty years. The result is intended to be consistent with the view 
presented by Brian Bond, writing on the eightieth anniversary of the war: 
 
The time is at last coming when the First World War can be treated as history (like 
earlier wars) rather than be approached emotionally and polemically in terms of 
‘futility’, ‘horror’ and ‘national trauma’.44 
 
The initial starting point was to construct a framework and timetable for the campaign; 
this was done using the relevant volumes of the Official History,45 together with the 
1998 book by J P Harris with N Barr: Amiens to the Armistice.46  
                                                                                                                                                                                
42
 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, pp. 64-5. 
43
 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, p. 65. 
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The next step was to review available writings on 1918 and in particular to find 
secondary material on Second Army during the Hundred Days. This confirmed that 
there were very limited references to the operations of British Second Army and the 
GAF within descriptions and assessments of the final period of the War. There were 
acknowledgements of the allied advance in Flanders, and often the opening of the 
Battle of Ypres on 28 September 1918 was referred to, usually because of its place 
within the sequence of Foch’s timed offensives along the Western Front. However a 
coherent military history of Second Army’s campaign is always missing. 
 
In reconstructing this history, the Official History narrative has been revised, 
developed and expanded. The key sources have been the war diaries of the units 
involved. These are contemporary documents written during or very soon after the 
events described, by someone directly involved in or close to the operations, and 
drawing upon other relevant plans, orders and intelligence reports. The quality of a 
war diary is however variable: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
44
 From the Foreword to B. Bond et al,  Look to Your Front: Studies in the First World War by The British 
Commission for Military History  (London: Spellmount, 1999), p. vii; the book collects together a series of 
papers by writers who shared similar convictions. 
45
 As referred to earlier, these are, J. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918  Vol. IV, 8
th
 August 
- 26
th
 September (Official History)  (HMSO, 1947); J. Edmonds with R. Maxwell-Hyslop, Military Operations 
France and Belgium 1918  Vol. V 26
th
 September – 11th November (Official History) (HMSO, 1947). 
46
 Harris with Barr, Amiens to the Armistice; the book describes the history of the Hundred Days including the 
part played by British Second Army. 
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They are not personal diaries… the information and quality of each war diary 
varies, often quite substantially. Some diaries will record little more than daily 
losses and map references whilst others will be much more descriptive…47 
 
It is also important to acknowledge the circumstances in which the diary may have 
been completed: 
 
Writing such documents in the trenches would have been a difficult enough job 
in its own right but amid the clutter and confusion of battle it must have been 
doubly so.48 
 
Many Second Army war diary entries for this period will have been written while the 
writer was on the move as part of the general advance. With the amount of detail 
varying considerably between diaries, greater use is made of the evidence from 
certain units. Overall the aim has been to ensure that the result is a balanced and 
well-informed description of the operations undertaken across the Army. 
 
This study covers the war diaries produced at battalion, brigade, division and corps 
levels, as well as Second Army records. All the diaries, irrespective of the varying 
levels of detail or quality of writing, contain valuable additional papers; reports of 
actions and events, maps and diagrams, correspondence, copies of orders both 
issued and received. Crucially, there are subsequent reviews and analyses of 
                                                         
47
 M. Mace and J. Grehan, ‘1 July 1916 – The Somme War Diaries: Unvarnished Accounts of the British Army’s 
Worst Day’, Stand To! The Journal of the Western Front Association, 98 (September 2013), p. 23. 
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operations. Together, a more rounded assessment of a unit’s history and operations 
can be made.  
 
Use has also been made of first-hand accounts by participants where these add 
texture to the description of an event or emphasise a piece of information through 
commentary. Such memoirs have usually been written years after the events 
described, although they may be based upon diaries kept during the war. The study 
makes selective use of such records because the focus has been on presenting a 
narrative and analysis of the military operations; and to do this as objectively and 
impartially as possible. Eye-witness testimony can provide a snap-shot of an incident 
or event at the very sharp end but does not allow for context or show the wider 
picture. Commenting on the large growth in books on the First World War that are 
based on an individual’s memoirs or, increasingly, the collation of extracts from a 
range of personal accounts, Reynolds points to this ‘problematic approach to the 
writing of history’. 
 
Although the recollections of ordinary participants can often provide 
fascinating and important historical detail that is not recorded in official 
archives, scholars cannot treat such ‘testimony’ as intrinsically more reliable 
than any other source.49 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
48
 Mace and Grehan, ‘Somme War Diaries’, p. 23. 
49
 Reynolds, The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century  (London: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 
pp. 367-370. 
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These primary and first hand eyewitness sources have interpreted and analysed by 
researching selected and relevant secondary writing. There are histories of individual 
formations and units belonging to Second Army.50 A number of books include limited 
references to Second Army during the Hundred Days. The two titles which have 
provided the most perceptive commentary on the strategic import of the GAF victories 
were written thirty years apart: John Terraine’s summary account of 1918, written at 
the end of the 1970s in his drive to have the military history of the First World War 
looked at afresh; and the recent comprehensive history and analysis of that year by 
David Stevenson.51 The study also draws upon key assessments of the British Army 
in 1918, its composition, doctrine and tactics, logistics and supply, weaponry and 
resources; particular examples include Bidwell and Graham’s book on the 
development of artillery and its place in the all-arms battle;52 and Paddy Griffith’s 
analyses of the British Army’s fighting tactics.53 Important context has been provided 
by the revisionist writings on the British Army’s performance during the war and in 
1918 in particular; the principal starting point being Gary Sheffield’s seminal Forgotten 
Victory,54 plus Gordon Corrigan’s Mud, Blood and Poppycock,55 an excellent re-
examination of the various myths and misperceptions regarding the War. 
 
                                                         
50
 Two prime examples are C. Falls, A History of the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division (London: Constable, 1996; first 
published, Belfast: McCraw, Stevenson, 1922); D. Bilton, Hull Pals: 10
th
, 11
th
, 12
th
 & 13
th
 (Service) Battalions of 
the East Yorkshire Regiment: A History of 92 Infantry Brigade, 31
st
 Division  (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 1999). 
Please refer to the Bibliography for further sources. 
51
 Terraine, To Win A War; Stevenson, Backs To The Wall. 
52
 Bidwell and Graham, Firepower. 
53
 Griffith, Battle Tactics; Griffith, ed., British Fighting Methods. 
54
 Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. 
55
 G. Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War (London: Cassell, 2003). 
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The most useful and relevant of these works are referred to within the text and listed 
in the accompanying bibliography. 
 
The research has informed the themes referred to in this Introduction; as the narrative 
proceeds, these are described and analysed, drawing upon primary sources 
wherever possible. The composition of Second Army, its preparation for and conduct 
of operations, and the conclusions regarding the campaign outcomes, have also been 
analysed with the aid of secondary writings on the performance of British forces 
during the latter stages of the war. 
 
There is a shortage of secondary material on certain themes. Writing on the allied 
coalition is limited and looks mainly at French and American links; there are few 
references to Belgium other than in 1914 and the German occupation. The 
exceptions are to be found in works by William Philpott and Elizabeth Greenhalgh, 
which include references to the relationships between Britain, France and Belgium. In 
particular, Greenhalgh provides a valuable commentary on Haig’s dispute with Foch 
regarding the return of Second Army to the former’s command.56  
 
                                                         
56
 E. Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); also valuable is her later book on Foch: E. Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: 
The Forging of a First World War General (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). W. J. Philpott, 
Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front 1914-18  (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); W. J. 
Philpott, ‘Britain, France and the Belgian Army’, in Bond, B.et al, ‘Look to your Front’ Studies in the First 
World War by The British Commission for Military History (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), pp. 121-135. 
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Despite the general recognition of Plumer as one of the most successful commanders 
of the war, only two biographies have been written,57 which give a limited narrative of 
his career and contain very little critical analysis; and he has a chapter by Peter 
Simkins in a book on Haig’s army commanders.58 There have been a range of books 
examining his major battles, particularly Messines and the later set-piece actions of 
Third Ypres; but he receives little coverage within writing on the final stages of the 
war. 
 
Of the conscript army of 1918, there has only been one general study so far, Ilana 
Bet-El’s 1999 excellent ‘ground-breaking’ description of the conscript experience, 
focusing on the reality of army life for the new troops.59 Fourteen years later, Tim 
Lynch has published his study of a Yorkshire draft, which also provides a brief social 
and military history of the conscript generation, and their combat experience.60   
 
English language writing on the performance of the French Army in World War I is 
generally available, mostly as part of accounts of particular battles or periods of the 
War, often complementary to the British experience (the one exception being 
Verdun). Particular examples of the writer deliberately reminding us of the French 
                                                         
57
 G. Powell, Plumer: The Soldiers’ General: a Biography of Field-Marshal Viscount Plumer of Messines (Pen & 
Sword, 2004); T. Harington, Plumer of Messines (John Murray, 1935). Perhaps understandably, the biography by 
his former Chief of Staff, Harington, presents a very positive and uncritical portrait of its subject. 
58
 P. Simkins, ‘Herbert Plumer’, pp. 141-163. 
59
 I. R. Bet-El, Conscripts: Forgotten Men of the Great War (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2009; 
first published under the title Conscripts: Lost Legions of the Great War by Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton 
Publishing, 1999); the term ‘ground-breaking’ is taken from the paperback edition’s sleeve notes. 
60
 T. Lynch, They Did Not Grow Old: Teenage Conscripts on the Western Front, 1918 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: 
Spellmount (The History Press), 2013). This book is a wonderful read, combining social and military history, and 
providing a concise summary of the British Army’s development during the war years. Lynch’s ability to 
combine readability with academic rigour, to provide first hand experiences within a meaningful context, is to be 
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Army’s role include William Philpott’s account and re-assessment of the Battle of the 
Somme,61 and more recently, Nick Lloyd’s history of the Hundred Days.62 The latter 
work has the added value of focusing on the French contribution in the latter part of 
1918, a neglected topic. Anthony Clayton’s Paths of Glory (2003) remains the one full 
history of the French Army in World War I.63 There is no comprehensive account in 
English of the Belgian Army in the First World War;64 accounts within more general 
texts deal mainly with 1914 and little thereafter. The best military history of the Army 
in 1914 is Paul Van Pul’s account of the Battle of the Yser.65  
 
The first of the seven chapters in this study sets the context for the campaign. It 
describes the climate and terrain of Flanders, and the implications of these for the 
armies fighting there. The majority of the chapter concerns Second Army and its 
GOC, through examination of ‘The Advance in Flanders’ over the summer of 1918. 
Particular aspects of warfare in Flanders are considered; of these, gas was a 
constant factor, regularly employed within artillery shoots by both sides. In common 
with other British armies, the RAF was integral to the conduct of operations as part of 
Second Army’s combined arms methodology.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
admired. Lynch makes the point that ‘More attention has been paid to pets in the trenches…’ than to the 
conscripted soldiers (p. 230). 
61
 W. J. Philpott, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme (London: Little, Brown, 2009). 
62
 N. Lloyd, Hundred Days: The End of the Great War (London: Viking, 2013). 
63
 A. Clayton, Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914-18 (London: Cassell, 2003). 
64
 For this reason, the Osprey book (one of its Men-at-Arms series) on The Belgian Army in World War I has been 
helpful, including a useful summary of the Army’s development over the course of the War and its operations in 
1918: R. Pawley & P. Lierneux, The Belgian Army in World War 1 (London: Osprey Publishing, 2009). 
65
 P. Van Pul, In Flanders’ Flooded Fields: Before Ypres there was Yser (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 
2006). 
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Chapter Two opens with the formation and composition of the Groupe d’Armées des 
Flandres, including the strategic and policy considerations behind its creation. The 
chapter then looks briefly at the Belgian Army before providing a detailed insight into 
the operational readiness of Second Army. 
 
Chapters Three to Six describe the major battles and operations undertaken by 
Second Army from the opening day of the Battle of Ypres on 28 September 1918, 
through to the Armistice. The planning of the crucial first attack is considered in detail, 
including liaison within the GAF and with the Belgian Army. The subsequent fighting 
is examined, explaining how Second Army strove to exploit the breakthrough of 
enemy lines, with the advance frustrated by a combination of the rear guard actions of 
the enemy and the interaction of climate and terrain conditions. The success 
achieved by Second Army led to Plumer’s force taking the lead role for the GAF in the 
subsequent Battle of Courtrai. The breakout by the army group saw the liberation of 
large areas of Flanders.  Up to 11 November, Second Army units continued to exploit 
the gains made, crossing the River Lys and developing preparations for assaulting 
beyond the River Scheldt; thus helping to precipitate the overall defeat of the German 
Army on the Western Front and the search by its commanders for a negotiated 
peace. 
 
Chapter Seven considers the consequences for the civilians of Flanders as the British 
forces drove forward the advance. A final section then examines the arguments 
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around the return of Second Army from the GAF to Haig’s command, within the 
crucial context of the ongoing armistice negotiations.  
 
The Conclusion reviews the performance of British Second Army, its troops and 
commanders; the strategy and tactics adopted; and the wider implications of the 
Army’s victories. The aim is to place on record an assessment of the achievements of 
Second Army, its contribution to the GAF, to the liberation of Flanders and the defeat 
of the German Army on the Western Front. 
 
A set of appendices include comprehensive Orders of Battle for Second Army in 
1918; bibliography; maps; notes on terminology and a glossary of terms; the full text 
of Foch’s letter 19 October, and the resulting letters from Haig; plus supporting 
papers on particular aspects of Second Army operations. 
 
The forgotten story of British Second Army in Flanders during the Hundred Days will 
now be told. 
 
 
Dennis Williams 
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Note:  Many locations in Flanders have alternative French and Dutch names. 
At any particular point in the study, I have opted to apply the name and spelling 
from the relevant source or reference. 
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Chapter One 
 
British Second Army: July-September 1918 
 
You do not know what Flanders means. Flanders means endless human 
endurance. Flanders means blood and scraps of human bodies. Flanders 
means heroic courage and faithfulness even unto death.1 
 
Flanders is the ancient name for the area of land along the North Sea coast in 
Belgium adjoining the French coast along the English Channel. The name means 
literally ‘flooded land’, reflecting the elaborate drainage system which channels most 
of its heavy rainfall into the river Yser. The area is largely flat and therefore the series 
of relatively low ridges (no more than 160 feet high) east of the main town of Ypres, 
provide a commanding view of the entire plain; hence the military value of these 
ridges and the small villages and key pieces of ground in and around them. Many of 
the names record key battles and actions, as control was contested over the course 
of the War.2 
 
Ian Beckett describes Flanders as: 
                                                         
1
 Quoted in J. Giles, The Ypres Salient: Flanders Then and Now (London: Picardy Publishing Ltd, 1979; first 
published by London: Leo Cooper Ltd, 1970), p. 226; the words are from an ‘extract from a letter of an unknown 
German officer found in the mud of the battlefield, quoted in Realities of War, by Philip Gibbs’. 
2
 Iconic names and titles such as Messines, Wytschaete, Ploegsteert, Hollebeck, Polygon Wood, Hill 60, 
Passchendaele. A useful pen picture is given at the start of chapter 3 of W. Groom,  A Storm in Flanders: The 
Ypres Salient 1914-1918: Tragedy and Triumph on the Western Front  (Cassell, 2003). There is also the wide 
number of battlefield guides which are available for anyone wishing to visit the sites. 
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… a level plain broken only by a line of undulations rising to slight, almost 
imperceptible, hills which ran first west to east from Cassel to Mount Kemmel 
then, as gentle ridges, east to north-east through Wytschaete, Gheluvelt and 
Passchendaele, finally curving north to Dixmude. Technically the plain was 
mostly heavy marine clay known as Ypres clay, the hills of Ypresian and 
Paniselian sand sediments overlying the clay. 
The hill line stood at about 400 feet at Kemmel, but not much more than 100 or 
150 feet at Wytschaete and Gheluvelt, and only 70 feet at Passchendaele. 
From Kemmel it was possible to see the whole countryside from Lille to Menin 
and Dixmude. Various spurs extended from the ridge line, as at Messines… 
given the low-lying nature of much of the plain, these gentle slopes took on the 
appearance of dominant features, a saucer-like rim appearing to the observer 
from Ypres lying at the centre of the plain. Gradients were gentle nearly 
everywhere... 3 
 
The majority of Belgium had been under German occupation for four years. The 
Belgian Government had rejected the German demand on 2 August 1914 for Belgium 
to adopt a stance of ‘benevolent neutrality’ and allow free access across its borders 
                                                         
3
 I.F.W. Beckett, Ypres: The First Battle, 1914 (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2004), pp. 42-3; Beckett’s 
references include P. Doyle, Geology of the Western Front, 1914-1918 (London: Geologists’ Association, 1998), 
pp. 11-14, 29-32; J. Hussey, ‘The Flanders Battleground and the Weather in 1917’ in P. Liddle, ed., 
Passchendaele in Perspective: The Third Battle of Ypres (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), pp. 140-158; in a later 
book, Beckett writes of ‘one French general’s description of Flanders in 1914 as a monotonous countryside with 
an air of melancholic sadness melting almost imperceptibly into the grey waters of the North Sea’ (I.F.W. 
Beckett, The Making of the First World War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 1. 
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for the German Army: invasion followed.4  The Belgians then sought to put up as 
much resistance as possible, with an inevitable outcome such was the imbalance of 
the opposing forces.5  
 
The majority of occupied Belgium was under the administration of a Governor 
General, with the areas in the vicinity of the front line placed under military 
administration. It has been estimated that total Belgian war deaths, military and 
civilian, were around 50,000; its army recorded 13,716 soldiers killed, 44,686 
wounded, and 34,659 captured or missing in action.6 
 
The British Army had consistently defended Ypres, the principal remaining city of 
Belgium, since the dogged resistance by the ‘Old Contemptibles’ at the end of 1914.7 
Malcolm Brown has noted: 
                                                         
4
 Because the Schlieffen Plan required an attack on France from the direction of Belgium, the German army had 
already commenced crossing the border before the ultimatum expired. 
5
 M. MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War  (London: 
Profile Books Ltd., 2013), pp. 584-6. A subsequent attempt by the invaders to set up an independent Flanders 
under German influence and with a force to fight alongside the German Army failed, as most Flemish-speakers 
remained loyal to the country of their birth. Between October 1916 and June 1917 around 170,000 Belgians 
(including 4,000 women and 3,000 children) were deported for labour in Germany, although this was not seen as 
a successful policy and repatriation began in 1917 (M. Derez, ‘The Experience of Occupation: Belgium’, in J. 
Bourne, P. Liddle, I. Whitehead, eds., The Great World War1914-45: Volume 1: Lightning Strikes Twice 
(London: HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 511-532). Stevenson, Backs to the Wall, p. 279, states that ‘during the war 
[Germany] used some 120,000 Belgian workers in France and Belgium (see also P. Haythornthwaite, The World 
War One Source Book (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1992), pp. 148-9). The Belgians were forced to conform 
‘to German rules and German ways of life (even… to German time of day) ( A. Garcia, ‘Soup and Stoicism – 
Feeding occupied Belgium during the Great War’, Stand To! The Journal of the Western Front Association, 82 
(April/May 2008), pp. 57-60). This paper describes the operation of the American-based aid agency, Commission 
of Relief for Belgium (CRB); it points out that there is very little research available into the experiences of the 
Belgian civilian population during the war. Resources were seized for German consumption and homelessness 
and starvation became a fact of life for many Belgians, despite humanitarian aid from allied and neutral countries. 
Germany requisitioned all manner of goods from the populace such that ‘From 1917 Belgium’s industry was 
systematically dismantled… and its machines were melted down to make weapons’ (Derez, ‘Experience of 
Occupation’, p. 519). 
6
 Haythornthwaite, World War One Source Book, pp. 149-152. 
7
 As referred to in the Introduction to this study, this description derives from an alleged remark made by the 
Kaiser about the small size of the volunteer British Army prior to 1914. .  
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…the British determination to hang onto this piece of torn and battered 
territory… 
 
Not yielding ground to the enemy was part of the ethos of the time. Additionally 
the Belgians had lost so much of their homeland to the Germans that to 
concede even more – and by doing so to allow the Germans to advance to the 
very walls of Ypres – would not have been just a geographical adjustment, it 
would have been a psychological one, indeed almost a gesture of defeat.8 
 
A parallel has been drawn between the ongoing conflict around the Ypres Salient and 
the epic Franco-German clash at Verdun.9 Fittingly, Ypres would provide the platform 
for the successful breakthrough by Second Army at the end of September 1918. 
 
Operations in Flanders 
 
In 1918 a British Army was composed of an Army Headquarters (HQ), at least two 
corps, plus units attached at army level for the purposes of management, supply and 
                                                         
8
 From the introduction by M. Brown to The Wipers Times: The Complete Series of the Famous Wartime Trench 
Newspaper  (London: Little Books Ltd., 2006), p. xv. 
9
 The analogy is drawn by M. Brown, Verdun 1916 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing, 2003; first 
published 2000), pp. 21-2: ‘The city of Ypres, determinedly defended with the kind of ‘they shall not pass’ 
mentality which pertained at Verdun, is the only possible British equivalent’. The comparison had been made 
much earlier - Steel and Hart quote Captain Harry Yoxall, 18/KRRC ‘…there is only one battle of Ypres... 
[lasting] from October 1914 and, with Verdun, it is the biggest battle of all’ (IWM documents, H. W. Yoxall, 
letter, 3 August 1917); see also N. Steel and P. Hart, Passchendaele: The Sacrificial Ground (London: Cassell 
Military Paperbacks, 2007; first published 2000), p. 13. 
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strategic firepower. This included artillery, engineers, transport, medical, machine 
gun, veterinary and labour units. Army HQ reported to General Headquarters (GHQ). 
 
The Orders of Battle for British Second Army during 1918 are set out in Appendix A. 
 
From their original structure in1914 of two divisions plus Signals Section, Army Corps 
grew and increased in complexity. The number of divisions could be more than two 
and, as these were moved around or in and out of the line, so they might be moved to 
different corps. By 1918 a corps HQ could consist of 50 officers and up to 150 other 
ranks. Corps units included heavy trench mortar batteries, signals, cyclists, motor 
transport and mobile workshops. The average soldier would know which Army he was 
in and its commander, and his division, but was far less likely to know which corps 
they were attached to due to formation changes and the lack of a corps ‘identity’. 
 
The largest tactical unit of the British Army was the division. It consisted of a division 
HQ, three infantry brigades, plus troops from all ground forces including artillery, 
engineers, signals, transport, and medical. At full establishment it could consist of 
18,000 men and 5,000 horses.  
 
The infantry brigade was an intermediate and largely administrative unit, between the 
division and battalions. Regular Intelligence Summaries were prepared by a brigade 
for division HQ, recording information on its own and enemy operations, plus other 
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intelligence of use.10 Its HQ would have a small number of officers and men, often 
drawn by secondment from battalions. In early 1918, as a consequence of the 
manpower shortage, brigades were reduced from four to three infantry battalions. A 
number were wound up and men redeployed in order to ensure that most remaining 
battalions were as close to full-strength as possible.  
 
The core tactical unit of the Army was the infantry battalion. The HQ comprised the 
battalion CO with senior and administrative officers and men; key responsibilities 
included such specialist roles as medical and transport. The battalion was drawn from 
the British system of regiments. With the exception of the Guards regiments, which 
had no Territorial or New Army Battalions (though they did recruit from volunteers and 
conscripts), most County Regiments had two Regular Army battalions, two Territorial 
battalions, and also subsequently raised battalions of the New Army.   
 
All soldiers carried a rifle, the Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE), and bayonet. By 
1918 each battalion was also equipped with 36 Lewis light machine guns, plus small 
mortars and grenades. This significant increase in firepower was designed to 
compensate for the reduced number of overall troops; it also reflected tactical 
improvements through which small units of infantry would be more flexible and 
effective when attacking. Trench mortar and machine gun units were deployed under 
divisions, increasing in number and scope during the war. There was a similar 
increase in heavy artillery at corps and army levels. 
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 TNA WO95/2364, War Diary of 94
th
 (Yeomanry) .Brigade HQ, July 1917–May 1919; ‘Intelligence Summary’ 
headings included Our Operations (Infantry, Artillery, machine-guns, trench mortars, aircraft, visibility), Enemy 
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Each battalion consisted of the HQ plus four companies of men; each company was 
made up of four platoons. By this stage of the war, the average platoon would 
comprise:11 
 
1 Platoon Commander and Runner 
2 Scouts 
6 Lewis Gun Team, Right 
6 Lewis Gun Team, Left 
4 Riflemen, Right 
4 Riflemen, Left 
1 Yukon Pack Carrier 
2 Platoon Sergeant and Runner 
__ 
26 Officers and Other Ranks 
 
The composition of the platoon, its weaponry and additional equipment, reflects the 
emphasis at this stage in the war of empowering this smallest operational unit of 
soldiers to provide its own covering and supporting firepower; with additional supplies 
and ammunition such that it can occupy and ‘dig in’ on seized ground. The platoon 
had become, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Operations (Infantry etc.), and Intelligence (Movement, General). 
11
 The description is taken from the operational instructions issued for the troops of 1
st
 Lancashire Fusiliers (86 
Brigade, 29
th
 Division – the one Regular Army Division within Second Army), as part of the preparations for the 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
33 
 
 
… An army in miniature, the Lewis guns supplying the covering machine gun 
fire, the rifle grenadiers acting as artillery; and the riflemen making the infantry 
assault.12 
 
The platoon had to be capable of altering its approach formation in order to respond 
to changing circumstances. It is implicit that the platoon command is expected to use 
its initiative in making the first response to whatever threat the enemy presents; and 
to take appropriate action to win a resulting firefight. These arrangements were 
responding to a more open style of warfare; a practical demonstration of the changes 
that have taken place – the ‘learning curve’ – in small arms tactics and the delegation 
of command within the British Army. 
 
It became increasingly common for additional weapons teams to be added to 
companies or battalions for specific operations. For example, 87 Brigade (29th 
Division) attached one field gun, two machine guns, one trench mortar and a section 
of cyclists (with a forward scouting role) to each company.13 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Battle of Ypres which opened three days later on 28 September 1918: TNA WO95/2013, War Diary of 1
st
 
Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers, Operation Instruction No: 1, 24/25.9.1918. 
12
 Captain A.O. Pollard, VC, quoted in Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, 1914-18: 
Defeat into Victory (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p.98; I first came across this descriptive metaphor in Boff, J. 
‘Combined Arms During the Hundred Days Campaign, August-November 1918’, War in History, 2010, 17(4), 
pp. 459-477, online at  http://wih.sagepub.com/content/17/4/459, p. 467. 
13
 TNA WO95/2303, War Diary of 87 Infantry Brigade, 1
st
 September 1918. There are many other examples 
given throughout this study of attaching additional firepower and gun teams to infantry units and formations, all 
demonstrating the combined arms tactics applied by Second Army forces. 
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The British Official History sets the scene for British Second Army in the summer of 
1918, pending the forthcoming Advance in Flanders:14  
 
The preparations of the enemy had been very carefully watched, complete air 
photographs being obtained week by week; and as the same formations, with 
the same staffs and same intelligence organisation had remained on the front 
since the battle in April, any change in the German situation had been at once 
noticed. Early in June, when an attack [by the Germans] seemed imminent, a 
systematic destruction of the enemy’s establishments by bombardment was 
begun, and harassing fire had since been ceaselessly employed.15 
 
Following heavy fighting in April as part of Ludendorff’s ‘Georgette’ offensive, causing 
Second Army to concede ground had won during Third Ypres, the northern sector 
had been relatively quiet. However, even the relatively limited actions of both sides 
had meant that casualty levels remained high; from 5 August – 7 September 1918 the 
Army sustained 10,437 casualties.16 
 
                                                         
14
 This is the title given to this period of the war in Flanders, 8 August-26 September 1918, by the Official 
History. 
15
 Edmonds, Official History Vol. IV, pg. 428. 
16
  
British Second Army 
Casualties 5
th
 August – 7th September 1918 
II Corps      346 (includes the American 30
th
 Division) 
X Corps   2,392 
XV Corps   4,832 
XIX Corps   2,867 (does not include the American 27th Division) 
TOTAL 10,437 
Source: Edmonds,  Official History Vol. IV. 
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In July 1918 the German Chief of Staff, General Ludendorff, had continued to harbour 
hopes of a further offensive in Flanders, with some prospect of a breakthrough; 
resources including heavy artillery and aircraft had been directed to the area in 
readiness. However the losses at the Battle of the Marne dealt a final blow to this plan 
and the attack was cancelled.17 Flanders had strategic importance for both sides, 
guarding as it did access to the coast, BEF supply lines and the left flank of the British 
Army.  
 
Typical of experiences on the Second Army front during July is that of 105 Brigade 
(35th Division),18 comprising 15th Battalion, Cheshire Regiment, 15th Battalion, 
Sherwood Foresters and 4th Battalion, North Staffordshire Regiment. 
 
During the course of 5-6 July 1918, the Brigade relieved the 358 French Infantry 
Regiment along a stretch of the front in the Locre Sector, Mont Rouge, to the south-
east of Ypres.  The exercise proceeded smoothly and without incident. 15/Cheshires 
relieved the French front line units; 15/Sherwood Foresters took over the support 
positions; 4/North Staffords moved into place as brigade reserve. These three roles 
would be rotated at regular and frequent intervals, to ensure that all troops had an 
equitable share of the responsibilities of the front line, and opportunities for training 
and recreation. While in the line the daily routine included regular forward patrols for 
reconnaissance purposes, raids on enemy trenches, and the regular tasks of wire 
examination and repair. The exchange of artillery, mortar or machine gun fire was a 
                                                         
17
 Terraine, To Win A War, pp. 94-5, 100. 
18
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade. 
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constant reminder of the state of hostilities, as was the resulting slow but sure toll of 
casualties that resulted. The brigade’s diary gives various examples of the ongoing 
resistance by the German soldiers, opponents capable of stubborn defence.19 
 
A similar routine persisted for the remainder of the month, with increased regular 
patrolling by front line battalions, occasionally generating fire from the German 
positions; bouts of enemy artillery fire, day and night, often intense and for a 
prolonged period. The consequences of the German actions, during what might be 
described as a reasonably quiet month, are evident from the brigade casualty figures 
of 33 soldiers killed, 110 wounded and 14 missing.20 
 
The Germans continued to mount occasional raids and limited attacks on parts of the 
Second Army line – not the actions expected of an enemy with low morale or 
contemplating defeat. On 11 August 1918 the diary of 18th Battalion (Arts and Crafts), 
King’s Royal Rifle Corps (122 Brigade, 41st Division) records its troops manning the 
forward line of trenches and coming under a severe enemy barrage; the battalion was 
                                                         
19
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade, entries 6-25 July 1918. For example: 
 [On the night of 13/14 July a patrol of one NCO and three men] went out from our lines, and after 
proceeding some distance the N.C.O. gave orders for the men to remain behind. He went forward 
himself and ran into a party of 30 Germans, apparently forming up for a raid. The patrol being warned 
attempted to get back to bring up a Lewis Gun but were pursued by the enemy and bombed while taking 
cover in a building. The N.C.O. being wounded the 3 men made a dash for it and have not been seen 
since. When the enemy party were first discovered a heavy barrage of shells of all calibres was put 
down on Locre and our front line causing several casualties. 
20
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade. 
105 Brigade: Casualties July 1918 
 Killed Wounded Missing 
Officers Other Ranks Officers Other Ranks Officers Other Ranks 
15/Cheshires 1 8 1 31 - 3 
15/Sherwood Foresters 
1 16 - 43 1 10 
4/North Staffs - 7 1 34 1 13 
Totals 2 31 2 108 1 13 
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then hit by a German attack in force. In consequence the British troops counter-
attacked to recover lost ground, resulting in 49 casualties, including three officers and 
four other ranks (ORs) killed.21 
 
At the start of August the front of Second Army (with Fifth Army on its right), ran from 
three miles north of the La Bassee canal to the northern side of Ypres; to the left lay 
the Belgian line, extending to the coast.  The Official History notes: ‘All the British 
divisions of the Second and Fifth Armies had taken part in heavy fighting during the 
early part of the year and were regarded as not so forward in their recovery as those 
of the First, Third and Fourth Armies.’22 The implications of this for the operational 
readiness of Second Army are discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
The Germans in Flanders were gradually withdrawing their line and reserve troops 
from the Lys salient, which had been won during the April offensive.  Half these forces 
were redeployed south to assist with the defence of the German line from attacks by 
the other British armies. British Second Army successfully followed up these 
evacuations, in accordance with General Plumer’s instructions ‘to exert continuous 
pressure upon [German] retiring forces, acting vigorously  against his rearguards and 
thus hampering his choice of defensive lines, whilst making his retirement as costly 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
21
 WO95/2365, War Diary of 18
th
 Battalion, Kings Royal Rifle Corps. 
18
th
 Kings Royal Rifle Corps: Casualties 11 August 1918 
 Officers Other Ranks 
Killed 3   4 
Wounded  2 20 
Missing 1 19 
Total 6 43 
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as possible.’23 For example, on 24 August, 9th Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers (107 
Brigade, 36th Division) seized a section of the enemy trench line and also secured 
Tomlin Farm, capturing 60 prisoners and five machine guns.24 
 
On 12 August 1918, 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers (86 Brigade, 29th Division) had 
carried out an operation to advance its forward line by 400 yards and seize a line of 
trenches east of a point designated as Celery Copse. The fierce fighting which 
resulted, the strength of the enemy defence and its subsequent counter-attack, led to 
battalion casualties of over 80 soldiers killed or wounded. The battalion’s war diary 
remarked that ‘This operation, though costly, established the position of the enemy’s 
main line of resistance, which was required by higher authority’.25  
 
At the end of the first week in August, 35th Division, deployed in the Locre Sector, had 
been relieved by 30th Division. Accordingly, 90 Brigade replaced 105 Brigade in line, 
with the latter moving back to billets in the area of Sylvestre Cappel. Its war diary 
describes the subsequent training and work duties undertaken by 105 Brigade’s 
troops, much of the content in preparation for offensive action. Two exercises 
involved signallers together with a contact aeroplane of 53
rd
 Squadron RAF; this was 
linked to a practice attack on the Terdeghem Switch. Officers were lectured on 
counter battery operations. On 22 August, Plumer inspected the training of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
22
 Edmonds, Official History Vol. IV. 
23
 Edmonds, Official History Vol. IV.  
24
 Noted in the War Diary of 1
st
 Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, TNA WO95/2502/3. 
25
 TNA WO95/2300, War Diary of 1
st
 Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers. 
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15/Cheshires and 15/Sherwood Foresters, evidence of his interest in and 
commitment to training.26 
  
Together with other examples in this study, these actions are indicative of what might 
now be termed ‘a learning organisation’, demonstrating Second Army’s emphasis on 
the development of its troops. References within the war diaries during this period, to 
men being deployed for work duties or taking part in recreational activities such as 
inter-unit sports competitions, are limited. The priority was to improve the skills of the 
soldiers while there was time and opportunity to do so. Reflecting the time spent 
behind the lines, the casualties’ report for 105 Brigade in August recorded no soldiers 
killed or missing; two officers and 20 men were wounded. The system of rotation 
between rear and front-line positions was a firm policy of the British Army and one of 
its strengths.27 
 
In essence, this is soldiering as shift-work, an analogy appropriate for the new 
industrialised warfare. As one rota of men completed its ‘shift’ in the front line another 
‘clocked on’ to take its place; thus the productivity of the workplace – the capability of 
the soldier for combat – was maintained.28 
 
The first hand evidence shows that units were working hard to learn lessons from the 
experience gained during minor operations. A common aim was to strengthen the 
                                                         
26
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade. 
27
 Corrigan, Mud, Blood, pp. 89-94, provides a concise summary of how the system operated and describes its 
advantages for the troops and the Army as a whole. 
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firepower of the infantry group and improve its ability to operate on its own initiative. 
86 Brigade noted the following points from actions at the start of September: 
 
Trench Mortars 
At present owing to the establishment of personnel, they are practically 
useless, immobile. It is suggested as a temporary measure that 6 pack animals 
per Battalion be used as transport for Trench Mortars when they are required 
to come into action in mobile fighting. 
18 mules will carry 4 Stokes Trench Mortars and 56 rounds per gun… 
 
Maps 
In mobile fighting it seems that more maps should be issued so that senior 
N.C.O.s may be in possession of a map of the immediate area – more 
instructions in map reading for all ranks appears to be necessary. 
 
S.O.S. 
A larger supply is necessary, so that the fighting troops may carry at least 4 
rockets per Company and obviate the necessity of sending rockets to the Front 
Line at night time.29 
 
Inspections were also a regular feature of the Army’s routine: 
                                                                                                                                                                                
28
 My thanks to Thomas Keneally, from his novel about two Australian sisters working as nurses during the First 
World War, The Daughters of Mars (New York: Atria Books, 2012), for the use of the shift-work analogy. 
29
 TNA WO95/2299, War Diary of 86 Infantry Brigade, Notes On Minor Operations 4
th
 and 5
th
 September, 
7/9/18. 
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Transport inspected by the Brigadier at 10a.m. The state of the transport was 
by no means satisfactory, and the whole inspection was too painful to 
describe.30 
 
Second Army had a number of formations which had been reconstituted or 
reorganised during the summer of 1918, in some cases from an initial training 
cadre.31 These required new administrative orders to provide a comprehensive 
outline of the deployment and organisation of the unit when it was ordered forward on 
active service. After its losses in the Battle of Hazebrouck during the German 
offensives in Spring 1918, 40th Division had been reduced to a training cadre; it was 
subsequently restructured and declared ready for front line action again by 18 July. 
The division’s 120 Brigade was re-formed in June 1918 with 15th Battalion, the King’s 
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry; and two former Garrison battalions: 10th Battalion, the 
King’s Own Scottish Borderers (formerly 9th Garrison Battalion) and 11th Battalion, the 
Cameron Highlanders (formerly 6th Garrison Guard Battalion). In ‘Brigade 
Administrative Order No. 207’ (10 August 1918),32 issued pending the brigade taking 
over the forward positions for the division from 121 Brigade, there are four closely 
typed pages giving comprehensive details of locations, with the associated 
arrangements for supplies and support. Some of the supply points and service 
                                                         
30
 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, 27
th
 August 1918. True to his word, the 
writer provides no details! 
31
 This subject is considered in detail in Chapter Two. 
32
 WO95/2610, War Diary of 120 Infantry Brigade, Administrative Order No. 207, 10
th
 August 1918 
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arrangements (for example, clean clothing) were delivered via the neighbouring 31st 
Division.33  
 
The Order lists (by map reference) the sites for the headquarters of the brigade, the 
headquarters of each of the battalions when deployed respectively in one of the three 
active positions (Front Line, Support or Reserve), and for the brigade’s trench mortar 
battery and RE company. This section also gives map references for the transport 
lines of the brigade and battalions (from 121 Brigade) plus the locations of the 
company train, the brigade post office, and the refilling point. The Order then provides 
comprehensive information on support services and supply arrangements. This 
includes the locations of ammunition dumps, medical posts, canteens, clean clothing 
stores and also cemeteries. Reflecting the nature of the troops’ daily living routines, 
specific procedures are prescribed including ‘trench foot preventative measures’ and 
‘the systematic burial of excreta’.  This being the army, HQ also demands ‘receipts… 
in duplicate, for all stores and supplies’. Any damaged equipment ‘however muddy or 
apparently useless’ is to be salvaged , and ‘waste paper, jam cartons, dripping, tea, 
biscuit and other large tins’ are to be returned to base.34 
 
The arrangements and instructions referred to here would be familiar to any troops in 
the British Army on active duty at this time. They show the attention to detail within 
the organisation of the Army and its formations (including Second Army). There is an 
emphasis upon encouraging and maintaining the health and welfare of the men, from 
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 31
st
 Division was the other division based within XV Corps at that time; this assistance with supplies is an 
indication of the newly constituted nature of 40
th
 Division, which had still to put in place its own supply services. 
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strict rules on sanitation and to prevent trench foot, through to the careful planning for 
the delivery of rations and the provision of clean clothing. These arrangements were 
also underpinned and made feasible by the supporting logistics. There are detailed 
systems in place, with specified locations and transport routes, to maintain effective 
communications and deliver or give access to supplies and provisions. Equally 
important is the plentiful availability of the variety of material resources to meet the 
needs of the soldier deployed on active service: hot food and water, baths or 
showers, clean clothes to put on when necessary, medical facilities, mail services, 
and ammunition. In addition the Army, being the Army and also a very large and 
complex organisation, had its regime of bureaucratic rules and requirements.  
 
It was through such attention to detail that the British Army continued to operate 
efficiently and effectively after four years of war, maintaining a generally cohesive and 
motivated body of men. This achievement was even more important by 1918, when 
an increasing proportion of the troops were made up of younger men, conscripts and 
soldiers re-categorised as fit for front-line duty. These personnel, many with a 
potentially less obvious commitment than the volunteers of 1914 and 1915, needed to 
be inducted into an organisation that might today be described as ‘still fit for purpose’. 
For Second Army this was particularly important due to the higher proportion of its 
units which had been rebuilt over the summer months or newly transferred from 
service in other theatres (and thus unfamiliar with the circumstances and demands of 
the Western Front). A well-resourced and efficiently organised support structure was 
crucial in the forging of a cohesive fighting force within a short space of time.    
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 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120 Infantry Brigade, Administrative Order No. 207, 10
th
 August 1918.  
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This cohesion was also important for Second Army given its pending commitment 
within an army group alongside forces from two other nations. The ability of its troops 
to operate effectively would be open to close scrutiny by its allies. A key element of 
Plumer’s future brief was to promote sufficient confidence within the Belgian Army for 
the latter to take the fight to the opposing German forces. The successful prosecution 
of Second Army’s own operations was crucial. 
 
In mid-August, XV Corps of Second Army led a well-planned and successful 
operation to seize Outtersteene Ridge; ‘a smart little victory’,35 this was a good 
example of effective pre-planning and the application of the tactics and weaponry of 
the British Army in 1918. The ridge was the last remaining piece of high ground still 
held by the Germans in front of XV Corps, following the initial advances that month. It 
was therefore decided that the ridge needed to be taken in order to assist further 
progress.36  
 
On 18 August, 27 Brigade (9th Division) together with 9th Battalion (Scottish Rifles), 
Cameron Highlanders (then with the South African Brigade)
37
 attacked Hoogenacker 
Ridge; 87 Brigade (29th Division) cooperating on their right. This ridge overlooked the 
Flanders Plain, including to the right the valley of the Meteren Beque; on the left was 
                                                         
35
 Terraine, To Win A War, p. 124. 
36
 Appendix F summarises the key features of the plan of attack. 
37
 The South African Brigade reported to 9
th
 Division from 22 April 1916 to 13 September 1918. On 24 April 
1918, due to heavy casualties, 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 4
th
 Battalions were amalgamated – forming the South African 
(Composite) Regiment; they were reformed by 1 September 1918. The 9
th
 (Service) Battalion, Cameronians 
(Scottish Rifles) and  2
nd
 Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers were transferred to the Brigade in April 1918 to bring it 
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the village of Meteren offering a good view of the surrounding country. With the prime 
aim of seizing and holding the ground, the orders included arrangements for a 
defensive barrage to be established as soon as the objective was achieved; together 
with the immediate establishment of Lewis gun positions as far forward as possible, to 
cover the trench preparations and wiring operations. Despite a level of enemy 
resistance, the attack was a success – in many cases, troops were reported to have 
advanced beyond the line of the objectives. Consolidation began during the early 
afternoon, with units reported to be entering Outtersteene at 1248 hours. Although a 
counter-attack was anticipated this did not result, although there was some heavy 
enemy shelling and machine gun fire.38 
 
The next day, units of the 9th (Scottish) Division mounted an operation to capture the 
village of Meteren and secure the position by establishing a line approximately 400 
yards to the South. 5/Cameron Highlanders and 8/Black Watch of 26 Brigade took 
part, together with forces from the South African Brigade which was part of the 
Division at this time.39 Under a barrage of HE and smoke shells, together with the 
throwing of ‘some hundreds of drums of burning oil’ the assault was successful. Initial 
fire from enemy machine gun posts was tackled by taking out each post using small 
arms fire and bombs. The advance troops dug themselves in quickly but the expected 
counter-attack did not materialise. There was, however, some shelling from the 
Germans which continued for a number of days, including occasional gas shells, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
up to strength; 9/Scottish Rifles and 2/Royal Scots Fusiliers were restored to 28 Brigade when this was re-
established in September 1918, prior to the Battle of Ypres. 
38
 TNA WO95/1771/4, War Diary of 27 Infantry Brigade, diary entries; Brigade Order No.256, 15/8/18; Defence 
Scheme (Provisional), 22
nd
 August 1918. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
46 
 
active sniper fire. It was thought that the Germans suspected that new forces were 
being prepared for a further attack, and they were attempting to disrupt this. The new 
positions remained secure.40 
 
As the Army’s advance continued, the defence of ground recently gained created new 
pressures:   
 
…The return of relative mobility… confronted commanders with a series of 
new challenges. 
One of the most pressing was the exercise of command and control… [placing] 
a premium on rapid intelligence and speedy decision-making. However 
communications remained a major constraint.41 
 
For the newly re-established 43 Brigade, a briefing note provided on 28 July 1918 
provided a full list of arrangements to try to ensure that effective communications 
were maintained.42 Methods included communications via cable or through visual 
displays, which might include rockets; there were also the traditional means of 
relaying messages via the deployment of dispatch riders or runners, and dogs and 
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 As described in note 102. 
40
 TNA WO95/1767, War Diary of 5
th
 Battalion, Cameron Highlanders . 
41
 J. Boff,’Command Culture and Complexity: Third Army during the Hundred Days, August-November 1918’, 
in G.D. Sheffield and P. Gray, ed. , Changing War: The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and the Birth 
of the Royal Air Force, 1918 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, Birmingham War Studies, 2013), p.19. 
42
 TNA WO95/1905, War Diary of 43 Infantry Brigade, Provisional Instructions for the Defence of portion of 
WINNEZELLE-HAZEBROUCK Line, 28/07/1918. 
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pigeons.43 Wireless equipment was available for brigade-division links, though sets 
for battalions were in more limited supply; the same applied to power buzzers. Where 
the enemy was suspected of being able to intercept messages then codes or cyphers 
would be used.44 The maintenance of effective communications was a constant 
challenge for the advancing troops. 
 
Counter battery arrangements to neutralise enemy defensive artillery positions were 
important, and would become more so in the planning and execution of forthcoming 
offensives. The collection and supply of information from the front line became more 
problematic as the line advanced and troops were no longer in fixed positions. Hence, 
on 6 September 1918, XV Corps found it necessary to write to its units reminding 
them of the value of feeding back intelligence on enemy shelling.45 The orders 
repeated the original instructions of December 1917 and April 1918, together with a 
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covering note acknowledging the new circumstances created by the ongoing 
advance, and reminding officers of the importance of providing details of enemy 
artillery fire: 
 
Attention is directed to [previous instructions]... 
 
No doubt largely owing to difficulty of communications under existing 
conditions very few reports of hostile shelling are at present being forwarded 
by units to the Counter Battery Office. This absence of information handicaps 
the efforts of the Counter Battery Staff. 
 
Additional Heavy Artillery is now being brought forward and it is of the utmost 
importance that shelling reports should be forwarded as regularly as possible. 
 
Every effort should be made to keep the Counter Battery Office fully supplied 
with information.46 
 
It is probably no coincidence that this reminder was being issued only a few weeks 
before the new offensive opened. Knowledge of the deployment and operation of 
enemy artillery would inform the drawing up of the artillery fire-plan to support the 
opening infantry assault and subsequent attacks; and to defend ground gained. It was 
unlikely for an officer ducking for cover from an artillery barrage to have as his first 
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concern the writing up of details in his notebook; however, the central collation of 
such information was of crucial importance for HQ.  
 
As the front line position became even more fluid then this intelligence gradually 
assumed a lower priority. The forthcoming campaign would see problems in getting 
artillery forward sufficiently quickly to support further attacks once the initial assault 
had been launched and early objectives achieved. Enemy artillery would be faced 
with the prospect of withdrawing or being overrun. In practice the locations of both 
British and German artillery batteries would become far more changeable, albeit for 
different reasons. The prospects for successful counter battery planning and firing 
would be reduced as a consequence. 
 
With this new ‘war of movement’, as British forces advanced from previously 
established (British or captured German) defence lines, then arrangements were 
needed to ensure that the new front could be made secure as quickly as possible. 
This included operational arrangements to support the infantry in the advance 
trenches - small foxholes, adapted shell holes, or modified strongpoints utilising the 
terrain or available buildings, or the remains of the latter. The ability of a division’s 
pioneer battalions to keep pace with an attack, and to be available for the building of 
communication works and temporary defences, was an important factor in the 
securing of captured ground. 
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On the night of 20-21 August, 6th Battalion, South Wales Borderers, Pioneer Battalion 
of 30th Division, supported an operation to attack and secure the line of the Dranoutre 
Ridge; the pioneers were attached to 2/14th Battalion (London Scottish), London 
Regiment (21 Brigade, 30th Division), under the command of its CO. Reaching the 
objective by 0250 hours, the troops were then involved in a number of associated 
tasks including digging in and ‘wiring’ (laying out and fixing barbed wire defence lines) 
along the advance line; and  ‘consolidating the support line by digging and wiring 
three strong points’. During these operations the battalion sustained six casualties.47 
The war diary of 2/14 London Scottish recorded that the pioneer battalion had ‘aided 
materially in the work of consolidation’.48 
 
It was also important for front line troops to be able to call for support when 
threatened. For example, 121 Brigade (40th Division) complied with ‘Centre Sector 
Defence Orders’ which included detailed briefings and associated orders for SOS 
signals. The signal could be given via one of the usual communication methods or 
using a light or by blasts on a strombos horn. The call could be made by any officer 
(infantry or artillery) or by an NCO in exceptional circumstances. Upon an enemy 
attack, or the immediate threat of one, being detected, the signal would automatically 
order the attached artillery and machine guns ‘to lay a barrage in front of [the] lines, or 
on the enemy’s lines, to assist the infantry in breaking down an enemy attack’.49 
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In this modern war when wireless signal communications remained in their infancy, 
such pre-planning for emergency artillery support was essential. Empowering a junior 
officer, or an NCO, to signal for a defensive artillery barrage, shows how important 
such fire support was for beating off an enemy attack. There is considerable 
delegation of authority to the commander on the ground, with senior command 
recognising the need for section leaders to exercise initiative. 
 
In the same division, 23 August saw action by 119 and 120 Brigades, in cooperation 
with neighbouring units, to ‘advance their line by means of strong fighting patrols’ with 
artillery support available if any significant hold-up occurred because of enemy 
action.50 The attack was only a partial success and a further attempt was quickly put 
together for 27 August. Artillery support was pre-planned to include a creeping 
barrage for the initial advance, a subsequent protective barrage (to prevent any 
immediate counter-attack), and a standing barrage to help secure the left flank of the 
attack. In the event there was heavy resistance from the German defenders, primarily 
in the form of machine gun fire, and it took heavy fighting over the next two days to 
finally take the objective. On the evening of 28 August there had been a defensive 
barrage from the German  artillery incorporating gas shells, which forced the British 
troops to put on their respirators (the attack stalling as a consequence). A set-piece 
attack was launched on 29 August under a creeping barrage which finally secured the 
Bowery Cottages objective. 
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On 25 August, details were received by 105 Brigade (35th Division) of the 
arrangements for the division to relieve 36th Division in the line (St Jans Cappel 
Sector); the move was completed successfully four days later. That evening ‘fires and 
explosions in rear of the German lines’ were taken as signs of a likely enemy 
withdrawal.51 This was confirmed the following day by division HQ, reporting that a 
German withdrawal appeared to be taking place; 31st Division now held part of 
Bailleul. Wired reports later that day stated that the enemy was carrying out a 
measured withdrawal across the whole of what was then the X Corps front, with 
machine gun teams providing fire support.52 
 
On 31 August, news reached the HQ of 14th Division that the enemy was evacuating 
the Kemmel area. In consequence, patrols were ordered forward, operating in 
conjunction with 27th and 30th American Divisions on the right and 12th Belgian 
Division on the left. The opportunity was taken to move the division’s artillery into 
more advanced positions. The orders were that the enemy was to be ‘pressed’ but 
not ‘actually attacked’.53 43 Brigade sent forward patrols to check if the enemy was 
withdrawing, with orders to maintain contact if this was so. The patrols reported that 
‘the enemy was holding his usual positions in at least normal strength’.54 
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Opposite Second Army, Prince Rupprecht, Commander of the German forces from 
Albert through to the sea, eventually halted his line to the east of Ypres, on La 
Bassee. Messines Ridge was retained, plus the town of Armentieres. 
 
By September 1918, British Second Army was holding a sixteen-mile front from west 
of Armentieres, at a junction with the River Lys, northwards to just beyond Ypres, 
where the Belgian line began. With the enemy continuing to retire,55 the early days of 
September saw the British forces continue their advance. However the enemy soon 
started to increase the intensity of its resistance through prepared fire positions and 
set-piece counter-attacks.  
 
Opposition stiffened considerably on the 4th [September] and subsequently, 
and the reluctance of the enemy to suffer the dislocation of his scheme of 
defence found frequent expression in counter-attacks. A sturdy opposition has 
been offered by the troops fronting us, and they have shown no signs of 
yielding positions of value without fighting. It was with increasing reluctance, 
from 10th September onwards, that the enemy gave ground, and our rate of 
progress thenceforward was appreciably lessened.
56 
 
This classic piece of military understatement within the Army’s Operations Summary, 
indicates an increased intensity in the fighting, with Second Army pushing its way 
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forward from one objective to the next. The level of enemy opposition was 
unpredictable. As the British advanced, a unit might face no resistance or suffer 
harassing fire, suddenly encounter direct fire from machine gun posts or artillery, or 
be subject to a full counter-attack. The psychological pressure thus created, as much 
as the physical risk of injury and death, placed very heavy demands upon the men 
and their commanders. This staccato pattern of warfare was to be a distinctive feature 
of the Final Advance in Flanders. 
 
The follow-up and harassment of the German forces as they carried out their fighting 
withdrawal during the latter part of August and into September, required Second Army 
units to proceed carefully and with due preparation. Operations by 108 Brigade (36th 
Division) between 1-5 September 1918 involved ‘a lot of house-to-house fighting’, 
particularly in Neuve Eglise; and a call was made for artillery assistance when the 9th 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, were caught by the enemy in an ‘exposed 
forward position’.57  
 
On 30 August, 2nd Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (deployed on the right of 109 
Brigade, 36
th
 Division), passed on a report to brigade HQ that the Germans (118
th
 
Regiment) were undertaking a withdrawal. There had been some anticipation of this 
the previous night, following a number of fires south and east of Ballieul, sighting of 
an enemy working party, and defensive covering fire from German machine guns. 
The origin of the report was 94 Brigade (31st Division), on the right flank of the 
Fusiliers, which had already initiated an advance. To the left was 89 Brigade (30th 
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Division). Scout patrols were sent forward by 109 Brigade, each one with an attached 
Stokes mortar. Despite some defensive machine gun fire, there was overall progress 
forward during the day across the divisional fronts.58 
 
This was suspected to be a carefully planned operation by the Germans: 
 
Definite information could not be gathered regarding the intention of the enemy 
but from situation reports he was thought to be fighting a rearguard action 
according to a definite plan as his withdrawal up to the time had been 
methodical and not hurried.59 
 
The next day saw further advances including Kemmel Hill and the village of 
Ravelsberg. Each of the forward battalions had a machine gun team attached plus a 
section of field guns deployed in support; an artillery officer was present to call for 
covering fire or to direct fire onto an enemy strongpoint. In the event, the poor state of 
the roads impeded the progress of the artillery. The resistance of the Germans 
increased, with light shelling of the high ground and fire from machine gun posts; the 
village of La Creche was particularly strongly held. The ground south of the ridges 
was quite open with any movement easily visible. Some limited progress along the 
Ravelsberg Road and, in the evening, along Waterloo Road, was achieved.60 In 
accordance with orders from 36th Division, during 1-2 September, 108 Brigade moved 
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through 109 Brigade, heading in the direction of Neuve Eglise, in order to continue to 
press the retreating enemy forces. Light mortars, machine guns and also a section of 
cyclists and a team from a tunnelling company, were attached to the brigade to 
support the operation.61 
 
On 1 September, units of 29th Division had moved up into the space created on the 
right of 36th Division, with 30th Division remaining on the left. The problem of crossing 
open ground, once troops had occupied the various ridges, remained. A number of 
casualties resulted, including the Intelligence Officer of 109 Brigade killed by a shell, 
and the CO (Lieutenant-Colonel J Knott) of 2/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers severely 
wounded. Progress was made in the direction of Neuve Eglise such that a new line 
was established east of the village by dusk; linking north along the Neuve Eglise – 
Kemmel road, plus south and west of La Crèche.62 
 
On 2 September, 41 Brigade (14th Division) sent patrols forward in response to 
reports of a further German withdrawal having pulled back from Mount Kemmel; they 
found no change in the enemy positions.63 
 
Elsewhere that day, despite enemy machine gun fire, the advance battalions of 108 
Brigade (36th Division) - 12/Royal Irish Rifles and 1/Royal Irish Fusiliers - moved 
forward in the direction of the Neuve Eglise – Nieppe road. There was some fierce 
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fighting for the possession of a small number of houses in the area, these only being 
cleared with the assistance of supporting mortar fire. Beyond this point the British 
troops, including forces from 89 Brigade to the south, ran into intense machine gun 
fire from the Germans; the advance was paused. The aim now was to clear Neuve 
Eglise, with 12/Royal Irish Rifles moving in from north west of the village. This led to 
‘stiff house-to-house fighting’ and the step by step clearance of enemy machine gun 
positions, with fighting continuing for the next few days.64  Soldiers faced very 
different challenges from the trench warfare with which they had become familiar. In 
its subsequent report on operations during that first week in September,65 108 
Brigade presents the picture of the house by house, street by street progress of the 
British infantry – images more familiar from the street fighting of later wars. Over the 
course of five days the men of the brigade undertook a series of minor operations in 
order to make good the advance. The report refers to a range of tactics being 
employed, applying the principles of fire and movement and making use of Lewis 
guns and heavy machine guns; with platoons alternating in the roles of providing 
covering fire for forward movement.66 
 
Fierce fighting saw British troops counter-attacked and forced to withdraw 
temporarily. On occasion ‘Artillery assistance was called and promptly given’. At times 
touch was lost between forward patrols, making the overall position very fluid. The 
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relief of 108 Brigade by 107 Brigade (also from 36th Division) was completed at 1430 
hours on 6 September, when the former was withdrawn into Divisional reserve. The 
determination of the German defenders to carry out an effective fighting withdrawal, 
and the resulting intensity of the fighting that the attacking forces were engaged in, is 
illustrated by the casualty figures. During the five day series of actions, 108 Brigade 
sustained over 400 casualties,67 with 70 soldiers killed, 315 wounded, and 34 
missing. The losses were spread evenly across the three battalions, reflecting the 
rotation of units between assault and support roles.68 
 
The nature of this fighting and the tactics employed by both sides, gave the troops 
valuable experience for the forthcoming offensive. With units pausing to allow for 
artillery support, the passing through of fresh troops, or for assistance from forces on 
the flanks, the staccato rhythm of the advance was sustained. 
 
The report of 108 Brigade for 1-5 September also included, as was common practice, 
a commentary on the operations. This included praise for the support from the 
machine gun company which had been organised with the latter’s OC based at 
                                                         
67
 TNA WO95/2504, War Diary of 108 Infantry Brigade, Report of Operations carried out by 108
th
 Infantry 
Brigade 1
st
 to 5
th
 September. 
68
 The table below shows the breakdown of the 108 Brigade losses: 
108 Brigade: Casualties 1-5 September 1918 
 Killed Wounded Missing 
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108 B
de 
   1   
12/R I Rifles
 
2 26 4 103  6 
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108 T M Batt    1   
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Brigade HQ, together with one machine gun section acting as reserve; one machine 
gun section had been attached to each battalion, an arrangement which had ‘worked 
very well’. Guns had been deployed very quickly when needed and ammunition 
supply had been carried out efficiently.69 An artillery liaison officer was attached to the 
brigade which ‘proved very useful’. The delivery of a protective barrage had been 
arranged effectively when troops were halted for a length of time; there had also been 
useful harassing fire provided when called for. The report added the suggestion that a 
‘sniping’ gun attached to each battalion ‘would have proved useful’ (perhaps a 
reflection of an infantryman’s innate attraction to having direct firing artillery alongside 
him whenever possible). Close co-operation between the battalion CO and the 
artillery officer in charge of the gun was ‘absolutely essential… if the gun is to prove 
of any use’.70 
 
Each battalion also had one trench mortar attached to it, deployed in the relatively 
new ‘mobile’ manner – with only the mortar tube, its body bed plate and ammunition 
being carried. The report noted that this was the first time that the brigade troops had 
operated with the trench mortar used in this way, ‘and probably had teams been 
better trained the results would have been far better’; in conclusion, the mortar was 
potentially ‘a very effective weapon and a valuable asset in this kind of warfare’.71 
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A tunnelling section had also accompanied the advance, for the purpose of searching 
and clearing captured dug-outs. As was becoming more common, the section 
discovered a number of booby traps left by the retreating enemy, which were made 
safe and removed. The supply of rations, water and ammunition to advanced troops 
had been successful, though it was noted that the good conditions of the roads had 
been an important factor in this (which would not always be the case). 
 
The report also referred to the problem of communications - in this operation the 
liaison with flanking brigades had not been good. The telephone lines had been used 
so frequently that there had often been difficulty in ‘getting through’. Other means of 
communication had been ‘seldom used’ or not practicable. However there was no 
obvious solution available other than that ‘flank Brigades should be ‘united’ where 
possible’, while acknowledging that this was difficult ‘when Divisions are operating on 
a one Brigade Front’.72 
 
On 4 and 5 September, 86 Brigade, with 1/Lancashire Fusiliers and 1/Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers leading, was part of a number of attacks undertaken by 29th Division 
(alongside 36
th
 Division, attacking Neuve Eglise); the Brigade’s principle targets were 
the village of Ploegsteert and the adjacent Ploegsteert Wood. On its left, 88 Brigade 
attacked the objective of Hill 63, with 2nd Battalion, The Hampshire Regiment, on the 
left and 2nd Battalion, The Leinster Regiment, on the right. It was a ‘brilliant hot day’ 
with an early mist providing valuable cover for the attacking troops, though it caused 
                                                         
72
 TNA WO95/2504, War Diary of 108 Infantry Brigade, Report of Operations carried out by 108
th
 Infantry 
Brigade 1
st
 to 5
th
 September. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
61 
 
some problems for the artillery. Despite a number of German counter-attacks, the 
objectives were taken and held, but with a large number of casualties. On the night of 
4 September, 1/Royal Dublin Fusiliers advanced east of Ploegstreet. Prisoners 
reported that Hill 63 was part of the enemy’s main line of resistance and orders were 
‘to hold it at all costs’. The Acting Commander of 86 Brigade, in a letter praising the 
performance of the troops ‘under very trying circumstances’, expressed his sadness 
at ‘the heavy losses that the Lancashire Fusiliers and Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
sustained’; while acknowledging that the action had led to the capture of ‘160 odd 
prisoners and many machine guns and trench mortars’.73 
 
On 6 September the GOC of 29th Division, Major-General D. Cayley, wrote to all his 
immediate subordinate commanders in order to ‘congratulate all ranks of the division 
on their excellent work during the last seven days, while following up the retreating 
enemy’.74 In his letter he made particular reference to the ‘skilful co-operation’ 
between the artillery and the infantry, with the assistance of the division’s machine 
gun battalion, aided by successful communications. The work of engineer and 
pioneer sections, repairing and maintaining roads and bridges, had ensured the 
supply of the large quantities of the ammunition required.  
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Major-General Cayley also highlighted the good organisation of the field ambulances, 
crucial given the number of casualties sustained in just three days.75 Over 100 
soldiers had been killed and five times that number wounded, indicating the 
continuing strength of the German resistance. Having pulled back from the Lys 
Salient, the enemy was clearly resolute in holding its new defensive line. The 
preparation and tactics employed by the division (the one former Regular Army 
division within Second Army), while drawn up at short notice, show sensible and 
careful planning; the resulting casualties do not appear to have been the result of 
failings at command or staff level.  
 
The orders had specified the objectives as Hill 63 and Ploegsteert village76; prisoner 
statements had identified these points as part of the German army’s line of resistance 
within its planned withdrawal. The cover of an artillery barrage was arranged for the 
assault, with two attacking brigades (86 and 88), each deploying two advance 
battalions with the remaining battalion in reserve. There were initial problems 
overnight when enemy forces were encountered along the roadway identified as the 
‘jumping off’ point: only the 1/Lancashire Fusiliers (86 Brigade) managed to secure 
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their portion of the road, and hold this despite a counter-attack before dawn. 88 
Brigade withdrew 500 yards to allow for a 12 minute barrage of enemy forces along 
the road; then proceeded to follow the barrage, encountering only limited resistance 
at first. Subsequently the troops met artillery fire from the western slopes of Hill 63, 
plus enfilade machine gun fire from the south. The assault was pushed home by 
2/Hampshires and 2/Leinsters, despite the defenders’ fire and large amounts of wire. 
Two subsequent counter-attacks were beaten off with little difficulty. 
 
For 86 Brigade, the artillery preparation had concentrated on predicted centres of 
enemy resistance, rather than providing a covering barrage. The Lancashire Fusiliers, 
from its starting line, had successfully advanced along the left flank of the attack. On 
its right, 1/Royal Dublin Fusiliers was facing heavy machine gun fire to both its front 
and from its right flank. It was therefore decided to delay its assault until 1500 hours, 
pending the cover of an artillery barrage; in the event the battalion advanced to 
secure a line east of Ploegsteert. It was relieved by 2/ Royal Fusiliers, who drove off a 
counter- attack upon their right flank at noon on the following day.  The right company 
of the Lancashire Fusiliers was halted short of the village but by 1100 hours on 5 
September it too had reached its objective. 
 
In its concluding remarks on the operation, the division’s summary notes that the 
success owed much to the initiative and leadership on the ground of the company 
and platoon commanders. The artillery barrage was delivered as ‘a map shoot’ 
without preparation (most of the guns had only moved into position on the evening of 
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3 September); the infantry also received valuable covering fire from machine guns 
and mortars (particularly important in tackling enemy machine gun posts).77 This 
example of Second Army operations during September illustrates the potential 
strength of German resistance once committed to holding a defensive line. It also 
shows the art of attack adopted by the Army’s units and their ability to sustain or 
remount assaults, successfully combining arms to achieve identified objectives. 
 
Another good example of the developing expertise of Second Army units, particularly 
regarding small scale infantry tactics and infantry/artillery co-operation, is an 
operation carried out by 93 Brigade (31st Division) on 18 September. The attack was 
designed to capture Soyer Farm in the area east of Ploegsteert, thereby allowing the 
line to be advanced towards a stretch of the River Warnave. Two companies from 
each of the two battalions, 15/West Yorkshires (operating on the left) and 13/York and 
Lancaster (operating on the right), were involved. It subsequently transpired that, from 
prisoner interviews and evidence on the ground, including the presence of pioneer 
troops with mobile charges, the Germans had themselves been intending to carry out 
a raid on 93 Brigade positions. The enemy was concerned at the proximity of British 
advance posts and the raid had been intended to provide greater security for the 
defenders at the farm. The fact that the Germans in that area were planning 
operations to improve their defensive position, suggests that their intention at that 
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time was to resist actively any assault by the allies; and steps would be taken where 
possible to disrupt any preparations regarding this.78 
 
The attack by 93 Brigade led to the successful capture of the farm, including 59 
prisoners, and heavy casualties for the enemy. The brigade suffered 75 casualties of 
which 30 men were killed. Soyer Farm had been protected with large concentrations 
of wire, and heavily defended, particularly to the north and west.  Thus the aim of the 
plan was to get troops around the flanks and able to strike at the rear of the farm, 
where defences were relatively weaker. Sketch maps were drawn to show the 
deployment and manoeuvres of each platoon involved in the attack. Although the 
farm seemed ‘to have been held abnormally strongly’ (reflecting the Germans’ 
intentions to attack British positions),79 the operation appears to have been carried 
out with minimal problems and in accordance with the arrangements prepared by the 
brigade and battalion commands. 
 
The final plan had been executed successfully,80 with zero hour at 0530 hours and 
the light signal to indicate the capture of the farm subsequently observed at 0638 
hours. Particular features included the incorporation of a machine gun barrage within 
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the covering fire support, with enemy outposts to the east of the farm subject to a 
standing barrage throughout the operation. The creeping barrage to cover the attack, 
  
…instead of moving forward on parallel lines was pivoted on the farm and 
moved fanwise, thus ensuring that the farm and enclosures remained under 
fire until the attacking force had reached a position in rear of it. This barrage 
then lifted and joined the standing barrage whereupon the attacking troops at 
once rushed the farm from the rear.81 
 
The soldiers were equipped in full ‘fighting order’, so that each soldier, as well as rifle 
and ammunition, carried a full water bottle, one day’s rations plus emergency iron 
rations, two rifle grenades and a signal flare. Rifle grenade sections were supplied 
with five grenades and twelve cartridges for each soldier. Each Lewis gun team 
carried 18 ammunition pans. In addition, with carriage distributed across its members, 
each platoon had two pairs of wire cutters, two day and two night SOS grenades, four 
rifle grenade discharger cups, one Very pistol and five shovels; plus additional small 
arms ammunition (SAA). 
 
The attack shows the level of detailed preparation of which Second Army units were 
now capable. Pre-planning was crucial to enable the mix of troops (new and 
experienced soldiers, conscripts and men deployed from other war theatres, and re-
classified men) to deploy successfully on the battlefield. There is evidence of 
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innovation and creativity in the delivery of the artillery support, and the infantry 
demonstrated a confidence in the ability of the gunners to provide the planned 
barrage efficiently; this co-operation between the two arms allowed the troops on the 
ground to carry out their actions in an organised and effective manner. The tactics of 
the advancing infantry, the use of Lewis guns and rifle grenades (‘employed with 
great effect against M.G. posts which attempted to put up a fight’), all point to a 
doctrine of ‘fire and movement’ with which the troops were becoming increasingly 
familiar.82 
 
One point of post-action criticism concerned the lack of photographs of the target and 
the surrounding area. The report on the attack pointed out that ‘Most of the men and 
nearly all N.C.O.’s are now capable of appreciating a photograph, and explanation is 
much assisted by their use’.83 This comment indicates the positive view which 
commanding officers held of the soldiers they led, and their confidence in the men’s 
abilities; it also shows how the application of aerial photography was now considered 
to be an integral part of operations at all levels within the army. The increase in 
expectations regarding the initiative of NCOs and the private soldier is also illustrated 
by comments on command and control during the operation: 
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The importance of practising chain of command was also made clear. One 
platoon lost its Officer and all senior N.C.O.’s and was commanded with 
success by a young Lance Corporal assisted by a Senior Private.84 
 
There were three particular features of Flanders which were impacting on operations 
and would influence the forthcoming major offensive: 
 
1. One was the notorious Flanders weather. This was able to produce stifling dry 
heat on one day, yet change to torrential rain within twenty-four hours. The 
consequences for the advancing forces would be considerable and these are 
referred to regularly in contemporary writings and in the Official History.85 
 
2. The variable weather exacerbated the transport problems created by the poor 
quality of the roads in the area. Sustaining supply lines and in particular the 
bringing forward of artillery support, for advancing forces, had been a major 
factor throughout the war. This undermined the ability of troops on either side, 
to maintain the momentum of an attack; to convert a breakthrough into a 
breakout. This would be the main challenge facing the coalition forces. 
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3. The Flanders terrain was divided by a series of rivers, generally running north 
to south, which created a succession of natural defensive lines.  
 
The partially canalised River Lys bisected the area, running west then south-
west from Ghent to Armentieres via Menin some 15-20 yards wide and 5-6 feet 
deep and passable only by bridges. There was also a network of other canals 
originally constructed both for communication and defence, while numerous 
streams like the Steenbeck, Stroombeek and Kornebeek, and willow-lined 
dykes intersected the plain, fed by springs at the junction of the permeable 
sands and the impermeable clay. The Yser Canal connected to the Lys at 
Comines.86 
 
These were important planning considerations for the advancing forces, impacting on 
transport, communications and logistics. Mitchinson, writing about the experiences of 
the pioneer battalions on the Western Front, has pointed out the additional problems 
within the region of Flanders for building railways and laying roads.87 
 
As Second Army advanced there were changes in the nature of the terrain. Much of 
the initial ground regained was pitted by the detritus of battles previously fought and 
the pock marks of no man’s land. As new ground was reached then different 
challenges could present themselves. On 5 July 1918 the following order had been 
issued to units of 121 Brigade: 
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No.2 of each Lewis Gun will go forward with two sandbags tucked into the belt. 
When necessary these sandbags are to be filled and used to raise the tripod 
so as to enable the guns to be fired over standing crops.88 
 
While this statement may seem self-evident, it illustrates two important points. The 
obvious nature of the instruction is a likely reflection of the inexperience of many of 
the brigade’s troops, such that orders are required to ensure small levels of detail in 
weapon handling are known and complied with. There is also the reference to 
‘standing crops’ – it is likely that many of the troops on the Western Front in 1918 
would not have had cause to manoeuvre or fight in terrain covered with crops, 
whether standing or otherwise, for some considerable time, if at all. The new 
environment for the fighting to come would include cultivated farmland (and the 
people responsible for the cultivation). 
 
The Commander 
 
Second Army had been formed in France in December 1914, initially commanded by 
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. Sir Herbert Plumer assumed command of V Corps at 
Christmas 1914, subsequently replacing Smith-Dorrien as GOC of Second Army in 
May 1915.  
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From the start Plumer developed a reputation for success via careful planning, 
preparation and support, of which there was strong evidence during the Final 
Advance in Flanders.89 The regular availability of drinking water, and the ready 
provision of food and supplies for units in action, are examples of the importance he 
attached to the delivery of effective support for the front-line troops; organisation and 
logistics were always a high priority. His emphasis on planning included the co-
ordination of artillery fire-plans, the preparation of defensive positions, and the 
drawing-up of operational orders to respond to emergencies. Liaison officers were 
attached to each corps, charged with getting to know each of the corps battalions and 
spending time in the trenches. Training was seen as a vital tool and troops were 
released as often as opportunity would allow. The initiative for much of this has been 
put down to his chief of staff (and subsequent biographer) Major-General ‘Tim’ 
Harington, who served with Plumer for most of the war. Summarising Plumer’s 
career, Simkins has written that Harington had a ‘special bond’ with Plumer which 
‘was an indispensable ingredient in Second Army’s success in 1917’.90 
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An early example of Plumer’s considered approach to command is his response to 
the creation of pioneer battalions in 1915. He disagreed with the simple expedient of 
identifying one existing unit to be converted to a division’s pioneer battalion,  
 
… preferring instead the idea that divisional commanders should be allowed to 
build up a Pioneer unit. Such a formation should, he suggested, begin with a 
small establishment and then be gradually expanded by the transfer of officers 
and men within their divisions.91 
 
Second Army held part of the front in Flanders and Plumer became directly 
associated with the area. During winter 1916, his staff produced four training 
manuals, looking to take account of the lessons from Arras and the Somme. He 
achieved the success for which he is most noted on 7 June 1917 with the attack on 
Messines, ‘one of the completest victories of the war’.92 Although overlooked initially 
for the 3rd Ypres (Passchendaele) offensive, despite commanding continuously in the 
area since 1915, he took over responsibility after the August failures. Applying the 
concept of ‘bite and hold’ he planned, fought and won three battles – Menin Road 
Ridge, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde. The results of two subsequent actions with II 
Anzac Corps at the start of October 1917, Poelcappelle and First Passchendaele, 
were less successful and more controversial.93 Following the taking of 
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Passchendaele Ridge by Canadian forces in November, the infamous Flanders’ 
weather led to Haig calling a halt to the actions. The Second Army staff moved with 
their General to Italy between November 1917 and March 1918, as part of allied 
moves to bolster the Italian Army.  
 
Plumer arrived back in Flanders on 13 March 1918 (his sixty-first birthday), together 
with most of his staff; his return negotiated as part of Haig’s long-running attrition with 
the British government over issues of BEF command and troop supply.94 
 
In response to the crisis caused by the German offensive, which opened on 21 
March, it was Plumer who made the offer of a transfer of additional troops to the 
threatened areas from the Second Army front.95 Haig recorded in his diary on 23 
March 1918: 
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I arranged with Plumer to thin down his front; then I shall be glad to see the 
divisions thus set free near the Somme! It is most satisfactory to have a 
Commander of Plumer’s temperament at a time of crisis like the present.96  
 
This comment shows the major reappraisal of Plumer by Haig over time, given the 
latter’s initial criticism when he first assumed full command of the BEF.97  
 
In return it was agreed with the Belgians that they would slightly extend their front; 
plus exhausted BEF divisions from the southern fighting were to be transferred north 
as an opportunity to recuperate on a quieter front. This would have further 
repercussions as events unfolded. All but three of Second Army’s divisions were 
redeployed in the south, replaced by divisions who had suffered up to 70 per cent or 
more casualties. Replacements were made up of 19-year olds with a minimum of 
training, soldiers previously considered short of the A1 frontline requirements, plus 
returnees recovered from wounds. New command teams were being hastily put 
together alongside the gradual replacement of equipment and weapons.  
 
On 9 April the German ‘Georgette’ offensive was launched against Horne’s Third 
Army to the right of Second Army. Plumer’s willingness to put the overall strategic 
priorities ahead of his own circumstances saw him immediately agree to move two of 
his three remaining full strength divisions to cover Third Army.    
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The following day, 10 April, the Germans extended their attack northwards in a drive 
towards the railway interchange of Hazebrouck, and around the Ypres salient. The 
bitter rearguard defensive actions are well documented.98 The gravity of the position 
was evidenced by Haig’s ‘Backs to the Wall’ order issued on 11 April. Plumer’s 
actions as commander included daily visits to every divisional HQ and also some 
brigade HQs – a clear sign of his desire to provide visible leadership and support to 
his officers. He also had charge of additional French troops sent as reinforcements. 
As part of a planned withdrawal to create a shorter and more defensible line, ground 
was conceded within the Ypres Salient.99 Around this time Harington is reported to 
have informed his commander that his Second Army was broken into three pieces; 
‘Well that is better than being in four’ was Plumer’s phlegmatic reply.100  
 
In his biography of Plumer, Powell makes the firm assertion: 
 
If Plumer’s depleted divisions had failed to prevent that German breakthrough 
to the Channel ports, the war would almost certainly have been lost.101 
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David Stevenson, referring to the defensive battles of April 1918, states that ‘The 
British were… fortunate in their Second Army commander, Sir Herbert Plumer [who] 
ran an efficient headquarters’.102  
 
As described earlier, Plumer was subsequently to take advantage of local German 
withdrawals in August to begin to take back the conceded territory. Through a series 
of small actions, the Second Army had slowly advanced forward, and the Lys Salient 
had been cleared by 7 September. 
 
Much of Plumer’s success has been attributed to the excellence of his Chief of Staff 
since June 1916, ‘Tim’ Harington. It was a successful partnership, perhaps the most 
effective of the war on the allied side, between GOC and MGGS.103 Yet it ended 
before the final phase of the war. After the stalling of the German offensives in 
Flanders, Harington had received promotion to become deputy to Wilson at the War 
Office. For the final phases of the war, Plumer had Jocelyn Percy as MGGS, who 
proved an effective replacement. A man of Harington’s undoubted ability and intellect, 
and who had an uncanny ability to interpret his chief’s thinking, was impossible to 
replicate; it would have been difficult for Plumer to have had the same confidence in 
Percy. Harington was adamant that Plumer was always the man in command - it was 
his ability to lead, to attend to detail, to grasp the key points of plans and react 
decisively when engaged in action, which shaped the direction of Second Army. 
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With Second Army in 1918, Plumer’s central approach when issuing orders to his 
corps commanders was to produce an initial written draft (complete with crossings out 
and amendments), probably following discussion with Percy and senior commanders, 
informed by intelligence reports and briefings. From September 1918, he had also to 
take account of the orders produced by the Flanders Army Group.104 It was Percy’s 
role to then arrange the final typed set of orders, including administrative numbering 
and circulation list, which he would sign off as MGGS.105 
 
Terraine has praised Plumer as a forward-looking general in a war in which such 
persons were in short supply. In particular, in Plumer’s emphasis on planning and 
preparation, and the high level of organisation he demanded, Terraine sees a 
precedent for the requirements of World War II and beyond:  
 
[Plumer was] one of the most modern soldiers of his generation.... many of 
[his] methods became the standard procedure of the Second World War… 
Plumer’s sense of organisation was therefore a cardinal principle, a sine qua 
non of modern war.106  
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It is said that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.107 Plumer’s emphasis on the 
planned, set-piece attack has been described as the fore-runner to the methods that 
Montgomery applied when winning victory at El Alamein in 1942.108  
 
His [Montgomery’s] models for future operations were the meticulously 
planned battles of Sir Herbert Plumer – arguably the best British general of the 
First World War – particularly Messines Ridge in 1917, when artillery 
preparation was at its most thorough and well coordinated.109  
 
Montgomery’s biographer, Nigel Hamilton, wrote: 
 
The lessons he would draw from [the First World War] were… those 
fundamental lessons implanted by General Plumer: namely that if offensives 
are planned on a sound tactical understanding; if the troops are well trained 
and have limited, realistic and identifiable objectives; and if the full weight of 
modern artillery is intelligently brought to bear on a concentrated front, there is 
almost nothing the enemy can do except withdraw.110 
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Plumer’s realism and attention to planning are echoed in other assessments of his 
performance. Peter Simkins concludes that Plumer, owing to his instincts for 
promoting teamwork and practical approaches to problems, alongside a sound feel 
for tactics, ‘did as much as anyone, and more than most, to encourage and develop 
the type of all-arms attack that proved the key to victory in 1918’. Such qualities also 
encouraged the sort of lower level command and initiative which was to prove 
essential during the more open warfare of autumn 1918.111  
 
Gas 
 
A notable feature of the war diaries from Second Army formations is the 
commonplace reference to the use of gas warfare. More than half of the recorded use 
of gas occurred during the final year of the war, and around half of the fatalities 
resulting from exposure to gas on the Western Front occurred in 1918.112 In a lecture 
to troops, a divisional gas officer is recorded as ‘… reminding his audience that the 
YPRES Sector has always been the enemy’s gas experimental ground’.113 
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In a chapter on the application of chemical warfare,114 Michael Freemantle discusses 
the development of the weapon and its effectiveness. He quotes the conclusion of 
Albert Palazzo that ‘gas [became] ‘the most effective method’ of neutralising the 
enemy’s guns and achieving fire supremacy. It also lowered the morale of the enemy 
and reduced their ability to resist.115 
 
Lloyd describes how the deployment of gas as a weapon had become commonplace 
in 1918: 
 
… The allied armies had to operate in a terrible and dangerous chemical 
environment… gas evoked a fear that was unlike any other weapon and had a 
significant effect on how the war was fought… 
 
By 1918 all sides had incorporated gas into their battle tactics, with both front 
and rear sectors regularly being deluged with gas, which poisoned the ground 
and caused a constant trickle of casualties. 
 
…Mustard gas… was used in increasing amounts by the German artillery. As 
the retreat [by the German forces] gathered momentum, German gunners fired 
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thousands of these shells at their pursuers, using it as an area denial weapon, 
through which the Allies could not advance, or at least not without difficulty.116 
 
He quotes the findings of Tim Cook: 
 
German gunners simply blocked out map grids and fired shells to saturate the 
whole sector, thereby eliminating that area from the front.117 
 
Despite its dangers, the references within the war diaries of Second Army units 
indicate that gas was dealt with as part of the routine of the front line. Given the 
relative inexperience of many units making up Second Army, from their first time in 
the front line, men had to be able to cope with the gas shells delivered as part of 
enemy bombardments. On 17 August 1918 (on the first morning of only the second 
spell on front line duty for the battalion), the war diary of 11/Cameron Highlanders 
records that ‘In the early morning Lt. G.S. Young and four men were gassed and two 
men wounded’.118 On 24 September, 104 Brigade records that ‘Gas, especially Blue 
Cross, being used very extensively by the enemy’.119 
 
War diaries make regular mention of the use of gas shells by the German artillery’,120 
directed at both front and support lines. There is no particular significance attached to 
                                                         
116
 Lloyd, Hundred Days, p. 102.  
117
 T. Cook, No Place To Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1999), p. 200; quoted in Lloyd, Hundred Days, p. 102. 
118
 TNA WO95/2611/4, War Diary of 11th Battalion, Cameron Highlanders. 
119
 TNA WO95/2483, War Diary of 104 Infantry Brigade, 24 September 1918. 
120
 For example, these are extracts from TNA WO95/1767, War Diary of 5
th
 Battalion, Cameron Highlanders:  
18 August, Meteren, Heavy gas concentration put down over our whole front line. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
82 
 
these references – it was obviously viewed as part and parcel of the ongoing 
harassment by the enemy when on active duty.121 
 
Precautions were necessary when men came into contact with materials present 
during a gas attack; for instance, the use of sandbags which had previously been in 
an area fired on by a German barrage including gas shells.122 As well as concern for 
their immediate health, the men’s clothing could also be contaminated by gas; in such 
cases fresh clothing was issued.123 Contact with other soldiers who had themselves 
been subject to a gas attack, was another threat, requiring suitable guidance to be 
issued to troops. The aim was to ensure all possible steps were taken to minimise the 
risk of injury through exposure to the after-effects of gas shelling, and to put in place 
arrangements for disinfection.124 
 
By this time in the war the British Army was also making regular use of gas as part of 
its artillery fire plans; arguably outpacing its enemy: 
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Chemical warfare developed from a novelty in 1915 to an approved component 
of the British method of waging war by 1916… it made a significant 
contribution to the eventual British victory in 1918.125 
 
Army and Corps HQ had the position of chemical adviser on their staff; information on 
the use of gas by British forces and its effects was an important part of intelligence 
gathering. Prisoner interviews were the most common source, with questions 
designed to assess the impact of British gas shells and gas operations on enemy 
troops. Air photographs could show areas of bleached or contaminated ground.126 
 
There are various references within Second Army records to the use of gas by its 
forces in 1918. This applied during periods of relative inactivity, as well as in support 
of an offensive.127 Gas operations by Second Army were part of normal routine and 
where these were noted in war diaries they were not afforded any particular 
emphasis; it was part of the regular exchanges of artillery fire.128 The Army’s use of 
gas as an offensive weapon also meant that British troops needed guidance when 
approaching ground which had been subject to a gas bombardment by their own 
artillery; although much of the general advice and training provided on anti-gas 
measures also applied.129 
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It was an essential part of front line routine for troops to issue warnings as early as 
possible of a forthcoming gas attack and to take steps to protect themselves. At the 
beginning of August, 121 Brigade was issued with three closely typed pages of ‘Anti-
Gas Instructions’, which also referred the reader to SS534 (March, 1918) where ‘full 
details of Gas Defence’ could be found.130 
 
On 14 August, while out of the line, the troops of 5/Cameron Highlanders had 
experience in the ‘Gas Chamber’ – an arrangement designed to provide soldiers with 
first-hand experience of being gassed. The intention of the Army was for all units to 
spend a session in the chamber as part of their training and preparation for front line 
operations.131 
 
Despite such measures, there was ongoing concern at the number of casualties 
resulting from enemy gas attacks. Second Army wrote to its corps commanders at the 
start of September 1918 to stress the importance of gas discipline.132 Officers were to 
be regularly reminded of their responsibility for gas casualties in their units where 
these resulted from a lack of training in appropriate defensive measures. These 
instructions show the concern of Second Army at the scale of the ongoing threat 
posed by the German use of gas on a regular basis. The result is a commitment to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
129
 For example, instructions on OUR OWN GAS SHELL BOMBARDMENTS were issued by XV Corps in 
October 1918: TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120
th
 Infantry Brigade, XV Corps No. 89/145 G. 28
th
 October 
1918. 
130
 TNA WO95/2614, War Diary of 121 Infantry Brigade, Centre Sector Defence Orders, Appendix III. 
131
 TNA WO95/1767, War Diary of 5
th
 Battalion, Cameron Highlanders. 
132
 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120
th
 Infantry Brigade, Second Army G.T. 420, 9
th
 Sept. 1918; XV Corps No. 
89/137 G. 11
th
 September 1918; 40
th
 Div. No. 10/56 G. 13-9-18. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
85 
 
manage the consequences of this through actions designed to minimise the resulting 
number of casualties by attaching a very high importance to anti-gas measures. 
 
Subsequent amendments were made to anti-gas instructions, reflecting a perceived 
casual approach by troops to gas shelling, perhaps a result of over familiarity with this 
type of artillery fire, or the reaction of ‘old hands’ believing in their own ability to 
decide how to respond following a gas attack. Troops also disliked wearing the 
respirators which were uncomfortable and restricted visibility, and therefore the 
movement, of the wearer.133 As the advance in Flanders gathered pace, soldiers 
faced the new danger of gas contained in booby traps left behind by the German 
soldiers as they withdrew.134 
 
Gas remained a prime concern for Second Army throughout the Hundred Days. In 
instructions issued after the Battle of Courtrai, the command of XV Corps stated that it 
was considered probable that the Germans would ‘make considerable use of gas’ 
during the retreat. Cloud gas attacks were considered unlikely and the main threat 
would be from gas shells delivered using HE. It was acknowledged that with the 
ongoing advance causing ‘frequent changes of positions’ then units would not be able 
to receive the same amount of supervision from senior anti-gas personnel and would 
have to rely principally upon their own trained soldiers. Frequent inspections of 
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respirators were to be carried out together with the maintenance of anti-gas 
appliances such as respirators, containers and rattles.135 
 
A background paper on gas warfare in Flanders is attached as Appendix G. 
 
The War in the Air 
 
The growth in importance of air power and the ability to defend against it is illustrated 
by the post of Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander on the Army general staff. The rank 
of the officer, lieutenant-colonel, reflects both the newness of the role and that the 
available technology meant the full potential of air power was yet to be realised. 
Nevertheless, ground troops could expect to be observed and, of greater immediate 
concern to them, to be attacked by enemy aircraft. Air bombing raids upon troops and 
key strategic points were also increasingly common, although by the final phase of 
the war the allied aircraft outnumbered their German counterparts. While it was in 
reconnaissance that the aeroplane continued to make its most important contribution, 
Plumer had come to realise the potential of air power in the new warfare.  
 
Referring to the battles of April 1918, Sir John Lessor, a future Marshall of the Royal 
Air Force, wrote that Plumer ‘pressed urgently for concentrated bombing of vital 
points of the German supply system to help slow down the enemy advance… [he] 
was emphatic that an essential condition of success was the concentration of all 
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available aircraft continuously on the minimum number of points where the greatest 
dislocation could be produced’.136  
 
Such an approach was regularly evident during the Flanders Offensive. Appendix H 
includes a table recording RAF activity during this period, compiled from weekly 
operations reports produced by Second Army HQ.137 The returns show the number of 
enemy aircraft destroyed and the RAF expenditure of ammunition and bombs. The 
figures illustrate the large increase in activity during Army operations. 
 
Even during quieter periods, the war in the air was a common feature of the daily 
routine for the soldiers at the front, and for the aircrews: 
 
One enemy aeroplane dropped a few light bombs on our front line doing little 
damage. Considerable aerial activity on part of the enemy. Two of our planes 
brought down by enemy squadron behind our lines.138 
 
The control of the air space above the opposing forces was an important factor in the 
allied advance. The RAF, together with its French and Belgian counterparts, enjoyed 
a numerical superiority during the campaign; the success that this led to is shown by 
the high number of enemy aircraft destroyed in this period. This control of the skies – 
when the weather permitted – gave a significant advantage to coalition troops. It 
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allowed effective reconnaissance of German troop activity and positions, including 
artillery, plus the crucial details of the new terrain over which the troops would be 
advancing. French and RAF planes also carried out regular bombing of enemy 
communications, headquarters and transport, thereby disrupting German command 
and movement. A further feature of air operations was the dangerous task of direct 
attacks at low level upon German troops. 
 
The much smaller Belgian Air Corps, around 150 craft, also played its part; primarily 
in observation and reconnaissance, but also via its fighter squadrons, which had been 
reorganised at the start of the year.139 On 17 October pilots of the Groupe de Chasse 
Jacquet (Fighter Group Jacquet) landed in Oostende to become the first members of 
the Belgian armed forces to enter the town after German occupation. 
 
Communications with aircraft by advancing troops relied almost entirely upon visual 
aids. The normal practice was an agreed system of coloured flares. For example, 
during an action by advance platoons of 31st Division on 18 September 1918 
(described earlier)140, a ‘Contact Aeroplane’ was identified to ‘co-operate with the 
attack’. Troops carried SOS flares: red smoke by day, green over green over red by 
night; plus white Very lights: three to be fired when a platoon reached its objective. 
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The RAF was also a regular feature in the advance planning by Second Army. Orders 
issued by 89 Brigade in August 1918 included reference to the RAF dropping supplies 
to forward troops.141 An attack on 19 July to capture the village of Meteren, by 26 
Brigade and the South African Brigade (9th Division) was given air cover by six RAF 
planes circling the front before the attack and preventing enemy observation.142 
 
The preparations for the forthcoming Battle of Ypres give a good example of 
requirements for the various units of the RAF to undertake specific missions in 
support of the attacking infantry. The priority, through the use of ‘contact aeroplanes’, 
was to track the progress of the attack in order to inform HQ.143 Another important 
role was that of the ‘counter attack aeroplane’, used to identify possible counter-
attacks by the enemy and to signal for a defensive barrage by artillery.144 
 
The reference to ‘wireless’ in such orders would most likely be through a code signal; 
for example, the arrangements for 88 Brigade refer to an ‘LL’ or ‘GF’ call.145 These 
arrangements also illustrate the increasing importance of wireless communications; 
while the existing equipment was too heavy and bulky for advancing units to utilise, it 
could be fitted to an aircraft with suitable adaptations.
146
 The main HQ of Corps, 
Division, and increasingly Brigade, would have access to wireless receivers. It was 
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crucial for the forward infantry to be able to indicate that an objective has been taken 
and, as required, to signal for the necessary materiel or other forms of support in 
order to protect the gains made; reconnaissance aircraft made an important 
contribution to the various means of communication employed by advance 
formations. However there was concern at the ability of the enemy to intercept 
wireless communications. 
 
The initial planning for the Battle of Ypres, arranged at divisional and brigade levels, 
also included what at the time was the novel proposal to use aircraft to deliver 
supplies, principally ammunition, to forward troops. The system depended upon the 
ability of the advance troops to display the required layout of strips of white cloth, 
along with the firing of a white flare. Parachutes (to be collected and returned to 
division) were employed to prevent the weighty packages from just falling directly to 
the ground (with unfortunate consequences for any nearby troops).147 
 
For the Battle of Courtrai, the scope of such operations had been extended to include 
the dropping of food and rations (plus messenger pigeons) as well as small arms and 
machine gun ammunition. Each of these had a different arrangement of ground 
sheets by which advance units could indicate the type of supplies required; with the 
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attention of the contact aeroplane attracted by the firing of a white very light or the 
lighting of a white flare.148 
 
All units were now required to take the necessary steps to protect themselves from 
attack from the air, normally co-ordinated at brigade level. In the front line the main 
emphasis was upon the deployment of Lewis guns.149 By 1918 defence against attack 
from the air had become an important component of operations, offensive and 
defensive. In November 1918, British Second Army had five anti-aircraft batteries and 
two sections of 13-pounder guns for anti-aircraft defence.150 
 
A more detailed background paper on aspects of air warfare in Flanders is attached 
as Appendix H. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Groupe d’Armées des Flandres 
 
To turn the present situation to account, the most resolute offensive is 
everywhere desirable. Risks, which a month ago would have been criminal to 
incur, ought now to be incurred as a duty. It is no longer necessary to advance 
in regular lines and step by step. On the contrary, each division should be 
given a distant objective which must be reached independently of its 
neighbour, and even if one’s flank is thereby exposed for the time being. 
Reinforcements must be directed on the points where our troops are gaining 
ground, not where they are checked. A vigorous offensive against the sectors 
where the enemy is weak will cause hostile strongpoints to fall, and in due 
course our whole army will be able to continue its advance. The situation is 
most favourable; let each one of us act energetically and without hesitation 
push forward to our objective.1 
Douglas Haig, 22 August, 1918. 
 
By Sunday 11 August, the last day of the Battle of Amiens, Haig had conceived 
the possibility of bringing the war to an end that autumn....From mid-August a 
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scheme for a general offensive [by all allied armies] was gradually 
developed...2 
 
Under Foch’s direction as generalissimo, a scheme was worked out for a series of 
coordinated offensives along the Western Front, designed to stretch the resources of 
the enemy to the maximum extent. It became clear to both Foch and Haig that an 
attack in Flanders must be included in their scheme, and that the Belgian Army had to 
be party to these operations.3  
 
… Foch proposed to Haig and to the Belgian CGS, Cyraique Gillain, a new 
attack in Flanders… Foch had been approached by Belgium’s King Albert, who 
had nursed his army since 1914 but now wished it to participate in the final act. 
By abandoning the Lys salient the Germans had exposed their railways 
running north to the sea. The chance presented itself to over-run the heights 
east of Ypres that the British had assaulted in the previous year, and to 
establish a base for operations against the trunk line running through Roulers.4 
 
Map 1 shows the overall position on the Western Front before the start of the 
Hundred Days, and the key deployment of Second Army in front of Ypres and holding 
the right flank of the Belgian line.  
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The disillusionment with the strategic policies of the allies that had grown in King 
Albert as the war ground on, and his despair that victory remained ever-distant, had 
begun to dissipate during 1918. His insistence on maintaining the Belgian Army’s 
freedom of action, and his resistance to offensive action in Belgium, given the 
potential devastation that could result, was now less marked.5 The King’s ‘growing 
appreciation of Foch’s leadership of the allied forces and the recent battlefield 
successes’ led to an ‘ingenious compromise’ to allow Albert to cooperate with the 
proposed joint offensive.6  
 
Following a positive meeting between French Premier Clemenceau and Albert on 7 
September, Clemenceau prompted Foch to meet the King as he believed that the 
latter ‘would not sit idly by as the British and French advanced’.7 With the coming 
together of Foch and Albert, the idea of the GAF was born; also involved in a round of 
meetings were the Belgian Chief of Staff, Gillain, Haig (and Henry Wilson,8 at Haig’s 
request) and Plumer. On 9 September, at Cassel, an agreement was reached on the 
establishment of a new Army Group: the Groupe d’Armées des Flandres (Army 
Group, Flanders - GAF). This would comprise the Belgian Army, the British Second 
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Army and two French Corps. The GAF would be led by King Albert with the French 
General Jean Marie Joseph Degoutte as Chief of Staff.9 
 
This represented a major shift in Albert’s position regarding the army. In the past he 
had always wanted to see his army as independent of the allied forces, and, whilst 
stating his willingness to work cooperatively, was single-mindedly committed to 
maintaining the neutrality of Belgium.10 Wishing to avoid further devastation to his 
country, he had even been prepared to consider a unilateral negotiated peace with 
Germany during the winter of 1915-16. The views of his cabinet prevented any such 
manoeuvre and the influence of the Foreign Minister, Paul Hyams (former 
ambassador to Britain), together with the attractive prospect of leading Belgian troops 
in the liberation of the country, persuaded him to finally agree to cooperation with the 
allies in the final push in 1918. 
 
Haig had therefore offered, in the interests of the overall campaign to defeat the main 
German field armies on the  Western Front, to relinquish operational control of Plumer 
and Second Army; British Second Army would operate within the Army Group, under 
the overall command of the Belgian King.
11
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Subsequently, when a dispute arose over the return of Second Army to his command, 
Haig summarised his original view of this arrangement in a letter to Foch as follows: 
 
[At Cassel on 9 September] it was agreed by me that two divisions of the 
Second Army should be employed under the command of His Majesty the King 
of the Belgians for the purpose of covering the flank of the Army of Flanders 
operating in an easterly direction. It was further agreed that the whole of the 
Second Army should be used in the event of the enemy retiring from the 
MESSINES Ridge, and to exploit any success which might be obtained by 
following and pressing the German forces… The Second Army was not to be 
committed to any other operation than that of clearing the ground up to the 
LYS River. The whole scope of the operation had as its objective the ‘clearing 
of the Belgian coast and the country between the coast and the River LYS’.12 
 
As will be seen, in practice there were no two specified British divisions placed under 
King Albert’s direct command; Second Army as a whole acted in concert with its army 
group partners. It is not clear whether Haig subsequently chose to reinterpret the 
agreement in this way or if Plumer perceived that the achievement of the overall 
objective was most likely if the whole of Second Army co-operated with the allied 
forces in the GAF. It was the latter course which Plumer followed, though he was to 
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carry it out in single-minded fashion: the operations of Second Army would be 
determined by its GOC albeit in accordance with the strategic aims of the army group. 
The performance of Second Army would go well beyond the limited role outlined here 
by Haig. 
 
At the same time as he wrote the above letter to Foch, Haig also wrote to the War 
Office on the same subject. In this more detailed letter he emphasises that his original 
agreement was for a ‘temporary detachment of the Second Army under the King of 
the Belgians’, and that Second Army ‘was to be returned on the completion of the 
specific operation in hand’.13 It is not clear if this is an example of Haig seeking to add 
limited objectives to the arrangement with the benefit of hindsight, or whether he had 
been satisfied from the outset that the agreement with Foch was explicitly short term 
and limited in nature. The resulting successes of Second Army and its increasing 
importance within the army group would lead to repercussions however, not least in 
terms of the relationship between Haig and Foch. What is clear, from the resulting 
actions of both Haig and Plumer, is that the former had agreed to the transfer of the 
command of Second Army to King Albert and the structures of the GAF, for the 
purposes of an assault on German forces in Belgium. This arrangement and the 
circumstances of its subsequent ending are considered in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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 TNA WO32/5102, (General, Code 86(A)), Field Marshal Haig requests return of 2
nd
 British Army to his 
command from the King of the Belgians, letter from Haig to Foch, 25 October 1918. See Appendix E1 for the full 
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nd
 British Army, letter from Haig to the War Cabinet, 25 October 
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In his 2011 biography of Haig, Gary Sheffield points out that ‘Haig had already 
discussed with Plumer the possibility of co-operating with the Belgians and joint 
operations with the Royal Navy’.14 However, a suggestion by Plumer on 5 September 
for an assault to recapture Messines (conceded to the enemy following withdrawal 
during the fighting earlier in the year), was rejected as not sufficiently ambitious. 
Stevenson attributes these decisions by Haig to the importance he attached to the 
need for the Belgian Army to also take part in the forthcoming attacks: 
 
Plumer had wanted to by-pass the [Ypres] Salient and attack towards 
Wytschaete and Messines, but Haig refused to press the case, as his main 
concern was to get the Belgians into action.15 
 
With agreement that the general offensive would include action on the northern 
stretch of the Western Front, the aims of this particular operation would include the 
clearing of ground between the River Lys and the coast; the clearance of the Flanders 
coast; and the establishment of a line through Ghent to the Dutch frontier. Haig 
subsequently told Plumer that he should ‘be prepared to move a Division by sea to 
Ostend and occupy Bruges with left on the Dutch frontier, and connecting with Anglo-
Belgian Army on the line Thourout-Roulers’.16 Judging from subsequent events this 
advice appears to have been treated by Plumer with the same degree of importance 
as the guidance from GAF Chief of Staff Degoutte; that is, noted with respect, but not 
deflecting Plumer from what he considered to be the correct course of action. 
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 Sheffield, The Chief, p. 316. 
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Plumer had good experience of working with allied forces and commanders. As well 
as the experiences early in his career of commanding colonial and volunteer troops, 
there was his more recent time in Italy. Here he had made a good impression upon 
the Italian leaders despite his reservations about the lack of concern for their troops 
shown by some Italian officers. During the Spring 1918 fighting he maintained positive 
relations with both Belgian and French allies, despite some frustration with the latter. 
Haig had remarked that ‘The French have been very trying and poor old Plumer has 
had a most anxious time’.17 The evidence is that the Belgians had particular respect 
for Plumer. The Earl of Athlone, Head of the British Military Mission to King Albert’s 
HQ, writing to his brother-in-law King George V in April 1918, is quoted as stating that 
the Belgians ‘would do anything for General Plumer’; the same source also claims 
that the Belgians did not have the same liking for the French.18 
 
During June-August 1918 two American Divisions had served under Second Army. 
The commander of American 27th Division wrote how Plumer’… became a very good 
friend of the 27th Division… [all who met him] will always remember his kindness of 
heart and his interest and confidence in American troops’.19 The Ypres Times reports 
how one officer was on the receiving end of Plumer’s methodological approach. Over 
tea Plumer made the casual remark ‘Oh, by the way, O’Ryan [27th Division 
commander], how would you like to have a go at our friends on the ridge?’ Major-
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 Reported in Sheffield, The Chief, p. 316; reference Douglas Haig Manuscript Diary, 9 September 1918. 
17
 Quoted by Powell, Plumer, p. 266, from Edmonds, Official History Vol. 1V, p. 484. 
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General O’Ryan, having agreed to consider the operation, found that the details of the 
plan and the draft orders had already been drawn up for discussion.20  
 
Peter Simkins views Second Army’s flank role for the GAF, within a coalition force 
under foreign command, as Haig failing to give Plumer ‘a leading part in the final 
Allied offensive’.21 There is a more positive interpretation of Haig’s decision and the 
arrangements with King Albert. While the setting up of the GAF was certainly a 
political compromise negotiated through Foch as generalissimo, responding to 
pressure from King Albert for a visible role in the liberation of Belgium, it provided for 
the Belgian Army to be directly engaged in the final series of offensives,.  
 
The British position, influencing Haig’s thinking, reflected a concern to ensure that 
France and French troops did not claim the credit for a liberation of Belgium fought for 
by British soldiers. Haig both wanted and needed to keep Plumer in situ because of 
his proven ability to manage his way successfully through the political complexities of 
coalition warfare. In his diary for 5 September 1918, Haig reports his meeting with 
Plumer regarding ‘the instructions I sent him for co-operating with [the] Belgian 
Army… I told [Plumer] the most important object was to get the Belgians to 
advance!’.22  
 
                                                         
20
 Quoted by Powell, Plumer, p. 271; from the Plumer Papers, an extract for the Ypres Times, quoted by the Rev 
‘Tubby’ Clayton in an unnamed Toc H publication. 
21
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Haig was anxious to ensure that the Belgian Army would actively commit to the 
forthcoming series of attacks. At the same time he was also sceptical of the potential 
fighting value of the Belgian forces, so Plumer and Second Army would ‘stiffen the 
Belgian Army with two British divisions on [the Belgian Army’s] right flank’.23  One can 
see that only the presence of a full British Army together with a commander 
possessing a thorough knowledge of the area, as well as being known and respected 
by the Belgians, had the potential to provide the necessary reassurance to Albert and 
his troops. 
 
Another consideration for Haig should have been the combat readiness of Second 
Army at this time. This was a weakened force, comprising ten divisions, many 
depleted through the demands of the fighting in the spring. It is likely that Haig feared 
the Army was not capable of a role much beyond that of securing the flank of the 
Belgians; his prime concern was to give the Belgian Army the confidence to advance. 
As well as Plumer’s diplomatic abilities, Haig also needed an experienced 
commander who could nurse a weakened British Army through the fighting to come. 
 
Plumer, perhaps showing understandable apprehension regarding the capability of 
Second Army to carry out a major offensive, and given the unproven potential of the 
Belgians, showed initial caution regarding whether the GAF could meet the 
expectations placed upon it.  He was wary of the pressure for Second Army to 
provide the necessary support for its army group allies. On 13 September, Plumer 
told General Sir Herbert Lawrence (Haig’s Chief of Staff) ‘that he doubted that he 
                                                         
23
 Sheffield, The Chief, p. 316. 
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would be able to advance towards Menin and Courtrai unless the German defenders 
suffered a major collapse’.24 
 
Map 2 shows the allied front line in Flanders on 28 September, the date set for the 
GAF to commence its attack, as part of the allied grand offensive conceived by Haig 
and Foch.  
 
The German Army 
 
Its Intelligence Summary at the start of September had identified eleven German 
divisions in line facing Second Army, but only one in reserve,25 following the enemy’s 
withdrawal from the Lys Salient. These belonged to the German Fourth Army under 
General von Armin. Appendix A9 provides details of the German forces opposing 
Second Army in the forthcoming battles.  
 
In 1918 a German Division normally comprised three regiments (battalions). By this 
period of the war, the average fighting strength of a battalion was three companies, 
each of between 70-80 men.
26
 
 
The quality of the troops, in terms of experience and ability, was mixed. Most had 
been able to undertake a period of rest following the fighting earlier in the year, which 
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should have helped improve their capability and morale. For instance, on 10 August 
1918, the War Diary of 121 Infantry Brigade (40th Division) notes information received 
that there was now a fresh German Division (52nd Infantry) on the opposite side of no 
man’s land: 
 
As their moral [sic] and fighting qualities were probably high… patrols to be 
more vigilant than when the 207th German Division was in the line.27 
 
Though troop numbers meant that Second Army enjoyed a 2:1 majority at the start of 
the Battle of Ypres, the German positions were well-organised. Pill-boxes, dug-outs 
and wire from earlier fighting were made maximum use of, in order to provide for 
effective defence in depth. Machine gun positions were carefully concealed, and the 
wide deployment of snipers provided further problems for the British. The enemy was 
defending higher ground giving clear lines of sight onto the advancing British forces. 
The battlefield was another factor in favour of the defenders. The shell-torn terrain, 
pock-marked by craters and former trenches, was littered with the debris of previous 
conflict – ‘.... wire, wood and broken war material and equipment....’28 – impeding the 
movement of men, animals and machines. 
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 Edmonds, Official History, Vol. V. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
104 
 
The Belgian Army 
 
In August 1914 the Belgian Army had comprised a main army of 120,500 troops with 
18,000 volunteers, organised into six divisions of either two or three brigades; 
together with around 130,000 garrison troops.29 This, as Ian Beckett has noted, was 
‘a conscript army though one of only recent creation’, conscription only being 
introduced from 1909.30 Each brigade included one machine gun company (Maxim or 
Hotchkiss guns). There was also a small aeronautical section.  
 
Following the initial resistance to the German invasion, and the Battle of the Yser, by 
the end of 1914 the Belgian army was an exhausted and demoralised force: only 
85,000 of the original field army and the 80,000 Troupes de Forteresse reached the 
River Yser. Regiments that had been split on mobilisation to form a second unit had 
to be merged to maintain their strength; the army was desperately in need of new 
recruits. In a first appeal (26 October 1914) King Albert asked every Belgian male 
between the ages of 18 and 30 to volunteer. The government in exile decided on 1 
March 1915, that every male between the ages of 18 and 25 and living in Belgium, 
France or England was obliged to enlist (although there were also volunteers from 
Belgians living abroad); on 21 July 1916 this was extended up to the age of 40.  
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 The majority of the material in this section describing the Belgian Army is drawn from: Haythornthwaite, 
World War One Source Book, pp. 149-153; R. Pawley & P. Lierneux  The Belgian Army in World War 1 (Osprey 
Publishing, 2009); W. J. Philpott, ‘Britain, France and the Belgian Army’, in Bond, B.et al, ‘Look to your Front’ 
Studies in the First World War by The British Commission for Military History (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), 
pp. 121-135; and the website Brave Little Belgium – a website of summary information on the Belgian Army in 
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As a boost to numbers, many Belgians living in occupied territory made the risky 
journey across the Belgian-Dutch border to enlist. This was an extremely dangerous 
task, and many who tried were shot by German patrols. Eventually the Germans 
erected electrified fences along the entire length of the border, although many 
Belgians still made the attempt. From Holland they went to England and then to 
training camps in France. 
 
Lacking a strategic reserve, the extent of the front held by the Belgian Army meant 
that none of its divisions could be wholly relieved. From 1915 onwards the army 
maintained its ‘Watch on the Yser’, where the most frequent enemy was the water 
undermining the defence works. Although enemy sniping was a constant feature, 
there was little other action beyond occasional raids.  
 
Further south towards Ypres the flooded area between the lines became less intense 
and the terrain was more typical of the rest of the Western Front. 
 
The German Spring offensives of 1918 involved the reconstituted Belgian Army in 
direct action, notably the fighting near Merkem in April. Despite the initial German 
attack breaking through to the Belgian support line, the advancing troops were halted 
by artillery fire directed at them and their reserves. Under the cover of a moving 
barrage the Belgian infantry then counter-attacked. Gradually the German forces 
were pushed back – ‘Battalions broke, and the fighting degenerated into a number of 
smaller local battles’ – and by the evening all of the lost ground had been 
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recovered.31  The action demonstrated that the Belgians had the potential to take the 
offensive as well as defend ground. Terraine states that ‘the well-rested and up-to-
strength Belgian Army had a good day north of Ypres on 17 April’.32  
 
In January 1918 the Belgian Army had been reorganised: the initial brigades were 
abolished and each of the six divisions d'armée was to consist of two divisions 
d'infanterie (each comprising 3 regiments). The cavalry division had three brigades 
with two regiments each, one group d'auto-canons mitrailleuses', two battalions of 
cyclists, three batteries of 7.5 cm guns, one company of engineers, and a platoon of 
télégraphistes sur cycles. 
 
By the time of the Final Advance in Flanders, the Belgian army, under its commander 
General Gillain, comprised: 
170,000 soldiers 
5,700 officers 
38,000 horses 
850 artillery pieces (not including trench mortars).33 
Appendix A8 provides the Orders of Battle for the Belgian Army in September 1918. 
 
Belgian troops had undertaken little action since the retreat in 1914. They had 
experience of trench warfare to the extent of maintaining and defending their 
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positions,34 but were composed predominantly of fresh soldiers. Their preparation 
and readiness for action in 1918 can be most closely compared with the American 
troops arriving in France at this time: they offered enthusiasm and energy, but lacked 
the experience of the modern warfare of 1918. The Belgians did, however, have the 
added incentive of fighting to liberate their country from German occupation.  
 
The appearance of the troops had also changed from the 19th century uniform worn in 
1914. The revised uniform was a curious hybrid of French and British influence: a 
French Adrian helmet, a greatcoat, a uniform of khaki serge procured from Britain, 
and equipment made by the Mills company and similar to the British 1908 pattern. 
 
… At any distance [the Belgian soldier] resembled a soldier of the French 
Colonial and Moroccan divisions… M1915 Adrian helmets with cloth covers 
[and] M2 gasmasks.35 
 
Control of most of Belgium by Germany meant that the army had no large pool 
available for new recruits or replacements; Belgian units, while relatively fresh, were 
often below their paper strength. Conscription now operated for all Belgians aged 18-
40 years, living in the retained part of the country, France, Britain and, from the 
middle of 1916, in allied or neutral countries.  
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The French Army 
 
Though the French Army had mostly recovered from the mutinies and discord of the 
previous year it faced serious manpower problems in 1918, exacerbated by the 
casualty rates during the earlier battles in 1918. Despite such steps as bringing 
forward the 1919 draft to April 1918, the recall of certain categories of reservists, and 
the enlistment and deployment of foreign recruits, considerable deficiencies 
remained: ‘Some front line units were composed almost entirely of men in their 
forties, some as old as forty-eight’.36 Many divisions were under strength and there 
were ongoing issues regarding supplies, replacements and casualty rates. Morale 
remained brittle and it was all too clear to the French soldier that he lacked the 
material support which the British and in particular the Americans enjoyed.37 
 
Appendix A7 includes the Orders of Battle for the French formations attached to the 
GAF: the original Detachement d’Armee du Nord (General de Mitry); and French 
Sixth Army (General de Boissoudy) from 19 October1918. 
 
British Second Army 
 
At the beginning of May 1918 [following the German Spring offensives]… of 
the sixty British infantry divisions then in France, ten were marked with a red 
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circle, indicating they had been reduced to cadre divisions and could not be 
made up to strength, at least not for some considerable period of time.38 
 
This position was exacerbated when subsequent German attacks led to additional 
British casualties, as Haig deployed British units in support and reserve roles to aid 
the French Army. 
 
John Terraine has described a retained cadre as follows: 
 
In effect, the infantry ceased to exist, the battalions being reduced to mere 
‘caretaker’ companies of ten officers and forty-five other ranks; artillery, 
machine-gunners and engineers remained available for action with other 
divisions.39 
 
Following representations made by Foch to the Prime Minister Lloyd George at a 
meeting on 1 June, there were improvements in the reinforcement programme such 
that nine of the divisions were reconstituted.40 Five of these ‘reduced to cadre’ 
divisions (14
th
, 30
th
, 31
st
, 34
th
, and 40
th
) would in due course make up half the fighting 
strength of Second Army for the Flanders Offensive.41  
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By this time there had been further changes to the composition of Second Army, 
including the withdrawal of the American 27th and 30th Divisions. The Army comprised 
four Corps: II, X, XV and XIX; there were now just ten divisions in total, nine of which 
had been with the army during the summer, plus 14th (Light) Division (initially attached 
to II Corps). 29th Division was a Regular Army Division; all the rest: 9th (Scottish), 14th 
(Light), 30th, 31st, 34th, 35th, 36th (Ulster), 40th, and 41st, were New Army Divisions.42  
 
A comprehensive listing of the Orders of Battle for British Second Army throughout 
1918, focusing in particular on the period September-November 1918, is contained in 
Appendix A. 
 
Second Army was made up completely of British troops – there were no colonial or 
dominion units. The Canadian and Anzac troops, who have often been presented as 
the most effective formations within the BEF, were all deployed in other armies. There 
was no obvious ‘elite’ or similar formation within Second Army;43 a British division was 
also smaller in size than its Dominion equivalent.44  
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With Second Army wholly comprised of British divisions, and containing a number of 
reformed, rehabilitated or potentially less effective units, it was potentially the weakest 
of the BEF armies in September 1918.  
 
During this final year of the war, the British Army faced an increasing manpower 
challenge. While the reduction in the size of British divisions was justified by 
reference to the increased firepower available to the infantry, there were other 
consequences for the troops involved. Any assessment of the performance of British 
units during the Spring 1918 German offensives and afterwards must take these 
changes into consideration. Implementing the reorganisation meant the breaking up 
of certain units and the dispersal of troops into unfamiliar groupings. It also reduced 
the ability of divisions to provide reliefs and to release troops for training and 
refreshment. 
 
Many divisions which had faced the Michael offensive in March had subsequently 
been redeployed to the north in order to recuperate; instead they found themselves 
repeating their experience in response to the Georgette offensive in northern France 
and Flanders. Battalions and brigades saw their surviving troops pulled together in 
composite formations, to allow for some continuing cohesion in command and control. 
Subsequently a number of units were formally reduced to cadre status, from which 
some were rebuilt to be restored to active duty.  
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The experiences of certain units and divisions prior to joining Second Army during the 
summer of 1918 tell us much about the potential readiness or otherwise of the Army’s 
operational formations, and the condition and combat effectiveness of many of the 
troops, prior to the commencement of the major offensives from the end of 
September.  
 
2/15th Battalion (County of London) (Prince of Wales’ Own Civil Service Rifles), 
London Regiment, only joined 90 Brigade (‘The Grey Brigade’), 30th Division, at the 
start of July 1918; prior to that it had been part of 60th Division in the Middle East, 
travelling from Egypt in June.45 Its soldiers had no experience of the demands of 
warfare on the Western Front. 
 
34th Division was reconstructed in June 1918, taking in units from India and the 
Middle East. ‘They had no experience of the war as waged in France’ complained the 
divisional history.46 The division was soon placed under French XXX Corps and took 
a major part in the Battle of the Soissonnais and the Ourcq, and the Capture of 
Beugneux Ridge. One of its battalions, 2/Loyal North Lancs, had entrained to 
Alexandria, en route to France, on 23 April 1918 with 33 officers and 941 ORs. By 1 
August it had been reduced to 7 officers and 380 ORs. The division was not ready for 
the intensity of the fighting into which it was plunged. It had 
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… no experience of war as waged in France, except in one respect, this was 
no great drawback, as open warfare was expected. The one exception was 
that they knew nothing of gas. So they were slow to recognise gas shelling. 
This caused casualties which troops accustomed to gas would have avoided.47 
 
The divisional history lists the various challenges facing this newly re-built formation, 
prior to its first action. Its troops had no previous experience of action on the Western 
front, the country was entirely new to them; they had only just completed a long 
journey by rail, bus and march. Although there were no organised trench systems, no 
time was available for reconnaissance (the positions of the enemy were only fully 
known once captured). The division was to co-operate for the first time with allied 
troops.48  
 
Thus Second Army, to which 34th Division was subsequently transferred, was not 
receiving an up-to-strength division, or one experienced in fighting on the Western 
Front. The arrangements for its reconstitution ‘as a first line division in the Second 
Army area and under arrangements to be made by Second Army’ were set out in a 
memo from GHQ on 24 June 1918.
49
 This detailed the constituent battalions for the 
division and also its supporting units,50 together with the initial steps for bringing these 
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together. Second Army was required to distribute the battalions to brigades and 
nominate one for conversion to pioneers.51  
 
The battalion selected for the latter attachment to the division was 2/4 Somerset Light 
Infantry, which had been one of the first units attached to the newly re-established 
division.52 This decision was not without its problems, as shown in the following 
extracts from a report, filed on 25 June 1918, on the health of the battalion’s troops: 
 
This Battalion is not at the moment suffering from a high Malarial incidence, 
but a few cases are occurring daily, and there are known to be 182 Malarial 
Subjects in the Battalion, of whom 50 are at present unfit for duty… 
 
There is a large number of men in the Battalion who have not had leave for 
periods varying from 18 months to before 1914. 
The general standard of health is rather low, rendering men more susceptible 
to any form of disease, and at the present time a large number of influenza 
cases are occurring. 
 
To render the Battalion fit for Active Duties in the field, I would recommend that 
they be removed to a seaside camp; that the training be of a very light nature, 
not lasting after mid-day, and that men who in the opinion of the Medical 
Officer are unfit for training, be excused. 
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I would further recommend that a liberal leave allotment be granted as this 
would benefit the health of the men and improve morale.53 
 
This report shows the practical consequences for Second Army of having a unit 
reconstituted from cadre and incorporating large numbers of replacement troops. The 
incidence of the symptoms of malaria is an ongoing concern of the medical 
authorities. The reference to cases of influenza is an early indication of the impending 
flu epidemic – itself a result in part of the poor health of soldiers and civilians; it was 
also starting to become a concern for the Army’s medical staff with implications for 
maintaining unit strength. The lack of leave taken by these troops challenges the oft-
referred to commitment by the BEF to ensuring its soldiers are regularly rotated out of 
the line and allowed opportunities for leave, as an important part of maintaining 
morale. The recommendations by the division’s medical officer, made during a period 
of high activity for the Army, for an increase in leave entitlement, light training and a 
period experiencing sea air, are suggestive of a sympathetic and concerned approach 
to the welfare of the troops.  
 
The medical officer’s recommendations were accepted by the division and referred up 
the chain of command to Second Army HQ for authorisation – reflecting the Army’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                
52
 The Battalion was attached initially to 101 Brigade for training and administrative purposes, prior to taking on 
attachment to the Division (TNA WO95/2456, War Diary of 101 Brigade, Order No. 205, 29 June 1918). 
53
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, memo 25
th
 June 1918, REPORT ON THE HEALTH OF THE 
2/4
TH
 BATTALION OF THE SOMERSET LIGHT INFANTRY, Division HQ, (signed) G. W. Bliss, Colonel, 
A,M.S., A.D.M.S. 34
th
 Division. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
116 
 
commitment to maintaining, and where possible improving, the health of its soldiers.54 
This action does not support the common perception in current times of a heartless 
and disinterested top brass. 
 
35th Division, originally formed as a New Army Bantam Division,55 had a chequered 
history prior to this final campaign, with concerns regarding its performance in combat 
at various points during the past two years. In the defensive battles along the Ancre at 
the end of March 1918, it had sustained more than 3,000 casualties. Despite its poor 
record, this latter action probably saved the 35th from reduction to cadre, showing it 
had potential fighting qualities.56 
 
40th Division had also been intended as a New Army Bantam Division, although a 
number of its original units were non-Bantam. In 1918 it saw action during the 
German Spring Offensives, at the Battles of The Lys, the Battle of Estaires and the 
Battle of Hazebrouck. Following the scale of its losses in the fighting at Hazebrouck, 
the division was reduced to a training cadre. It then was subject to a major 
reorganisation, bringing together former Garrison Guard units which were converted 
to fighting units. On 10 June, Garrison Guard Battalions 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 were 
allotted to the division, initially as a Brigade ‘… for work, and to man the line in case 
                                                         
54
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, initial memo 25
th
 June 1918, and subsequent memos 1
st
 July 
and 2
nd
 July. 
55
 The term ‘Bantam’ was used to describe specifically formed Battalions comprising men of short stature who 
did not meet. the regulations regarding height and chest measurements. For further reference see S. Allinson, The 
Bantams: The Untold Story of World War 1 (London: Howard Baker, 1981). 
56
 This summary is based upon P. Simkins, ‘Each One A Pocket Hercules: The Bantam Experiment and the Case 
of the 35
th
 Division’, in Sanders Marble, ed., Scraping The Barrel: The Military Use of Substandard Manpower 
1860-1960 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), pp. 79-104. 
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of necessity’;57 from 12 June, each battalion was allotted a permanent designation.58 
Two days later, orders were issued for 40th Division to be reorganised as a ‘Garrison 
Division’ (semi-mobile) with support arms formed through Second Army and GHQ. As 
such, the division would be required ‘to hold a quiet sector of the line’ with training 
organised to support this role.59 Via a divisional order, 13 July 1918, each battalion 
had the word ‘Garrison’ deleted from its title.  
 
9th Garrison Battalion, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers had been brought together 
at Buysscheure during the period 10-14 June 1918, many men being drafts from 
labour companies; the war diary refers to other ranks being equipped with ‘1914 
equipment’ at this stage. It began its battalion training on 15 June, when it was also 
renumbered as 10/KOSB. On 24 June, an inspection by the Inspector of Medical 
Services led to forty soldiers being classified as lower than B1 status, with the result 
that they were returned to labour companies.60 
 
In the same 120 Brigade was 11/Cameron Highlanders. Originally 6th Garrison Guard 
Battalion, it had been established at Etaples in June 1918. The battalion HQ was 
formed on 9-10 June; the following day, officers and four companies arrived, most of 
                                                         
57
 TNA WO95/2594, War Diary of 40
th
 Division. 
58
 Nos. 6-11 GGBs were designated as Garrison Battalions (GB) 11/Cameron Highlanders, 13/Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, 13/East Lancs, 10/ KOSB, 15/KOYLI and 12/North Staffs, respectively. 
59
 TNA WO95/2594, War Diary of 40
th
 Division. Four GBs transferred in from 59
th
 Division, First Army on 15 
June: the organisation of brigades (with deletion of the term ‘Garrison’ from 13 July) was: 
119 Brigade 120 Brigade 121 Brigade 
13/ Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 11/Cameron Highlanders 8/Royal Irish (originally 2/) 
13/East Lancs 10/ KOSB 23/Cheshires 
12/North Staffs 15/KOYLI 23/Lancs Fusiliers 
*Each Brigade also created one Light Trench Mortar Battery (3 officers, 47 other ranks). 
*On 28 June, 17/Worcesters absorbed 12/Yorkshires (Pioneers) to become the division’s pioneer battalion . 
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the men being category B1 and drawn from 29 different labour companies. On 14 
June training commenced. 
  
Two weeks later, the GOC, 40th Division, ‘decided to transfer Scotchmen to this unit’ – 
with the result that there were 250 new transfers in, with 221 Englishmen and 
Irishmen transferred to other units in the division (119, 120 and 121 Brigades). This 
action was no doubt designed to assist in building a shared commitment to the 
battalion and a close bond between the new troops; given the fresh composition of 
the unit and the combat operations pending, this can be viewed as a positive move, at 
least as far as 11/Cameron Highlanders was concerned. A new cadre of Scottish 
officers was received from the Black Watch the next day. 
 
On 7 July the battalion commenced a four day tour of duty in the West Hazebrouck 
line. Three officers and six NCOs from 31st Division were attached to the battalion in 
order to provide instruction on trench duties. One month later the battalion was 
inspected by the Army Commander, General Plumer. On 17 August, less than six 
weeks after the HQ was formed, the battalion took up front line duty.61 
 
This experience shows the steep learning curve which many of the soldiers making 
up Second Army had to climb.62 The new troops were not, in the main, keen 
volunteers with a long period of training behind them; they were young conscripts, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                
60
 TNA WO95/2611/4, War Diary of 10th Battalion, Kings Own Scottish Borderers. 
61
 TNA WO95/2611/4, War Diary of 11th Battalion, Cameron Highlanders. 
62
 Appendix J contains a short paper describing aspects of training undertaken by Second Army units, in the build 
up to the Battle of Ypres. 
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re-classified men transferred from former garrison battalions and labour companies. 
The evidence indicates that senior commanders were aware of this and there was a 
heavy emphasis on induction and training throughout June, July and August. The 
mentoring role described above, using experienced soldiers from a neighbouring 
division, is indicative of the need to support these newly (re)formed groupings. Units 
with a more established pedigree were willing and able to provide such support. 
Insofar as service demands and the actions of the enemy allowed, units were 
introduced to front line duty on a gradual basis, making full use of the Army’s policy 
for the regular rotation of troops between front line, reserve and support positions. 
 
As has been noted above, 120 Brigade was newly constituted as part of the re-built 
40th Division, and its comprehensive programme of training reflected this. During the 
first week in July the troops practised all aspects of musketry, bombing, and the Lewis 
light machine gun (120 selected soldiers). Routine PT classes designed to improve 
fitness led to the conclusion that ‘A number of the men however are unlikely to reach 
the standard of agility required for Recreational Training’.63 Junior officers received 
lectures on map reading, platoon organization and on ‘simple tactical schemes’. 
 
This record makes clear that the troops were in need of training across the range of 
skills and experiences which a soldier required in 1918. Basic rifle shooting including 
care and reloading was a fundamental part of the programme. Alongside this there 
was the essential need for a trained core of Lewis gun teams to provide the mobile 
firepower to support advancing infantry. In subsequent weeks there would be training 
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for a second team per gun as well as AA (anti-aircraft) shooting. Training in bombing 
had however only just commenced and there was much to do in terms of supporting 
skills such as signalling. There remained some concerns regarding the overall health 
and fitness of the men; a report later that month stated that there had been an 
improvement in marching with a reduction in the number of men falling out because of 
‘the worst cases having been evacuated to Base by A.D.M.S’.64 
 
Improving the leadership abilities of the officers and NCOs was also a priority, 
indicative of the overall shortfall in the initial capabilities of these units. The 19 July 
report for 120 Brigade, under the heading ‘Drill’, concludes that ‘There is still 
considerable room for improvement one of the chief weaknesses being the lack of 
power of command on the part of both junior Officers and N.C.O.s’. The training 
reports include reference to lectures ‘to impress upon all Platoon Commanders the 
importance of handling their own platoon and the need of cultivating the power of 
command’ as well as instruction in basic elements such as the writing of messages, 
saluting and march discipline.65 
 
The following week saw the three battalions commencing four days occupation of the 
main trench line for ‘training in trench duties’, on a rotating basis. Troops from 
affiliated units – Labour, Tunnelling, Royal Engineers (RE) – were also involved. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                
63
 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120
th
 Infantry Brigade, Training Progress Report 6-7-18. 
64
 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120
th
 Infantry Brigade, Training Progress Report 19
th
 July 1918. 
65
 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120
th
 Infantry Brigade, Training Progress Reports 12-7-18, 19
th
 July 1918, 
26/7/1918. 
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exercise was supported by experienced officers and NCOs from the neighbouring 31st 
Division, which was also under XV Corps command: 
 
Valuable experience was gained during these tours of duty in a Trench 
System: but the standard of knowledge of actual trench routine as displayed by 
some companies was poor while there is also considerable room for 
improvement in trench discipline.66 
 
The experience was also used to provide instruction for specialist roles including 
those of sniper, scout and observer; as well as lectures for officers on ‘Trench 
Routine’. In the following weeks the troops also received basic training on anti-gas 
measures. Officers received lectures ‘on the platoon in the assault’,67 although as late 
as 5-6 September 1918, 120 Brigade records that its units were ‘practising’ outpost 
and advanced guard operations, at battalion and brigade levels.68 40th Division orders 
include frequent references to an ‘Advanced Guard Brigade’ which comprised infantry 
units with attached field artillery and machine gun teams, under the command of a 
brigade CO; a practical illustration of preparation for the forthcoming offensive. 
 
In common with the rest of the BEF, Second Army was increasingly composed of 
conscripted men: 
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 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120
th
 Infantry Brigade, Training Progress Report 12-7-18; Brigade Order No. 
204 8-7-18. 
67
 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120 Infantry Brigade, Training Progress Reports 19
th
 July 1918, 26/7/1918. 
68
 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120 Infantry Brigade. 
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By the allied summer advance of 1918 a majority of the men fighting in the 
[BEF] were conscripts, and it was this force which won the war.69 
 
On 7 July 1918 7/Seaforth Highlanders received reinforcements of 28 other ranks 
from 3/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders; the average age was 18-19 years - none 
would have had previous service abroad.70 In common with many other battalions, 
the Seaforth Highlanders continued to receive new drafts of men at various intervals. 
 
Following the original introduction of conscription through the Military Service Act of 
January 1916, there had been a further series of revisions which had widened the net 
from which new drafts were drawn. The changes in 1918 are indicative of the 
manpower problems faced by the BEF and demonstrate the very wide range of 
calibre of conscript who would make up the replacement drafts for units.71 The 
Military Service Act (II) in February 1918 raised the age limit to 50 years, revised the 
schedules of reserved occupations, and gave the Ministry of National Service the 
power to cancel exemptions granted on occupational grounds. In July 1918 the Act 
was amended to raise the minimum age for exemption due to working in a protected 
occupation, to 23 years. While there had been developments in the medical 
inspection of recruits and revisions in the resulting classification system, there was 
also consistent pressure to supply the army with new troops. 
 
                                                         
69
 I. R. Bet-El, Conscripts: Forgotten Men of the Great War (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2009), p. 2. 
70
 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, 7th July 1918, 
71
 For an overview of conscription see Bet-El, Conscripts, Introduction pp. 1-24; from which the main 
information in this section is drawn. 
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… Ultimately, fitness remained a relative term: such were the demands of war 
that military considerations nearly always overrode medical ones.72 
 
Appendix I has a table setting out the medical categories applied to recruits and 
conscripts, noting the major change in October 1917 which removed Category C (‘fit 
for home service only’) and transferred all men so listed to the equivalent subdivision 
of Category B (‘fit for service abroad, but not general service’). The potential pool of 
those who could serve on the Western Front, in labour or garrison units, or in 
‘sedentary’ work (such as clerks, orderlies, or storemen), was therefore significantly 
increased.73 
 
The new drafts into units were not always of the best quality. 14th Division had been 
reduced to a training cadre the end of April 1918. The division was subsequently 
reconstituted during June 1918, being ‘mobilized with ‘B’ men’.74 An administrative 
note on 5 July 1918 lists the infantry and specialist units which have arrived in the 
‘Concentration Area’; and confirms the arrival of the remaining units, including 43 
Brigade, its constituent battalions and the division’s pioneer battalion, on the following 
day. The various supply arrangements are described – the note then ends with the 
following important commitment: 
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 Bet-El, Conscripts, p. 37; however, while this was a prime consideration for the authorities in Britain, the 
evidence suggests a more sympathetic and pragmatic approach closer to the front line – for example the approach 
adopted towards the soldiers in 2/4
th
 Somerset Light Infantry (34
th
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 This information is taken from C. Messenger, Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-18  (London: Cassell, 
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Arrangements are being made to deliver S.A.A. and Grenades and the 
attendance of the Field Cashier as soon as possible.75 
 
The new arrivals were therefore reassured that they would have ammunition and also 
be paid before becoming fully operational. 
 
The importance of the rebuilding process for such units – and the pride to be gained 
in due course through achievements in the field – is shown by a subsequent note in 
the diary of 42 Brigade: 
 
[7th September 1918] 
 
The 14th [Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders] captured 1 NCO & 7 O.R. 12th 
Bavarian Division in a patrol encounter. These were the first prisoners 
captured by the reorganised 14th Division.76    [My emphasis]. 
 
15/Loyal North Lancs (attached to the division as its pioneer battalion), from an initial 
cadre of about ten officers and forty ORs, was boosted by new drafts during June to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
74
 TNA WO95/1880, War Diary of 14
th
 Division, Administration Section, statement alongside period dated 17
th
 
to 30
th
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 TNA WO95/1880, War Diary of 14
th
 Division, Administration Section, O.C.1 ‘A’ and ‘Q’ NOTES 5.7.18. 
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 TNA WO95/1899, War Diary of 42 Infantry Brigade. 
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43 officers and 937 ORs – but on 2 July, 254 of the new arrivals were then ‘boarded’ 
as medically unfit and returned to Britain.77 
 
The process of rebuilding the brigades which would make up 30th Division shows the 
amount of work which parts of Second Army had to undertake. For 21 Brigade it 
began during June 1918, when the brigade HQ was involved in overseeing cadre 
battalions and also delivering training to American units. On 17 June its first battalion 
joined the brigade: 5/Royal Irish Fusiliers. However, just over a week later, the 
battalion left the brigade, ‘having been found medically unfit for service’.78 The 
brigade received (and kept) its three new battalions at the beginning of July: 7/Royal 
Irish Regiment (4 July), 6/Cheshires and 2/23 London Regiment (7 July).  
 
The different experience of each of these three battalions prior to joining 21 Brigade 
demonstrates the variable make-up of formations within Second Army. 7/Royal Irish 
had only been rebuilt as a battalion at the end of June 1918: 
 
[26 June 1918] 
 
The training staff of the 7th (SIH) [South Irish Horse] Royal Irish Regiment 
arrived to take over Irish Reinforcements composed of 500 Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers, 250 Royal Munster Fusiliers, 85 Royal Irish Regt.79 
                                                         
77
 War Diary of 15
th
 Battalion, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (Pioneers). 
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 TNA WO95/2328, War Diary of 21 Infantry Brigade; 5/Royal Irish Fusiliers joined the Brigade on 17 June and 
left on 26 June 1918. 
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 TNA WO95/2330, War Diary of 7
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A period of organisation and training followed, with the battalion allocated to 21 
Brigade of 30th Division on 4 July. Symbolism can be all in building and maintaining 
the morale and spirit of a unit. Three days later the war diary records that ‘Drums and 
fifes having been received, the Drums were organised and practice commenced’.80 
 
Like a number of other battalions in Second Army, 2/23 London Regiment had been 
based previously in the Middle East. It formally joined 21 Brigade on 8 July, spending 
the rest of the month on training and inspections. On 31 July it carried out ‘a practice 
attack’.81 
 
While part of the 25th Division, 6/Cheshires had suffered significant losses earlier in 
the year as had another battalion from the same regiment, 11/Cheshires. During June 
1918 the two were put together as a composite battalion. On 17 June the 11th 
Battalion was formally absorbed into the 6th; 6/Cheshires began its new life with 16 
officers and 492 other ranks.82 
 
Just two months later, 1-2 September 1918, 21 Brigade with its three transferred or 
rebuilt battalions took part in the action to capture Wulverghem.83 
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 TNA WO95/2330, War Diary of 7
th
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 TNA WO95/2330, War Diary of 2/23
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The 30th Division also included two other ‘new’ brigades. On 6 June 1918, the records 
of 89 Brigade note that ‘… officers of the British Cadre Battalions carried out tactical 
exercises without troops’.84 One week later an order was issued by the new 30th 
Division HQ stating that: 
 
[It has been decided] to reconstitute the 30th Division as a first line Division with 
Battalions due to arrive from Egypt about the end of this month. In the 
meantime the Division will continue to supervise the training of American 
Divisions in the Fourth Army area.85 
 
After a further week the battalion training cadres under 89 Brigade HQ were 
transferred across to the 66th Division. The brigade was then put together with three 
battalions joining: 2/17 London Regiment and 2/South Lancashire Regiment (30 
June); 7/8 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (3 July 1918).86 
 
Preparations had been made in May 1918 for 90 Brigade to become a cadre brigade 
and to play a part in the training of American troops. The brigade consisted of a HQ 
establishment; by 19 May it had responsibility for five cadre battalions, each of which 
contained ten officers and 49 other ranks.87 In July the brigade was formed with the 
addition of its three battalions from the London Regiment, all transferred from Egypt: 
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 TNA WO95/2332, War Diary of 89 Infantry Brigade. 
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 TNA WO95/2332, War Diary of 89 Infantry Brigade, 13
th
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2/14 London Scottish (1 July); 2/15 Civil Service Rifles and 2/16 Queen’s 
Westminster Rifles (2 July 1918).88 
 
Individual battalions each had their own tales of rebuilding. The losses of 25th Division 
had led to it being broken up and a cadre sent to the UK. 2nd Battalion, Prince of 
Wales’ Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment), which had been part of a composite 
unit following the Battle of the Aisne, stayed in France and received new drafts to 
bring it back up to strength. It was deployed to 89 Brigade, 30th Division, under X 
Corps of Second Army, where it was quickly brought into action and played a full part 
in the subsequent advance.89 
 
Despite the success of British forces, the casualty list remained high overall during 
the final months of the war. David Bilton has drawn attention to the manpower 
shortage in the British Army generally and its impact upon the quality and quantity of 
available replacements for the units of the 31st Division. He refers to ‘the extreme 
youth of the replacements’ and that ‘many men of less than perfect health were being 
sent to the front line’.90 The practical consequences are illustrated in this reference 
from his history of the 10
th
 Battalion (Hull Pals), East Yorkshire Regiment (10/East 
Yorkshires): ‘On the 13th [August 1918] we were unexpectedly relieved by the 15th 
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 TNA WO95/2338, War Diary of 90 Infantry Brigade; TNA WO95/2340, War Diary of 2/14
th
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th
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KOYLI so that we could move to the left to replace some B1 men of the 8th Royal Irish 
Regiment.... They had only done four days trench duty altogether, while their 
signallers had had but six weeks training, and the whole battalion had but six weeks 
training, and the whole battalion seemed amazed to find themselves actually in the 
fighting area’.91 
 
This problem existed across the British armies and while Second Army was not 
unique, it had a greater proportion of its formations requiring replacements as a result 
of the rebuilding of units. On 2 August 1918 Major-General Nicholson of 34th Division 
noted ‘.... all Battalions were down to an average strength of less than 250, short of 
officers and very tired.... though quite willing to advance, I did not think the men were 
in a condition to go more than about 3 miles’.92 
 
15/KOYLI was attached to 40th Division from June 1918. The battalion, initially 
designated as a Garrison battalion, was composed of mainly B1 and B2 classified 
soldiers, many transferred from labour battalions. The first CO, Lt-Col F C McCordick 
remarked with pleasure (though I suspect this was not shared by the troops), that the 
men marched six miles from Watten to Buyscheure in full kit even though B2 men 
were technically certified as medically unfit to march more than five miles.93 
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By the time of the Final Advance it would have been very unusual for any battalion to 
be at full strength. As such the need to avoid unnecessary casualties was a very 
important consideration. On 6 September, 40th Division wrote to its units for the 
specific purpose of instructing officers to take care in this regard: 
 
1. The situation as regards Reinforcements for the Division, particularly 
Infantry Reinforcements, is not, at the moment, entirely satisfactory. Hence 
it becomes more than ever necessary to conserve, as far as possible, 
Officers and men. 
The Divisional Commander looks to Unit Commanders for their whole 
hearted co-operation in this. 
He feels that much can be done in saving Officers and men unnecessary 
fatigue and exposure; in ensuring that they are well and regularly fed; in 
taking precautions about drinking water used, etc. 
2. In the forward area there is not always sufficient attention paid to the 
avoidance of unnecessary movement, nor when movement is necessary is 
cover intelligently made use of.  
The necessity of wearing steel helmets and box respirators in the defined 
zones must be insisted on. 
3. All matters of this sort which tend to prevent wastage must receive the 
attention of all Commanders. 
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It is appreciated that much has been done already but it is felt that there is 
still more to do.94 
 
Training was always of crucial importance given the number of reconstituted units 
within Second Army and the large number of new conscripts and re-designated men. 
The arrangements represented practical implementation of the British Army’s 
principal operational doctrine, SS 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions 
(issued in January 1918).  
 
Tactically there was a move away from the bayonet to the use of controlled fire, a 
major shift in doctrine. Field artillery was increasingly expected to keep pace with the 
advancing infantry; a challenge, particularly in the early stages of the Flanders’ 
campaign given the problems of weather and terrain. The increasing emphasis upon 
troops deploying in open order when assaulting, adopting a looser formation than 
even that represented by the ‘snake’ profile, reflects a greater confidence in the 
initiative and ability of the individual soldiers (as it was more difficult for NCOs and 
officers to maintain command and control when men were dispersed). There was a 
growing trust in the commitment of the troops to continue to manoeuvre forward, 
making maximum use of covering fire and available ground cover.95 
 
Maintaining the men in healthy condition was another constant challenge. The war 
diary of 7/Seaforth Highlanders notes on 8 July 1918 that, after a long spell of trench 
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duties (33 days), the men had a bath and were issued with clean underclothing; the 
Medical Officer, following inspection and acknowledging the length of time spent in 
front and support positions, ‘remarked on the clean condition [of the troops]’.96 In the 
trenches the risk of infection was ever-present; a later note from the same source 
records that ‘the prevalence of diarrhoea was very marked during this tour and was 
attributed largely to the water supply’.97 
 
Recreation was a feature of time out of the lines, officers making arrangements to 
promote sports competitions between units, with men taking part or as spectators. 
This was a means of ensuring healthy activity as well as providing entertainment for 
the troops. On 7 September 1918, 120 Brigade held its Sports Day; events included 
athletic races, horse jumping, tug-of-war, sack race, and mule race (‘no saddlery, 
spurs or stick’).98  
 
On 9 July 1918 the 7/Seaforth Highlanders held a battalion football tournament with 
inter-company matches; the following day its division (9th) held a football match with a 
team from 31st Division.99 Football also brought allies together; on the evening of 17 
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September, C Company of 7/Seaforth Highlanders played a football match against a 
Belgian team with the latter winning by two goals to one.100  
 
There is other evidence of sport bringing together Belgian and British troops. ‘Belgian 
Fete Day’ is recorded as taking place on 21 July 1918 – at this event there were two 
sporting competitions for teams from the Belgian Army and British Second Army, with 
prizes provided by Princess Philippa of Caraman-Chimay.101 On 3 July, 36th Division 
held its Horse Show at Proven, guests from the neighbouring Belgian Cavalry 
Division.102 
 
As late as 10 September, just two weeks before the Battle of Ypres began, a football 
match took place between British and Belgian teams, from 18/York & Lancaster and 
2nd Belgian Grenadier Regiment; the latter winning by two goals to one, ‘the Belgians 
being slightly the better team’.103 
 
                                                         
100
 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders; the battalion belonged to 9
th
 (Scottish) 
Division, the northernmost of the Second Army divisions, and deployed next to the Belgian Army. 
101
 TNA WO95/2299, War Diary of 86 Infantry Brigade, Administrative Order, 29
th
 Division, No. 160/136, 1
st
 
July, 1918. The briefing note from 29
th
 Division continues: 
The CARAMAN-CHIMAY CUP, to be competed [for] annually, and 11 medals, for the winning Divisional 
Association Football Team, from the two Armies. 
8 Medals for a Cross Country Run of 10 kilometres. Open to 8 runners from each of the [Belgian and British 
Second] Armies. Further information is being asked for, as to whether this is a team or individual event… 
It is thought that the best way of selecting a Divisional Team, as time is so short, will be to find out the best 
Battalion or other Unit team by an eliminating tournament and then give that Unit the choice of playing in the 
Corps tournament with the team as then constituted, or of selecting one or more men from any other Unit for 
inclusion in their team…Brigades and Divisional Artillery will select 8 men and all other Divisional Units… 4 
men to represent them in a race to be arranged by Divisional H.Qrs over a 10 Kilometre course. The first 8 men 
in will represent the Division… 
102
 C. Falls, A History of the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division (London: Constable, 1996; first published Belfast: McCraw, 
Stevenson, 1922). The Belgians proved to be proficient horsemen: ‘… the officers of the neighbouring Belgian 
Cavalry Division, including an Olympic competitor, descended like wolves on the fold, giving a remarkable 
display of skill and horsemanship, and taking practically all the prizes for jumping events’. 
103
 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
 
Breakthrough: The First Day - 28 September 1918 
 
 
… The Western Front was crumbling. Ludendorff might be able to hold the 
centre, but he could not hold the flanks. On… 28 September, the Allies 
attacked at Ypres, and finally, this time, they broke through.1 
 
In his book on the First Battle of Ypres, Ian Beckett makes reference to the concept of 
the ‘immortal salient’, associating this primarily with the fighting by the original BEF in 
the autumn of 1914, together with the subsequent battles in 1915 and 1917 and the 
adding of ‘yet more British blood to the salient’.2 He also draws attention to the major 
roles played by French and Belgian forces in 1914; it was fitting that all three 
countries would be involved in the breakthrough at the Battle of Ypres 1918.3 
                                                         
1
 Lloyd, Hundred Days, pp. 175-6. 
2
 I.F.W. Beckett, Ypres: The First Battle, 1914, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2004), pp. 5-6. 
3
 The Official History names the battle as The Battle of Ypres 1918. It has also been described as The Fifth Battle 
of Ypres (‘Fifth Ypres’) – the most recent example of this is in W. Philpott, Attrition: Fighting the First World 
War (London: Little, Brown, 2014), p. 333; this approach is based upon describing The Battles of the Lys (as 
named  by the Official History) in the spring of 1918 as The Fourth Battle of Ypres (‘Fourth Ypres’). 
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Throughout September, Second Army had concentrated on occupying the ground 
conceded by the enemy as it withdrew to improved defensive positions. Increasingly, 
as the month progressed, attention was focused on the forthcoming major offensive. 
There were regular efforts by Second Army to disrupt the German withdrawal through 
the use of artillery, frequent probing advances and small raids to capture and 
consolidate small pieces of ground. The seizing of enemy prisoners was also 
encouraged; for instance, on 17 September a forward patrol of 17/Cheshires (105 
Brigade, 35th Division) captured an NCO of the 40th Saxon Division, who gave 
valuable information on the nature and quality of the German defenders in the 
opposing lines.4  
 
Training remained a high priority, particularly for the units more recently reconstituted, 
though the Flanders’ weather continued to cause problems. During September, 41 
Brigade (14th Division) prioritised close order drill and patrol formations, but rain 
hampered a number of the exercises and forced cancellation of outdoor training on at 
least one occasion.5 
 
The RAF was active, recording a weekly outscoring of the enemy. During 10–30 
August, 75 German aircraft were destroyed for the loss of 14 RAF planes. The four 
weeks leading up to the Battle of Ypres brought an increase in enemy air activity, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Confusingly, The Battle of Ypres 1918 has also been described as The Fourth Battle of Ypres, drawing upon the 
nomenclature of the Official History. 
4
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade. 
5
 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade, entries for September 1918. 
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indicating anticipation of the pending attack, though poor weather between 7-13 
September prevented either side from flying.6 As well as attacking enemy planes the 
RAF was engaged in bombing German targets such as aerodromes, roads, railway 
lines and bridges. The Second Army Operations Report for the week 21–27 
September lists RAF raids on stations, (ammunition) dumps, aerodromes and docks, 
with 2,374 bombs dropped7. However, high winds and low levels of cloud had 
restricted the RAF work on counter-battery observation, although 232 ‘flashes’ were 
located. The Report noted that German air activity was ‘above normal’.  
 
In the week before the battle, both sides’ artillery maintained their regular duelling. 
Second Army artillery fired 93 HE (High Explosive) concentrations, nine gas 
concentrations and 535 ‘neutralisations’. There are two recorded uses of gas: 10/11 
September, from 379 projectors in the Ypres sector; 23 September, from 197 
projectors in the Ploegsteert sector. In response, the Germans continued their 
harassing fire, including neutralising fire on field and forward siege batteries. The 
British line was advanced via minor operations in the sectors of Steenwerek, 
Wulverghem, Vierstraat and Ypres, in readiness for the pending attack.8  
 
This was becoming a war of movement much different from the trench-bound 
experience of many of the troops. On 21 September, Sergeant Miles of 15/KOYLI 
noted: 
                                                         
6
 For the period 31 August – 27 September, the RAF lost 32 aircraft for 53 German planes destroyed; nine of the 
RAF planes were lost over the British First Army front – information compiled from TNA WO158/218, Second 
Army, Weekly Operations Reports. 
7
 Information compiled from TNA WO158/218, Second Army, Weekly Operations Report 21 – 27 September. 
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.... Jerry’s blown the bridges up. As soon as the Engineers have repaired the 
bridge we move forward again.... He comes over bombing at night.... trying to 
get our supply columns. On the move at last...9  
 
Commanders were aware of the need to ensure British units could operate effectively 
in the new environment of advance and assault. For example, at the end of August, 
the GOC of 34th Division was aware that his troops had not been ‘.... up to standard 
required for a war of movement and manoeuvring’.10 He issued orders to all soldiers 
in the division reminding them of the need to be able to operate as ‘a mobile 
formation, not... one whose raison d’etre is to settle down in a trench system’.11 
Action followed to address these shortcomings, including additional training, a revised 
organisation for supporting advancing units (plus the removal of ‘surplus baggage’), 
and a new ‘mobile system’ for ammunition supply. To help ensure that senior 
commanders could deliver effective command and control, he introduced 
arrangements for an advanced divisional HQ with different ‘echelons of support’ to 
allow for speedy communication between the front line and HQ staff.  
 
There is continuing evidence of the inexperience of many of the British infantry. For 
instance, the instructions issued by 41 Brigade (14th Division) a few days prior to the 
attack included such elementary points as: 
                                                                                                                                                                                
8
 TNA WO158/218, Second Army, Weekly Operations Reports. 
9
 IWM, 83/6/1, E. Miles, Sergeant and Company QM, 15
th
 Battalion Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 40
th
 
Division. 
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The attack will not be carried out in a series of rigid extended lines but platoons 
and sections will be kept under the control of their Commanders for as long as 
possible, in small column and group formations. 
 
Various roads and light railways lend themselves to the maintenance of 
direction, but in addition each Company will be given its direction by at least 
one compass. 
 
Troops will be warned that the majority of our field gun barrage will be 
shrapnel, and that though the shells will burst just over their heads they are not 
directed at them, and are not short, but that the bullets will strike the ground in 
front of them.  
 
Troops will similarly be warned that our machine guns will be firing over their 
heads, which may be disconcerting unless accustomed to it.12 
 
There were also reminders regarding such essential actions as distinguishing and 
communicating with RAF contact aeroplanes, sending back regular messages with 
times and locations clearly marked (my emphasis), and the potential for enemy 
dugouts to contain mines or traps. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
10
 IWM, 01/14/1, from the papers of Major-General Sir Cecil Lothian Nicholson KGB CMG, 34
th
 Division July 
1916 – March 1919. 
11
 Nicholson, private papers (IWM). 
12
 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade, Instruction No. 1, 23/9/18. 
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Signs of nervousness can be detected as the deadline for the attack grew nearer. A 
joint operation had been ordered between 41 Brigade and its neighbouring Belgian 
Regiment, to seize a number of small farms on the night of 15-16 September, in order 
to improve observation lines. Although the planning for the operation led to it being 
subsequently much reduced in scope, it was then directed to be cancelled ‘owing to 
pressure from a senior authority’.13 
 
The launch of the allies’ grand offensive would follow the timetable agreed by Haig 
and Foch:14 
 
26 September American First Army} {to attack between the Meuse and  
French Fourth Army} {Reims, towards Mezieres 
 
27 September  British First Army}  to attack in the Cambrai area 
   British Third Army} 
 
28 September GAF    to gain a line from the Ypres-  
Commines Canal to Clerken 
(ten miles north of Ypres) 
 
 
                                                         
13
 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade, entries 14
th
-16
th
 September 1918; Order No. 15, 14
th
 
September 1918. 
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29 September British Fourth Army}  {to attack the Main Hindenburg  
     French First Army}  {Position 
 
The deployment of the GAF at the commencement of the attack was as follows: 
 
British Second Army  holding a front of 14 miles 
(Ten Divisions   Armentieres – Ypres 
in four Corps) 
 
Belgian Army   holding a front of 23 miles 
(Twelve Divisions   Ypres to the coast 
Plus Belgian Cavalry Division) 
 
French forces   echeloned in reserve 
(VII Corps (Three Divisions) 
XXXIV Corps (Three Divisions) 
II Cavalry Corps (Three Divisions)) 
 
The disposition of the four Corps of Second Army, north-to-south, was as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
14
 Map 1 (Appendix B) shows the overall disposition of the allied armies. 
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II Corps 
9th Division 
29th Division 
36th Division 
XIX Corps 14th Division 
35th Division 
41st Division 
X Corps 30
th 
Division 
34th Division 
XV Corps 31st Division 
40th Division 
 
The start line for the GAF is shown in Appendix B, Map 3. 
 
Unlike the other British armies, Second Army had no tanks of its own, though some 
subsequent operations included co-operation with Belgian or French tanks or 
armoured cars.15 Second Army also had no cavalry formation but there are 
subsequent examples of support from French cavalry units.16 
 
The Army deployed at least 400 heavy guns and howitzers (one per 70 yards of 
front), and 20 brigades of field artillery (about 480 field guns, giving one per 60 yards 
                                                         
15
 The French deployed 181 tanks in Flanders during October 1918: Stevenson, Backs to the Wall, p. 218. 
16
 Jonathan Boff has pointed out the important distinction between a combined arms as against an all arms attack: 
‘By this stage of the war [September 1918], the British army had, in addition to infantry, six arms available: 
artillery; …gas; cavalry; medium machine guns; aeroplanes; and tanks’ (J. Boff, ‘Combined Arms During the 
Hundred Days Campaign, August-November 1918’, War in History, 2010, 17(4), pp. 459-477, online at  
http://wih.sagepub.com/content/17/4/459, p. 464); as pointed out, Second Army had no cavalry or tank units of 
its own – its attacks would require the successful application of  the combined arms available to it. 
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of front). In addition there were the 16 squadrons of the RAF’s II Brigade to secure 
and maintain air superiority. Despite rain and low cloud on the night of 27/28 
September, reconnaissance missions were flown and bombing raids carried out on 
supply dumps and the main road, water and railway communications. During the next 
week 28 September – 4 October, the RAF would drop almost 7,000 bombs on 
German sectors, including over 50 heavy (230 pound) bombs. Despite increased 
German efforts which saw 30 RAF aircraft brought down, the RAF recorded 51 
enemy aircraft destroyed.17 
 
The GAF received its first set of orders from the King of the Belgians on 19 
September, signed ‘au nom du roi’ by General Degoutte as Chief of Staff. The GAF 
was to attack between Dixmude and St Eloi, to break through the enemy’s lines and 
then use these as the base for further exploitation. This was followed by further 
orders on 21 September which provided for exploitation of the attack by the French 
and Belgian cavalry, plus clarification of the key roles for Second Army. These were 
to provide flanking cover to the Belgian forces to the north, and to establish a 
bridgehead south of the River Lys. 
 
Plumer had issued his main operations order at 0900 on 19 September, before 
receipt of Degoutte’s instructions, in line with the GHQ briefing he had received three 
days previously. The implication in the Official History is that the thoughts and actions 
                                                         
17
 TNA WO158/218, Operations Reports. 
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of Degoutte did not impress Plumer or the writer of the History.18 Harris and Barr 
comment that ‘Plumer and his staff seem, however, to have regarded Degoutte as 
officious and inefficient and to have thought that he did little to co-ordinate planning 
between themselves and the Belgians’.19 Powell, in his biography of Plumer, 
comments: ‘It now fell to Plumer to remedy faulty staff work in the GAF and to carry 
out much of the essential co-ordination necessary between his own Army and the 
Belgians, especially the scope and details of the artillery programme’.20 
 
From the 18th to 23rd [September] constant modifications of the [plan of attack], 
of the rate of barrage, pauses in the barrage in order to suit the Belgians, etc. 
were made and the date of the attack was altered on the 22nd September to 
the 27th and then to the 28th.21 
 
Plumer saw no need to amend his orders to Second Army. These took into account 
intelligence collated at Army HQ which suggested that the Germans were making 
ready to undertake a planned withdrawal in order to shorten their line. This could offer 
a window of opportunity with a period of disruption to enemy defences, offering some 
advantage to the attackers. 
 
                                                         
18
 For example, the text of the Official History (J. Edmonds,  Vol. V) includes ‘....going dead against the 
expressed opinion of General Plumer, it was laid down that ‘it is not necessary in the first instance to attack the 
Wytschaete-Messines area...’’ (p. 58)  and ‘General Degoutte made no attempt to co-ordinate action at the 
junction of the Belgian and British Second Armies, and it was discovered by General Plumer that several points 
of difference required adjustment’ (p. 60). 
19
 Harris with Barr, Amiens. 
20
 Powell,  Plumer. 
21
 TNA WO95/2470/1, 35
th
 Division Headquarters General Staff: Narrative of Operations from 28
th
 September to 
end of October, 1918. 
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On the northern sector of the British line, II Corps (9th and 29th Divisions, with 36th in 
reserve) and XIX Corps (14th and 35th Divisions, with 41st in reserve) would attack at 
Zero hour. To the south, X Corps and XV Corps were to await the initial outcomes 
and to advance should opportunity permit ‘... and take every advantage of the enemy 
weakening on their front to press their advantage’.22 
 
In accordance with Second Army’s reputation for thorough preparation, a large-scale 
model of the positions to be attacked was constructed at Army HQ. Officers from 
each attacking division were brought in to be briefed on the overall attack and their 
role within it. For example, the ‘Narrative of Operations’ by 35th Division records: 
 
On the 25th and 26th September the G.O.C. [of 35th Division] took large parties 
of Officers, about 60 each day, to CASSEL and with the help of Major General 
PERCY (M.G.G.S. Second Army), and Captain HEYWOOD (G.3) explained 
the ground they were going to attack over on the large scale model at Second 
Army Headquarters, pointing out the marshy places, cuttings, land marks, dug-
outs, etc., which all three Officers knew intimately from previous experiences. 
Afterwards the various Commanders of Battalions and Companies discussed 
their mutual co-operation and practically played a war-game of their portion of 
the attack. It is certain that this was responsible in a great degree for the 
smoothness with which the operations were subsequently carried out.23 
 
                                                         
22
 Second Army Order No 35, 19
th
 September 1918, signed by Major-General J Percy, CGS of Second Army – 
from  J. Edmonds,  Official History Vol. V.   
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On 24 September a joint conference took place between leaders of the Belgian Army 
and British Second Army in order to finalise the practical arrangements for the attack. 
Most notably, the discussion focused upon the use of artillery, with the British 
favouring a surprise attack without a preliminary bombardment. The Belgians were 
concerned at the ability of their forces to breach the German defences without an 
initial bombardment and so it was agreed that they would commence a barrage three 
hours before Z-hour. Both forces were to apply a creeping barrage but with lifts of 100 
metres for the Belgians and 100 yards for the British.24  
 
That same day, Plumer issued a summary set of orders to his four Corps 
commanders which show the initial caution in his interpretation of the directions being 
issued by the GAF. The Second Army commander makes clear that Corps will make 
no attempt to ‘exploit’ or take any further action once the initial agreed objectives 
have been achieved; and this will happen only once further orders have been given 
by him. Although making clear his ‘grip’ of the situation, Plumer does demonstrate his 
appreciation of the potential for Second Army to make a strategic breakthrough; and 
outlines how each Corps can contribute to a broadening of the offensive: 
 
If the first phase of the operation is carried out as planned the Second Army 
will have as their next task the capture of the ground west of the YPRES-
COMINES CANAL and west of the [RIVER] LYS north of ARMENTIERES. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
23
 TNA WO95/2470/1, 35
th
 Division. 
24
 An arrangement preserving the integrity of the British Imperial unit! 
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… II Corps will have to keep touch with the Belgian Army on its left and the XIX 
Corps on its right and to prepare for a further advance eastward. 
 
The XIX Corps will have to move along the CANAL to HOUTHEM and 
COMINES. 
 
The XV Corps will have to secure the crossings over the LYS and move on 
COMINES. 
 
The X Corps will have to move forward via WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES to 
join up with the XV and XIX Corps.25 
 
As will be seen, this prediction of how operations could proceed is reflected very 
closely in the development of the campaign and Second Army’s advance. 
 
There is evidence that Second Army orders below Army HQ and Corps levels were 
being shared with the allied forces within the GAF: copies of divisional orders being 
copied to the ‘French Mission’ and the ‘Belgian Mission’. The source is from within 
29th Division which came under II Corps, the latter bordering the Belgian Army during 
the battle.26  
 
                                                         
25
 These orders, G452, 24
th
 September 1918, are located within TNA WO95/2285, War Diary of 29
th
 Division. It 
is important to note the stress placed upon maintaining touch with the Belgian Army, reflecting the flank 
protection that Second Army was charged to provide. 
26
 TNA WO95/2303, War Diary of 87 Infantry Brigade (29
th
 Division). 
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Some units of Second Army were already used to co-operating with their Belgian 
allies at tactical and operational levels, having spent time alongside each other at the 
boundary of the two armies. For example, during the latter part of August, 41 Brigade 
had spent time deployed on the extreme left flank of Second Army. Its orders give 
specific details on the practical arrangements to be made for liaison by its battalions 
with the adjacent Belgian formation:27 
 
The 2nd Belgian Grenadier Regt. is on the left of this Brigade front. Officers and 
O.Rs. for liaison are required as follows: 
1) 1 Senior Officer and 2 runners for duty with H.Qs., 2nd Belgian 
Grenadier Regt. will be found by 33rd London Regt… 
2) 1 Officer and 2 runners for duty with H.Qs. Right Battn., 2nd Belgian 
Grenadier Regt. will be found by 29th D.L.I.… 
3) 2 runners for duty with Right Front Coy., Belgians, will be found by 18th 
Y. & L. 
4) 2 runners for duty with Support Battn. H.Qs., 2nd Belgian Regt., to be 
detailed by 29th D.L.I. 
The above personnel will report to H.Qs., 103
rd
 Inf. Bde. [the Brigade being 
relieved]. 
 
                                                         
27
 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade, Order No. 10, 26
th
 August, 1918; Amendments & 
addenda to… Order No. 10, 27th July [27th August] 1918. 
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The detail of these arrangements was repeated in the orders for relieving brigades 
during subsequent deployment along the boundary of the two armies.28  
 
The covering barrages for the infantry would be delivered without prior registration. 
Both smoke and gas barrages would be included in the artillery preparation, in order 
to neutralise defensive positions and reduce the defenders’ visibility, thus offering 
some further protection for the advancing troops. In addition to the field artillery 
creeping barrage, a proportion of the heavy artillery would fire a rolling barrage ahead 
of the ‘creeper’. This would help to prevent the defenders in the front-line from 
carrying out an orderly withdrawal and also discourage the bringing up of reserves. 
The rest of the heavy artillery would engage in counter-battery fire and bombardment 
of specified targets. Certain batteries were to select and camouflage forward positions 
to which they could move once the infantry advanced, thus allowing them to extend 
the time and distance over which they could offer support to the advancing troops. 
Time limits were set for the indirect barrage fire, after which this would cease west of 
certain pre-determined lines. The exception was observed direct fire from field guns 
attached to attacking infantry. These arrangements would allow ground troops to 
exploit any successes without being hindered by gunfire from their own side. Heavy 
machine gun batteries contributed to the creeping barrage and delivered 
concentrated fire on specified objectives; in addition ‘… certain [machine] guns were 
detailed to work forward with the infantry to act as a Battery of opportunity’.29 
 
                                                         
28
 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade, Order No. 11, 3
rd
 September, 1918; Order No. 13, 11
th
 
September, 1918. 
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Troops of the assaulting units would wear ‘fighting order’ of 170 rounds SAA, two 
bombs and two flares per soldier, plus smoke bombs for ‘dealing with hostile Machine 
Guns and Dug-outs’.30 Units moving up in reserve would bring five sandbags per 
soldier plus a variety of picks and shovels.31 
 
The orders for 2/15 London Regiment (90 Brigade, 30th Division) included handwritten 
instructions, issued on the day before the battle, referring to the wide range of 
materiel to support the attacking infantry. Each rifleman carried one extra bandolier of 
ammunition plus two Mills grenades; sixteen magazines were provided for each Lewis 
gun; rifle grenadiers were each issued with five grenades and five smoke bombs. 
Other equipment issued at platoon or company level included wire cutters, aeroplane 
flares, Very pistols and lights, and message rockets; support and reserve companies 
would each bring forward 24 pickaxes and 48 shovels (for entrenching). Every soldier 
had a full water bottle at zero hour and carried an extra two days’ rations plus his ‘iron 
ration’.32 
 
Reading the preparatory orders and plans leading up to the Battle of Ypres, one can 
detect an inner confidence within the level of detail and organisation. This is not just 
the benefit of hindsight, from knowing of the subsequent success of the initial attack. 
There is an overwhelming sense of men and commanders who had begun to believe 
that their time had come – they were finally going to make that breakthrough which 
                                                                                                                                                                                
29
 TNA WO95/1876, War Diary of 14
th
 Division: General Staff, Report on Operations, 28
th
 September 1918.  
30
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade, Order No. 267, 24
th
 September 1918. 
31
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade, Order No. 267, 24
th
 September 1918. 
32
 TNA WO95/2340, War Diary of 2/15
th
 Battalion, London Regiment, Admin Instructions to Order LXVI. 
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had for so long eluded them. There is a confidence amongst the soldiers - confidence 
in their mates, in the range of materiel available, in the success of recent small 
actions and raids, in the status of the opposition, in their leaders, in their own abilities 
- showing a conviction that success lies ahead. 
 
For an example of the artillery plans below corps level, the orders for 35th Division 
(attacking on the left flank of XIX Corps in the direction of Zandvoorde) included a 
creeping barrage at the rate of 100 yards in three minutes, double pauses in the 
barrage at 500, 1000 and 1500 yards; and (following fine-tuning of the attack plans) 
after 1500 yards the rate of lift to slow to 100 yards in five minutes. Designated 
‘special points’ would be ‘dealt with by Field Howitzers’ or, for more distant points, by 
corps heavy artillery. As the advance proceeded beyond the line of the first objective 
then the two forward brigades would each have access to one battery of 18 pounder 
field guns and one section of 4.5” howitzers, under the direction of the brigade-
general. The division would also have two additional brigades of field artillery 
available.33 
 
The division’s orders provided for the immediate repair of certain roads once the 
attack commenced – reflecting the concerns of commanders regarding their ability to 
maintain supplies and support for the advance troops.  
 
The extent of the forward planning and the cooperation between service arms is 
demonstrated in the orders of 14th Division, which included details on signalling to the 
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RAF for additional supplies of ammunition.34 Further evidence of the careful 
preparation undertaken is the mapping of current and proposed supply arrangements. 
The orders of 29th Division included map overlays to show roads ready, or to be 
opened up now or later, for field artillery; plus mule tracks and tramlines.35 
 
Within 14th Division, the orders prior to the attack stressed the importance of 
capturing and retaining the key objectives (in this case, craters termed ‘The Bluff’ and 
‘Saint Eloi’), and for these to be recovered by counter-attack if necessary.36 The 
orders also made clear that while strong defence was expected from the Germans, 
every opportunity to maximise the advance should be explored. There was a firm 
emphasis on driving home the assault: 
 
The general principle guiding the attack is that it is to be pushed most at the 
points where resistance is least and is consequently most successful. Portions 
of the line held up are to be relieved by the flanks being pushed forward and 
enveloping the enemy centre of resistance.  
Reserves will be used to accentuate success and not to reinforce portions of 
the line in difficulties.
37
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Despite the strong belief that the Germans were on the defensive and the attack was 
being made at an opportune time, Second Army could not anticipate a clear 
breakthrough. The orders issued by 14th Division include clear instructions for 
consolidating the capture of enemy positions and for units to be prepared as soon as 
possible to repel any counter-attack. A minimum of two defensive lines were to be 
established with pack transport to bring forward supplies of barbed wire and 
sandbags.38 Second Army was determined that by the end of the first day it would be 
a case of ‘what we have we hold’.  
 
The Belgian right wing would receive creeping barrage support from II Corps heavy 
artillery.39 The Belgian forces had also been allocated air support from the eight 
squadrons of the 5th Group RAF. During the battle, ‘200 hostile artillery positions were 
kept under fire during the operations and very little hostile shelling was reported’.40 
 
The ground over which the attacks would be launched had been the site of Third 
Ypres (‘Passchendaele’): 
 
… a battlefield of bitter memories. In 1917, it had taken the British Army four 
and a half months to reach Passchendaele, meanwhile suffering grievous 
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casualties in appalling conditions… Now the same ground had to be crossed 
again.41 
 
During the build-up, the commander of 28 Brigade (9th Division) wrote in his diary: 
 
… How familiar the place-names of today were 14 months ago: the Menin and 
Lille gates, Bellewaarde and Westhoek ridges, Zonnebeke Redoubt. We shall 
presently assault the identical positions then attacked by the 8th Division, 
containing the 2/West Yorks under my command. The bones of most of my 
officers and many of the other ranks lie between here and Zonnebeke. I hope 
the 28th Brigade will have better luck… 
All is ready for the battle; we can think of nothing left to chance… 42 
 
The physical consequences of the previous fighting were all too real. British troops 
would have to advance across a barren landscape scarred by warfare:  
 
The fearsome artillery bombardments of 1917 had destroyed the fragile 
drainage system and left a wilderness of water-filled shell craters, decaying 
trenches, rusting wire entanglements and all the debris of a war that had 
passed by.43  
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The cratered ground would subsequently prevent the hoped-for deployment of the 
GAF cavalry reserve, intended to exploit the anticipated early gains to be made by the 
infantry. 
 
The line of the first objective was the crest of a ridge overlooking Ypres from the east. 
South of this lay the Wytschaete-Messines ridge which the British had gained in 1917 
but been forced to retire from during the April 1918 German offensive. The British line 
extended south to Ploegsteert Wood and Armentieres; during 30 August - 6 
September, the Germans had withdrawn from the area west of this in order to shorten 
their lines. 
 
Various steps had been taken to ensure that the British units were in the most 
advantageous positions from which to mount the forthcoming attack. For example at 
2223 hours on 15 September, 103 and 104 Brigades (35th Division) carried out a 
minor operation which established a line of posts up to 500 yards in front of the 
Division’s line. The objectives included the creation of more room for deployment of 
the attack brigades, and to enable machine guns to be brought within effective range 
for barrage purposes.
44
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The importance of such operations for the Army’s preparations saw General Plumer 
first wiring congratulations on the success of the raid, and then visiting the Division 
personally on 16 September;45 a reflection of his particular style of leadership. 
 
Typical of preparations at battalion level, on 26 September the officers of 7/Seaforth 
Highlanders (26 Brigade, 9th Division), on the left of the Second Army front, studied 
the ground for the assault; with a conference the following day to agree final details.46 
 
There was a confident approach in evidence towards a German army that was now 
very clearly on the defensive. On 20 September a member of an enemy (Bavarian) 
patrol had entered British lines and promptly given himself up.47 This single incident 
was just a snap-shot of a perceived change in the enemy’s thinking: 
 
Information has been obtained pointing to the probability of the enemy 
withdrawing in the near future from his present front to positions beyond the 
MESSINES-WHYSCHAETE ridge or still further back. It is possible that a bold 
& aggressive approach on our part may bring about this withdrawal… 
It is the intention of the Commanding Officer to press close on the tails of the 
retreating enemy but avoiding casualties as far as possible.48 
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The final reference to ‘avoiding casualties as far as possible’ reflects the continued 
concern at command level regarding troop numbers, and a common commitment to 
reassuring soldiers that no casualties would be caused unnecessarily. Covering 
artillery fire to support infantry attacks was seen as a major way of reducing 
casualties. 86 Brigade, reporting on operations carried out 4-5 September, concluded 
that ‘the front of the attack not supported by barrage fire was held up and heavy 
casualties occurred, whereas the front supported by artillery fire suffered 
comparatively slight losses’.49 
 
An example of practical steps taken by infantry commanders to minimise 
unnecessary casualties included the deployment, at the head of the advance and on 
the flanks, of ‘fighting patrols’; these were intended to probe the enemy lines and 
provide intelligence which would inform decisions on the bringing forward and 
deployment of supporting units.50 
 
The ten divisions of the Second Army faced up to an initial six divisions of the 
German Fourth Army; the latter a mix of experienced and new troops, some rested 
and others recovering from recent fighting.
51
 Second Army Intelligence reported on 28 
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September that most of the enemy divisions were ‘… of good quality having had from 
3-4 weeks rest after heavy fighting’.52 
 
The defenders were largely deployed well-forward, utilising prepared defences of 
dug-outs, wire and pillboxes, as their numbers precluded the adoption of the strength-
in-depth arrangements used in 1917. These positions offered excellent observation of 
the slippery, shell-marked and generally open ground over which the British troops 
would be advancing. Second Army Intelligence had developed a series of maps 
which showed the location of the German defensive lines and the disposition of the 
supporting supply lines and assets immediately prior to the battle.53  
 
An attack had been anticipated, and the Germans had fired counter-preparation 
bombardments at dawn for several mornings leading up to and including 28 
September. There had however been limited disruption caused for the attacking 
forces. Despite the problems created by the condition of the ground for 
communications, transport and supply, the outcomes of the attack were to be very 
different from previous allied offensives in the area.54  
 
The disposition of British Second Army, and the progress achieved on the first day of 
the attack, is shown in Map 4. The first objectives for the British were listed as: 
                                                         
52
 TNA WO157/128, Second Army Intelligence Summary, 28 September 1918. 
53
 Map 11 shows the series of German defensive lines, as mapped by Second Army Intelligence, facing the 
British forces: TNA WO157/128 Second Army Intelligence Summaries: September 1918. Maps 12A and 12B 
illustrate Second Army’s assessment of the German supply lines and assets immediately prior to the battle: TNA 
WO153/508 Second Army: Enemy Organisation 1918. 
54
 TNA WO157/128, Second Army Intelligence Summary, 29 September 1918. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
158 
 
Molenaarelsthoek – Stirling Castle – Observatory Ridge – Hill 60 – ‘The Bluff’; forming 
a line from which a further advance could be made.55  
 
II Corps 
 
Securing the right flank of the Belgian Army was the responsibility of II Corps; the 
Belgians were to attack in the direction of Passchendaele and to secure the ridge 
overlooking the area. On the first day of the battle, II Corps committed two divisions to 
front the attack, 9th (left) and 29th (right), with 36th Division in support. Attacking 
companies each had two attached machine guns; supporting companies were each 
strengthened by one Stokes mortar. The signals officer of each battalion was to 
accompany the support companies and be responsible for the establishment of 
message stations at appropriate stages of the assault; a temporary station at a 
specified point on the line of advance and a more permanent station once the first 
objective was achieved. Troops were advised to remain ‘alert’ at all times given ‘the 
broken nature of the ground and the long grass’. Maintaining the momentum of the 
attack was paramount:  
 
In the event of a unit on either flank of the [29th] Division or within the Division 
being held up, adjoining units will not check their advance but will carry on and 
if necessary detail a party to watch their exposed flank.56 
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9th Division, which occupied the extreme left of Second Army along the boundary with 
the Belgian Army, had the crucial task of maintaining touch with its allies. It was 
crucial that both the assault by the division was successful, and the right flank of the 
Belgians was held securely; to provide the Belgian troops and commanders with the 
confidence to drive home their attack. Plumer knew the importance of meeting this 
primary aim of Foch and Haig when they placed Second Army under King Albert’s 
authority. 
  
26 Brigade was on the left of 9th Division, operating in co-operation with Belgian 
forces. 8/Black Watch was deployed on the left flank of 26 Brigade and therefore held 
the immediate responsibility of liaison with the advance troops of the Belgians. Its 
diary recorded: 
 
Conferences with Commanders of Battalions of 17th Belgian Regiment on left 
and Liaison assured. Lieut. H.F. Calder and 4 runners with Belgian Bn HQ. 
Lieut. B.M. Laing in charge of International Platoon to attack along the 
International Boundary… 
[0800-0900] 
Liaison established on left and right with Belgians and 7th Seaforth Hrs. 
respectively.57 
 
The nature of the ground was ‘soft, boggy and pitted with shell holes’.58 
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The enemy appeared to have been completely surprised by our attack making 
no show of resistance, surrendered freely.59 
 
Acknowledging the issues of command and control when carrying out an assault, one 
unit emphasised the importance of soldiers maintaining contact with their immediate 
leaders as the attack progressed and casualties resulted. Expressing concern at men 
becoming separated from their NCOs and officers, 7/Seaforth Highlanders had noted 
that ‘…all men should be thoroughly trained to follow their section commander or, if 
he becomes a casualty, his understudy’.60 
 
The important question of whether, once the fighting started, there could be effective 
co-operation between the forces of the two different nations, British and Belgian, was 
answered in the affirmative: 
 
[The] Belgian Army co-operated with the 2nd British Army in the operation, 
which was completely successful.61 
 
[0900] 
Advance resumed – The Belgians had some difficulty with MOORSELEDE and 
to assist them, 26th Brigade was ordered to bear slightly N of line of advance. 
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[1000-1500] 
… 5th Camerons [26 Brigade] coming into line between Belgians and 28th Bde. 
8th Black Watch and 7th Seaforths continuing in support.62 
 
These extracts from battalion war diaries demonstrate how Second Army, through the 
actions of the troops on the ground, delivered on its responsibility to support the 
Belgian Army.  
 
The first objective of the Freiberg63 Ridge was gained by 26 Brigade with limited 
resistance, other than the problems caused by heavy rain and mist. 5/Cameron 
Highlanders then moved through its partner battalions (8/Black Watch and 7/Seaforth 
Highlanders), following the creeping barrage, and over Anzac Ridge where an enemy 
strong point was taken out. The next obstacle was the Glasgow Spur which needed a 
flanking movement to capture a defended pill box.  The southern stretch of the 
Passchendaele Ridge was also ‘carried without much trouble’ whereupon the line 
achieved was consolidated and touch confirmed with the Belgian forces to the left. 
‘Battle patrols’ were sent out at regular intervals to check for the presence of the 
enemy.
64
 27 Brigade, in divisional reserve, was charged with exploiting the 
breakthrough towards Becelaere and then to Terhand; the brigade was also tasked to 
move northwards if necessary to reinforce the Belgian attack on Passchendaele. The 
brigade began its advance at 1500 hours and two hours later the troops of the 11/ 
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and 12/Royal Scots were involved in ‘heavy fighting’ to capture Becelaere; by dusk 
the village was taken. Enemy reinforcements east of the village were driven back by 
small arms fire. The flanks of the advance troops were unsecured for a time but the 
locations of the Belgians and 29th Division were known and touch was re-established 
in due course.65 
 
For 29th Division, 86 and 87 Brigades took the lead, with 88 Brigade in support; the 
initial objectives included Hooge and Chateau Wood on the left, down to Sanctuary 
Wood. In common with similar preparations across the Second Army front: 
 
Every effort was made to get the attacking troops into their Concentration 
Areas as soon after dark as possible, so that directly after a hot meal was 
served, as much rest as possible could be obtained before the Assembly…66 
 
The brigades adopted the now orthodox arrangement of leading initially with one 
battalion and then, once the first objective was achieved, the following battalion 
passed through and moved towards the second objective. Battalions attacked on a 
two company front with two companies in support. In this case, for 86 Brigade, the 
plan proceeded with 1/Lancashire Fusiliers as the leading Battalion. 1/Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers was in support, subsequently passing through the Lancashire Fusiliers when 
the latter was on the line of the first objective, to maintain the attack and exploit this 
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first success. 2/Royal Fusiliers, initially in reserve, then moved up and through the 
Dublin Fusiliers, to make the final push towards the target line of Polderhoek Spur 
and Cameron House. At the appointed time, subject to the progress of the attack, 88 
Brigade would move through the two forward Brigades to continue the advance.67 
 
The attack went in under a creeping barrage of smoke and HE shells, and corps 
artillery was retained to provide covering fire up to the final target line. Reflecting the 
fresh composition of many of Second Army’s units, the report of 86 Brigade points out 
that ‘Troops of this Brigade had never previously advanced under an H.E. barrage 
and owing to the intense enthusiasm of all ranks and the fact that one battery fired 
very short throughout the barrage – the greater number of casualties suffered 
throughout the day was caused by our own barrage’; those casualties very nearly 
included the brigade commander and his deputy. On the division’s front there was 
limited defence from the Germans in the face of the infantry’s attack, ‘but wherever 
the enemy offered any opposition he was immediately killed’. The GOC, 86 Brigade, 
is recorded as having brought down an enemy aircraft (these had been active during 
the afternoon) with rifle fire.68  
 
Resistance from the enemy was not sustained and the advance by 29th Division 
proceeded as planned, with initial objectives secured by 0900 hours; the reserve 
battalions of each brigade (2/Royal Fusiliers for 86 Brigade, 1/KOSB for 87 Brigade) 
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moved through to exploit the gains.69 Within the hour, 88 Brigade began its move up 
and through the front troops, to maintain the momentum of the attack. Rain during the 
morning had cleared away and the weather proved to be fine for the afternoon and 
evening. 1100 hours saw the capture of Gheluvelt and 88 Brigade, its flanks secured 
by troops of 86 and 87 Brigades, advanced up high ground above the Menin Road 
until checked by machine gun and artillery fire in the vicinity of Kruissecke.70 
Reference is made in the official records of using (‘driving forward’) prisoners to 
identify enemy strong-points and pill-boxes.71 By dusk the advance troops were well 
to the east of Gheluvelt and close to the Kruiseecke-Cabaret cross-roads; here the 
attacking units halted, facing considerable defensive fire from enemy machine guns.72 
The leading troops were also attacked at 1700 hours by four enemy aircraft; these 
were met by Lewis gun and rifle fire, resulting in the downing of one plane, at which 
point its companions withdrew.73 
 
During the evening, 36th Division moved up in readiness to move on Terhand the next 
day. 
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XIX Corps 
 
The two attacking divisions of XIX Corps, 14th and 35th, had the objective of capturing 
and holding the general line: St Eloi Mound – The Bluff – Zandvoorde – Alaska 
Houses – Kruiseecke – Gheluvelt; operating along an east then south-east axis, in 
conjunction with 29th Division (II Corps) on the left.74 41st Division stood in reserve, 
ready to exploit the anticipated breakthrough. 
 
On the left of XIX Corps was 35th Division which, with 14th Division, had transferred 
from II Corps, on 12 and 20 September respectively; these arrangements being linked 
to the plans for the forthcoming offensive. Army command agreed to the proposal by 
35th Division for all three of its brigades to take part in the attack (rather than the more 
common arrangement of two attacking brigades with one in reserve), due to the 
frontage of the advance expanding from 1700 yards at the jumping off point to 3800 
yards at the line of the third objective. The right and centre brigades, 105 and 104 
respectively, each had two battalions in line and one in reserve. Machine gun 
sections were deployed to be ready to move forward as soon as their involvement 
was sought. 106 Brigade on the left attacked with one battalion (12/Highland Light 
Infantry) through a company of another battalion; 18/Highland Light Infantry, in 
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support for the first objective, had an attached platoon from 19th Cyclists Corps to 
assist in the advance to the second objective.75  
 
The attack commenced at 0530 hours.76 A creeping barrage began at a rate of 100 
yards per three minutes, with a first lift four minutes after zero; after 1500 yards, the 
rate changed to 100 yards per five minutes. An initial ‘Line of Pause’ was identified, 
during which time the artillery would ‘search backwards and forwards’;77 after which 
four companies held in reserve (two per attacking battalion) would resume the 
advance. The priority was to seize and hold ‘at all costs’ the first objective around the 
Triangular Bluff and Buff’s Bank - the line to be arranged for defence as quickly as 
possible. This action was necessary to secure the flank of the corps and the corps 
boundary, thereby protecting the next stage of the attack. 105 Brigade, supported by 
35th Division Machine Gun Corps, was responsible for holding this line, acting at that 
point as division reserve; available to pursue a retreating enemy or to make a flank 
attack should the Germans attempt a counter-attack through Zandvoorde.78 104 
Brigade noted that the field artillery had experienced ‘… great difficulty in getting their 
guns forward owing to the extremely bad state of the ground’.79 This delay meant that 
the German machine guns were able to put up a considerable resistance to the 
attack. Pack transport was used to bring rations, water and ammunition up to the 
advance troops.80 
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For 106 Brigade, 12/Highland Light Infantry achieved the first objective within two 
hours and pushed on for a further 500 yards, subsequently capturing a section of 
German field guns which had been firing on the supporting advance by 18/Highland 
Infantry. Further progress was generally steady during the day despite ongoing 
problems in bringing forward the field artillery designated to provide fire support (‘the 
road was extremely bad and mined’); it was evening before these guns could be 
brought into action, in the vicinity of Hedge Trench Tunnels. The problems with the 
ground conditions also held up the cyclists’ section. The brigade secured and made 
good its final objective Alaska Houses by around 1230 hours. Communication was 
established with 29th Division on the left.81 
 
41st Division stood in the centre of XIX Corps; it would advance in support of the two 
other divisions in the Corps at the opening of the battle, initially on a one brigade front 
via 124 Brigade. The Division moved forward at 1430 hours, with its right flank 
against the east bank of the Comines canal, experiencing limited enemy resistance.82 
The Brigade was deployed in order to exploit the enemy’s retreat from Zandvoorde 
towards Wervicq, following the success of 35
th
 Division; pushing forward through 
Kortewilde to the canal bridge. A holding line was set up on a ridge north of the village 
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of Houthem, securing crossings over Ypres-Comines canal. The intended attack to 
seize the bridge at Houthem was deferred until dawn the following day.83 
 
14th Division attacked in cooperation with 34th Division (X Corps, to its right) and 41st 
and 35th Divisions (left). 42 Brigade led on the right with the objective of the St Eloi 
Craters; 43 Brigade advanced on the left, with the objective of The Bluff; 41 Brigade 
started as reserve. Orders stated that ‘these objectives will be gained and held at all 
costs’.84  
 
Careful plans were in place for communications within the division and its subsidiary 
units, and with corps HQ. The subsequent report on the operation referred to 
telephone wiring between brigade and division HQ, with trench wireless sets and loop 
sets for brigade forward centres as back up. Pigeon, dog and rocket communication 
was also arranged. Five mounted orderlies were attached to each brigade and to 
division HQ, together with despatch riders from the corps cyclist battalion.85 
 
The attack started successfully with a limited reply from the German artillery to the 
opening British barrage (there being no preliminary bombardment). The first objective 
was achieved on schedule despite an advance ‘over very rough ground, pitted with 
shell-holes and covered with debris’,86 with large numbers of prisoners reported. For 
example, 35th Division had processed 750 German soldiers through the divisional 
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‘cage’ by 1200 hours. More prisoners and a large amount of materiel (guns, trench 
mortars and machine guns) continued to be captured throughout the day. The first 
objective (the Triangular Bluff and Buff’s Bank) together with the adjacent railway 
embankment, was secured with little opposition.87 A German counter-attack against 
Zandvoorde at 1830 hours was easily beaten off, resulting in a further haul of 
prisoners.  Pioneers and Royal Engineers were employed immediately following the 
start of the attack in carrying out repairs to roads; this allowed artillery to move 
forward in support of the advance in spite of the poor terrain. At 1605 hours the 
division issued orders for brigades to secure the ground gained, to establish outposts 
and push forward patrols. All steps were to be taken to bring forward attached artillery 
and machine guns, supplies and ammunition; with a view to being in a position to 
resume the attack at short notice. Pack trains were used to deliver rations and 
ammunition, a means of supply which the division noted ‘worked admirably during this 
and succeeding days’.88 Such arrangements were reflected across the Army front. 
 
43 Brigade advanced along the Ypres-Comines Canal; 12/Suffolks on the northern 
bank, 20/Middlesex on the southern bank (with 10/Highland Light Infantry as reserve). 
This water divide proved troublesome regarding communications between the two 
battalions. A further problem was the condition of the ground, pitted with shell holes 
and amounts of broken wire. The brigade’s report on the day’s action notes that all 
the men’s helmets, brasses and bayonets had been dulled to assist in keeping 
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assembly preparations secret from the enemy (successfully so as it turned out). 
Attacking troops formed ‘worms’ i.e. section columns in single file. The most notable 
terrain feature was high ground on the north side of the canal described as ‘The Bluff’, 
with an approach containing a large amount of marshy ground. On the south side the 
ground rose gradually up to the ‘White Chateau’, essentially a large mound offering 
clear views of the surrounding area. The report describes the attacking battalions as 
‘weak’ and made up of men who ‘belonged almost entirely to ‘B’ category’; 
nevertheless their attack proved successful. The Bluff was captured by 12/Suffolks 
through a flanking move allied to a frontal attack that ‘pinned’ the defenders. The 
capture of this key point prevented the Germans from being in a position to enfilade 
fire on the attacks north of the canal by 35th Division. 20/Middlesex gained the White 
Chateau and was able to secure the right flank of the advance towards that feature. 
43 Brigade’s operations report made special mention of 184th Tunnelling Company 
which supported the attack: this unit cleared fourteen tunnels and dugouts, of which 
at least four had been mined.89 
 
On the left, 42 Brigade concentrated on capturing the St. Eloi Craters. The objectives 
were achieved in the face of limited opposition, and the front battalions were 
consolidating the line within two hours of the start of the attack. In the event the 
advance units went beyond the final objective, finally reaching the line of the 
Dammstrasse; unfortunately, due to the prearranged artillery fire plan, the troops had 
to pull back to the consolidated line. The following day saw the brigade ‘pinched out’ 
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of the line by 34th Division extending across its front in the direction of the Ypres-
Comines Canal; as a consequence 42 Brigade moved into reserve.90 
 
X Corps 
 
For the opening day of the battle, with the main attacks being conducted by II and XIX 
Corps, it fell to X Corps and its southern neighbour XV Corps to ensure that the right 
flank of Second Army (and the GAF) was securely held; plus to pin the German 
defenders to prevent the transfer of enemy units north.   
 
On 23 September, 34th Division and the line it held had been transferred from XIX 
Corps to X Corps; whereupon it was directly engaged in the preparations for the 
forthcoming battle.91 On the first day 34th Division, with 101 and 103 Brigades in the 
lead, was successful in capturing the Wytschaete Ridge.92 Its commander had been 
reliant upon the successes of Second Army to its north: ‘.... As we had very little 
artillery [the capture of Wytschaete Ridge] was impracticable until at least the 
Northern flank had been turned by the capture of the line of the Ypres-Comines 
canal’.93 He subsequently concluded that ‘On the whole it was not a brilliant 
performance, progress being much too slow and information very bad’.94 
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The immediate objective for 30th Division was Messines and from there to advance in 
the direction of Houthem on the Ypres-Comines Canal. For the opening day of the 
battle the main priority was to conduct a ‘strong reconnaissance’ linked to and in 
support of the principal assault further north by XIX and II Corps. The task was to 
widen the overall frontage of the Second Army’s assault and be prepared to take 
advantage of any withdrawal by the enemy (in response to reverses to the north).95 
For 30th Division, its machine gun battalion supported the attacks on Messines Ridge, 
subsequently being involved in consolidating the forward slopes; eight teams moved 
forward to provide cover across the Douve Valley.96 Over the next two days the 
division would be called on to show that, despite its relatively recent genesis, it could 
match its Second Army comrades.  
 
XV Corps 
 
31st and 40th Divisions formed the right (southern) flank of Second Army, with the 
latter deployed at the junction with British Fifth Army.  
 
The immediate prospect facing 31
st
 Division was Ploegsteert Wood. The planning by 
the division for the early stages of the battle was linked to the outcomes from the 
Second Army attack further north:  
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It was expected that this attack, if successful, would compel the enemy to 
withdraw from the MESSINES RIDGE and also from our front. 
In the event of definite information being received that the enemy was retiring 
on our front, an attack was to be launched against his rearguards, and his 
retreat north of the WARNAVE Stream pressed. 
 
The role of [31st] Division was: 
a) To cover the Right Flank of the advance. 
b) To press the enemy’s retreat towards WARNETON [a village lying 
north-east of Ploegsteert Wood].97 
 
The division’s plan called for an attack by 92 Brigade on Ploegsteert Wood from the 
north, aiming to gain and consolidate a line on the eastern side of the wood, based on 
the River Warnave. 93 Brigade would then move through and maintain the pursuit of 
the Germans; initially towards the River Lys south of Warneton, then north along the 
line of the River Warnave (in the direction of Warneton). On 27 September 
18/Durham Light Infantry was transferred temporarily to 92 Brigade, and took over the 
right of that Brigade’s line in place of 11/East Yorkshires.98 
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The attack by 92 Brigade began at 1500 hours, with the advance troops approaching 
the wood from the north, then looking to work their way southwards. Despite heavy 
enemy shellfire the attack made good progress initially with the high ground being: 
 
… defiladed from the Wood and screened from Messines Hill by smoke 
barrage. But the going is appallingly bad – a tangle of old shell holes, wire, 
trench systems and concrete emplacements.99 
 
The intensity of the defensive fire is shown by the killing of the artillery observation 
officer based on Hill 63. The brigade was also concerned that 30th Division to the left 
had still not cleared Petite Douve Farm and Donnington Hall. The day saw fierce 
fighting to try and push the enemy out of its positions in the Wood, including the 
beating back of a counter-attack at 1746 hours. Overnight the brigade held the 
northern part of the wood, although it considered its position to be precarious due to a 
gap between the positions held by 11/East Lancs and 10/East Yorkshires.100 
 
The successful progress to the north, specifically the capture of Zandvoorde by II 
Corps forces and their subsequent drive towards Houthem, led to changes in the 
initial plans of XV Corps. Having awaited instructions to commence action for most of 
the day, at 1700 hours 93 Brigade was told that its original orders were cancelled and 
it was to advance as quickly as possible towards objectives north-west of Comines 
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(thereby trapping any German troops remaining on the Messines Ridge). By the time 
the new arrangements had been made it was dark, and the two battalions leading for 
the brigade were only south of Neuve Eglise by 2230 hours. Enemy shell fire caused 
the advance to pause for an hour in extended order around Hill 63. 11/East 
Yorkshires (92 Brigade) was now attached to 93 Brigade, as 18/Durham Light Infantry 
was already committed (with 92 Brigade) in line, and the East Yorkshires took on the 
position of advance guard. Enemy machine guns were encountered at Ash Crater, 
and although the defenders were being pushed back by the attacking troops, the 
advance was slow. The brigade halted on Tilleul Farm, with 15/West Yorkshires now 
taking on the front position. The circumstances were not ideal as touch had been lost 
with neighbouring British forces; both of the brigade’s flanks were in the air. Lewis 
gun teams were placed around the position, the priority being to be able to resist an 
attack from north or south. Losses overall had been low, most of these the result of 
the shelling around Hill 63.101  
 
40th Division had been originally re-formed as ‘semi-mobile’ and deployed to ‘hold a 
quiet sector of the line’. During September, 121 Brigade had operated as its advance 
guard, moving forward in the wake of enemy withdrawals; over the space of 23-24 
September, 23/Cheshires established four advance posts north of the village of 
Nieppe and along the River Lys. The division was now charged with securing the right 
flank of Second Army, focusing on the line of the River Lys, running west and north of 
the town of Armentières. 121 Brigade occupied the junction with Fifth Army, 119 
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Brigade on its left. On 27 September, having taken over the front line from the 
Cheshires, 23/Lancashire Fusiliers attacked in the direction of the Lys.102 The 
instructions for the assault give a valuable insight into the main elements of 
operational planning within Second Army during the battle, at brigade and battalion 
levels. That the action failed to achieve its objectives at this first attempt, illustrates 
the scale of the challenges facing Second Army, and its rebuilt formations, during 
these early stages of the campaign.  
 
The initial plan for 121 Brigade, ‘a minor operation… to clear the West Bank of the 
Lys…’,103 was issued on 23 September. 23/Lancashire Fusiliers would carry out the 
attack; two companies to lead the assault, two companies to support with mopping up 
activities. Posts were to be established on the line of the River Lys. The attack would 
be supported by a field artillery creeping barrage: sixteen 18-pounder batteries, to 
move forward at a rate of 100 yards per three minutes; to fire one final round of 
smoke, to make the infantry aware that the final barrage line (and the objective) had 
been reached. A smoke screen would be fired by the trench mortar battery to protect 
the right flank of the attack; two mortars were placed under the command of 
23/Cheshires
104
 in order ‘to assist the advance and cover the consolidation’. Heavy 
artillery fire was concentrated on specified areas (buildings) in the direction of 
Armentières, and hostile batteries. There was also a machine gun creeping barrage 
moving forward at a rate of 100 yards per five minutes, keeping 200 yards ahead of 
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the field artillery barrage. Three hours after the commencement of the attack a 
contact aeroplane would seek for flares over the objective, to be lit by the most 
advanced troops. 
 
There were subsequent minor changes and corrections to these arrangements, the 
most important being that six (not sixteen) 18-pounder batteries would fire the 
creeping barrage, with an additional smoke screen to be fired by a group of 4.5 inch 
howitzers. The machine gun creeping barrage would now move forward at the same 
rate as the field gun barrage.105 
 
In the event the Lancashire Fusiliers made limited progress, eventually establishing a 
small number of advance posts to the east of Pont de Nieppe. The preliminary report 
by 121 Brigade on the operation, which did not include a report from the CO of 
23/Lancashire Fusiliers, described how the two supporting companies had come 
under heavy enemy fire: the company on the left fell back to the line of the River 
Warnave; the right company became split with some men retreating to the start line 
and others becoming mixed up with troops in the assaulting company. In the 
circumstances it was not possible to secure the original objectives. The reasons 
presented for this setback included the strength of the German forces, and the 
effectiveness of their enfilade fire into the supporting companies. There had been a 
consequent loss of contact between the support and advance companies on the left 
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of the attack. Although the smoke screen was effective, the supporting barrage was 
considered ‘thin’.106 
 
While the original orders had been set for 28 September, this initial attack actually 
took place the day before, no doubt intended to strengthen the hold on Second 
Army’s right flank. On the evening of 27 September, 23/Lancashire Fusiliers were 
relieved by 23/Cheshires, who would in due course move forward to maintain contact 
with a retreating enemy – a consequence of the pending actions by 31st Division. The 
following day a party of 10/KOSB deployed with ‘L’ Special Company RE to launch 
timed smoke screens as cover for advancing troops.107 
 
 
On the first day of the battle Second Army captured over 2,000 prisoners, plus 
considerable arms and materials. In what might be termed a return to the battles of a 
previous century, ‘Field batteries moved forward with the advance and engaged 
enemy troops and machine gun nests over open sights’.108 
 
The achievements of the day can be attributed to a number of factors. Overall the 
artillery fire-plan proved successful with limited response from the German artillery, a 
consequence of effective counter-battery fire. In addition, as noted by 42 Brigade, 
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The creeping barrage was good and the indirect [machine gun] barrage was 
excellent.109 
 
The effectiveness of the weight and direction of the different fire-plans on particular 
areas of the front had varied; the resistance met by 121 Brigade in an initial operation 
on 27 September (described earlier) was attributed in part to the limited barrage in 
support of the attacking battalion.110 The resistance of the German defenders was 
found to be weak overall although defence had stiffened in pockets as attackers 
moved further forward.  
 
The early morning mist combined with the use of smoke and gas from artillery shells, 
allowed ‘machine-gun nests and pill-boxes [to be] isolated and overcome with less 
difficulty than had been expected’.111 There were alternative conclusions however: 
 
The smoke made it extremely difficult to keep direction but undoubtedly saved 
a considerable number of casualties.112 
 
In general the bringing forward of covering artillery, machine guns and mortars had 
assisted further advances and the exploitation of early gains; this was complemented 
by support from the air through ground attack operations. There had been flexible 
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deployment of the troops, making effective use of advance squads, and the carrying 
out of flanking and encircling attacks as circumstances required. Lewis gun teams 
within advancing units had provided immediate fire support. 
 
The troops involved, contrary to fears that many would not be of the right quality or 
have received sufficient training, proved fully capable of undertaking offensive 
operations. This applied even when the men had been re-classified as fit for active 
service: 
 
Although battalions were very weak and the men belonged almost entirely to 
‘B’ category, yet they were filled with keenness and confident of success. They 
moved across the ground with energy keeping close to the barrage… 
…They showed all the energy, keenness and fighting spirit of ‘A’ men, and 
though they may not be physically capable of undergoing the same hardships 
for a long strain, I feel the utmost confidence in them… 113 
 
The successful breakthrough of the enemy lines is illustrated by the reports from RAF 
planes undertaking reconnaissance of the front on the following day. The HQ of 11
th
 
Wing, RAF, had telephoned orders through to 206 Squadron, requiring a special low-
level reconnaissance mission in order to determine the positions of the advance 
                                                                                                                                                                                
111
 Edmonds, Official History Vol. V. 
112
 42 Brigade, Summary of Attack on September 28
th
 1918. 
113
 Brigadier-General, 43 Brigade, Report on Operations September 28
th
 1918 (from TNA WO95/1876 War 
Diary of 14
th
 Division: General Staff). 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
181 
 
troops.114 The squadron consisted of DH9 bombers. Second Lieutenant John 
Blandford took part in the mission and his written memoirs present a vivid snapshot of 
the conflict: 
 
There was a thin ground mist covering all the low-lying devastated area 
between Ypres and Passchendaele, which was a morass of water-filled shell 
craters. We could see a good many shell bursts popping through the mist, 
German as it proved, for beyond the misty area we could see our infantry 
patrols and some tanks probing forward and in action against the German 
rearguards in open country, all along the front. We knew then that the Second 
Army had broken clean through all the German defences, and that here was 
open warfare again after four long years! A great moment believe me.115 
 
At 1900 General Plumer issued new orders to continue operations on the following 
day. These included important strategic objectives which were essential for 
maintaining the progress of the offensive. The key elements were for II Corps to 
continue its flanking role for the Belgians; XIX Corps to secure the Ypres-Comines 
canal crossings and support X Corps, once the latter had gained the Wytschaete-
Messines ridge, in clearing the area west of the canal; XV Corps to move north-east 
and seize crossings over the River Lys.  
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Further orders were also received from Degoutte, around 1930, once again after 
Plumer had already determined Second Army’s actions for the next day. Degoutte 
stated that resistance had been weaker opposite the British Second Army and the 
Belgian right flank. Accordingly, he concluded that it was here the attack must be 
pressed without pause. He also included instructions for the use of the French 
Cavalry Corps and VII Corps – though neither would come into action subsequently. 
The Official History records dryly that ‘General Plumer saw no reason to modify the 
orders he had already given’.116 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Battle of Ypres 
 
Advance to Contact: 29 September – 3 October 1918 
 
 
Company have dug themselves in in shell holes out in open country.  
Pouring with rain. Troops fed up.1 
 
 
29 September 
 
The increasingly poor weather, allied to the deteriorating ground conditions, was 
already beginning to interrupt transport and supply lines. Heavy rain on the night of 
28-29 September impeded troops moving to attack jumping-off points; mist caused 
units to lose direction. Many attacks were delayed as a consequence. Artillery support 
would be limited as guns were restricted in their ability to move to forward positions. 
The day also saw an increase in German resistance and there was hard fighting in a 
number of areas, particularly east of the Ypres-Comines canal. Army Intelligence had 
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anticipated that the Germans would bring forward any available bodies of men to 
reinforce defences. Subsequently it was found that four divisions held in reserve had 
been added to the line.2  
 
II Corps 
 
28 Brigade took the lead for the 9th Division, moving forward to take the Keiberg 
Ridge. The British troops and the neighbouring Belgian forces were then forced to 
pause in front of Waterdamhoek due to enemy fire. Additional units were moved up to 
strengthen the attack; 5/Cameron Highlanders (26 Brigade) moved into the junction 
between the Belgians and 28 Brigade. The renewed assault proved too strong for the 
Germans and the village was captured, with the advance troops continuing east, and 
over the Waterdamhoek Ridge. At this point, owing to casualties and some loss of 
direction, contact between British and Belgian forces was lost briefly; the gap was 
filled by companies of the Black Watch. Heavy machine gun fire and wired defences 
led to a line being consolidated in front of Slypskappelle, facing Slypswood.3 During 
the afternoon the Belgians were reported to have moved through the village of 
Moorslede; meanwhile 36
th
 Division had finally succeeded in capturing Terhand. For 
27 Brigade, 11/Royal Scots and 6/King’s Own Scottish Borderers had initially 
provided cover for the right flank of 28 Brigade, which had been exposed by the delay 
in driving the German defenders from Terhand. Subsequently 11/Royal Scots moved 
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east of Dadizeele following ‘hard fighting’ to take Kanterhoek Farm. The brigade 
secured a line along Richmond Crossroads.4 
 
The advance of 29th Division continued, largely in a south-easterly direction, with 
Gheluwe the objective; maintaining touch with 36th Division on the left and 35th 
Division (XIX Corps) on the right. Progress here was restricted largely due to an 
increase in enemy machine gun fire and, as the day continued, artillery fire from 
German reserve batteries. A counter-attack directed at 86 Brigade at 1200 hours was 
repulsed by Vickers and Lewis gun fire.  French cavalry provided valuable support 
through maintaining liaison between the advance units of 29th Division and 36th 
Division to its left, although touch was lost with 35th Division around midday, when the 
latter was unable to advance east of Zanvoorde. Artillery support was limited by ‘the 
state and scarcity of roads’.5  
 
Despite no covering artillery fire ‘owing to the shocking state of the roads’,6 36th 
Division managed to sustain its push forward. The enemy machine gun positions 
made good use of hedges and isolated buildings for cover, as the British advance 
moved beyond the damaged terrain of the former battlefield. The village of Terhand 
was taken in late afternoon together with the hamlet of Vijfwegen two hours later; this 
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lay one mile south of the village of Dadizeele, finally captured by 9th Division at 1600 
hours.7  
 
The report of 1/Lancashire Fusiliers, on the left of 29th Division, states that contact 
was lost with the right flank of 36th Division during the afternoon; as per orders, the 
troops continued to advance, with contact re-established later in the evening. Heavy 
rain began falling from 1800 hours.8 
 
XIX Corps 
 
XIX Corps withdrew 14th Division from the line into reserve.9 35th Division was 
directed to attack in a south-easterly direction towards Tenbrielen and Werwicq. The 
advance units were held up near Zandvoorde, largely the result of the morning mist 
causing 105 Brigade to attack from the south-east when the original plan had been for 
an assault from the north. 104 Brigade had successfully taken the western side of the 
village including the western spur, but the Germans still retained the eastern spur, 
which contained pill-boxes and entrenched machine gun positions. (Initial reports had 
indicated that British forces held the whole village). The resulting delay would have 
consequences for 41st Division on its right, particularly for 123 Brigade, during the 
course of the afternoon. Following the preliminary manoeuvring, at 1230 hours 105 
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Brigade began its advance on Zandvoorde, immediately becoming the target of 
shellfire. General Pollard of 106 Brigade was ordered to push through the troops of 
105 Brigade towards Tenbrielen and Blagnaert Farm or to support the east/south 
advance on Zandvoorde; he was also to take command of all advance troops i.e. a 
combined battlegroup of troops from 105 and 106 Brigades. Initially, Pollard moved 
17/Royal Scots (106 Brigade) to the left flank of 105 Brigade (held by 4/North Staffs) 
and through Zandvoorde. An artillery barrage on Tenbrielen was called down. In the 
afternoon 105 Brigade was able to break through south-east of Zandvoorde and 
advance on Tenbrielen. Under Pollard’s command the result by nightfall was that 106 
Brigade, with 4/North Staffs of 105 Brigade, held the line Tenbrielen – Blagnaert 
Farm, with the remaining units of 105 Brigade in support. While it had been possible 
to bring forward field artillery and machine gun units, both ‘Cyclists and T.M.B. 
[Trench Mortar Battalion] had to be left behind’.10 Active patrols were put in place in 
front of the secured ground; Pollard issued orders for the attack to be resumed, by the 
six battalions now under his command, at 0615 hours the following day.11 
 
41st Division maintained its advance on the right of XIX Corps, with 124 Brigade 
initially halted on a ridge overlooking the village of Houthem. At 0700 hours the 
Brigade attacked the village and its bridge, with 123 Brigade in support; the capture of 
the village was reported by1000 hours.12  
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Under the covering fire of trench mortars, 123 Brigade moved quickly through the 
village; the troops’ progress was ‘exceedingly rapid, prisoners being freely taken, and 
opposition slight’.13 At this stage, German machine guns continued to fire from the 
opposite west bank of the Comines canal, causing some casualties. Accordingly, 
once clear of the village, a platoon was dispatched across the canal to take out the 
enemy positions; this attack was successful, capturing 36 prisoners and three 
machine guns. 123 Brigade continued its advance, taking up positions along the 
railway line; these offered good sight lines from which troops could direct fire upon 
enemy targets. However by 12 noon the attack had stalled; the Germans were clearly 
intent on holding their current positions and machine gun fire had intensified, in front 
of the advance companies and also from across the canal. Attempts to outflank the 
defenders were unsuccessful and ‘a good many casualties’ resulted.14  
 
During the course of the afternoon the situation remained in the balance and the 
brigade’s left flank remained exposed; at this stage 35th Division was not in touch with 
the brigade.15 There was evidence that the Germans were attempting to manoeuvre 
machine guns forward so as to be able to enfilade the British forward companies, in 
preparation for a possible counter-attack. An enemy aeroplane dropped lights to 
direct the targeting of defensive artillery fire. As a consequence of the heavy fighting 
so far there were concerns that ammunition levels were becoming very low while the 
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casualty rate was increasing. Making effective use of their own machine guns to 
cover the action, the front companies aligned their positions to stabilise and make 
secure the line by the railway. SOS rockets were fired and pigeons released in order 
to call for artillery support and for more ammunition. With the circumstances of 35th 
Division remaining unclear, 122 Brigade was ordered to move along the Tenbrielen 
line and establish contact with the division’s right.16  
 
The situation was saved in the late afternoon through the successful advance by units 
of 30th Division on the west bank of the canal, to the right of 41st Division. Contact 
was made between the respective advance forces such that enfilade fire by 30th 
Division troops was brought to bear on the enemy across the front of 123 Brigade’s 
line. At 1600 hours the requested artillery support commenced, with fire directed onto 
the German positions. The result was to allow 123 Brigade to secure its front along a 
line about 1,000 yards to the east of Houthem.17 In accordance with orders received, 
the brigade established a line of outposts for the night. The shortage of ammunition 
was alleviated by the dropping of three boxes of SAA by aeroplane, in response to 
the brigade’s signal.18 
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X Corps 
 
Following its capture of the Wytschaete Ridge, 34th Division proceeded to advance 
towards the Ypres – Comines Canal.19 
 
30th Division was tasked with clearing the area to its front between Messines Ridge 
and the Ypres-Comines Canal (target: Houthem).20 The neighbouring 31st Division 
(XV Corps) was reported to be held up 1500 yards in front of Warneton (south-east of 
Messines) so 90 Brigade, on the right of 30th Division, was ordered to adjust its 
movement in a south-easterly direction to threaten to outflank the Germans in the 
village. The advance by the brigade was moving forward quickly; the pace was such 
that the OC 2/15 London Regiment ‘reported that he was 1 mile [east] of MESSINES 
and his Bn. advancing so fast that he could not catch them up’.21 
 
The successful attack meant that by mid-afternoon 2/15 and 2/16 London Regiments 
of 90 Brigade ‘were well on their way’ to the Ypres-Comines canal,22 and out of 
communication from brigade HQ. The speed of the advance and the distance covered 
left the troops ‘somewhat exhausted and disorganised’. The reserve battalion, 2/14 
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London Regiment, was ordered to secure the line of the advance, based on 
Warneton-Comines railway.23 
 
XV Corps 
 
During the day 92 Brigade, led by 10/East Yorkshires and the attached 18/Durham 
Light Infantry, ‘began to penetrate [Ploegsteert] Wood from N. and E.’; by mid-
afternoon the Wood was taken and advance posts established to the east and south. 
12/Royal Scots Fusiliers (94 Brigade) was attached temporarily to the Brigade.24 The 
priority now for 31st Division was to reach and then cross the River Douve, west of 
Warneton; despite some resistance from enemy machine guns reasonable progress 
was made. Later that day the Division reinstated the original target of the River Lys 
south of Warneton – to be attacked by 93 and 94 Brigades. The timing of the attack 
was put back to the following morning at 0600 hours due to ‘the extreme fatigue of the 
men, and the difficulty of assembling for a further attack in daylight’.25 
 
Overnight, 119 Brigade, on the left of 40th Division, had put bridges across the 
Warnave, ready to take advantage of any enemy withdrawal.
26
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Despite the problems described at the end of the previous chapter, the second day of 
battle brought further significant advances. A notable feature of the fighting was the 
co-operation on the adjoining flanks between British 9th Division (II Corps) and 
Belgian forces. This joint offensive had achieved a breakthrough of the prepared 
German defensive position, Flanders Line 1; by late afternoon, units were in place in 
front of Flanders Line II. The Belgians had regained Passchendaele, plus Zarren and 
Dixmude to the north.27 
 
Plumer issued two sets of orders during the day. At mid-day he confirmed the Second 
Army role of flank guard for the Belgians, emphasising the aim of covering and 
securing the crossing points of the Lys. That evening, taking account of the day’s 
progress, he set out the objectives of each Corps for the following day. 
 
The extent of the advance on 29 September had though been disappointing in 
comparison with the significant gains on the first day. The Official History puts this 
down to ‘the inexperience of the staffs in open warfare.... [and] weather preventing 
the RAF from giving the usual assistance, and to the difficulties of the war-torn 
ground’.28 The Germans had brought forward troops from a further four Divisions, 
either to reinforce the line or in consideration of a possible counter-attack. There were 
advances on the left but inconsistent results elsewhere, although large numbers of 
prisoners and materiel had been taken. The Operations report for the first two days of 
the battle records the capture of an estimated ‘3,660 prisoners, about 100 guns, and 
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large numbers of T.M.s [trench mortars] and M.G.s [machine guns]. 17 E.A. [enemy 
aircraft] were destroyed, and 5 balloons burnt, at a cost of 3 of our machines 
missing.’29  
 
There was some action possible by the RAF, responding to the German forward 
movement of reserves. Peter Hart writes of 206 Squadron undertaking a bombing raid 
on Menin railway station in response to reports from RAF fighters of enemy 
reinforcements detraining.30 Each bomber dropped twelve 25 lb bombs as well as 
strafing the station (‘… which was full of rolling stock with German troops all over the 
place unloading and forming up’31) with machine gun fire.  
 
We learned next day that we had so disrupted the detrainment and deployment 
of the German division that the expected counterattack never materialised… 
and the 206 Squadron raid was generally considered to have had a real impact 
on the course of the battle.32 
 
The advance made so far meant that most of the country which had been scarred by 
previous battles now lay to the rear of the front line forces. The prospect for the British 
forces was that of moving across virgin territory, with troops able to liberate towns and 
villages which had been under German occupation since 1914. The Germans would 
no longer have the benefit of defending amidst the detritus of previous battles. 
                                                         
29
 TNA WO158/218, Operations on the Second Army Front: 28
th
  September to 13
th
 October 1918. 
30
 Hart,  Aces Falling , p. 322. 
31
 Blandford,  Sans Escort, pp. 16-17. 
32
 Blandford,  Sans Escort, pp. 16-17. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
194 
 
However this new terrain would be unfamiliar to the attackers, which increased the 
importance of air reconnaissance in assisting with the production of reliable maps. 
 
General Degoutte was still anxious for exploitation of the gains he anticipated. He 
drew up plans for a ‘groupement d’exploitation’ comprising French infantry, cavalry 
and artillery, together with two Belgian Divisions. However, no directions were issued 
for the formation’s deployment and circumstances would not prompt its involvement. 
 
Further orders issued that evening for the following day, in response to Plumer’s 
directions, included 105 and 106 Brigades of 35th Division, under General Pollard, to 
attack the northern outskirts of Wervicq, and to establish a bridgehead overlooking 
the town. All available artillery was to carry out a barrage of Wervicq from 0550 to 
0650 hours. This operation would be carried out in co-operation with an attack by 41st 
Division on Comines. Later that night these orders were modified, with 35th Division 
ordered to continue its advance through to the railway north of Vervicq; its right wing 
to co-operate with the left wing of 41st Division in the direction of Les Casernes.33 
 
30 September 
 
The ground in front of Second Army was now unfamiliar and not helpful for attacking 
forces. It was generally flat and under cultivation. The continuing bad weather, in 
particular the torrential rainfall on the night of 29-30 September, and heavy rain 
throughout the following day (‘The weather was bad, with heavy rain and strong 
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wind’)34 prevented the badly-needed air reconnaissance, as well as disrupting supply 
traffic. With a limited number of decent roads, the delivery of ammunition and rations 
to advancing troops by this means was near-impossible. At the same time the 
resistance of the enemy was stiffening. The German defenders had withdrawn behind 
the Lys and were determined to retain some hold on Flanders Positions 1 and II, as 
long as possible. Plumer ordered that artillery operations focus on disrupting enemy 
forces crossing the Lys, counter-battery and general harassing fire. 
 
II Corps 
 
The importance of continuing to maintain the link with the Belgian forces, and hold 
secure the right flank of the Belgian Army, remained a prime concern for the 9th 
Division. The war diary of 8/Black Watch (26 Brigade) recorded: 
 
… [Brigade HQ] pointed out that the Belgians on the left were not to attack till 
11a.m. and reply received that this was understood and that arrangements had 
been made to secure our left flank.35 
 
An attempt to outflank Slypswood was called off due to casualties.36 27 Brigade 
consolidated the positions in and around Dadizeele which had been taken during the 
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previous day; that evening, orders were received for the brigade to attack 
Ledeghem.37 
 
36th Division was engaged in a series of hard fights to capture and secure Hill 41, a 
key feature south of Dadizeele offering clear views of the surrounding area, and 
populated with farms and outbuildings that provided excellent cover for its defenders. 
Artillery support was still awaited and initial attacks were rebuffed. Arrangements 
were subsequently made for 12/Royal Irish Rifles to mount a further attack at 1630 
hours under the cover of a smoke and HE barrage from 50th Brigade, RFA of 9th 
Division. The initial success of the assault proved brief as a heavy enemy counter-
attack that evening recaptured the position.38 
 
29th Division was now engaged in heavy fighting to take Gheluwe, from where it was 
then to threaten Menin. To its left, 1/Lancashire Fusiliers was protecting the flank 
(through snipers) while also charged with maintaining touch with 36th Division. Efforts 
were made to link up with reserve elements of 35th Division (XIX Corps) on the right of 
29th Division in order to try and strengthen the concentration of the British forces. 
Attacking troops, with covering fire from the attached Vickers machine guns, ran into 
heavy machine gun fire from enemy positions in Gheluwe, and from houses and 
strongpoints on its northern edge.39 This drive was offset by a strong counter-attack 
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from fresh German troops during the late morning, which pushed back the advance 
units of 88 Brigade which were in Gheluwe. 
 
The enemy was holding an organised and strongly wired line in considerable 
strength… Owing to the exhaustion of the troops and the lack of artillery 
support no further advance could be made…40   
 
By the close of the day, 1/Lancashire Fusiliers had managed to push forward to within 
a few hundred yards of the Dadizeele-Gheluwe Road.41 At 1800 hours, the battalion 
used the covering fire from machine guns plus field artillery support to succeed in 
taking a key farm held as a strong point by the enemy,42 which had been frustrating 
its advance. Next, a pill-box was rushed and captured using Lewis guns to provide 
covering fire; then a further farm was taken. At that point the advance stalled in the 
face of continuing machine gun fire, primarily from the right of the battalion.43 
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At 2110 hours, II Corps issued orders for the advance to continue with the objectives 
of Ledeghem (9th Division), Hill 41 (36th Division) and Menin (29th Division, with XIX 
Corps).44  
 
XIX Corps 
 
During the course of the morning units of 35th Division moved forward to approach 
Wervicq from the north and west, supported by 159 Brigade, RFA, advancing from 
Tenbrielen. Troops from the battlegroup (the six battalions from 106 and 105 
Brigades) aiming to complete the capture of Wervicq and make good the line of  the 
canal, were now engaged in heavy fighting in front of Wervicq. At 0615 hours 
12/Highland Light Infantry (right) and 18/ Highland Light Infantry (left) led the attack, 
with 15/The Cheshires and 17/Royal Scots in support, 15/Sherwood Foresters and 
4/North Staffs in reserve.45  
 
At 0905 hours General Pollard reported the claims of a prisoner that German forces 
had moved back overnight to positions five kilometres east of the Comines canal. The 
enemy had retreated in the direction of Wervicq and was now operating from 
prepared positions, trenches and pill-boxes, north of the railway line. The General 
stated that heavy casualties had considerably weakened his forces, and that he 
would need artillery support in order to progress; it would not therefore prove possible 
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for him to extend his line to the left to Reeke. Arrangements were put in place for a 
bombardment of the enemy positions by heavy artillery from 1600 to 1630 hours; the 
bombardment would also cover the bridges in Wervicq across the River Lys. To 
support the troops on the ground, 157 and 159 Artillery Brigades were each placed 
under the direct command of 104 and 106 Brigades respectively (General Pollard was 
still at this stage in command of the battlegroup of 105 and 106 Brigades). However 
no effective artillery support was in position to support a new attack that day. It had 
also not been possible to obtain touch with flanking units; the advance line was 
maintained overnight, albeit with no further progress made. Machine guns were sited 
to the north of the position, to provide enfilade fire should it prove necessary.46 
 
The strength of the German resistance around Wervicq is demonstrated by the 
uncertain nature of the British positions at the end of the day’s fighting. 104 Brigade, 
under General Sandilands, had been unable to establish the clear link required with 
units of 29th Division on its left; it could extend as far as 1000 yards west of the village 
of Coucou, and requested that 29th Division look to join up at that point. Overnight the 
left flank of 104 Brigade remained in the air. While the bad weather had restricted the 
ability of the artillery to get forward, positions were eventually established near 
Tenbrielen and Blaegneart Farm. Delivery of rations and the evacuation of the 
wounded had presented serious problems due to the muddy ground.47 
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For 41st Division, 124 Brigade attacked successfully in the direction of the Wervicq-
Comines railway, capturing signal stores, machine guns and a lorry. The speed of the 
subsequent advance meant that the brigade was for a time in front of neighbouring 
units with its flanks exposed. It consolidated on a line to the north west of Comines 
and patrols were pushed forward into the town which appeared to have been 
evacuated.48 
 
XIX Corps orders issued at 1300 hours, anticipating the position on the following day, 
1 October, were as follows: 
a) 30th Division (X Corps) to relieve 35th Division along the line from Les 
Casernes to Wervicq  
b) 35th Division to hold  the line Wervicq to Menin 
c) 34th Division (X Corps) to move to Zandvoorde area (lying north of 
Tenbrielen, west of Gheluwe); then to relieve 104 Brigade (35th Division) 
on 2 October, along the line Wervicq – Menin 
d) On 2 October, 41st Division to move behind 35th Division, to take over 
the line Menin, east to Wevelghem.49 
 
X Corps 
 
On 30 September, 34th Division was withdrawn into corps reserve, with 30th Division 
taking full responsibility for the corps’ front and the gains made by the troops so far. 
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The morning found the division’s units unclear as to the position on the flanks of the 
advance: 
 
We were now in a somewhat unsatisfactory position as situation of troops both 
on right (31st Div.) and left (41st Div.) was obscure.50 
 
Advance parties from 2/14 London Regiment moved through to the River Lys; pack 
animals were used to carry mobile guns for the support of the forward troops. They 
found all possible river crossings in the division’s area to be destroyed; the Germans 
had taken up positions on the south side of the river, apparently intent on holding this 
line.51 
 
XV Corps 
 
The attack by 31st Division to reach the Lys was launched at 0600 hours, with 93 and 
94 Brigades leading. Enemy resistance, principally from machine guns, increased as 
the advance troops moved ever nearer to the river. Due to heavy casualties, the 
attacking forces paused on the high ground overlooking the Lys, before renewing 
their efforts during the course of the afternoon. Progress then became easier, the 
defenders’ machine gun fire eased (presumably due to the Germans’ withdrawal 
across the Lys) and ‘by night all objectives had been reached on the whole front’.52 
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For 92 Brigade, 10/East Yorkshires advanced to the Warnave River; 18/Durham Light 
Infantry and 12/Royal Scots Fusiliers (attached from 93 and 94 Brigades respectively) 
continued to push towards the Lys.53  
 
The 93 Brigade suffered a number of senior casualties during these operations. This 
is evidence of the commitment by commanders at brigade and battalion levels to 
keep close touch with their advancing troops, to assist in maintaining communication 
and thereby control. Lieutenant-Colonel Wauhope of 13/York & Lancaster was 
wounded (with Major Goodburn assuming command of the battalion); Brigadier-
General Taylor was wounded (with Lieutenant-Colonel Hickman of 11/East Lancs 
assuming command of the brigade); and the Acting Brigade Major, Captain Watts, 
was killed. 
 
40th Division ‘continued to drive in the enemy’s covering screen’, seeking to push 
forward to the west bank of the Lys.54 
 
The Operations record describes enemy activity as a ‘minor consideration as 
compared with the problem of communications’.55  
 
We continued to make progress [on 30 September] on the whole Battle front in 
spite of unfavourable ground, considerable opposition and incessant rain.56 
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Over much of the reclaimed land roads were almost non-existent and the ground had 
been churned over through the combined effects of shellfire and the rain. To try and 
deal with these circumstances, Second Army had improvised via ‘corduroy’ roads 
(using wooden boards) and through the extension of existing railway lines.57 For 
example, by day three of the battle the German railway system east of Ypres had 
been linked up to the railway station at Passchendaele.  However the Belgian Army 
had no experience of dealing with such conditions while at the same time sustaining 
the pace of operations.  Second Army found it necessary to slow its own advance in 
order to maintain coherence with its ally.  
 
The quote from Private Pope at the start of this chapter encapsulates the view we like 
to have of the British Tommy58 – practical, happy to complain while also getting to 
grips with the job in hand. A pretty good summary of their feelings towards Flanders 
and its weather (and the British do like to talk about the weather). You can picture the 
scene. These brief comments sum up the likely views of the Second Army troops at 
this time as well as any chapter in a history book.  
  
An increasing feature of the warfare was street-fighting in order to take possession of 
a farm, village or town.  In some cases, control of a village could change hands more 
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than once over the course of a day or period of days. On 1 October a Brigade of 9th 
Division approaching the village of Ledeghem from the east was attacked. The 
fighting moved into the village itself and the Germans were eventually pushed back. 
However they subsequently mounted a further counter-attack during the afternoon 
which successfully recaptured the village.  
 
A later example, on 11 October, is from 36th Division which captured Mansard Farm 
near Ledeghem. The enemy launched a successful counter-attack during the evening 
and the farm was to change hands three times during the night, remaining in British 
possession in the morning 
 
1 October 
 
The pace of Army operations was sustained but the resistance of the enemy was 
continuing to stiffen. 
 
II Corps 
 
At 0830 hours 36th Division recorded that there were reports from prisoners of three 
fresh enemy divisions being brought up.59 107 Brigade had attacked at 0615 hours, 
with the objectives set as Heule, Bisseghem and Courtrai. The action was not 
successful, the troops being ‘held up by enemy machine guns’.60 
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An improvement in the weather on 1 October allowed the RAF to resume low-level 
attacks on German forces. Ten enemy aeroplanes were destroyed and 24 tons of 
bombs were dropped. During late morning, reports from the RAF reached 36th 
Division, referring to enemy troops heading south towards Menin; No. 7 Squadron 
RAF reported that it had silenced two enemy machine guns by fire from the air.61 
However the rains returned on the next day, worsening the poor state of the approach 
roads and increasing the existing disruption, thus restricting further advances.  
 
On the left flank of the British advance the 9th Division, attacking at the junction with 
the Belgian Army, was seeking to exploit the breakthrough, requesting support from 
all available troops including the reserve Cavalry Brigade. 27 Brigade noted at 0825 
hours that ‘French Cavalry Patrols do useful work on the flanks’.62 The Belgians were 
reported to have moved up to be in line with II Corps by late morning, though facing 
‘heavy opposition’.63 At the same time however, German counter-attacks were being 
reported; these were particularly prolonged around Hill 41, which lay directly to the 
front of the eastward advance by the divisions of II Corps, enemy attacks being 
recorded at 1600 and 1840 hours.
64
 
 
This was to be a day of problems for the attacking units of 9th Division, as the 
Germans sought to reinforce their lines and strangle the breakthrough by the British 
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forces. 26 Brigade had attack orders for 0600 hours but with the Belgians delaying 
their attack until noon, the morning saw a gap on the left of the British line. The 
machine gun company had been designated to fill this breach but due to the distance 
it needed to cover, was unable to do so in time. 8/Black Watch on the far left ‘was 
counter-attacked as it passed the Menin-Roulers Railway’. This led to a short 
withdrawal of the British line and ‘if the BOSCHE had been really in strength [the 
Black Watch] would have been cut off’. Units from 5/Cameron Highlanders moved 
forward to secure the gap and the Germans did not press further. The front was 
consolidated along the railway line.65 
 
7/Seaforth Highlanders, 26 Brigade, mounted an attack on the Menin-Roulers railway, 
north of Ledeghem, with the aim of then moving onto the village. The troops met 
strong resistance, with the enemy seeking to hold onto its pillboxes and strongpoints 
for as long as possible; machine gun and rifle fire was very ‘hostile’ and ‘snipers 
[were] particularly active’. The resulting losses led to the remaining members of the 
battalion being reformed into one composite company.66 
 
27 Brigade had been ordered to attack Ledeghem. To assist this, one company of 
11/Royal Scots was tasked with securing Telford farm on high ground to the north 
west of the village, which it did with assistance from a field gun placed to the west, 
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‘firing point blank’.67  6/KOSB, attacking from the south, met heavy enemy fire as it 
moved forward; it achieved its objective after experiencing heavy casualties, such that 
all the remaining troops were deployed to form a defensive line. Meanwhile, 12/Royal 
Scots was able to push into the village and advance to the railway about 1,000 yards 
to its east.68 The Germans fought back strongly: 
 
The enemy appear to have accurately gauged the predicament of the 9th 
Division. – both flanks in the air for he immediately counter-attacked on these 
flanks. As far as we were concerned the first counter-attack came from the 
South-East at 10.30a.m. and was wiped out by 4 Lewis guns firing from 
LEDEGHEM Cemetery. The enemy were in close column and were difficult to 
miss, their officers were mounted and behaved with great gallantry. The 
second attack came from the N.E. and S.E. at about 12.30 and forced the 
Brigade right back out of LEDEGHEM. The position was partially restored by 
the 11th Royal Scots and the station building and about 200 yards of the town 
were reoccupied, the 6th K.O.S.B. restoring their line under cover of a gallant 
attack by the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers [109 Brigade, 36th Division] which, though 
costly to them, came just at the right moment…  
… we were able to hold what had been won at great cost.69 
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At 1810 hours 26 Brigade was reported to have re-established touch with Belgian 
forces who were 400 yards east of Menin.70 
 
On the right wing of II Corps, at 0712 hours the 29th Division reported that its troops 
were now in touch with 35th Division (XIX Corps). However it became clear later in the 
day that neither formations were as far forward as they believed, and attacks made 
during that day were unsuccessful. An exception was 1/Lancashire Fusiliers (86 
Brigade, 29th Division) which succeeded in advancing its left flank by 400 yards, 
seizing two farms and a pill-box, making good use of outflanking manoeuvres with 
supporting fire from machine guns and Lewis guns.71 
 
In its Summary of Operations, 86 Brigade makes no reference to the attack by the 
Lancashire Fusiliers, stating that: 
 
During [1-2 October] little progress was made, owing to the very strong 
opposition offered by enemy machine gunners from the line of numerous pill-
boxes opposite our front. It was considered that further advance without many 
losses was impossible, without effective artillery support, which at that time 
was not available.72  
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This may be a reflection of the reserve role which the brigade undertook during 1-2 
October, and its relief on 3 October, because units of 29th Division were engaged in 
attacks through until 3 October (described later in this chapter). In its Operations 
Report, 29th Division concluded that despite attempts to advance ‘no headway could 
be made owing to very strong opposition’73. By the close of the day’s fighting the 
Germans were still in control of Gheluwe and the machine gun fire from its positions 
in the town frustrated further progress. 
 
Subsequently, 35th Division concluded that a fresh co-ordinated attack would be 
required.74 
 
That evening II Corps received orders for the following day, operations to commence 
at 0700 hours: the aim was to clear the enemy from the area Ledeghem – Gheluwe – 
Menin. From there, 36th Division would be in a position from which to push forward in 
the direction of Courtrai.75 
 
XIX Corps 
 
Much of the day was taken up with a re-grouping of British forces, in line with the 
orders issued previously. The 41st Division moved through 35th Division to establish a 
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position on the latter’s left, with orders to advance on Menin ‘without delay’;76 30th 
Division (X Corps) moved up to be available to relieve General Pollard’s troops on the 
right of 35th Division. Meanwhile the Germans continued to concentrate artillery fire on 
the forward troops; when 122 and 123 Brigades (41st Division) moved east in daylight 
to a position north of Menin, they were heavily shelled.77 
 
Efforts were to be focused on driving in the direction of Menin, hence there was a 
realignment of units in order to concentrate forces for this attack. The advance troops 
of 41st Division would push forwards south of Gheluwe, while on its right 35th Division 
should do everything possible to maintain touch. The overall situation was frustrating: 
attacks by 104 Brigade from the north of Wervicq had been checked and co-
ordination with 29th Division had been made difficult by the poor weather and muddy 
terrain. Troops from 35th and 41st Divisions were still in the process of re-arranging 
their positions. The casualties suffered by General Pollard’s combined force (he 
reported that day that the approximate active strength of 105 and 106 Brigades was 
900 and 500 troops respectively),78 meant that it was not capable of mounting a 
further attack before its planned relief. The Corps Commander therefore ordered a 
further shelling of Wervicq between 1600 and 1700 hours; once it was dark, advance 
patrols should then be sent into the village to establish whether the enemy was 
withdrawing (as per intelligence reports passed down by Army HQ). Patrols found the 
village remained strongly held and covered by artillery.79 General Pollard, in his 
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summary report on the operations, gave particular praise to the signals officer of 106 
Brigade, for maintaining communication between brigade and division.80 Despite the 
bad weather and the severity of some of the fighting, Pollard was also able to 
conclude that, due to the work of transport officers ‘… troops were provided daily with 
water and rations by, or soon after, nightfall, and an adequate supply of ammunition 
maintained’.81 
 
For Plumer, capture of the Wervicq – Menin line was an urgent priority. At the Army 
conference held that day orders were prepared for a joint attack on 2 October by 35th 
Division (104 Brigade), 41st Division and 29th Division; the opening bombardment to 
commence at 0630 hours with the attack going in at 0700 hours. 
 
At 1930 hours the relief of 105 and 106 Brigades by 21 Brigade (35th Division) 
commenced. ‘On relief they withdrew to near KRUISEBEECKE cross-roads where 
transport and cookers met them’.82 Behind the lines teams of pioneers and engineers 
were struggling to make good the road between Klein Zillebeke and Zandvoorde, to 
link up with the road heading east. The evacuation of casualties was speeded up by 
operating an alternative route, north-west out of Tenbrielen.  The problems for 
transport and communications behind the front line positions were illustrated by a 
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corps staff officer taking six and a half hours to deliver written orders from Corps HQ 
to the command post of 104 Brigade.83 
 
X Corps and XV Corps 
 
To support its front line units, 30th Division Machine Gun Battalion moved up to the 
eastern side of the Ypres-Comines Canal.84 
 
The War Diary of 90 Brigade notes that ‘A continued stream of traffic of all kinds 
circulated on the main roads [drawing] hostile fire’. By now, civilians were a 
substantial proportion of that traffic, looking to return to former homes or trying to 
avoid the new battlefields.85 
 
31st Division continued to push towards and consolidate its positions along the River 
Lys; temporary attached battalions were returned to their host brigades.86 40th 
Division now advanced across the ground north of Armentieres; from Pont de Nieppe, 
units advanced overnight to continue ‘the envelopment of LE BIZET’, establishing a 
number of advance posts.
87
 
 
Enemy resistance had ‘stiffened considerably’ to the north and west of Menin. In its 
centre, Second Army held the western side of Ledeghem; the left flank was secure 
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west of Gheluwe. The Belgians continued to advance, capturing Vierschaar, 
Kruisstraat (north of Staden) and Hazewinde.88 Army orders directed XV and X Corps 
to extend their lines north eastwards, assuming responsibility for Armentieres-
Comines and Comines-Wervicq respectively. XIX Corps was to ‘clear up the situation 
towards Menin’ and then, as X Corps extended its line, drive east alongside II Corps. 
Finally, II Corps was to clear the ground south of Ledeghem, before resuming the 
advance eastwards.89 
 
2 October 
 
2 October saw advance units of Belgian and allied soldiers cut off from supplies and 
without food. To avoid these troops having to pull back, eighty aircraft were deployed 
to air-drop 15,000 rations to them; an overall load of thirteen tons. Small sacks were 
used, each with five or ten packs, and padded with earth to absorb the shock of 
hitting the ground after being thrown out of the aeroplane.90 
 
Every effort was being made to build and repair roadways behind the advance, to 
improve the flow of arms and supplies to the front line troops. Teams from the pioneer 
battalions directed by Royal Engineers were ordered to remove debris and put new 
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surfaces in place which could support the heavy transport and guns. From the 
opening day of the battle the pioneers of 6/South Wales Borderers had worked on 
repairing roads in the Wytschaete-Oostaverne-Houthem area, attached to 21 Brigade 
(30th Division).91 
 
II Corps 
 
For the 9th Division, 26 Brigade held the line established on the previous day. Small 
gains made by 7/Seaforth Highlanders were ‘however nullified almost immediately by 
counter-attack’.92 The Germans also attempted to break through the line held by 27 
Brigade and units of 6/KOSB and 12/Royal Scots were ordered forward in response. 
At 2045 hours the situation was recorded as quiet and no breakthrough had been 
made. The following night saw 27 Brigade moved up to take over the new line and 
relieve the existing troops who had been in action since the opening day of the 
battle.93 
 
107 Brigade had taken over the advance role for 36th Division from 1 October. 
Despite the reverses initially experienced it made a further attempt to push forward on 
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2 October but little progress was made.94 109 Brigade repulsed an enemy counter-
attack on Twig Farm.95 
 
For 29th Division, 2/Hampshires (88 Brigade) fought its way into Gheluwe but was 
subsequently ‘compelled to withdraw’.96 A prepared attack with artillery support would 
be required. 
 
XIX Corps 
 
The planned attack by all its three Divisions, with 35th and 41st assaulting defences 
towards Menin, went in as directed at 0700 hours; the aim was to capture the 
Terhand Line of the enemy. By 0830 hours it was reported that patrols of 122 Brigade 
were attempting to clear Gheluwe and along the railway line, in the face of continual 
rifle and machine gun fire. However a strong counter-attack in the evening would 
force a slight withdrawal to a line along the Wervicq-Gheluwe road.97 Overall the 
assault on Wervicq failed although some progress was made in a few places. The 
enemy defence line, the Gheluwe Switch, was proving to be too strongly held for the 
weakened British forces; the evidence from prisoners was that the Germans were 
under firm orders to hold this line for the present. General Sandilands reported that 
morning that his 104 Brigade, attacking the high ground west of Reeke (north of 
Wervicq), had sustained ‘heavy casualties’ and that ‘High ground even if taken would 
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be impossible to hold as it is machine gunned from three sides including houses in 
Wervicq… Enemy artillery and [machine guns] increasing’.98 122 Brigade (41st 
Division) attacked with 18/King’s Royal Rifle Corps and 15/Hampshires; the battalions 
were themselves counter-attacked and forced to withdraw slightly and consolidate 
their lines.99 Due to these circumstances, 124 Brigade moved up during the evening 
as support for 41st Division but was not called upon.100 
 
Intelligence from Corps HQ stated that a large number of German troops had been 
seen moving on roads west and north-west of Menin; between 0800 and 1200 hours 
16 trains were recorded as entering the town. This evidence of strengthened enemy 
forces led British commanders to conclude that ‘a heavy bombardment and organised 
attack would be necessary before the [Gheluwe] Switch could be carried’.101 With 
further evidence suggesting that a possible counter-attack from the direction of Menin 
was planned, XIX Corps secured the commitment of support from X Corps should 
such a situation materialise. Arrangements now proceeded for the relief of 35th and 
41st Divisions by 34th Division (X Corps); 41st Division took over the Gheluwe sector 
from 29th Division.102 Over the course of the battle, 35th Division, involved in the 
fiercest of the fighting, had sustained 1748 casualties (264 killed, 1366 wounded, 118 
missing), distributed across all its constituent brigades and battalions.103 
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14th Division had 41 Brigade send forward advance patrols to reconnoitre the bridges 
over the River Lys – there was concern that 90 Brigade (30th Division) did not have 
full control of the river banks.104 
 
X Corps and XV Corps 
 
The first priority for 30th Division was to secure the line of the River Lys to its front. 
The aim was to then advance this line north east through Wervicq, taking advantage 
of the operations under XIX Corps to the north and east.105 In support of these and 
other operations there had been as much work as possible carried out on building 
and repairing roads to allow supplies and artillery to be moved forward.  
 
The previous day, 14th Division had transferred to the command of XV Corps from 
XIX Corps; its 41 Brigade now took over the line from 30th Division (X Corps) on the 
left.106 92 Brigade (31st Division) advanced its line to the Armentieres-Ploegsteert 
Railway, and set up posts on the eastern side.107 
 
For 40
th
 Division, 2 October saw 10/KOSB across the Lys at Erquinghem with its 120 
Brigade reserve, 11/Cameron Highlanders, deployed in support.108 The following day, 
following an evacuation by the Germans, the division was able to surround 
Armentieres; it found ‘All chimneys, towers and churches blown up by enemy, who 
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has also fired many villages E. of LYS’. By 4 October, Warneton was secure and 31st 
and 40th Divisions were established in positions on the west of the Lys, with 
footbridges in place to commence further crossings.109 The primary task of 40th 
Division, to maintain touch with 59th Division on the right flank of Second Army, had 
been achieved. 
 
Day five of the battle had seen ‘obstinate resistance’ from the Germans, particularly 
around Gheluwe and Ledeghem. The Belgians had captured Hazewind but a strong 
enemy counter-attack had pushed their advance troops out of Roulers. A combined 
attack by French and Belgian forces the following day, supported by tanks, made 
gains west of the city.110  
 
The impact of the Flanders’ mud upon military operations should not be 
underestimated. Paddy Griffith, in reference to the operations twelve months 
previously, provides a concise and clear description of the resulting problems for 
weaponry:  
 
HE shells became buried and smothered in [the mud]. If they could fly at all, 
aircraft could not tell friend from foe since the uniforms of both had been 
equally discoloured by it. Mortar base plates sank into it every time a bomb 
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was fired… Small arms became hopelessly clogged by it within an hour of 
opening fire…111 
 
29th Division concluded: 
 
The nature of the country, over which the advance was made, was 
indescribable, waterlogged and absolutely destroyed after 4 years of incessant 
shelling… After the first day, the weather broke and there was 36 hours of 
continuous heavy rain… The almost complete absence of shelter… made the 
conditions very trying for the troops.112 
 
In the face of such conditions, that Second Army managed to maintain the 
momentum generated by the breakthrough on the first day of battle, demonstrates 
high levels of motivation and morale from the men involved. 
 
The orders from II Corps recognised the cumulative impact of the wet weather and 
the deteriorating ground conditions upon supplies and fire support for the front line 
troops: 
 
Divisions will consolidate and hold whatever line is held on the evening of to-
day 2nd October… until such time as it is practicable to move forward heavy 
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artillery and launch forward another properly organised attack with artillery 
support… so soon as practicable as many troops as possible will be withdrawn 
into reserve.113  
 
Falls describes the problems for transport by day two of the battle, given the need to 
both bring forward artillery and also to establish a relay system for supplies: 
 
The roads were choked. The only tolerable among them… were the Menin and 
Zonnebeke Roads. Upon each was a solid mass of transport, which often for 
hours at a time remained immobile.114 
 
The summary by 107 Brigade (36th Division, II Corps) of its experiences during the 
battle gives a valuable insight into nature of the fighting and the problems caused by 
the extent of the advance achieved, when combined with the severe weather 
conditions, poor road links, and difficult terrain.115 The German defenders had the 
advantage of operating on interior lines, closer to their supplies and supporting 
artillery; bolstered by reserves, they were increasingly determined to hold their 
ground. The brigade moved into the attack on 30 September, as enemy defences 
were becoming stronger. Artillery support remained limited with only 18-pounder guns 
able to be brought forward and supplies of artillery ammunition (no smoke shells were 
available) restricted because of the difficulty of carriage by pack on long and almost 
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impassable roads: ‘The limited roads that existed were blocked with transport and 
troops (including a French Cavalry Division) for long periods…’.116 
 
Although the German units opposite might be under strength, they were well-
equipped with machine guns operating from prepared strongpoints and concrete 
pillboxes. 
 
While it was important to push towards COURTRAI, and further, out-flank the 
enemy defensive lines protecting LILLE, the losses suffered by troops (in good 
spirits though tired) decided in favour of a policy of waiting until our guns and 
supplies came up, before undertaking an advance again on a big scale.117  
 
With the worsening transport and supply problems, together with German reserves 
strengthening the defensive lines of the Flanders Positions, the battle ceased. The 
Belgians were glad to halt in order to re-group following the fighting of the past five 
days: ‘an inexperienced army operating in difficult circumstances (and unfamiliar with 
open warfare) ran ahead of its supplies’.118 The British were two miles short of Menin. 
General Plumer recognised that heavy artillery and planned preparations would be 
necessary to achieve a full breakout. He issued orders for attacks to cease for the 
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present, the ground currently held to be consolidated, artillery to be manoeuvred 
forward, and communications improved.119 
 
On behalf of the Belgian Army, Gillain wrote to Plumer to congratulate him on ‘the 
magnificent success’ achieved by Second Army during the battle;120 he highlighted 
the co-operation of II Corps with Belgian forces in the successful ‘joint attack’. 
 
Writing to the Commander of 29th Division, Lieutenant-General C.W. Jacob (II Corps) 
pointed out that the division had been ‘specially selected’ for a key task on the 
opening day of the battle, the capture of the Broodseinde Ridge, which it had 
achieved and more in the first 24 hours of the attack. He also congratulated the 
division on its subsequent capture of Gheluvelt on 28 September and, after very 
heavy fighting, the village of Gheluwe, on 3 October.121 These gains were important in 
terms of supporting the Belgian Army’s attack and maintaining the momentum of 
Second Army’s initial breakthrough. 
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1. The attack carried out on the Army front today made little progress owing to the determined 
resistance offered by the enemy, both with Artillery and machine gun fire. 
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Reports from civilians and prisoners indicated that the morale of the German troops 
was fragile, that of Bavarian units particularly poor, and of concern to their officers. 
Depots were being evacuated and materiel moved back to reserve positions.122 
 
Many of the post battle operations reports made reference to the importance of 
artillery support for the infantry to be able to overcome determined enemy defences 
and entrenched machine gun posts. 
 
Very great credit is due to the supporting artillery. Many guns only took up 
position on Y/Z night and fired their barrage as a Map Shoot. The barrage, 
though ragged, was excellent…123 
 
Reports also made positive comments about the direct support to infantry units by 
attached and supporting machine gun and trench mortar sections: 
 
Machine Guns advanced with Battalion Headquarters under the immediate 
control of Battalion Commanders. Section Officers, however, were encouraged 
to seize every opportunity of using their own initiative, and, by their untiring 
efforts, skill and boldness in handling their weapons, the Machine Gunners 
assisted very considerably throughout the operation. 
 
Stokes Mortars proved invaluable in overcoming hostile points of resistance.124  
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Map 5 shows the stages of the advance made by Second Army after the first day of 
the battle through to the decision by Plumer to break off the attack on 3 October. 
 
Conclusions on the operations indicated that the range of flexible tactics adopted by 
the advancing infantry units of Second Army - the precise details varied between 
brigades and divisions - had generally been successful. The men and their officers 
exercised their initiative as they moved forward. Decisions on the use of terrain and 
cover, and the deployment and direction of supporting firepower, were made in 
response to the immediate circumstances. 
 
Very few casualties were suffered from hostile fire. I attribute this largely to the 
fact that all ranks had been trained to ‘dribble’ forward and under cover of 
trench mortars, Lewis Guns, Rifle Grenades and rifle fire, outflank centres of 
resistance.125 
 
Army Order 41 directed all Corps to maintain harassing actions by infantry and 
artillery, designed to persuade the Germans that a new attack was imminent. The aim 
was to prevent the enemy from moving troops north where the Belgians, with French 
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support, intended to exploit Second Army’s breakthrough.126 Although Degoutte 
wished for a new general advance to commence on 7-8 October, King Albert 
subsequently set the date as 14 October.127 The high number of Belgian casualties so 
far was an important factor in this decision to allow more time for preparation of the 
next phase. 
 
The Battle of Ypres saw British Second Army casualties of 303 officers and 4,392 
other ranks; for the Belgians, around 2,000 soldiers had been killed and 10,000 were 
sick or wounded.  Second Army had captured 4,672 prisoners and about 100 guns. 
Overall, the GAF had taken over 10,000 German prisoners, 300 guns, 100 trench 
mortars, and 600 machine guns.128 
 
The long guard was over, and the shattered tower of Ypres still stood, the 
pointing witness of an inviolated charge. The curving belt of fire and steel – so 
often strained near to breaking-point, so often pierced but never broken – had 
spread wide, had gone forward. 
There was no Salient.129 
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128
 Edmonds, Official History Vol. V, footnote, p. 92. 
129
 Brice, The Battle Book of Ypres, p. 52. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
226 
 
Chapter Five 
 
The Battle of Courtrai 
 
Breakout: 14 – 19 October 1918 
 
 [Captain Baron] liked a well-planned unalterable routine… He petulantly 
disapproved of the open warfare which had suddenly come after years of 
trench routine: unexpected things kept happening and decisions had to be 
made at once without any guiding precedent – which was most incorrect.1 
 
In Flanders in 1302 the Battle of Courtrai was fought, with a result that confounded all 
known expectations. The workers of Bruges were in revolt and their Flemish infantry 
inflicted a major defeat on the flower of French knighthood – so many nobles were 
slain that royal commissioners were forced to, in the words of one author, ‘scour the 
provinces for bourgeois and rich peasants prepared to pay for ennoblement’.2 Just 
over six hundred years later another Battle of Courtrai was fought, and the troops of 
an army once considered to be the most powerful in Europe would be defeated by a 
British force largely consisting of conscripts and transferees. 
                                                         
1
 From the opening page of  R. Aldington, ‘Victory’, a short story in B. Korte, ed., The Penguin Book of First 
World War Stories (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 41-48. 
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 Century (Macmillan, 1979), pp. 76-77. 
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At Zero hour of 0535 on 14 October 1918, British Second Army launched its assault. 
 
The battle took place against the background of the German High Command making 
efforts to pursue a negotiated armistice. The rumours regarding the prospects of an 
end to the war were beginning to circulate amongst the British troops. It was in these 
circumstances that GHQ acted to try and ensure that the focus remained on defeating 
the German Army in the field. On 7 October 1918, 90 Brigade (30th Division) recorded 
the following order from Field Marshal Haig:  
 
There are indications that the attention of officers and men is in danger of 
being diverted by insidious rumours from their single task of defeating the 
enemy… F.M. C.inC. [Haig] warns all ranks against the disturbing influence of 
such unfounded Peace talk and wishes it to be clearly understood that at no 
time has there been a greater need of relentless efforts or a fairer promise of 
greater results. The Army will concentrate in an entire energy of bringing 
operations in the field to a successful and decisive issue.3 
 
Second Army again deployed ten divisions, with 14th Division transferred from XIX to 
XV Corps; the disposition north-to-south was now: 
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II Corps 9th Division 
29th Division 
36th Division 
XIX Corps 35th Division 
41st Division 
X Corps 30th Division 
34
th 
Division 
XV Corps 14th Division 
31st Division 
40th Division 
 
Map 6 shows the Army’s disposition at the start of the battle, and the advance 
achieved during the first 48 hours. 
 
The Germans held Flanders Position II and still held Position I south of Gheluwe. 
Since ceasing attacks on 3 October, which had seen the occupation of Armentieres 
on the right of the line,4 Second Army had maintained a daily programme of harassing 
artillery fire (gas shells, hurricane bombardments and neutralising fire), small arms 
fire, wire cutting, feint attacks and patrol work. This achieved its aim of persuading the 
enemy that an attack was imminent, to the extent that the German artillery fired a 
counter-preparation bombardment every morning. Support services worked on re-
making roads and laying new railway lines, allowing the artillery to be moved forward. 
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Much of the fighting during this period was for control of the various farmhouses and 
smallholdings that could serve as points of resistance. Despite bad weather that 
‘interfered considerably with flying’ the RAF concentrated on attacking important 
railway junctions, dropping over 3,000 bombs.5 
 
Overall the GAF had 32 Divisions (13 Belgian, 10 British and 9 French) faced by the 
German Fourth Army of 24 Divisions.6  
 
In conjunction with the Belgian and French forces to its left, the Second Army 
launched the new offensive on 14 October, retaining the role of securing the right 
flank of the GAF. The recently inserted French XXXIV and VII Corps were to act as 
the main strike force with immediate flanking support from Belgian divisions on either 
side. The aim was for the Belgian forces to seize Roulers and from there advance to 
Thielt and Ghent. XX, XIX, and II Corps of Second Army received initial orders to 
advance in the direction of the River Lys, thereby linking with XV Corps (holding the 
right flank) along the north-east / south west line of the waterway. ‘All that was 
required of the Second Army was a wheel to the right up to the Lys’.7 
 
However, Plumer was apparently mindful of the potential for his Army to do rather 
more than guarding a flank. He perhaps agreed with Haig’s opinion that the British 
                                                         
5
 TNA WO158/218  Operations Reports  - from which much of the supporting information in this paragraph is 
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6
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armies were providing the cutting edge for the allies’ offensive operations.8 Haig was 
still urging Plumer to stick with the flank role; Second Army should not assault across 
the River Lys unless there were clear signs of a German withdrawal. However Haig 
also wanted Second Army to cross the river to the east of Courtrai so that it could link 
up with the BEF near Tournai.9 It is probable that Plumer was influenced by other 
factors, not least his continuing lack of confidence in GAF Chief of Staff, Degoutte. 
The successes of the previous battle had given him a new belief in the strength and 
abilities of Second Army troops. He was also aware of increasing evidence that the 
defence put up by the German forces was weakening and that their commanders 
were making preparations for a further withdrawal.  
 
On 11 October, Plumer issued a modification to his earlier orders, changes which 
implied that a far more aggressive assault should be launched, whilst ensuring that 
the right flank of the Belgian Army remained secure. Delays by the latter were 
impeding the coordination of artillery fire support for the forthcoming attack. Therefore 
Army Order 43 directed II Corps to detail a detachment of infantry and machine guns 
on the left flank, to ‘move in touch with and at the same rate as’ the Belgians. 
Meanwhile each Army would ‘move at its own pace’, with the consequence that 
‘Second Army will gradually become echeloned forward’.10 
 
                                                         
8
 See references in Haig’s Diary for October 1918 (TNA WO158/244); these views are also referred to in various 
secondary assessments of Haig’s opinions on the leading part being played by the BEF armies at that time, e.g. 
Harris with Barr, Amiens. 
9
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10
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1918. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
231 
 
The Second Army threat to cross the Lys (with the associated pressure from British 
Armies to the south) might hasten German evacuation from the industrial cities of 
Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing. Therefore Corps commanders should be prepared to 
use forward advance guards to establish bridgeheads south of the river, targeting 
sites such as Wervicq, Lauwe and Marcke. 
 
This line of reasoning was supported by GHQ Intelligence, which reported on 14 
October that the enemy was evacuating material from the Belgian coast and showing 
little interest in constructing further defences in the area. The conclusion drawn was 
that the Germans would not fight indefinitely to retain the region and were likely to 
look to withdraw south of Lille and then to a line based on the River Schelde. 
 
Various conferences and meetings took place as the preparations of the Army 
proceeded. On 12 October, 26 Brigade held a conference at its headquarters to 
discuss the ‘forthcoming operations’.11 French forces were now moving forward in 
preparation for the next phase of the campaign; on 4 October, the diary of 27 Brigade 
(9th Division) recorded that ‘French 7th Corps reported advancing towards 
ROULERS’.12 There were also some minor adjustments between the adjoining British 
(9th Division) and Belgian units; on 5 October, ‘6th Belgian Regiment relieved 12th 
Royal Scots on the left’.13 
 
                                                         
11
 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders. 
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There was still evidence of enemy resistance above the battlefield. On 4 October 
7/Seaforth Highlanders experienced a night attack by German aircraft, bombing roads 
around the battalion camp behind the village of Waterdamhoek.14 Around the same 
time 120 Brigade recorded:  
 
At 1400 four E.A.s [enemy aircraft] crossed our lines bringing down one of our 
O.B.s [observation balloons] in flames… 
Strong formations [of RAF planes] were observed to cross the enemy lines 
meeting with heavy A.A. fire… 
Repeated attempts were made [by enemy aircraft] to cross our lines…15 
 
On 7 October, Lieutenant-Colonel W A W Crellin, commanding 15/Sherwood 
Foresters (105 Brigade, 35th Division), was severely wounded by enemy shellfire and 
subsequently died of his wounds.16 
 
British units were continuing to push forward at regular intervals, and at various points 
along the Second Army Front. On the right, the orders of 40th Division on 6 October 
established 120 Brigade as advance guard, responsible for defences south of the 
Lys, with guns from Brigade RFA, a machine gun company and a half company of 
cyclists attached.17 119 Brigade assumed responsibility for the north bank. The 
subsequent instructions of 120 Brigade on 7 October illustrate the arrangements 
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 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
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made to address the operational challenges of this war of movement. There are 
references to ‘the wide frontage’ and the consequent ‘large gaps between posts’ 
which required advance patrols and scouting sections to take special precautions. All 
patrols were to be deployed as ‘strong fighting patrols capable of dealing with any 
small parties of the enemy encountered’. There was also emphasis on guarding and 
covering any bridgeheads achieved, taking account of the various streams and rivers 
which lay across the general line of the Army’s advance.18 
 
On 9 October, units from 9/Irish Fusiliers (108 Brigade, 36th Division) captured 
Goldflake Farm, a fortified position on the south facing slope of Hill 41. A strong 
counter-attack by the Germans not only retook the farm but also pushed back the 
troops holding Twigg and Mansard farms on the crest of the hill. The importance of 
these last two positions for the forthcoming operations led in turn to British counter-
attacks; Twigg Farm was secured after an immediate attack and Mansard Farm 
following an assault just before dawn.19 
 
In 14th Division, 41 Brigade recorded the regular harassment experienced as a 
consequence of enemy artillery fire, as well as trench mortars and machine guns. 
There was some frustration with the response of the British guns, given the perceived 
advantages of well-positioned observation points held by the German defenders. On 
10 October the Brigade welcomed the artillery ‘crashes’ on selected enemy positions, 
noting: 
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The silly sentiment of not wanting to shell COMINES and WERVICQ Churches 
certainly helped to increase [our] casualties, which would not have happened 
had the enemy been deprived of such excellent observation.20 
 
That same day the Brigade observed fires in Wervicq which, together with the 
‘enemy’s wild harassing fire, indicates a possible withdrawal soon’. 
 
For the new attack it was decided that there would be no preliminary bombardment 
and a creeping barrage would support the infantry. This would commence three 
minutes before Zero hour and proceed at the rate of 100 yards every two minutes, 
with a pause of 15 minutes every 1,500 yards. This rate of advance would have been 
unthinkable twelve months previously, indicative of the confidence of the attackers, 
the changed nature of the terrain over which they were to advance, and the perceived 
weaknesses of the defenders.  
 
On the evening before the battle the British artillery conducted targeted shelling of 
enemy lines: 
 
At 1900 our Artillery heavily gas shelled hostile positions with the new BB 
(Mustard Gas) shell.21 
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(A notable German casualty resulted from the use of mustard gas shells in the British 
bombardment).22 
 
RAF support for the attack was delayed; the weather was dry but a ground mist 
prevented air operations until after 1100.  
 
II Corps 
 
9th Division still operated on the left of II Corps and Second Army, with the 9th 
Regiment of the Belgian Army on its left; for the initial attack, 26 Brigade was 
deployed on the left of the Division with 28 Brigade on its right, and 27 Brigade in 
reserve. The immediate objective was the Winkel-St-Eloi – Drie Masten Road, and 
then to drive for the Courtrai-Lenlade Railway. Once this was achieved the division 
was expected to undertake a crossing of the River Lys and the capture of the town of 
Harlebeke. On the immediate boundary of the two armies, to assist in the 
coordination of operations, liaison platoons were established drawn from 
                                                         
22
  … the British opened an attack with gas on the front south of Ypres… They used the yellow gas whose 
effect was unknown to us, at least from personal experience. I was destined to experience it that very night… We 
were subjected for several hours to a heavy bombardment with gas bombs, which continued throughout the night 
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morning I also began to feel pain. It increased with every quarter of an hour; and about seven o’clock my eyes 
were scorching as I staggered back and delivered the last despatch I was destined to carry in this war. (A. Hitler, 
Mein Kampf, translated by J. Murphy (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1939), p. 162). 
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is interesting to note that Hitler did not use chemical weapons during the Second World War’.  
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neighbouring units. Each liaison platoon comprised one officer and twelve men of 
each nationality:23 
 
8/Black Watch (26 Brigade) – 28 Brigade – 2nd Battalion, 9th Belgian Regiment 
5/Cameron Highlanders – 1st Battalion, 9th Belgian Regiment 
7/Seaforth Highlanders – 3rd Battalion, 9th Belgian Regiment. 
 
There had also been arrangements agreed for a series of light signals which the 
Belgian forces would use to report progress or call for support as they advanced.24 
 
With no preliminary bombardment, the 18 pounder barrage of HE and smoke would 
begin three minutes before Z hour, before moving forward in 50 yard lifts per minute. 
The RAF was involved in monitoring the progress of the attack, including a ‘Counter 
Attack Aeroplane… for the purpose of giving warning of hostile attack’ – the warning 
would be via the dropping of a red parachute light. The changed nature of the warfare 
by this point is illustrated by the order stating that company commanders ‘will ensure 
that no men leave their units to go in search of souvenirs’.25 
 
With zero hour set at 0535 hours, the immediate objective for the 29th Division was 
Ledeghem, and the cutting of the railway between Courtrai and Ghent. The day’s 
attack began under the cover of ‘an intense artillery barrage’ with a twenty minute 
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defensive barrage planned once intermediate objectives were reached. Unfortunately 
the early morning mist combined with the smoke of the barrage created visibility 
problems for the attackers, causing infantry to lose touch with the barrage or, in some 
cases, to lose direction entirely. However the fog proved to be of overall assistance to 
the assaulting troops ‘who were able under its cover to get close to and surround 
hostile posts without encountering any aimed fire’.26 There was some initial street 
fighting but the capture of the village was largely achieved by 0700 hours, with large 
numbers of the enemy surrendering. 1/Lancashire Fusiliers, starting as reserve for 86 
Brigade, was responsible for ‘mopping up’.  
 
The approach by 86 Brigade was typical of the battle plan applied by the Corps 
formations, with a one battalion front, support and reserve battalions moving up and 
through the front battalion as each objective line was reached. The advance on the 
first objective was covered by a field artillery barrage; the next advance received a 
covering barrage from heavy artillery. Subsequent covering fire included trench 
mortars. In due course, touch was restored between the attacking battalions, both 
within the 29th Division and with the right flank of 9th Division. Progress was steady 
despite opposition from enemy machine guns and light artillery fire.
27
 Importantly, 
during the evening all field artillery and much of the heavy artillery was able to move 
up into position to support the next day’s attack.28 
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88 Brigade was tasked with supporting the arrangements to cross the Heulebeek 
Stream.29 By 1730 hours, 2/Hampshires were ‘going for Salines’ and had reached the 
Driemaasten-Gulleghem Road, from where they attracted enemy machine gun fire 
from the direction of Gulleghem; reports that 36th Division had captured the village 
appeared to be premature (which was correct). 9th Division was held up by defensive 
fire from the Bois de Heule Wood.30 
 
The results from RAF reconnaissance as recorded at 36th Division HQ showed that 
the artillery preparations had been successful in closing down the initial defensive fire 
from enemy batteries.31 However, this was not necessarily the experience of 36th 
Division’s units on the ground. 107 Brigade recorded that at H Hour as the attack 
commenced there was a ‘fairly heavy enemy reply to our barrage’, but by 0600 hours 
‘enemy artillery quieter’.32 Reports from prisoners that the attack had not been 
anticipated showed that there had been value in the decision to dispense with a 
preliminary bombardment.33 
 
The division made good progress, entering Moorseele (1033 hours) and then looking 
to outflank Gulleghem from the north and south (1325 hours), from which heavy 
machine gun fire was reported. The attack stalled here and plans by 107 Brigade to 
deploy a motor machine gun battery supported by a platoon of II Corps cyclists were 
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changed as these units were ordered to pull back into divisional reserve during the 
evening. A line 300 yards west of Gulleghem was consolidated and plans made to 
make a fresh assault in the morning.34 
 
The liberation of occupied towns and villages meant there were new considerations 
amidst the fighting, as civilians were overtaken by the advancing allied forces. A 
report on the progress of the 35th Division (XIX Corps) on the right flank of II Corps 
stated that the division was advancing towards the Lys via ‘Woelvelghem which [the] 
enemy [is] shelling… Civilians released’.35 107 Brigade recorded that ‘A number of 
civilians were found in Moorseele and the outskirts of Gulleghem and evacuated to 
the rear’.36 
 
The unexpected pace of the advance was illustrated by an unconfirmed report that 
the 6th Cavalry Division had possibly reached Gulleghem.37 
 
By the close of the day, the advance on the II Corps front had progressed around 
three miles, on a two mile frontage. A line running north-south was established on the 
west side of Gulleghem, one and a half miles west of Heule (which lay on the rail line 
out of Courtrai), with units deployed to provide ‘defence in depth’ to secure the 
gains.38 
                                                                                                                                                                                
33
 Falls, 36
th
 Division,  pp. 272-3. 
34
 TNA WO95/2502/1, War Diary of 107 Infantry Brigade; Falls, 36
th
 Division, pp. 274-5. 
35
 TNA WO95/2492, War Diary of 36
th
 Division, 1200  hours. 
36
 TNA WO95/2502/1, War Diary of 107 Infantry Brigade. 
37
 TNA WO95/2492, War Diary of 36
th
 Division, 1245 hours. 
38
 TNA WO95/2300, War Diary of 1
st
 Lancashire Fusiliers, Narrative of Operations 13-15
th
 October 1918; troops 
were placed in front line posts and in support positions, with machine gun posts dispersed throughout. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
240 
 
 
Gas shelling of Moorseele by the Germans was recorded on a number of occasions 
that evening and the following day, no doubt designed to disrupt the build-up of British 
forces for the anticipated further attacks.39 
 
XIX Corps 
 
At 0535 hours, 104 and 105 Brigades led the attack by 35th Division, under a creeping 
barrage; 106 Brigade in support. The advance was towards the River Lys, in a 
direction to the south of Courtrai and the village of Marcke. The immediate task was 
to capture and secure high ground south of the village of Gulleghem, overlooking the 
river.40 Troops found welcome benefits from moving over ground unaffected by the 
fighting in previous battles: 
 
It is interesting to note that the advance and arrangements for the 
accommodation of troops were much facilitated on account of the fact that we 
were now operating in open Country untouched by heavy shelling and free 
from concrete pill-boxes. The good roads and level ground made possible the 
quick advance of the Field Artillery and Infantry and the existing farms, houses 
etc., which were not destroyed by shell fire were used for the accommodation 
of Support and Reserve Troops.41 
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At the close of the day the division was held up on a line just west of the hamlet of 
Kloefhoek (Klythoek). 
 
At the synchronised Z hour of 0535 hours, 122 Brigade moved forward to begin the 
attack by 41st Division on the ‘Terhand Switch’;42 124 Brigade (plus 23/Middlesex 
from 123 Brigade) was in support. Following a creeping barrage of 100 yards every 
two minutes, early morning mist combined with the smoke from the enemy’s 
defensive barrage to create difficulties for the assaulting troops; direction was hard to 
discern and officers faced problems in exercising command – ‘supervision of any 
units larger than a section [was] practically impossible’.43 As the advance progressed 
the fighting became more intense; the area contained a number of small farms which 
provided cover for defenders. The attacking troops were confronted by the expected 
machine gun fire and also by ‘enemy light field guns firing over open sights at point 
blank range’.44 The latter were engaged by 18 pounder guns attached to each of the 
attacking battalions. The success of this last action once the fog began to disperse, 
combined with outflanking manoeuvres to take out each farm and its defenders in 
turn, saw progress resumed over the course of the morning. The first day’s objective, 
a line running south-west to north-east through the hamlet of Wijnberg, was achieved 
by around noon. Resistance continued throughout the day and the Germans also 
attempted counter-attacks on the junction between 41st and 35th Divisions, though 
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these were repulsed without reported difficulty. At 1600 hours the division’s advance 
troops had consolidated the ground won.45 
 
X Corps 
 
With the objective of Menin, 34th Division launched its attack with 102 and 103 
Brigades, operating in liaison with 41st Division on its left and 30th Division (also under 
X Corps) on its right.46 The troops began from the starting line of the Gheluwe Switch, 
facing the village of Gheluwe; two days previously, a raiding party from 4/Royal 
Sussex had captured a German soldier, thereby providing some valuable information 
on the facing defenders. The division’s subsequent summary report provides a 
concise account of the resulting advance: 
 
The 103rd Infantry Brigade on the left of the Divisional front enveloped 
GHELUWE from the North and South capturing all the enemy garrison located 
there. They were hung up temporarily in the TERHAND SWITCH by enemy 
field guns shooting over open sights from RUMANIAN FARM. The 5th K.O.S.B. 
and 8
th
 Scottish Rifles, however, succeeded in capturing two and one of these 
guns respectively, and established themselves on their final objective on the 
N.E. outskirts of MENIN. The 102nd Infantry Brigade on the right came under 
heavy machine gun and artillery fire when they commenced to advance. They 
overcame all resistance, however, and established themselves in the 
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TERHAND SWITCH by nightfall, being all along their final objectives on the 
Western outskirts of MENIN.47 
 
The Commander of 34th Division, Major-General Nicholson, recorded that ‘the 
barrage at 100 yards in two minutes.... was much too fast.... communications were 
bad and information inaccurate’. He also subsequently heard stories from troops that 
‘....putting the barrage down 300 yards ahead of the infantry line was too far and the 
cause of heavy casualties from machine guns which were not touched by the 
barrage’. Despite this, his division had taken part in the successful capture of 
Gheluwe village which had been ‘smashed and shelled with Thermite shells’. ‘The 
Hun surrendered freely, only machine-gunners fighting’.48 
 
For 30th Division, 21 Brigade (right flank) and 90 Brigade (left flank) led the attack. 
Support included the division’s 30th Battalion, Machine Gun Corps, and also one 
company from 14th Battalion, Machine Gun Corps (the 14th Division would be 
attacking on the right of 30th Division). The barrage would provide cover for the attack 
on the railway line, the village of Reeke and the road junction there.49 7/Royal Irish 
(21 Brigade) launched its attack under the cover of an artillery barrage of smoke and 
HE, together with Stokes Mortars. The advance pushed on into Wervicq despite 
resistance in the village from enemy snipers and machine guns. With further support 
from artillery and mortars, the troops then moved on Hoogemotte.50 
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The use of machine guns as part of the artillery barrage to cover infantry assaults had 
been a regular feature of the British Army’s plan of attack throughout the latter part of 
1917 and in 1918. The ‘Machine Gun Barrage’, with sections of heavy machine guns 
providing indirect fire onto enemy positions, was designed to pin down defenders 
while the attacking infantry advanced. The other crucial role for the heavy machine 
gunners was to take forward their guns in order to deploy in defensive or covering 
positions, consolidating the ground won by the infantry. A system for command and 
control was required as the battle developed and units moved forward. The orders to 
30th Battalion, Machine Gun Corps, for the attack by 21 Brigade on 14 October, 
included details on the allocation of gun companies to specified infantry units, 
arrangements for a covering barrage, instructions on the steps to be taken to secure 
and defend captured positions, and reporting requirements to Brigade HQ.51 
 
As well as providing the additional firepower to resist a counter-attack by the enemy, 
the machine gun teams allowed the infantry the space and time to regroup and also 
to move onto the next objective, as required. The prescribed detail in the orders 
regarding timing, and the relay and receipt of information, is indicative of the ‘modern’ 
style of warfare being waged but without the benefit of a mobile system of wireless 
communication. In these circumstances, much was dependent on forward 
preparations, with pre-planned timings based on such factors as distance and terrain.  
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The covering barrage began at 0531 hours with the synchronised attack beginning 
four minutes later. The line of the River Lys was ‘held by the enemy in fair strength’ 
with the main points of resistance being fortified pill boxes.52 For 30th Division, 1/6 
Cheshires (21 Brigade) had begun to cross the Lys during the afternoon.53 The 
smoke barrage helped the attackers to take the enemy by surprise in the drive for the 
Lys, engineers commencing bridging works as soon as possible.54  
 
XV Corps 
 
14th Division had been transferred to the command of XV Corps, while maintaining its 
position along the Ypres-Comines Canal, facing the village of Comines. Its role was to 
take advantage of any withdrawal by enemy forces resulting from the attacks by X 
Corps formations to its left. In this case it was establish a bridgehead across the Lys, 
covering the village; linking with 30th Division on its left, with whose progress it was to 
keep pace.55 At 0750 hours, with 30th Division reported to have reached Wervicq, 41 
Brigade pushed forward patrols to the river. The neighbouring farms, Blanche and 
Lamlash, were found to be strongly defended, and there was heavy machine gun fire 
from Comines (with the church tower a likely observation post). Artillery fire was 
brought to bear on the town, the barrage including smoke. From 1215 hours the RE 
began putting pontoon crossings over the river at four specific points identified in the 
original attack orders, as well as making temporary repairs to a damaged bridge. The 
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attacking battalions, 33/London and 29/Durham Light Infantry, were each allocated 
two bridges. By mid-afternoon, infantry began to cross the river and orders were 
issued for a bridgehead to be established and for reserve units to move forward in 
support. However, this initial success could not be sustained. In the face of heavy 
enemy shelling, the ‘Advanced posts East of River… were blown out of position’,56 
and the bridgehead was withdrawn. Orders from division were for a crossing to be 
forced the following morning, with artillery support. 
 
The early fighting in the battle shows the continuing application of flexible tactics by 
Second Army forces. Smoke and gas shells were again used in specific 
circumstances to screen the attackers. There were several instances of the 
successful use of Lewis guns in support of infantry units; for example, the capture by 
107th Brigade, 36th Division, of a length of the Flanders Position II plus the railway and 
Moorseele behind it. 36th Division also successfully employed cyclists and motor 
machine guns to outflank enemy machine gun positions west of the village of 
Gulleghem. 28 Brigade (29th Division) crossed the Wulfdambeek river using eight 
portable bridges; each battalion had18-pounder field guns and 6-inch mortars up with 
the attack. 29
th
 Division’s report praised the quick thinking of ‘Junior Commanders’ 
who ‘took prompt steps… to overcome opposition… when the line was checked’.57  
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1/Royal Irish Rifles attacked Gulleghem but without artillery support, the attack 
becoming held up by the density of the wire and machine gun fire. A second attack 
took place at 1700 with an outflanking operation but there was a gain of only 200 
yards. One section did manage to bring down a German reconnaissance plane and 
captured its crew.58 
 
The first day of the battle saw the GAF capturing over 6,000 prisoners, more than half 
taken by British forces. The Belgian Army, with the French XXXIV Corps operating 
between its Northern and Southern Groupements, had reached Rumbeke, Roulers 
and Gitsberg. Second Army captured Gheluwe and Moorselle, and was positioned to 
strike for Menin.59  With the significant ground gained, the operations were a 
convincing success. Resistance had been limited. Private Pope (2/15th London 
Regiment) recalled that his unit ‘stopped by a pill box to collect prisoners [who gave] 
no resistance.... we lighted cigarettes as we went forward.... [encountering] stranded 
Germans who gave themselves up after being threatened’.60 
 
Philpott points out that there were broader strategic gains from Second Army’s 
advance, with the capture of enemy lateral communications along the line Roulers-
Thourout-Courtrai bringing about a general retirement by German forces in 
Flanders.61 
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The Second Army Commander was rightly pleased with the results: 
 
Please accept my congratulations and convey them to all commanders and 
troops engaged today on the very successful results on what had been a long 
and arduous day.62 
 
 
15 October 
 
This success was repeated on 15 October, with Plumer’s orders urging units to 
consolidate the gains of the previous day, send forward patrols and to establish 
bridgeheads across the Lys, if possible to achieve ‘without undue loss’. On the right 
XV Corps, employing the cover of artillery and machine guns, put temporary bridges 
across the Lys and established a firm bridgehead. This was a crucial move as it 
allowed enemy defences on the right (southern) bank of the Lys to be outflanked. To 
the north, II Corps in conjunction with the Belgian right wing made good progress 
despite encountering considerable resistance during the initial stages of the attack.  
 
The Germans were estimated to now have twelve divisions facing the GAF with 
between seven and nine divisions available as reserves.63 The enemy made full use 
of snipers and machine gun posts well dug-in behind fortified positions, including 
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abandoned farmhouses. Enemy artillery continued to resist as the British troops 
advanced. ‘Jerry was shelling the [Lys] bridge with heavy stuff.... He shelled every 
road and street....’64 
 
II Corps 
 
On the left of Second Army, the Belgians attacked at 0900 hours, with a preliminary 
barrage opening ten minutes earlier.65 Initial covering fire for the British advance 
made effective use of machine gun attachments as well as battalion Lewis guns.66 
The principal objective for II Corps was the village of Heule. 
 
For 9th Division, 27 Brigade now took the lead, with the objectives of Hill 40 and the 
village of Steenbeck. 11/Royal Scots attacked the Hill but were hit by surprise fire 
from the direction of Laaga-Kepel Wood (north of Steenbeck) which had been 
reported to have been cleared of the enemy. This led to the battalion carrying out a 
mopping up exercise in the vicinity of the wood before resuming its assault. Despite 
encountering heavy wire defences the Hill was subsequently ‘successfully stormed’, 
its capture recorded at 1010 hours. Thereafter the battalion was forced to outflank 
Heetje in order to progress, whereupon it became pinned by the enemy’s defence, 
concentrated around a windmill which dominated the surrounding ground. As the 
evening approached the German defenders appeared to recognise the danger of 
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being trapped in what had become a salient and the position was evacuated. Belgian 
troops were now entering the area and some were persuaded to consider moving on 
Heetje.67 
 
Meanwhile, 12/Royal Scots had moved up behind its brother battalion and proceeded 
to attack and capture Steenbeck, under the cover of an artillery and machine gun 
barrage. The advance of 9th Division was initially checked west of Heule Wood but an 
outflanking action by 2/South Wales Borderers (87 Brigade, 29th Division) captured 
the wood and allowed the advance to continue.68 At this point 27 Brigade paused to 
ensure contact with the Belgian and 29th Division units on its flanks. It was now 
looking to drive towards Harlebeke but became concerned to learn that the Belgians 
had been checked by a counter-attack in the vicinity of the railway line, and that 29th 
Division had at that time no further orders to progress; ‘an obvious opportunity for the 
Battalion Commander to use his initiative’ in the opinion of 27 Brigade. GOC 9th 
Division subsequently authorised the resumption of the advance, ordering the brigade 
to ‘press on whether the others followed or not’. The cyclists and motor machine guns 
proved to be very effective in maintaining the pace of the advance, driving towards 
the river and preventing the defenders from getting a chance to reorganise. The 
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machine guns were able to cause severe casualties amongst the troops retreating via 
the main road and the adjoining railway.69 
 
By late evening, the Belgian forces had taken Heetje and Bavichove, despite a heavy 
counter-attack by the Germans. Opposite the British forces, the enemy had dug itself 
in to retain a small bridgehead west of the Harlebeke-Courtrai road. Civilians warned 
that roads leading to the Lys in the vicinity of Courtrai had been mined.70 
 
87 Brigade took the lead for 29th Division, 88 Brigade in support. The infantry kept 
close touch with the barrage and made good early progress. 87 Brigade was at the 
outskirts of Heule by 1330 hours, whereupon it was decided to consolidate the ground 
gained and await the capture of the village itself by 36th Division; thus avoiding the 
risk of a counter-attack from that direction when the advance resumed. At 1800 
hours, crossings over the Heulebeek were secured at Watermolen and Old Mill. 
Orders were received to drive for the Lys on the 16th.71 
 
36th Division received morning reports that Gulleghem was believed to be taken 
except for some remaining enemy machine gun positions. As ordered, 1/Royal Irish 
Rifles had made a further attack at 0900 hours on the village, supported by a 
creeping barrage. The assault was a success, allowing an advance up to 1000 yards 
east of the village. The attack had not been without problems, heavy wire causing the 
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troops to lose touch with the barrage after a time.72 2/Royal Irish Rifles (from the 
same 107 Brigade) were then able to pass through their sister battalion and advance 
in the direction of the II Corps objective of Heule.73 This village, less than a mile from 
the outskirts of Courtrai, was captured by units from 109 Brigade (reported to 36th 
Division HQ at 1515 hours).74 Numerous prisoners were taken, from 2nd and 3rd 
Battalions, 181st Infantry Regiment (40th Saxon Division) and 9th Uhlan Regiment (6th 
Cavalry Division). British troops were now through Heule and advancing easterly 
towards the Courtrai-Ingelmunster railway. That evening a defensive flank was 
formed and further operations deferred until the following day.75 
 
However, overnight 107 Brigade was ordered to try and find out whether the enemy 
intended to make a stand on the west bank. 2/Royal Irish Rifles sent forward a patrol 
into Courtrai, the troops finding that the bridges across the Lys had been destroyed. 
The patrol appears to have acted contrary to the orders from division, most likely on 
the initiative of its leader Lieutenant Adams. He may have had some particular 
motives of his own as he was ‘a native of Courtrai’.76 The group ‘failed to send back 
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reports of its whereabouts’ and ‘remained in Courtrai until involved in our own 
barrage, returning later with five prisoners’.77 
 
During the evening II Corps issued orders that the 36th and 29th Divisions, acting in 
co-operation with the 35th Division (XIX Corps) on their right, were to continue the 
attack towards the River Lys, it being a priority to seize and hold river crossings.78 
 
XIX Corps 
 
For 35th Division, 105 Brigade attacked at 0900 hours, between Kloefhoek and 
Kappelhoek. Despite enemy machine gun fire from houses on the outskirts of 
Wevelghem, the units moved forward; shortly after 1000 hours posts were 
established on a line Wlinberg – Kloefhoek Cross Roads – Kappelhoek. During the 
afternoon 4/North Staffs led for the brigade, working its way forward in conjunction 
with 104 Brigade on its left, and troops from 41st Division on its right, protecting the 
southern flank of the advance. Posts were then set up east of the Wevelghem – 
Gulleghem Road. Under cover of darkness a patrol of 15/Sherwood Foresters 
reached Wevelghem Church, finding no enemy soldiers. On report of this to HQ a 
second patrol of 4/North Staffs was sent forward; this group made its way through 
Wevelghem and reached the north bank of the Lys, just above the village of Lauwe.79 
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106 Brigade received orders to pass through 104 and 105 Brigades, then to attack 
and secure the ‘high ground commanding the Bridge head crossing the Lys opposite 
the village of Marcke’. A conference of unit commanders together with their opposite 
numbers from the artillery was held late that evening, and zero hour was agreed as 
0530 hours the following morning.80 
 
The initial attack by 41st Division was also impeded by machine gun fire from 
Wevelghem, striking the left flank of the British troops. The pace of the advance was 
maintained nonetheless and the west bank of the Lys was duly reached. A line was 
consolidated from there, through the northern outskirts of Wevelghem, and along the 
Wevelghem-Gulleghem road. That night the Division was relieved by troops of 101 
Brigade (34th Division, X Corps) and its units moved north, taking up positions west of 
Courtrai.81  
 
X Corps 
 
After the successes on day one, the troops of 34th Division completed the occupation 
of Menin. Their orders were then to strike for a line from Le Malplaquet, south and 
east of Halluin, to Le Cornet. In the face of strong resistance, patrols fought their way 
across the Marathon and Mongrel bridges over the River Lys where they succeeded 
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in creating two bridgeheads. Both of these positions were under threat but the 
soldiers ‘managed to hang on’ until relief forces from 30th Division arrived.82  
 
On the left flank of the Division, as mentioned above, 101 Brigade had moved north to 
take over positions previously held by units of 41st Division.83 During these 
manoeuvres the brigade also carried out the clearing of the village of Wevelghem, 
establishing jumping off points from which to make a crossing of the Lys on the 
following day.84 
 
202 Field Company, Royal Engineers (30th Division), was ordered to reconnoitre and 
repair the bridges over the canal section of the River Lys between Wervicq and 
Comines, and to put two foot bridges in place for the infantry.85 
 
For 30th Division, 21 Brigade led by 7/Royal Irish continued to press forward.86 By the 
morning the battalion had established positions along the northern bank of the Lys.87 
Later that day, south of Wervicq, 1/6 Cheshires managed to force a passage 
across,88 aided by the success of 14th Division on its right which had secured a 
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crossing to the south west. Approaching midnight, the engineers succeeded in putting 
a pontoon bridge in place despite regular shelling by the enemy.89 
 
90 Brigade was ordered to cross the Lys between Bousbecque (where the bridges 
were reported to be burning) and (Le) Malplaquet. Advancing to the high ground 
above, fighting patrols were then to push forward and maintain close contact with the 
enemy. One company from 30th Battalion, Machine Gun Corps would provide support 
as required.90 2/15 London Regiment was initially ordered to cross at Bousbecque. In 
practice, ‘A’ Company of the battalion crossed via Wervicq and established a 
bridgehead which was subsequently reinforced by ‘C’ Company.91 
 
XV Corps 
 
14th Division had forced a crossing of the River Lys south west of Wervicq through 41 
Brigade, after the latter had launched a further assault at dawn and met little 
opposition. The first troops across were then able to outflank the remaining German 
defenders on the facing east bank. More worrying was the loss of touch with 
neighbouring units on both flanks, which were yet to cross. It was 1600 hours before 
contact was re-established and the line running along the Wervicq-Comines road, and 
the railway line south of Comines, secured. ‘The mopping up of Comines was 
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completed’.92 42 Brigade moved up into line at Comines, with 41 Brigade withdrawn 
into reserve.93 
 
On the Army’s right, 40th Division operated under orders for ‘further objectives for the 
pursuit and harassing of the enemy in the event of his withdrawal’, whilst maintaining 
touch on its right with 59th Division at the junction of the two British Armies.94 
 
As the battle progressed, the heaviest fighting involved those formations in the 
northern half of Second Army, in and around Courtrai. To the south, the main task for 
XV Corps was to continue the advance of its units eastwards across the Lys and 
towards Tourcoing and Roubaix, looking to wheel the right wing of the Army into a 
north-south alignment with its left flank and the coalition forces to the north. The corps 
was looking to try and take advantage of the pressure on the enemy further north so 
that the movement of its own units could be carried out with the minimum of 
casualties. The sequence of daily orders issued by 92 Brigade (31st Division) illustrate 
the nature of the drive towards and across the Roubaix canal,95 rotating units into and 
back from the front line or vanguard of the attack in order to maintain the momentum 
of the advance. The logistics of these operations placed a heavy workload upon staff 
and support services in ensuring the regular flow of daily supplies for the leading 
troops. In addition, billeting arrangements were required for those soldiers in support 
or reserve. 
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As 9th Division on the left flank of the Army blasted its way through a couple of miles 
of German defences, the units of 40th Division were about to begin an advance of 
over 15 miles to bring about the north-south configuration of the Second Army front. 
Moving across more open country, these forces had to remain constantly vigilant for  
pockets of enemy resistance. Second Army was across the Lys near Comines, 
though the latter was yet to be taken. Wervicq and Kloethock ridge had been 
captured; Menin was poised to fall. Reports suggested that the enemy intended to 
evacuate Lille – all civilians would be left behind except males of military age.96 
 
On 15 October the German Fourth Army commander Crown Prince Rupprecht 
ordered a general retirement to prepared positions east of Thourout-Roulers and 
south to Menin.97 (This ground was in fact already held by the allies).  
 
The progress made by French forces in the north was disappointing (see Map 6A). 
Their advance of 4 kilometres compared poorly with the 10 kilometres achieved by 
the Belgian Southern Groupement and II Corps.98 Foch became unhappy with this 
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situation and subsequently arranged for a regrouping of French forces to create a 
French Sixth Army under General de Boissoudy. On 19 October this took over the 
line held by the Belgian Southern Groupement, adjoining II Corps of Second Army. 
 
David Stevenson summarises the position in the Battle of Courtrai by 15 October as 
follows: 
 
[The GAF forces] were advancing faster than expected and threatening the 
Germans on the Flanders coast, who had the greatest distance to retreat if the 
Western Front became untenable. The local commanders feared being cut off 
and for two weeks Ludendorff had rejected their requests to pull back, but now 
their position became critical and on the 15th [October] the OHL authorised a 
general withdrawal.99  
 
16 October 
 
The full impact on ground operations of Plumer’s modified orders of 11 October would 
now become evident. II, X and XIX Corps were to cross the Lys and establish 
bridgeheads on the south side. XV Corps was already across and so the Army’s left 
pivoted on Bousbecque to allow the right wing to swing around and undertake an 
advance of over five miles. By the close of the day the four Divisions on the right of 
Second Army (40th, 31st, and 14th of XV Corps and 30th of X Corps) held a line across 
                                                                                                                                                                                
powerful French Army to give weight to French counsels in the peace negotiations’, which was justified by ‘the 
incomparable exertions and sacrifices of the French Army and nation in the early years of the war’. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
260 
 
the Lys up to Bousbecque. The remainder of the army rested on the north bank of the 
river. 
 
II Corps 
 
From 16 October onwards the heavy howitzers and long-range guns of II Corps 
engaged targets south of the Lys. Harassing fire was carried out together with the 
bombardment of targets selected by the infantry. The artillery of the other corps 
moved forward as conditions permitted, crossing the Lys as soon as appropriate 
bridging was in place. Overnight, 29th Division had consolidated a line in the centre of 
the II Corps front, holding Cuerne and Watermolen.100 
 
The 9th Division continued to keep pace with the Belgians on the left of the Army, with 
arrangements in hand to cross the Lys.  By lunchtime, the division was reporting that 
patrols had crossed the Lys at Menin, Wervicq and Comines. The Belgians were now 
in possession of the southern side of the Roulers-Lys Canal. By early evening their 
forces were reporting the retirement of enemy artillery from Harlebeke in the direction 
of Deerlyck and Vichte.
101
 In front of 27 Brigade, during the night a team of Royal 
Engineers had put two bridges across the Lys, but being placed very close together a 
German shell destroyed both. Despite this, three companies of 6/KOSB made a 
crossing that evening and attacked the Courtrai Road. This was successful but a 
subsequent attempt to work round Harlebeke was rebuffed. Accordingly a bridgehead 
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was formed on the road with flanks secured on the loop of the river. The enemy made 
a limited attempt to take out the position but was easily beaten off.102  
 
Advance units of 29th Division kept pace with neighbouring forces to reach the Lys; 
otherwise the day was focused upon the preparation of crossing points. In response 
to a request from 9th Division for support in holding its initial bridgehead, that night 88 
Brigade sent two platoons of 2/Hampshires across the river. A further bridging 
attempt was made to provide an alternative line of retreat but was stopped by heavy 
enemy machine gun fire.103 
 
By early morning the advance troops of 36th Division had reached Courtrai and the 
west bank of the Lys, finding many civilians still living there.104 Bridges across the 
river were found to be blown and so arrangements proceeded for the putting down of 
pontoon crossings, under the cover of a smoke screen. The objective remained that 
of clearing Courtrai of the enemy and establishing bridgeheads across the Lys, 
beyond the town. That afternoon, 60 men of 108 Brigade were reported to have 
established an initial position on the east bank but their bridge was subsequently 
destroyed by enemy artillery fire; fierce enemy counter-attacks led to them 
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subsequently being withdrawn by ferry.105 There was another reason for the 
withdrawal: rather than a direct assault on Courtrai, the city would be outflanked to 
the north and a drive made to the Scheldt – thereby making it untenable for the 
Germans to continue to hold the industrial cities to the south. In these circumstances 
there was no value in fighting to retain a bridgehead without a bridge.106 
 
XIX Corps 
 
At 0530 hours 106 Brigade moved through its companion brigades in 35th Division 
and attacked the enemy to the front. The Germans were overrun and the brigade 
advanced down to the River Lys, east of Wevelghem. Units from 104 and 105 
Brigades were pulled back to secure the area west of the Menin-Roulers railway. 41st 
Division was deployed to relieve 36th Division.107 
 
X Corps 
 
After the capture and clearing of Wevelghem, 101 Brigade of 34th Division crossed 
the Lys between Halluin and Marcke, successfully establishing advance posts.
108
 
 
For 30th Division, in the early hours ‘A’ Company of 2/15 London Regiment (90 
Brigade) crossed the Lys via a destroyed bridge and moved into Bousbecque. In 
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response the German artillery fired on the village, the bombardment including gas 
shells. Later on the division received orders to adjust its line northwards during the 
evening, to take over a portion of line from 34th Division.109 
 
Arrangements were already underway to improve the transport infrastructure in 
support of the advance. For the next few days 6/South Wales Borderers (Pioneers) 
worked on repairing the approaches to Menin and then on the neighbouring 
bridges.110 
 
XV Corps 
 
The priority for XV Corps was to cross the Lys, with 40th Division ordered to sustain 
forward pressure on a retreating enemy.111 
 
Information from prisoners together with observed evidence, suggested that the 
Germans were looking to undertake a planned withdrawal to the Schelde. Despite 
encountering strong covering detachments of artillery, machine guns and small arms, 
British forces maintained their pursuit. German Fourth Army had been instructed to 
retire on the prepared Hermann Position (running from Ghent, through Tournai and 
Conde, east of Le Cateau). However, this line would be broken on the following day, 
by the British Fourth Army operating south of Flanders. 
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For Second Army the day had brought the clearing of the north bank of the Lys up to 
Halebeke. Intelligence assessments concluded that the enemy had brought up seven 
divisions from its reserves to reinforce the GAF battlefront, giving a total of 17 
German divisions engaged since the Battle began. It was believed that five divisions 
were still held in reserve in the Courtrai and Lille areas; but north of Courtrai, all 
enemy divisions had been committed.112 
 
On 16 October, reflecting his own unhappiness with the limited progress of the 
French forces,113 King Albert issued orders (reaching Plumer on 17 October) which 
altered the responsibilities of Second Army within the Army Group. The British force 
would no longer retain its original designation as the flank guard (not that Plumer had 
shown himself restricted to that role). XV and X Corps were to push eastwards, south 
of the Lys; XIX and II Corps were to consolidate their positions and then to clear the 
enemy from the vicinity of the Lys and Courtrai. The Official History states that 
‘General Plumer again ignored the orders of the GAF.... [directing] XV and X Corps to 
advance to the Tournai-Courtrai railway.... XIX and II Corps to make all preparations 
to cross the Lys when the situation demanded’.114 
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17 October 
 
The Second Army Intelligence Summary reported that naval forces had landed at 
Ostend and occupied the town. British Fifth Army was entering Lille. Reports 
indicated that the Germans were attempting a planned withdrawal to the Scheldt, 
including delaying positions along the Lys and the Courtrai-Bossuyt Canal.115 
 
II Corps 
 
II Corps and XIX Corps received orders to both consolidate the current positions and 
to prepare for river crossings.116 Overnight there was fierce fighting as 9th Division 
struggled to retain its hold on the bridgehead across the Lys, just south-east of the 
village of Cuerne.117 In the early hours, troops from 2/Hampshires (88 Brigade, 29th 
Division) had crossed the river to secure the right flank of 27 Brigade. The British 
advance forces faced strong enemy shelling followed by a determined counter-attack 
at 0510 hours which caused some initial withdrawal; however a bayonet charge 
managed to recover the ground.  
 
During the early morning there were concerns regarding supplies for the troops on the 
east bank; the damaged bridges were preventing the delivery of fresh ammunition 
across the river. At 0830 hours arrangements were made to carry out the planned 
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supply drop from the air for advance troops. Aeroplanes of the RAF subsequently 
dropped ammunition and rations in order to sustain the bridgeheads. While there 
were no engineers available to repair the bridges, infantry continued to manage to 
cross the river by making use of the remaining wreckage. On the right, 29th Division 
succeeded in clearing the enemy from a farm which had been holding up the 
advance. However at 1630 hours, the advance troops holding the bridgehead had 
faced a strong enemy counter-attack supported by an artillery bombardment. Though 
the attack was repulsed it was decided to withdraw the troops temporarily given that 
no support could be delivered until secure bridges were in place. During the course of 
the evening the division’s engineers successfully constructed six bridges.118 
 
36th Division was ordered to transfer north and to relieve the 3rd Belgian Division in 
the front line; this would mean it taking over the left flank of Second Army, and to be 
responsible for leading the drive by the Army to cross the Lys, while acting in 
conjunction with French forces to its left. The Belgian Army would then concentrate 
on clearing the coast as far as the Dutch border.  II Corps orders were for efforts to 
establish bridgeheads to be put on hold pending the identification of suitable crossing 
points and the putting down of appropriate bridging materials.
119
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XIX Corps 
 
41st Division was ordered to consolidate its position, clearing any remaining enemy 
from the vicinity of the River Lys and Courtrai. While preparations were to be made 
for bridging the river, no attempt should be made to cross while opposition was in 
situ.120 
 
X Corps 
 
Army Order 44 instructed XV Corps to maintain the drive eastwards, supported by X 
Corps.121  
 
102 and 103 Brigades (who had led the attack by 34th Division on the opening day of 
the battle) were withdrawn into reserve and support respectively.122 101 Brigade 
maintained the division’s advance eastwards, troops of 2/Loyal North Lancs crossing 
the Lys at Ruddy farm. The brigade subsequently captured a series of villages 
between 16-19 October: Lauwe, Knocke, Rolleghem and Belleghem.123 
 
At this point in the battle, to improve the effectiveness of combined arms tactics, 30th 
Division took the initiative in reforming its different arms into what were described as 
‘Brigade Groups’ named for the Brigade commander: 
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89 Brigade Currie’s Group 
 
90 Brigade Stevens’ Group 
 
21 Brigade Goodman’s Group.124 
 
These formations brought together infantry and units from other specialist services 
under a unified command structure, in what would later be described as a 
‘battlegroup’ formation. In common with its companions, the order of battle for the 
Stevens’ Group comprised: 
 
Brigade HQ 
1 x Infantry Battalion (2/14 London Regiment) 
1 x Infantry Battalion (2/15 London Regiment) 
1 x Infantry Battalion (2/16 London Regiment) 
1x Light Trench Mortar Battery 
1 x Brigade, Royal Field Artillery:  
(including 1 x Section, Divisional Ammunition Column;  
 1x Trench Mortar Battery) 
2 x Companies, 30th Machine Gun Battalion 
1 x Section, Royal Engineers 
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1 x Cable laying Signal Section, Royal Engineers 
1 x Field Ambulance Unit 
1 x Company, 30th Divisional Train ASC 
1 x Section, Cyclists125 
 
This combined arms formation was intended to facilitate the pursuit of the enemy. It 
allowed the brigade commander to have the immediate control of specialist weapons 
and support services, able to issue orders and direct deployment; encouraging a 
flexible approach to the challenges of the different forms of enemy resistance. This 
system represents a formalising of the variety of combined arms arrangements which 
Second Army formations had used during the campaign. The attack orders delineate 
the particular responsibilities of the infantry commanders and the commanders of the 
support units, and how these commands would interrelate as the assault progressed. 
 
The commander of 30th Division, Major-General W Williams, would appear to have 
been looking for an improvement in the pace of the advance, believing that his troops 
had been slow to adapt to the mobile warfare now taking place.126 Williams was 
looking for the more effective use of fire support units in suppressing or taking out 
enemy positions. 
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It was reported in the early hours that the enemy was retreating and therefore British 
efforts to cross the Lys were increased. Some troops of 90 Brigade/Stevens’ Group 
used rafts made from duckboards, able to carry two or three men, in order to ferry 
themselves across the water. 2/15 London Regiment crossed at Bousbecque, 2/16 
London Regiment at Menin, using pontoon bridges. During the day the soldiers 
encountered civilians from neighbouring villages that the enemy had evacuated, such 
as Turcoing and Roncq. As the advance brigade group for the division, the troops 
held the line Roncq-Mont D’Halluin-Reckem (with 34th Division on the left and 31st 
Division on the right).127 
 
XV Corps 
 
Having moved up into line two days previously, 42 Brigade now led the advance by 
14th Division. Units of 40th Division moved forward across the Quesnoy railway line 
with patrols entering Wambrechies; it was necessary to erect a footbridge as ‘All 
bridges across [the Canal] between Quesnoy and Wambrechies had been destroyed 
by the enemy’.128 
 
Between 16-19 October (as shown in Map 7), units along the Second Army line 
crossed the Lys despite the resistance from German covering forces.  Considerable 
use was made of deploying field guns in advanced positions in order to neutralise or 
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take out enemy machine gun positions. Where daylight crossings were deemed too 
dangerous then an offensive was launched under cover of darkness. The variations in 
the depth and breadth of the Lys meant that a variety of bridging arrangements were 
used including rafts, a barrel bridge, and pontoon bridges. X Corps formations 
crossed on 17 October, clearing the southern bank from Bousbecque up to Lauwe. 
 
202 Field Company, Royal Engineers (30th Division) was deployed to construct a 
bridge across the Lys at Halluin. Later in the day, once the enemy had been cleared 
from the opposite bank, a barrel tier bridge (for infantry crossing in single file) was 
constructed.129 
 
18 October 
 
II Corps 
 
26 Brigade (9th Division) ordered 7/Seaforth Highlanders to reconnoitre the Lys Canal 
to ascertain the most suitable places for bridging as well as the best positions from 
which to deliver covering fire for a crossing. The battalion was also to try and identify 
enemy strong points which would require attention from the artillery.130  
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At dusk, 5/Cameron Highlanders (26 Brigade) moved into the line at Bavichove, 
relieving 3 Battalion, 9th Belgian Regiment.131 
 
Overnight, 88 Brigade (29th Division) looked to put a patrol of 2/Hampshires across 
the river to probe for enemy defences. Signs of enemy retirement would be the signal 
for further units to cross the river. In the event, heavy machine gun fire made the use 
of pontoons deemed to be impossible and the action was postponed. 
 
The 36th Division completed its relief of the 11th Belgian Infantry Regiment (3rd Belgian 
Division), east of Hulste.132 The intention now was to put bridges across the Lys on 
the following day. The French would not be ready to cross until 20 October at the 
earliest, but Second Army considered the importance of driving beyond the river to be 
paramount.133 
 
XIX Corps 
 
News was now filtering through of military successes elsewhere on the GAF Front:  
 
Troops much elated by the news of the capture of LILLE and BRUGES and the 
landing at OSTEND.134 
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Such reports boosted morale, encouraging the British soldiers to maintain their 
pressure on the enemy. 
 
That same day, preparations were in hand to renew the advance, with 35th Division 
HQ in conference with unit commanders to plan an attack to capture Marcke, south of 
Courtrai. For 41st Division, the planned crossing of the Lys was postponed for 24 
hours; 123 Brigade was to push patrols across the river if an opportunity arose. The 
division’s diary records heavy enemy shelling, including gas, of Courtrai, Heule and 
surrounding roads.135 
 
X Corps and XV Corps 
 
101 Brigade (34th Division) continued its successful progress eastwards, liberating the 
village of Knocke. The brigade’s CO, Brigadier-General Woodstock, took part in a 
successful victory parade into Lauwe, meeting an ‘enthusiastic reception by liberated 
civilians’.136 
 
43 Brigade (14
th
 Division) had assumed the advance role from 42 Brigade. With 
10/Highland Light Infantry as the lead battalion, it successfully attacked the railway at 
Mouscron and pushed on through the village.137 Advance guards of 31st Division were 
moving beyond the line Roncq – Croix Blanche.138 
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40th Division continued to harry the retreating German forces,139 recording later that 
day ‘Roubaix was evacuated by the enemy and entered by our troops’.140 
 
18 October saw Second Army extend its left flank northwards, relieving part of the 
Belgian line. The leftwards wheel of Second Army continued, bringing British forces to 
the south of Courtrai. Advance guards went forward, probing the defences and 
making use of cycles for transport. On 19 October Courtrai was taken. In fact it was 
‘regained’ as an advance unit of the 9/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (36th Division) had 
entered the town two days previously but been forced to retire due to enemy gun-fire. 
That night II Corps finally forced a crossing of the Lys and by the first light of 20 
October, the whole of Second Army was across, or moving forward in support. 
 
The pace and extent of the advance placed a strain upon communications; signals 
teams were responsible for ensuring that contact could be maintained between unit 
headquarters and the forward troops; to allow progress to be monitored and for 
appropriate support to be provided. In addition to disruption from the enemy there 
remained the potential for the weather and the terrain to cause significant problems. 
Formations continued to adopt a wide range of methods for communication, no doubt 
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working on a ‘belt and braces’ approach – at least one of the methods tried at any 
particular time would make the necessary connection.141 
 
The advantage of wireless in comparison to wire communications (telephone and 
telegraph) in terms of reliability was notable, but the size of the necessary equipment 
and its related lack of mobility meant it could only normally be used for contact 
between headquarters at brigade level and above. Although there was concern at the 
amount of work involved in maintaining telephone links, a more positive was view 
taken at brigade level. 90 Brigade recorded that ‘the new practice’ of the laying of 
phone lines from battalions to brigade as the advance proceeded had been a 
success.142 Given the problems of enemy shelling and poor road connections, the 
most successful methods identified were often those used on battlefields in previous 
centuries: the carrier pigeon and the horse mounted despatch rider. This is a very 
vivid demonstration of how the attempts to come to terms with the immense 
developments in firepower and the technology of warfare were constantly frustrated 
by the lack of an effective, secure and mobile form of battlefield communications. 
Given all the circumstances, perhaps there should be appreciation for the amount of 
communication that did actually take place during fighting, whilst recognising the 
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limitations placed on offensive operations by the urgent need for an improved 
technology. 
 
Efforts continued to put effective transport arrangements into place and move 
resources and supplies forward in support of the front line troops. Effective staff 
support was important. The pace of the advance allied to the poor roads and shelled 
terrain was causing problems. 41 Brigade noted: 
 
Owing to congestion of roads and bad traffic control over bridges transport of 
units seriously delayed.143 
 
As a consequence of further German withdrawals to the north, the French and 
Belgians were able to accelerate their advance. On 17 October the Belgians had 
entered Ostend. Two days later they were in Zeebrugge and Bruges. 
 
19 October 
 
II Corps 
 
Original orders called for advance units to force a crossing of the River Lys during the 
night of 19/20 October. Towards midnight, troops crossed the Lys via the pontoon 
bridges (‘barrel raft’ and ‘barrel pier’ constructions), with very light casualties overall. 
5/Cameron Highlanders (26 Brigade, 9th Division) crossed at 2300 hours, establishing 
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an initial bridgehead extending 250 yards east of the river; then moving 500 yards 
east of Harlebeke.144 For 29th Division, 88 Brigade began ferrying men across the 
river from 1800 hours, via rafts and pontoons. Once a crossing of the river was forced 
then the division was to aim for the village of St. Louis and ultimately for the River 
Escaut. By 0130 hours, 2/Hampshires had successfully secured the Harlebeke-
Courtrai Road east of the River, which was to be used as the assembly position for a 
new attack.145 
 
At 2330 hours, 36th Division HQ recorded that two of its battalions from 109 Brigade 
were now across the Lys. 9/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers plus a unit of three machine 
guns was the first, working its way beyond the river and halting in front of Beveren 
(held by German machine gun teams), 400 yards east of the Courtrai-Ghent road. 
1/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers then crossed to its left, securing the left flank and 
pushing north-east. In turn the troops attacked the four small villages of Desselghem, 
Spriete, Straete and Dries, capturing the first three before consolidating on the edge 
of the latter.146 
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 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade. 
144
 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders. 
145
 TNA WO95/2300, War Diary of 1
st
 Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers, 86
th
 Infantry Brigade Order No. 280, 
October 19
th
 1918; TNA WO95/2307/4, War Diary of 88 Infantry Brigade; TNA WO95/2285, War Diary of 29
th
 
Division, Report on Operations, Period October 14
th
 1918 – October 22nd 1918. 
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 TNA WO95/2492, War Diary of 36
th
 Division; TNA WO95/2509, War Diary of 109 Infantry Brigade; Falls, 
36
th
 Division, pp. 281-4. Falls describes how the ‘greatest difficulty’ of  the ‘operation of bringing [1/Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers] across [the Lys], forming it up and attacking north-eastward, at right angles to the line of 
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XIX Corps 
 
35th Division delivered its planned attack across the Lys, capturing Marcke, with over 
1,000 civilians ‘released’ as a consequence of the advance.147 Around midday, two 
companies from 123 Brigade (41st Division) crossed the river, seeking to maintain 
touch with 35th Division, and subsequently reached Courtrai Railway Station; during 
the rest of the day the brigade deployed in strength along the railway line and the 
canal. 
 
That afternoon, planning took place to prepare for a new operation on the following 
day, attacking in the direction of Sweveghem (three miles east of Courtrai). XIX Corps 
set the final objectives as the River Scheldt between Bossuyt and Avelghem.  
 
X Corps 
 
There was fierce fighting for Belleghem as 101 Brigade struggled to secure the village 
in the face of determined resistance. The turning point was the capture by two 
companies from 2/Loyal North Lancs of a farm on the northern edge. This threatened 
to outflank the Germans, whereupon the defence of the village ceased quickly; by 
                                                                                                                                                                                
attack of the 9
th
 Inniskillings, of supporting the new attack by barrage fire… owing to good staff work, intelligent 
local leadership, and the dash of the private soldier, was carried through without a hitch’. 
147
 TNA WO95/2483, War Diary of 104 Infantry Brigade. 
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2300 hours, the Battalion had cleared the village and reached the Courtrai road.148 
34th Division was now ordered to withdraw into reserve positions.149 
 
30th Division, its attacking formations continuing to be organised into brigade groups, 
maintained its drive for the line linking the hamlets of Belleghem and Ruddervoorde. 
The opposing German forces ‘appeared determined to hold up our advance’ and 
enemy shellfire ‘indicated that he intended to hold the line of L’ESCAUT RIVER’.150 
That night 90 Brigade HQ issued orders for 2/14 London Regiment (‘London 
Scottish’) to continue to press forward on 20 October in order to reach the objective; 
the river would have to be attacked and taken by force.151 
 
It had been decided to try replacing the field gun section attached to the forward 
battalion, with a mobile 4.5 inch howitzer. This was subsequently judged to have 
‘achieved good results’.152 The expectations of London Scottish remained high,153 and 
the battalion did not disappoint, securing the final objective of the L’Escaut River by 
just after midnight.  
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 TNA WO95/2456, War Diary of 101 Infantry Brigade. 
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 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, Summary of War Diary for October 1918. 
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 TNA WO95/2338, War Diary of 90
 
Infantry Brigade. 
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 The London Scottish had now been fighting for some days, and were rather tired, but in excellent spirits. The 
Brigadier considered them fit to continue the advance: TNA WO95/2338, War Diary of 90
 
Infantry Brigade. The 
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XV Corps 
 
The advance troops of XV Corps were now in the vicinity of Heeseaux and Wattrelos, 
and the canal east of Roubaix, seeking to push further east towards Dottignies and 
Leers Nord.154 A realignment took place as 40th Division was withdrawn and the 31st 
extended its line to the right to make touch with 59th Division. 
 
19 October also saw a General Directive from Foch, instructing the GAF to advance 
in the general direction of Brussels. In response, Albert issued further orders for the 
GAF to move speedily to cross the Lys and the Deynze-Ecloo canal, thus denying the 
Germans the time to organise resistance. If resistance was encountered then ‘the 
principal part in dislodging him would fall to the British Second Army’. This recognised 
that the success of the Army in already crossing the Lys put it in the position to rapidly 
‘advance towards the Schelde’,155 allowing French and Belgian forces to the north to 
cross the Lys and advance over the open ground ahead. 
 
Victory in the Battle of Courtrai had wider strategic implications of benefit to all the 
allied forces. Stevenson points out the consequences of the enemy’s decision to 
undertake a withdrawal from the coast: 
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The allies could now push up to the Dutch border, overrunning the 
Bruges/Ostend/Zeebrugge triangle and the bases for the Flanders U-boat 
force, which was recalled. Defeat on land therefore also weakened the 
Germans at sea, and limited their scope for falling back on submarine warfare 
to compensate for failure on land. The withdrawal also meant that the Allies 
had outflanked the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing manufacturing complex, which the 
British had occupied on 17 October, and which Ludendorff had previously 
intended to hold [for bargaining purposes]… [the Germans thus] yielded crucial 
bargaining cards.156 
 
The Battle of Courtrai was now officially at an end but Second Army’s advance to 
liberate Flanders was not. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Second Army Operations 20 October – 11 November  
 
War of Movement: From the Lys to the Schelde 
 
They were all ready and prepared to take the offensive  
As we passed through and out we saw our guns so comprehensive. 
Firing, roaring, spitting shells just like a hurricane 
And then we knew, we had the men, the guns we’d sought in vain... 
 
.... We were soon on the move again, this time we were excited 
For we were chasing him over hill and dale, the Aisne and into Belgium…1 
 
The area for the final stage of the advance by British Second Army was in essence a 
ridge from which there were many spurs or smaller ridges. Agricultural land populated 
with numerous farms and cottages, it was divided in two by the Bossuyt-Courtrai 
canal running south-east to north-west. Marshy land lay to the north but the whole 
area, due to heavy rainfall, was difficult going. To assist the advance of the infantry ‘a 
                                                         
1
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Brigade of Field Artillery [was] included in each Infantry Brigade Group...’ in order to 
deliver ‘close and immediate Artillery support to our advancing infantry and to prevent 
checks’.2  Specific arrangements were also put in place for division HQ to be informed 
of enemy gun positions so that heavy artillery fire could be called up. There were 
special instructions issued which reflected that ‘the fighting of the last few days has 
become more mobile than has hitherto been the case and is now practically open 
warfare’.3 
 
Transport and supply remained a constant challenge. One example of the competing 
priorities was the Deputy Director Supply & Transport complaining on 30 October that 
the GOC Heavy Artillery has retained all lorries for siege guns only - ‘this scheme is 
wrong in mobile warfare’.4 
 
During this period there were further reports of the enemy withdrawing. XV Corps 
issued orders which stressed the importance of advance units continuing to push 
forward. Mounted troops deployed ahead of the infantry would be able to reconnoitre 
enemy movement and dispositions.5 
 
Work was continuing along the Lys on the repair and construction of bridges. From 
19-21 October, 202 Field Company, Royal Engineers (30th Division) concentrated on 
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 Nicholson, private papers (IWM); the arrangements are described in Training Leaflet No 5: The Action of 
Artillery in Close Support of Assaulting Battalions.  
3
 Nicholson, private papers (IWM) - taken from  Field Service Regulations Part I. 
4
 TNA WO95/292, Deputy Director Supply & Transport, Daily Visits and Inspections. 
5
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the construction of a super heavy pontoon bridge, capable of taking larger transport 
and artillery.6 
 
The front line troops were increasingly weary from the exertions of the previous 
week’s fighting. On 20 October, the diary of 7/Seaforth Highlanders (26 Brigade, 9th 
Division) made reference to the ‘tired condition of the troops’ and representations 
were made to delay a further push forward.7 Some units had been in almost constant 
action for a sustained period. That same day, 90 Brigade (30th Division) recorded: 
 
The Bde. had now been in action practically continuously since Aug. 15th, 
fighting almost the whole time and during that period had carried the 30th 
Division forward a distance of over 28 miles as the crow flies.8 
 
The flu epidemic was also making its presence known. Two days later the same 
brigade noted that ‘A considerable number of cases of the prevalent Influenza began 
to occur in the Brigade’. On a more positive note, on 24 October all three Battalions 
‘received drafts, the first for a very long time’.9 
 
Peter Hart has summarised the fighting during the Hundred Days as ‘some of the 
worst of the war… what faced [British soldiers] was probably the hardest campaign 
                                                         
6
 TNA WO95/2323, War Diary of 202 Field Company, Royal Engineers (30
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7
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ever fought by the British armed forces’.10 He points out that, whereas in previous 
offensives such as the Somme and Third Ypres men had fought in the front line for a 
short number of days and then been withdrawn into support or reserve, 
 
… in 1918 the pressure was simply unrelenting. There was such a shortage of 
manpower that those units who could keep going were repeatedly used…  
Men were caught in an awful trap where they could see victory approaching 
but also knew that as things stood they might not live to see it, yet they fought 
on. This was self-sacrifice on a grand scale.11 
 
The evidence from war diaries indicates that Second Army formations worked hard to 
ensure the regular rotation of units between front, support and reserve positions as 
the advance proceeded. As the Army neared the Schelde and the potential for an end 
to the war grew closer, whole divisions were withdrawn from the front. A snapshot of 
the roster of a battalion from 90 Brigade, 2/14 London Scottish, which had been 
heavily involved in the recent fighting as advance guard for the drive to the L’Escaut 
River, shows how much pressure there was on depleted troop resources in the front 
line. On 21 October 1918, the actual Battalion strength was listed as: 
 
41 Officers  764 Other Ranks.   
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 P. Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory, (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 2008), p. 364. 
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These figures are below the full complement for a battalion, but still do not give the 
true picture, as the actual ‘fighting strength’ was even lower: 
 
 25 Officers   539 Other Ranks  (plus the Chaplain) 
 
- the result of the number of troops ‘away’ on leave, undertaking training or on 
medical duties.12 
 
One week later, the problem of troop numbers was discussed at a conference of 120 
Brigade (40th Division); the situation was considered to be so severe that a radical 
reorganisation was proposed: 
 
Owing to the under strength of Battalions it was decided to organise 
Companies on three platoon basis and, if necessary, subdivide platoons into 
three sections – 2 rifle and 1 Lewis Gun Section.13 
                                                         
12
 TNA WO95/2340, War Diary of  2/14
th
 Battalion, London Regiment. The table below shows the location of 
these ‘missing’ soldiers: 
Location Officers Other Ranks 
Field Ambulance 6   92 
Officer Rest Camp 1     1 
Leave 5   70 
Military Duty -   13 
F P Camp -     1 
Command 3   28 
Courses -   17 
Detachment 1     3 
TOTAL 16 225 
Of particular note is that 75 soldiers are on official leave, a high number given the ongoing demands on the 
Battalion. It suggests that this remained a high priority despite the manpower problems and the pressure of the 
forward drive against the retreating German Army; it may also reflect the level of stress being experienced by the 
troops. 
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This was a serious step, reducing companies from four to three platoons and 
offsetting this through increasing the relative proportion of fire support from Lewis 
guns.  
 
II Corps was now advancing on a line from Hoogmolen (lying five miles east-south-
east of Courtrai) then north-east through Ooteghem - Ingoyghem – Engelhoek. With 
the Army’s left flank now placed to operate in conjunction with French forces, 36th 
Division was responsible for liaising with its allies. On 20 October, the 164th French 
Division reported that it was to send a brigade forward with the aim of crossing the 
Oyghem Bridge. During the afternoon the French line was advanced up to the 
junction of the Roulers canal and the River Lys, six miles north-east of Courtrai. An 
attack on the village of Leicant (Leikant) was initially successful but the Germans 
counter-attacked and the French were forced to retire.14 The French were also 
reported to be unable to cross the Lys at that stage due to the absence of bridging 
materials, thereby delaying the advance of 36th Division.15 
 
Map 9 shows the progress of Second Army operations 20-27 October 1918. 
 
Having been at rest since 16 October, three days later at 2100 Hours the units of 107 
Brigade moved into assembly positions for taking over the lead position for 36th 
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 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120 Infantry Brigade, 27
th
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Division from 109 Brigade. A conference of battalion commanders at brigade HQ 
earlier that day had discussed the orders and arrangements for the crossing of the 
Lys and the subsequent attack. At 0200 hours on 20 October (a ‘very wet night’) the 
advance battalions (1/Royal Irish Rifles and 15/Royal Irish Rifles) moved forward. The 
enemy had continued to shell the Lys overnight and ‘there was a direct hit on the 
bridge, a pontoon being damaged and a length of the superstructure destroyed’.16 
Engineers worked furiously to make good the repairs and the lead battalion crossed 
the river and assembled north-west of the Harlebeke – Vive St Eloi road; linking there 
with the forward units of 109 Brigade. Following a creeping barrage, at 0600 hours 
the troops moved off, with some additional cover from an early morning mist. Beveren 
was soon captured but the attack then met heavy machine gun fire, and Lieutenant-
Colonel B.J. Jones commanding 15/Royal Irish Rifles was amongst the casualties, 
subsequently confirmed as killed. Although the attack was checked on a number of 
occasions throughout the day – ‘progress… was slow’ – the main Courtrai-Ghent 
railway line was crossed before 0800 hours and the line was eventually halted west of 
the village of Knock, north-west of the River Gaverbeek. Dries had been the one 
remaining position still held by the enemy, threatening the left flank of the advance, 
but was finally taken by 12/Royal Irish Rifles (108 Brigade) during the early hours of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
15
 TNA WO95/2285, War Diary of 29
th
 Division, Report on Operations, Period October 14
th
 1918 – October 
22
nd
 1918. 
16
 Falls, 36
th
 Division, p. 284. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
289 
 
21 October.17 Overnight there was heavy shellfire from enemy artillery, HE and gas, 
plus machine gun fire.18 
 
In 29th Division, 86 Brigade swung its line to the south-east, pivoting on St Louis, and 
attacking under a covering barrage. 88 Brigade launched its attack under a creeping 
barrage, employing a one battalion front with supporting battalions moving up and 
through as each objective line was achieved. The village of Staceghem was reported 
captured at 0730 hours, the Esscher Wood at 1000 hours, and troops continued to 
press south eastwards.19 There was a strong emphasis throughout on the front units 
maintaining contact with their neighbours on the flanks; to ensure that the advance of 
Second Army was made in concert with a steady and coherent forward manoeuvre 
across the GAF front.20 41st Division was checked around Courtrai and touch was lost 
for a time with 29th Division on its left.21 II Corps issued orders for the advance to be 
resumed on 22 October, once its three Divisions were in line and contact re-
established with 41st Division. 
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 Falls, 36
th
 Division, pp. 285-6. Falls describes how it had been hoped that the advance by the French on the left 
of the Division would support the pinching out of the Dries pocket but in the event the 133
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 TNA WO95/2502/1, War Diary of 107 Infantry Brigade, Narrative of Operations carried out by the 107
th
 Inf. 
Bde. 28.9.1918. to 28.10.1918. 
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In this way the enemy was subject to a constant pressure and opportunities to check 
the British troops by enfilade fire were restricted. One can now detect an almost 
irresistible momentum to the forward movement of Second Army and its French and 
Belgian allies, which is clearly visible from Map 8 and the lines of advance from 4 to 
30 October. 
 
20 October also saw 35th Division (XIX Corps) attack in a south-east direction. After 
assembly east of Courtrai the attack commenced at 0615 hours on a broad frontage, 
with 104 Brigade on the right, 105 Brigade in the centre (its own left following the line 
of the Courtrai-Bossuyt Canal), and 88 Brigade of 29th Division to the left. There was 
no artillery barrage to cover the advance but the troops made good progress, with the 
exception of 4/North Staffs. The battalion was delayed in front of the small hamlet of 
Blokken (lying about two miles east of Courtrai) by machine gun and artillery fire.22 
 
Shortly after 0700 hours the hamlet of Beekstraat (one mile south of Blokken) was 
captured; at 0730 hours there were troops on the outskirts of Sweveghem village. 
This was a period of intense fighting with the German defenders seeking to restrict 
the attackers at every opportunity, as the diary of 105 Brigade noted: 
 
Up to this point the fighting, along the whole of the Brigade Front, had been 
very heavy and dangerous owing to the exposed nature of the ground and 
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stout manner in which the enemy contested the approach of every farm. 
Advantage was taken of ditches and by crawling up these our troops were able 
to work round the flanks of the enemy’s Machine Gun nests and Farms. 
 
[Having taken most of Sweveghem village]… shortly before 0900 the enemy, 
reinforced, worked forward into the village and for some time very heavy 
fighting ensued in the neighbourhood of the church, during which we suffered 
heavy casualties. Eventually our troops were forced back to the Western 
outskirts of Sweveghem where they were heavily fired upon by the enemy’s 
artillery and Machine Guns causing further casualties.23 
 
This account of the clashes taking place as the troops of 35th Division fought their way 
forward from Courtrai, provides a succinct picture of the warfare in Flanders during 
this final stretch of the campaign. It does not portray a beaten enemy or German 
defenders whose will to resist had been eroded. It does show a British Army pushing 
forward through initiative and commitment. This is warfare that would have been very 
familiar to later British forces fighting their way up the Italian peninsula, scrambling 
through the bocage of Normandy, or street fighting in French towns, in 1944. It is also 
very different from the popular image of trenches, a barren landscape, and ‘the big 
push’ which colours modern perceptions of the First World War. These British soldiers 
were fighting to overcome strong and determined enemy resistance, farm by farm, 
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hamlet by village, to liberate an occupied country. This is the sharp side of war - dirty, 
challenging, confused, dangerous – and nothing is won easily or without pain. Army 
Operations Reports concluded that ‘hard fighting has taken place for all high ground, 
where the enemy has defended himself obstinately… fighting… has been severe’.24 
 
The drive by the troops of 35th Division continued. Although the confused situation 
limited the amount of artillery support available, by 0900 hours 4/North Staffs had 
pushed the enemy back at Blokken; before being held up north west of Sweveghem. 
Despite a heavy artillery barrage upon enemy lines, the move forward by 
15/Cheshires was initially blocked by machine gun fire; at 1330 hours the battalion 
succeeded in pushing patrols across the Keibeek. That afternoon 15/Sherwood 
Foresters entered and captured Sweveghem and 4/North Staffs resumed the 
advance on the brigade’s left. The line now stabilised on the eastern outskirts of 
Sweveghem with 4/North Staffs exposed to enemy fire from the northern side of the 
canal.25 
 
After a further pause to take stock of the situation, 35th Division confirmed orders for 
the objectives to be captured. At 2330 hours, a new attack by 105 Brigade supported 
by an artillery barrage succeeded in taking the line of the Kreupel-Pontlevis Bridge 
(one and a half miles south-east of Sweveghem). Overnight the Germans were still 
                                                         
24
 TNA WO158/218  Summary of Operations, Week ending 25 October 1918. 
25
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
293 
 
holding the neighbouring Kappelle Milaene Farm, but a sharp action at 0500 hours 
compelled them to withdraw.26 
 
Elsewhere on the 35th Division front, troops were moving towards the village of 
Hoogstraatje (less than half a mile south of the Courtrai Bossuyt Canal). 106 Brigade 
moved through 104 Brigade to take up position. Although delayed in part because of 
‘the weather’, the attack began shortly after the start time of 1715 hours, supported by 
a creeping barrage. Progress was steady; early the following morning the support 
battalion, 17/Royal Scots, was ordered forward so as to align with the left of 106 
Brigade’s forward battalions (12/Highland Light Infantry and 18/Highland Light 
Infantry); and then to make a link with Hoogstraatje. This it did and the battalion also 
sent patrols up from west of the village to the Canal, thereby establishing a direct line 
on the Division’s front and securing the objective.27 
 
With the advance of Second Army gathering pace as it pursued the withdrawing 
German forces, it was crucial to maximise the effectiveness of the artillery fire support 
for the infantry. The need was for clear guidelines and instructions that reflected the 
demands of this new war of manoeuvre. In many respects these arrangements 
confirmed was already happening in practice – different methods of partnering 
infantry and artillery when on the attack have already been described; for example, 
the attachment of a field gun and crew to a company of infantry, or locating an artillery 
liaison officer at the forward HQ of a battalion. Senior officers were anxious to ensure 
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that there was the closest possible co-operation between the two arms, not least to 
minimise the potential number of infantry casualties during an attack.  
 
Instructions issued by 34th Division in October 1918 reflected these developments.28 
They confirmed the inclusion of a brigade of field artillery in each infantry brigade 
group, under ‘the immediate command’ of the brigadier-general; battalion and 
company commanders were to apply to brigade for artillery support. The artillery 
brigade commander would act as artillery adviser. The role of the attached field 
artillery would include fire cover for advance and assault, and the engaging of enemy 
guns. Division would control the artillery of brigade groups in support or reserve, as 
well as the heavy artillery; the principal responsibility of the latter was for counter 
battery fire. A brigade would only apply for the support of heavy artillery once its own 
field artillery had been engaged or if ‘a very strong and obstinate centre of resistance 
is encountered’.29  
 
The war of manoeuvre also led to growing recognition of the need to increase 
flexibility during operations. Junior officers and section leaders needed to be able to 
exercise far greater initiative as an attack developed in order to tackle the different 
challenges as they presented themselves. A further set of instructions issued by 34th 
Division (two days after the rules regarding artillery co-operation) addressed this 
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concern.30 Acknowledging that ‘the fighting of the last few days has become more 
mobile than has hitherto been the case and is now practically open warfare’, the order 
states that ‘a certain re-arrangement of ideas on the part of all commanders’ is 
necessary.  It is considered essential that ‘all commanders down to section and fire-
unit commanders’ should study Field Service Regulations Part I.  Furthermore, the 
headquarters of infantry and artillery brigades and of battalions ‘must be further 
forward than is the case in trench warfare’ so that the commander ‘can influence the 
progress and action of the fight by the use of his reserves and auxiliary weapons’.31 
 
The instructions then proceed to specify in detail the responsibility of the unit 
commander for taking control of the situation when an advance stalls because of 
enemy resistance. While the rules are quite prescriptive, they also empower the 
commander to assess the immediate problems and take decisions on the spot; 
including the deployment of fire support, auxiliary weapon teams, and reserves. He 
should ‘get into touch with the situation… making if necessary a personal 
reconnaissance’; such that he will ‘issue the necessary orders on the spot’.32 
 
Finally, the instructions look at some of the particular issues presented by the nature 
of the enemy’s defensive methods. The ‘premature deployment’ of advancing troops 
is advised against because the enemy’s rearguard actions were often specifically 
designed to encourage such a response. Only the minimum necessary number of 
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soldiers should be used to probe for the enemy’s positions; once located, the ‘position 
must be attacked without delay’ with sufficient troops and fire support ‘to make its 
capture a certainty’.33 
 
These orders from 34th Division show the concern to conserve troop numbers and not 
to take unnecessary risks that might result in heavy casualties. To this end there is a 
heavy emphasis on maximising the fire support available to tackle enemy positions. 
There have been many references in the earlier descriptions of operations to brigades 
deploying on a one battalion front. While this in itself is a likely consequence of 
seeking to limit the number of troops in the firing line at any one time, there is also the 
risk that the attack will not be sufficiently strong for the size of the front – hence the 
instructions from 34th Division also state that a front of 2000 yards should be treated 
as the maximum for one battalion to assault. Commanders are expected to take full 
responsibility for the ‘combined arms’ nature of the fighting; in effect, they were being 
supplied with a broad range of resources (in terms of quality and quantity and variety) 
and they are expected to make good use of these. 
 
20 October also saw 1/6 Cheshires of 21 Brigade (30
th
 Division) carry out an 
‘advanced guard action’ in pursuit of the retreating Germans. The latter made a final 
stand on the ridge below the hamlet of Saint Genois. Under the cover of darkness the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
32
 The Instructions conclude that only by using this approach ‘can a Commander ensure the effective co-
operation of the different arms at his disposal, retain control of the fight and impress his own personality upon the 
course of events’. 
33
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, General Staff Instructions No. 15, 23-10-1918. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
297 
 
position was successfully ‘stormed and captured’.34 Meanwhile II Corps had been 
ordered to ‘stand fast until flanks come up into line’ at which point 9th Division would 
move through to drive for the Scheldt.35 
 
Over the next few days the units of II Corps continued to push the enemy back. On 21 
October, 36th Division attacked with units from 107 and 108 Brigades, operating in 
conjunction with the 133rd French Infantry Regiment; there was no artillery barrage. 
Touch with the 133rd Regiment was lost temporarily: ‘As the French on our left were 
unable to advance it was found necessary for a Coy. of the 12th Royal Irish Rifles to 
take up a position to guard our left flank which was exposed’.36 A brigade of French 
cavalry was also attached to the division in order to assist with liaison and offer 
reconnaissance and support. There were reports of the cavalry looking to attempt to 
break through on the 107 Brigade front though this did not materialise.37 On the left of 
Second Army there were reports of French operations in the area of Spitaals Bosche 
Wood and the village of Waereghem.38 On the following day units from all three 
divisions in II Corps were involved in operations focused on and around Vichte.39 The 
village was successfully captured, together with Hill 50 to the south. However, 
attempts to then push on towards Ingoyghem met heavy enemy fire from both that 
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village and the village of Ooteghem, such that ‘… it was obvious that no progress 
could be made to INGOYGHEM until OOTEGHEM was taken’.40 
 
Further south, 41st Division attacked through 35th Division, the latter withdrawn to 
refresh. The objective was the line of the River L’Escaut from Bossuyt to Autryve. 
Initial progress was very good and by noon 20/Durham Light Infantry had occupied 
the villages of Baveghemknok and Poeldriesch. On the left of 124 Brigade progress 
was slower, with the Germans holding the tunnel over the Courtrai-Bussuyt Canal in 
considerable strength. 10/Queens had to cross the canal by this passage in order to 
work down the north east bank. The battalion was blocked by troops of 122 Brigade 
who were in front and had been unable so far to force ‘this strongly wired and 
defended enemy position’.41 Meanwhile 26/Royal Fusiliers, ‘against considerable 
opposition’ occupied the Duikingberg-Achterberg road facing the Canal.42 
 
That night, 41st Division consolidated the line Poeldriesch-Baveghemknok, pending a 
further drive forward in the morning.43 
 
Also on 21 October, 30
th
 Division made arrangements to drive across the Scheldt. 
During the morning 1/6 Cheshires captured the hamlet of Helghin (Helchin).44 Currie’s 
Group assumed the lead position for the division, establishing posts along the west 
bank of the river; all the existing bridges had been destroyed by the enemy. The 
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prospects of a daylight crossing were considered unlikely, given the weight of fire 
from the German defenders; the group was ordered to seek for an opportunity to 
make an assault that night. Initially frustrated, it was dusk on 22 October when Royal 
Engineers were able to construct a pontoon bridge for the troops. One platoon of 
2/South Lancs managed to cross but was then forced to withdraw by heavy artillery 
and machine gun fire. The following day saw the bridge partially destroyed by enemy 
shells and it was again dusk when engineers were able to put two new bridges in 
place; one in front of 2/South Lancs, one in front of 2/17 London Regiment. Three 
South Lancs platoons fought their way across but were again pushed back. Their 
pontoon bridge was destroyed during the fighting and the surviving troops were 
forced to crawl along the other bridge in order to get back to the west bank. The 
Germans were holding the east bank of the river ‘in strength… [particularly] enemy 
snipers and M.Gs.’.45 
 
During 22 October, II Corps continued its advance with the aim of seizing the 
crossings over the Escaut, contact now re-established with French forces. The 5th 
French Division had captured St Hubert. The 4th French Cavalry Brigade was placed 
under 29
th
 Division with the aim of passing through the advancing infantry to seize 
crossings over the Scheldt at Avelghem, Rugge and Berchem; should the bridges be 
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destroyed then the cavalry were to drive north east along the river and attempt to 
impede enemy defensive operations.46 
 
At 0900 hours, 36th Division, 107 Brigade leading, attacked towards and through 
Knock. The assault ran into a determined counter-attack on its left flank in the early 
afternoon; this opportunity for the enemy was created by 108 Brigade failing to keep 
pace with the advance. 107 Brigade looked to assist by sending forward reserves 
though in the event the Germans were pushed back without the extra manpower. The 
strength of the enemy assault is shown by neighbouring units also being pushed back 
before the line was re-established.47 There were subsequent reports from prisoners 
that suggested this enemy attack had been a determined effort to ‘turn the Klijtberg 
Ridge position from the North’ and that it had been ‘carried out by a Prussian Assault 
Battalion sent up for the purpose’. The enemy was looking to take all possible steps 
to delay the advancing British forces so that its planned withdrawal could proceed at a 
manageable pace. Further evidence from prisoners confirmed the decision of the 
Germans to pull back in an easterly direction.48  
 
During the day, 36
th
 Division captured and consolidated the Klijtberg Ridge. The 
intensity of the fighting taking place and the instances of fierce enemy resistance are 
also demonstrated by the need for 27 Brigade (9th Division) to be reinforced by 
8/Black Watch from 28 Brigade in order to ensure there were no gaps in the British 
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line and that the captured ground could be consolidated effectively.49 29th Division 
also met heavy opposition and only limited progress was made; French cavalry 
patrols encountered very heavy machine gun fire and any outflanking manoeuvre was 
considered impossible.50 
 
That same morning, 41st Division, utilising the temporary footbridge erected at 
Knokke, attacked along the north-east bank of the Courtrai-Bossuyt Canal. This move 
was checked by heavy machine gun fire, with intense fighting developing around 
Keiberg. 12/East Surreys flanked left and right of the canal tunnel (which civilians had 
reported as mined); Stokes mortars were used to take out the machine guns still firing 
from within.51 A fresh attack was made at 1400 hours and after some heavy fighting 
the north bank of the canal tunnel was cleared. This position was secured and held 
until relief by 34th Division on the night of 23 October. 41st Division then ‘side stepped 
Northwards’ to relieve 29th Division along a line facing Hoogmolen.52 
 
Reports to II Corps HQ in the evening spoke of hard fighting right across the front line 
with a number of references to the use by the enemy artillery of gas shells in its 
defensive barrages. At 0730 hours on the following day, the Germans were reported 
to be retiring along the front of VII French Corps.53 By noon, it was reported that 29th 
Division had taken Ooteghem but this proved to be premature; however the 
operations there allowed 9th Division to consider an attack from the south towards Hill 
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50 where the enemy was still resisting. At 1301 hours, 6/KOSB reported the capture 
of the Hill. Enemy fire from in and around the village of Ingoyghem continued to cause 
problems for II Corps forces.54 
 
On 23 October, 36th Division sent forward advance guards, moving towards the 
Escaut at Tenhove. A squadron of French dragoons was attached to 107 Brigade and 
ordered ‘to proceed towards TENHOVE, to try to seize KLEINEBERG and 
BERGWIJK and bridge over L’ESCAUT’.55 However long range enemy machine gun 
fire proved sufficient to prevent much progress and the dragoons were subsequently 
withdrawn.56 On the left of the division, 108 Brigade was working hard to maintain 
contact with the 41st French Chasseurs, meeting particular difficulties at the Railway 
Halt at Heirweg (Heinweg) due to German machine gun fire. An ‘International Post’ 
was subsequently established at the nearby level crossing.57 
 
In front of the division the Germans were occupying strong positions, defending a line 
(north to south) Heinweg – Huisbosch - Scheidhoek – Ingoyghem. 109 Brigade now 
took over the front line role; in recognition of the hard fighting it had taken part in, 107 
Brigade was withdrawn into division support and for training. For 14
th
 Division, 42 
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Brigade spent most of 24 and 25 October making ‘endeavours… to find any possible 
means of crossing River L’ESCAUT’.58  
 
16/Manchesters subsequently crossed on 29 October and established advance posts 
on the eastern side. The attack took the form of three ‘Assault Parties’, each with its 
Lewis gun teams placed so as to provide covering fire. There was also a fire plan for 
support from trench mortars and artillery.59 41Brigade took over the new line on the 
final night of the month. 
 
On 24 October, 41st Division attacked the Hoogmolen Spur but was beaten back by 
heavy machine gun fire. The division would now take part in the ‘Action of Ooteghem’ 
which was planned to take place the following day.60 
 
The Germans had set up intermediate defensive positions to the east of the Lys. 
Some were heavily wired and carefully sited to maximise the effectiveness of the 
defence. Their lack of troops led the Germans to make the most of field guns 
deployed well-forward, snipers, and machine gun posts. These arrangements appear 
to have been intended to delay the attacking forces while the German Army looked to 
re-establish itself on the Hermann Position beyond the River Schelde. The full extent 
of these defences does not appear to have been detected in advance by Second 
Army. Supporting artillery was still being transported forward – until 24 October, most 
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heavy guns and howitzers were awaiting the completion of satisfactory bridges across 
the Lys. The war diary of 36th Division for that day noted that a bridge was to be 
constructed over the Bossuyt Canal which was robust enough to take horse 
transport.61 The infantry found themselves advancing without significant artillery 
cover. The marshy ground, deteriorating further through heavy rainfall, made 
progress difficult. 
 
One of the more unusual problems of supply during this period was recorded in the 
war diary of 43 Brigade. The Medical Officer of 20/Middlesex had approached the 
ADMS complaining about: 
 
… [the] difficulty of supplying [Battalion] men with dentures.62 
 
Air support was restricted by the continuing bad weather and its impact on visibility, 
although the RAF was now able to move squadrons forward to occupy former 
German aerodromes.63 The lack of air reconnaissance caused problems for 
operational planning, in terms of knowledge of the terrain and mapping, enemy 
movement, and the deployment and operation of the artillery.  
 
Progress along the line was further hampered by the slow advance of the French 
Sixth Army to the left of British forces. The Germans had strengthened the resistance 
in front of Second Army because these positions had to be held until the troops 
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opposing the French could themselves pull back. The delay in the French advance 
was also causing II Corps to again have to regulate its own rate of progress in line 
with that of its ally, ‘the flank of the 36th Division was consequently refused’.64 
 
Action of Ooteghem: 25 October 1918 
 
Circumstances improved from 25 October, although there were exceptions: 
7/Seaforth Highlanders were prevented from a further advance by the weight of 
machine gun and shellfire.65 Orders for 36th Division were to maintain the advance 
with artillery support, with the immediate objectives of Hofdries – Caenkouter – 
Caster; to be followed by a forced crossing of the Scheldt. 9th Division was set the 
objective of the village of Tiegham. If these attacks were successful then the 4th 
Cavalry Brigade was on stand-by to pass through the line after Tiegham, then to 
wheel left and capture the neighbouring high ground. This proved to be optimistic 
given the strong resistance by the German defenders, and the exploitation by the 
cavalry was deferred. Evidence of the determination of the enemy to hold up the 
British advance is noted in 36th Division’s diary, there being ‘very few cases of 
surrender’ and ‘In many cases enemy soldiers continued firing M.G.s until 
bayonetted’.66 
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Notwithstanding these incidents, by 25 October heavy artillery was finally in place to 
support a set-piece attack. Plumer identified the line of the Schelde as the objective. 
Involved in what has been designated as the ‘Action of Ooteghem’ were (south-
north): X Corps (34th Division), XIX Corps (41st Division) and II Corps (9th and 36th 
Divisions) with the co-operation of the French 164th Division and a French cavalry 
brigade. 35th Division was put on stand-by to relieve 41st Division on completion of the 
operation.  
 
Commencing 0940 hours, the infantry moved forward under the cover of a creeping 
barrage. A counter barrage by the Germans caused some early casualties as the 
assault began.67 The attack to take and consolidate the high ground east of the 
village of Ooteghem was pressed home, despite the weight of machine gun fire from 
the north. 41st Division captured the high ground around Hoogemolen by 0945 hours 
then advanced on Kiebermolen; 10/Queens was reported to have cleared Heersteert 
by 1420 hours. However there were further frustrations beginning with units of 9th 
Division being subsequently forced to withdraw from Ooteghem. In so doing, as the 
result of a ‘mistaken order’, they also pulled back the left flank of 124 Brigade on the 
forward slopes above the village although this position was subsequently recovered. 
By mid-afternoon, 9th Division was being held at Zaveleinde, 34th Division was making 
limited progress and had lost touch with 41st Division, while the latter ordered 124 
Brigade to refuse the left flank (given the check to 9th Division) and ensure it was in 
touch with 123 Brigade (which was advancing on Avelghem).68 
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During the night, advance patrols pushed forward along the road from Driesch to the 
outskirts of the village.69 
 
102 Brigade of 34th Division was located just east of the Courtrai-Bossuyt Canal and it 
was from these positions that it attacked alongside the units of the 41st Division. The 
outcome was the clearing of the whole front of the canal, from Knocke southwards, 
including the capture of Moen. This latter operation by 1/4 The Cheshires, saw the 
village ‘smoked’; following this barrage the troops surrounded the dwellings and then 
moved in to carry out the mopping up.  By the evening, the British forces had secured 
a stretch of the River Scheldt running southwards from Autryve to Bossuyt. The 
previous night had seen 1/7 The Cheshires make two attempts to cross the Canal at 
Locks 3 and 4, but they had been beaten back. On the afternoon of 25 October they 
made a third successful attack, allowing them to join up with 1/4 The Cheshires, 
south-east of Moen. The 34th Division also captured Autryve as part of the 
operation.70 
 
The Action of Ooteghem was a partial success, the southern divisions (34
th
 and 41
st
) 
achieving their objectives but II Corps had been frustrated in its attempt to capture 
Ooteghem itself. The war diary of 5/Cameron Highlanders recorded that ‘… the 
Enemy’s counter Barrage was the heaviest yet experienced since the 28 Sept.’71 The 
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weekly operations record for Second Army uses classic understatement in reporting 
that the fighting which took place ‘was of a severe character’.72  
 
Scout patrols sent out on the morning of 26 October reported that the Germans had 
evacuated large areas of the front, retreating to the east of the Escaut.73 
 
The subsequent move forwards by 41st Division into Avelghem was followed by heavy 
enemy shelling of the village. (The last enemy patrol seen leaving the village fired ‘a 
white light’ as it left, interpreted as the signal for the barrage). The advance by 124 
Brigade saw its troops move through a series of villages: Avelghem, Waffelstraat, 
Rugge, Kaphoek, Langestraat, Bosch, and Kloosterhoek. That night the division was 
relieved by 35th Division.74 
 
The war diary of 36th Division records information from prisoners suggesting the 
Germans were now carrying out a planned withdrawal to the River Schelde 
(Scheldt),75 giving fresh urgency to the progress of the British forces.  X and XV 
Corps on the right of the Army’s front, were now able to extend the length of the line 
held on the west bank. The 26
th
 Brigade of 9th Division now occupied Ooteghem, but 
II Corps as a whole had not moved up to the river. The fight to control the air space 
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was intensifying; 27 October saw 14 German aircraft and 6 balloons shot down, for 
the loss of 6 RAF planes. 
 
26 October had brought the start of a realignment of the Corps fronts and the 
deployment of divisions, to allow some rest for those units which had borne the brunt 
of the fighting. For instance, 34th Division was transferred to II Corps, relieving the 
36th Division on the front facing the Anseghem-Langestraat Ridge.76 40th Division 
returned to the line, allowing 31st Division to redeploy north. There were now just 
seven divisions operating in the line, while retaining the four corps command 
structure. From 28 October the disposition of Second Army, north-to-south, was as 
follows: 
 
II Corps 34th Division 
35th Division 
XIX Corps 31st Division 
X Corps 30th Division 
29th Division 
XV Corps 14th Division 
40th Division 
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On the night of 27-28 October, 42 Brigade (14th Division) relieved units of 40th 
Division to its right and also took over the line from 30th Division on its left.77 
 
Thus the first seven days of action beyond the Lys had produced a limited advance 
by Second Army of no more than seven miles. More importantly however, the Army’s 
right wing had now reached the Schelde. 40th Division operated under daily orders 
combining defence arrangements with an emphasis on continuing to advance in the 
event of enemy withdrawal’.78 Its forward patrols engaged in skirmishes with enemy 
positions across the river in the vicinity of Warcoing and Pecq. On 1 November, the 
Division held a line of outposts along the west bank of the Escaut, from south of Pecq 
up to the canal at Espierres.  
 
For the other British units and the French and Belgian forces operating further north, 
the fighting, particularly on the fronts of II Corps and XIX Corps, had been intense at 
times. It had taken considerable perseverance by the infantry, reinforced whenever 
possible by artillery support, to sustain the pressure upon the German forces. 124 
Brigade (41st Division), summarised the results of its advance role during 20-26 
October as follows:  
 
As a result of the six days operations… which included two advances to the 
line of the river L’ESCAUT to a depth of 7,000 and 6,000 yards respectively, 
involving two big attacks and one minor one, more than twelve villages were 
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liberated from the enemy and very heavy casualties were inflicted, besides the 
capture of in-numerable machine guns.79 
 
The Brigade suffered 364 casualties of which 54 were killed.80 
 
Since the launch of the original attack of the GAF on 28 September there had been 
intense pressure upon the principal combat units of Second Army. The 36th Division 
had been one of the key formations to bear the brunt of the fighting; Falls describes 
the division’s circumstances in stark terms: 
 
The bolt of the 36th Division was now shot… The casualties since the 
beginning of offensive operations numbered over three thousand… But not 
more than a tenth of these casualties… had been replaced by reinforcements. 
As a consequence battalions in action had seldom more than two hundred or 
two hundred and fifty bayonets. Though little they knew it, [36th Division’s] part 
in the war was finished.81 
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over three thousand. Of these, six-sevenths were wounded, and a very large proportion, most fortunately, 
suffering from light wounds from machine-gun bullets, or a temporary disabling whiff of gas. But not more than a 
tenth of these casualties… had been replaced by reinforcements. As a consequence battalions in action had 
seldom more than two hundred or two hundred and fifty bayonets. Other arms had suffered in less, but still in 
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As further evidence of the continuing threat to British troops, on 29 October a senior 
officer was wounded by enemy shellfire. The GOC 120 Brigade, Brigadier-General 
W.P. Hore-Ruthuen, who had only been in post for just over a week, was visiting his 
front line units when: 
 
At dawn enemy heavily shelled the area. The G.O.C. was slightly wounded in 
the back.82 
 
The large amount of civilian traffic being generated as areas were liberated was 
causing problems for the British artillery, causing its fire to be ‘confined to definite 
targets’. The Germans were accused of using a high proportion of gas shells, causing 
casualties amongst unprepared civilians.83  
 
Action of Tiegham: 31 October 1918 
 
Plumer now set in train the arrangements for a major attack by II Corps and XIX 
Corps, with the French, on 30 October; later deferred to 31 October at the request of 
the French. That day the ‘Action of Tiegham’ involving II Corps (34th and 35th 
Divisions) and XIX Corps (31st Division) cleared the way forward for a full advance to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
high proportion, while the loss of transport animals was becoming serious. [On 27 October] a wire from the X. 
Corps [was received] to the effect that the Division would be relieved by the 34
th [Division]… Though little they 
knew it, [36
th
 Division’s] part in the war was finished. 
82
 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120 Infantry Brigade; Brigadier-General Hore-Ruthuen took over command 
of the Brigade on 18 October, replacing Brigadier-General C.J. Hobkirk who was transferring to England. 
Happily, Brigadier-General Hore-Ruthuen was sufficiently recovered to sign off the war diary record for the 
month.  
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secure the Schelde.84 The operation would also provide a springboard for the 
advance of French Sixth Army (see Map 10). 
 
Each of the divisions had the support of three or four brigades of field artillery. All the 
Corps artillery plus the guns of resting brigades and the heavy artillery of X Corps 
were utilised in support of the attack. A key objective was the neutralisation of enemy 
batteries and machine gun positions, plus the masking of enemy-held high ground by 
smoke, on the east bank of the Schelde. On the British left, French and American 
divisions would also be attacking. Two companies of French tanks were deployed 
with II Corps. For 34th Division, 103 Infantry Brigade would lead, with 5/King’s Own 
Scottish Borderers on the right and 8/Cameronians on the left, each supported by one 
company of 5/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, together with thirty tanks of the 18th 
French Tank Battalion.85 During the operation, the tanks and infantry worked well 
together, with the British troops reporting that the tanks ‘were of very great 
assistance’,86 and Major-General Nicholson (34th Division) noting that they proved to 
be ‘of great value on the right’.87 The tank crews also praised the co-operation of the 
infantry.88 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
83
 TNA WO158/218  Operations Reports. 
84
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade. 
85
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, Narrative of Operations From October 26
th
 to November 1
st
 
1918; each attacking battalion had ten tanks attached, with the remaining ten held in reserve. 
86
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, Summary of War Diary for October 1918. 
87
 Nicholson, private papers (IWM) - he also recorded the importance of the Second Army actions in assisting 
the French, noting that the commander of 41
st 
 French Division was ‘all over the 34th Division for having held his 
flank for him the day before. He practically acknowledged that his own men were not taking any [ie capturing 
any ground] and that our taking the Southern end of the high ground in front of them enabled them to get 
forward’. 
88
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, Summary of War Diary for October 1918. 
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At Zero hour of 0525 hours the infantry moved forward under a creeping barrage of 
artillery and machine guns, moving at a rate of 100 yards in three minutes. This would 
cease for two hours upon reaching the first objective, to allow guns to be moved 
forward.  
 
Overall, the attack proved to be a significant success with a series of villages 
liberated during operations. 5/KOSB made good progress south of Anseghem ‘with 
the aid of the tanks’.89 
 
Advancing via Hill 41, 8/Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) had cleared and captured 
Anseghem by 1100. The aim had been to turn the village on both northern and 
southern flanks, mopping up the remaining defenders later. However the flanking 
manoeuvre north of the village by three companies failed – these were forced to abort 
the operation and instead dig in and set up a defensive flank facing south-east. The 
battalion therefore had to mount an attack on the village from the south and this 
proved successful.  The reason for the failure north of the village was that the French 
advance on the left had been frustrated by fierce enemy resistance; in the evening 
the Germans still held strong positions on high ground above Boschkant, and the 
French and American forces were pinned in the valley to the north-west. The French 
tanks with the left half-company of 8/Cameronians were unable to operate effectively, 
finding the ground too marshy and the approaches to the enemy positions too 
                                                         
89
 Three tanks volunteered to go out in front of [the advance line] to clear enemy M.G. posts. Two of these were 
destroyed by hostile gun fire and the crews badly wounded : TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, 
Narrative of Operations From October 26
th
 to November 1
st
 1918. 
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exposed, with a German field gun (eventually taken out by British field artillery) 
particularly effective.90 
 
An ‘International Liaison Company’ had been formed under the command of a British 
Officer, consisting of half-companies from the 23rd French Regiment and 2/4 Queen’s 
(Royal West Surrey). However, the lack of progress by the French delayed this unit 
near Winteeken. In the afternoon, a company from 2/4 Queen’s moved to fill the gap 
between the Liaison Company and Anseghem.91 
 
To address the problem of the German machine guns and artillery sited above 
Boschkant, 5/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders sent forward fighting patrols overnight 
in order to maintain pressure on the defenders. The end result was that British troops 
eventually took possession of the positions, without opposition, by 0300 hours on 1 
November. This action relieved the pressure on the allied troops who moved forward 
at dawn. The French and American units then went on to clear all of the high ground 
west of the Scheldt, as far north as Audenarde.92 
 
The detonators of explosive charges placed by the enemy on the bridge at Rugge 
were successfully removed by an NCO from the Tunnelling Company.93 
 
                                                         
90
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, Narrative of Operations from October 26
th
 to November 1
st
 
1918. 
91
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, Narrative of Operations from October 26
th
 to November 1
st
 
1918. 
92
 TNA WO95/2437, War Diary of 34
th
 Division, Summary of War Diary for October 1918. 
93
 TNA WO95/2483, War Diary of 104 Infantry Brigade. 
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By 1 November the Second Army line was secure along the length of the west bank, 
with a small number of posts established subsequently across the river. II Corps 
transferred to Army Reserve.94 The orders of 40th Division summarise the approach of 
Second Army at this point of the campaign: 
 
… [The] enemy [is] continuing preparations for the destruction of roads and 
railways east of SCHELDE… therefore should enemy defence weaken then 
units are to establish advance guards east of the Inundations and prepare to 
carry out further advance to capture high ground to the front.95 
 
From 14-31 October, Second Army had captured 7,422 prisoners, 172 guns plus 
considerable numbers of machine guns and trench mortars. During this same period, 
76 German aeroplanes were destroyed and four balloons, for the loss of thirty British 
planes.96 
 
From the beginning of November, Plumer commenced plans for a forced crossing of 
the Schelde. 41 Brigade noted on 31 October, following a briefing at 14th Division HQ, 
‘the policy of offence to be adopted… [the] keyword being the SCHELDT must be 
crossed at all costs’.97 Artillery, sufficient to protect the west bank and conduct 
counter-battery work, was maintained in action. All other guns were to be held in 
preparation for supporting the crossing. Provisional orders were prepared to take 
                                                         
94
 TNA WO158/212, Second Army Operations, 1 October 1918 – 20 January 1919. 
95
 TNA WO95/2610, War Diary of 120 Infantry Brigade, 40
th
 Division Order No. 226. 
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advantage of any identified reduction in the German defences. Bridging material was 
being brought together. Probing patrols were sent forward regularly including two 
minor bridging operations. The enemy continued to resist with force, employing 
harassing fire including gas bombardments. 124 Brigade recorded that during four 
days in line, 1-4 November: 
 
… the enemy showing considerable artillery activity, and considerable machine 
gun fire was experienced from posts on the East bank of the river [Scheldt].98 
 
Despite this, the British succeeded in establishing a number of advance posts on the 
opposing bank. 20/Durham Light Infantry (124 Brigade, 41st Division) established a 
bridgehead across the Schelde,99 opposite Berchem, on 2 November. There was no 
immediate enemy opposition but the night brought heavy shelling and regular sniping 
such that it was decided to withdraw the post. What happened next is perhaps 
indicative of the growing sense within the Army that the end of the war was in sight.  
 
On the following night 3-4 November, further crossings were made by soldiers from 
the brigade’s other battalions, 10/Queen’s and 20/Durham Light Infantry, and posts 
set up on the eastern bank. Having confirmed the ability to carry out such operations - 
‘and since it was just as easy to command the Eastern bank from our side’ – the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
96
 TNA WO158/218  Operations on the Second Army Front: 14
th
 October to 31
st
 October1918 – which also 
records that on 14
th
 October there were 20 enemy planes and four balloons destroyed, which was a record for one 
day (Nine British planes were lost). 
97
 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade, 31
st
 October 1918. 
98
 TNA WO95/2642, War Diary of 124 Infantry Brigade, Report on Operations from Nov. 1
st
 to the 
commencement of the Armistice at 11.a.m. Nov. 11
th
. 1918. 
99
 41
st
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British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
318 
 
brigade ordered that these posts were withdrawn.100 This action was no doubt 
influenced by the prospect of an end to the war, and a desire to ensure that the lives 
of British soldiers were no longer placed at risk unless there was no other alternative. 
In this case the priority was for the units of Second Army to have all possible 
arrangements in place for a strong and successful crossing of the Schelde – and for 
this to be made at a time of the Army’s choosing. The main activities of 124 Brigade 
throughout this period were designed to prepare for a crossing, patrols seeking 
possible sites for foot or pontoon bridges.101 Over the next few days, while in 
divisional reserve, the brigade concentrated on training for the river crossing. 
 
40th Division had been looking to cross at Pecq with a subsidiary crossing east of 
Warcoing. Enemy resistance was considerable – machine gun, trench mortar and 
artillery fire – and 1 November brought an enemy counter-attack which was 
repulsed.102 A small number of advance posts were set up on the eastern bank during 
2-3 November despite enemy mortar and artillery fire. By 5 November, patrols were 
operating east of Pecq and Warcoing; enemy withdrawal had allowed troops to push 
forward towards Herrines.103 
 
The night of 4-5 November brought an attack by units of 14th and 29th Division to force 
a crossing between Helchin and Bossuyt. Previous attempts to cross, through taking 
advantage of operations by 121 Brigade (40th Division) on the right, had failed despite 
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 TNA WO95/2642, War Diary of 124 Infantry Brigade, Report on Operations from Nov. 1
st
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commencement of the Armistice at 11.a.m. Nov. 11
th
. 1918. 
101
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covering fire from trench mortars and machine guns. During the early hours, 
engineers threw a number of bridges across the water and parties of infantry crossed 
in the face of minimal enemy defensive fire. By 0530 the positions were secured, with 
no fatalities and three men wounded.104  
 
Following repeated pressure from Haig, by 4 November Foch had finally agreed that 
British Second Army would be removed from the GAF and restored to Haig’s 
command, as part of the BEF. This is discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter. Second Army would now be responsible for maintaining ‘close contact with 
the enemy and to follow up and press him with advanced guards in the event of his 
withdrawing’;105 and to force a passage of the River Escaut, the attack being carried 
out under the command of XV, X and XIX Corps. The operation would be in 
cooperation with British Fifth Army and its 39th Division, advancing in the Tournai 
area.106 
 
Meanwhile the successes of the campaign were being acknowledged. On 5 
November, 9th Division (in Army reserve) was inspected by the King of the Belgians at 
Hulste Aerodrome. In recognition of this, the GOC declared the following day as a 
holiday for all troops.107 
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 TNA WO95/2614, War Diary of 121Infantry Brigade. 
103
 TNA WO95/2594, War Diary of 40
th
 Division, entries for 2-5 November. 
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 TNA W095/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade. 
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 TNA WO158/212, Second Army Operations, 1 October 1918 – 20 January 1919, GHQ OAD 950: 3 
November 1918. 
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 Referred to in TNA WO95/1899, War Diary of 42 Infantry Brigade, Instructions No.1, 8
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 November 1918. 
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 TNA WO95/1771/4, War Diary of 27 Infantry Brigade. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
320 
 
On 6 November, 40th Division held a conference which considered the plans for the 
forced crossing of the Scheldt, by frontal attack if necessary. Two days later, 119 
Brigade (40th Division) crossed the river ‘in pursuit’ of the enemy.108 Patrols reported 
weakening resistance and some troops penetrated through Herrines. The following 
day the division advanced over seven miles, liberating a series of small villages and 
hamlets.109  
 
For the intended final phase, II and XV Corps were withdrawn into reserve. The 
number of front line divisions had been reduced over time to the point where, for the 
purpose of operations beyond 9 November, there would be only five divisions 
operating in the line, under a two Corps structure. The disposition of Second Army, 
north-to-south, would be as follows: 
 
XIX Corps 41st Division 
35th Division 
31st Division 
X Corps 30th Division 
29
th 
Division 
 
By now it was clear that German forces had given up on holding the line of the 
Schelde and Second Army sent forward advance units, using pontoon bridges and 
boats, onto the eastern bank. On that day 35th Division was tasked to seize and hold 
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 TNA WO95/2611/4, War Diary of 11th Battalion, Cameron Highlanders. 
109
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Bercham railway, crossing the river through the use of canvas boats (the RE would 
then erect floating foot bridges).110 20/Durham Light Infantry spent the night on the 
eastern bank at Meersche.111 For 30th Division, 89 Brigade forced a passage over the 
River Escaut, with 21 and 90 Brigades ordered to follow up in support.112 Following 
reports from patrols of enemy withdrawals, 43 Brigade (14th Division) moved forward 
to secure canal locks. 42 Brigade took up ‘assault positions’ to cross between Pecq 
and Helchin.113 
 
Army orders were issued to include confirmation of the crossing of the Scheldt that 
morning (XV Corps: 14th and 40th Divisions – who were then withdrawn to Army 
Reserve) and the securing of the line Cordes-Anseroeul-Renaix-Nukerke. On the left, 
XIX Corps would maintain touch with the French Army (the French tank detachment 
transferring to Army Reserve). X Corps was tasked with seizing the ridge above St. 
Sauveur before pushing east. XIX and X Corps would then push on to the River 
Dendre, with XV and II Corps following.114 During the final three days of the war, 
Second Army advanced 22 miles, reaching the Dendre.  
 
At 1020 hours on 11 November, 124 Brigade HQ was set up at Nederbrakel, four 
miles east of the Dendre, ‘where an enemy machine gun, with one officer and six 
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other ranks were captured’.115 Its battalions were deployed along the river, having 
spent the morning advancing to that line. 
 
By way of the Army’s final act before the Armistice took effect at 1100 on 11 
November, a squadron of the 7th Dragoon Guards, attached to X Corps, advanced 
towards the bridge over the Dendre at Lessines.  At around 1045 the troops charged 
the village, taking 130 prisoners and a machine gun; more importantly, the bridge, 
which was wired for demolition, was captured intact. A further 41 prisoners were 
captured on higher ground overlooking the village; it now being after 1100, these 
prisoners were released. 
 
During the period 1-11 November, 719 prisoners were captured by Second Army 
together with 18 guns, six trench mortars, 142 machine guns, and two complete trains 
and ten locomotives.116 The Army held the final line of East of Lessines – South and 
West of Ghoy – Ginintreau – La Livarde – Goeffendinge – part of Grammont – due 
North and West to the French right at Paricke.117 
 
Thus the British Second Army concluded its war. As a commentary on the Army’s 
achievements, Paul Harris concludes ‘The Flanders operation.... was a major 
success’.118 
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Chapter Seven 
 
War of Liberation 
 
After four years of tyranny, during which they subjected us to a reign of steel 
and blood, they are going, vanquished… by the heroic resistance of a whole 
people who… have held out to the bitter end.1 
 
The last phase of the war took place in hitherto undamaged country where 
civilians still lived and were often surprised and killed by the cruel storm of the 
approaching force of war.2 
 
The Liberation of Flanders 
 
The eastward drive of the fighting was liberating areas of Flanders which had been 
under German occupation for over four years. Two days into the Battle of Courtrai, 
41st Division commented on the ‘large number of civilians passing through our lines’.3 
One day later 121 Brigade recorded that ‘during the advance civilians were found in 
                                                         
1
 From the front page of the resistance newspaper La Libre Belgique published at the start of  October 1918, 
quoted in O. E. Millard, Uncensored: The True Story of the Clandestine Newspaper ‘La Libre Belgique’ 
Published in Brussels During the German Occupation (London: Robert Hale and Company, 1937), p. 283. 
2
 B. Stichelbaut and P. Chielens, The Great War Seen From the Air: In Flanders Fields 1914-1918 (Brussels: 
Mercatorfonds, 2013), p. 259. 
3
 TNA W095/2618, War Diary of 41
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all villages and houses’.4 7/Seaforth Highlanders noted that ‘During the afternoon and 
evening a large number of civilians passed through our lines on their way to Winkle-
St-Eloi.5 
 
On 18 October, Second Army Intelligence reported that thousands of civilians were 
being drawn towards the main towns including Tourcoing, Lauwe and Courtrai.6 The 
advancing troops of the Army saw evidence of this at first hand as they moved into 
and through the liberated areas. 
 
On the 18th [October, 1918] General Woodcock and the headquarters of the 
101st Brigade made a triumphant entry into Lauwe, which was the first Belgian 
Town we had entered which was still inhabited. The inhabitants gave the 
general a demonstrative and enthusiastic welcome. The enemy was evidently 
in full retreat, and a crowd of liberated civilians were met on all sides.7 
 
[Tourcoing was] full of civilians who received the battalion with the greatest 
enthusiasm: the streets were thronged with people, many of whom were most 
anxious to press refreshment of all kinds upon the first British troops they had 
seen.8 
 
                                                         
4
 TNA W095/2614, War Diary of 121 Infantry Brigade. 
5
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6
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8
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Although there had been assurances from the enemy that Courtrai would not be 
shelled, there had been artillery fire on 16 October resulting in a number of civilian 
casualties. In general, across the front, private houses were being found intact 
although many had been looted. Behind enemy lines, civilians were still being forced 
to assist in the construction of defensive positions. 
 
Arrangements were put in place to manage the movement of British forces into 
formerly occupied towns and villages, and to handle the passage of civilians through 
and behind the lines of advance. It was important for the British troops to remember 
their status as liberators of the areas they advanced into, whilst also acting in a 
manner that would distinguish them from their German opponents. Towards the end 
of the Battle of Courtrai, 92 Brigade (31st Division) issued orders for units behind the 
line: 
 
Troops of Battalions in support will be billeted as closely as possible… No 
houses except those in which troops are billeted will be entered… 
 
Men will not leave their billet areas. 
 
The strictest discipline will be maintained in the town. 
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Men will walk about properly dressed, and will present a smart appearance 
and impress the civilians by their marked contrast to the German troops. Men 
will not wear garlands or flags in their hats or on their tunics.9 
 
A growing concern was to ensure that the Belgian population was adequately fed and 
supplied, with arrangements for evacuation where possible or necessary during the 
fighting. During the Battle of Courtrai, 88 Brigade (29th Division) encountered numbers 
of civilians gathering at the Collecting Station set up in Ledeghem; with the town  
under direct observation from Courtrai, they were in danger from enemy shellfire. The 
brigade put in place its own arrangements for evacuation.10 
 
The success of the Army’s logistical arrangements meant that the British assumed 
much of the initial responsibility for providing supplies. On 18 October the Deputy 
Director Supply & Transport recorded that: 
 
A very considerable quantity of civilians are now being fed by the British. This 
feeding is limited to 4 days rations in order to give the French and Belgians 
time to get rations from their own bases. The French will probably do this but it 
is perfectly certain that the Belgians, who are devoid of any idea of 
organisation, will never do it.11 
 
                                                         
9
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With the increasing contact between troops and civilians, units were also charged 
with identifying anyone who might be supplying information to the enemy. Having 
considered the issue of liberated villages, 43 Brigade (14th Division) concluded: 
 
C.O.’s or Senior Officers to be Commandants of the villages where they are 
and to see to questions of lights, supplies and suspects. 
Suspects to be reported to Brigade.12 
 
The potential for action by spies or saboteurs was a new problem for the British as its 
troops encountered fresh numbers of civilians. On 22 October, 93 Brigade (31st 
Division) recorded that telephone wires between its HQ and the HQ of 13/York & 
Lancaster had been found to be cut in several places: 
 
In one case a piece of telephone wire 300 yards long had been cut out of the 
line. Several civilians were arrested as spies and handed over to the Belgian 
police attached to the Brigade.13 
 
There was concern that the retreating Germans had made arrangements for the 
collection of information on British operations. On 20 October, XV Corps issued a set 
of orders designed to guard against the potential for intelligence to be passed to the 
Germans, through putting restrictions in place for the monitoring and control of civilian 
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 TNA WO95/292, Deputy Director Supply & Transport: Daily Visits and Inspections, 18 October 1918; on the 
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Roubaix, estimating 150,000 adults and children (which would appear to be an excessive figure). 
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movement. All troops were to be circumspect ‘in conversation either with or within 
hearing of all civilians’.14 Specific actions included the ‘immediate detention of all 
suspicious individuals who may show undue interest in our movements and reporting 
at once any pigeons flying Eastwards or places from which pigeons are observed to 
have been released; in the latter case immediate investigation should be made by the 
observer’.15 All cables and lines were to be checked out by Signals and great care 
taken in the relay of messages. Civilians living in houses earmarked as headquarters 
would be the subject of detailed enquiries. 
 
On 22 October, 41Brigade (14th Division) arrested a Belgian named Van Hoenacker 
who was passed to the Assistant Provost Marshal ‘charged with being a German 
agent’.16 Two days later the Brigade recorded the arrest of two women who were also 
charged with working for the enemy.17 
 
While there is no evidence to link these incidents with the earlier orders from XV 
Corps, it is likely that units were increasingly suspicious of civilian activity. What had 
caused these Belgians to be arrested, or their subsequent fate, is not recorded.   
 
Where possible, forward areas were to be evacuated, to reduce the risk of civilian 
casualties and prevent the potential concern of troops for the safety of civilians from 
impeding military operations. 93 Brigade noted on 22 October that: 
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Our artillery was quiet owing to civilians moving about in the enemy’s forward 
areas.18 
 
On 17 October, 90 Brigade had recorded that: 
 
Civilians… came into our lines who said that the enemy had evacuated 
Turcoing and surrounding area… 
 
There were no civilians in [Bousbecque, Menin, Halluin] but 40 or 50 were in 
Roncq and these greeted our troops with every sign of joy.19 
 
The retreat of the German Army in the face of the advance by the allied forces 
brought conflicting experiences for the immediate populace. In many cases the 
enemy’s withdrawal brought unexpected but very welcome relief. Towards the end of 
the Battle of Courtrai, 41 Brigade (14th Division) was marching into reserve at Roncq: 
 
Civilians were met on the line of march who appeared somewhat dazed but 
nevertheless delighted.20 
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 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade, 24
th
 October 1918. 
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 TNA WO95/2360, War Diary of 93 Infantry Brigade. 
19
 TNA WO95/2338, War Diary of 90
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However, the hasty departure of the occupiers could cause short-term problems as 
noted by 27 Brigade (9th Division) on the second day of that battle: 
 
The inhabitants of CUERNE told us that not an hour before we arrived there 
the enemy had streamed through a panic stricken mob of 2,000 soldiers who 
looted everything they could lay their hands on. Two Uhlan officers were killed 
at CUERNE trying to escape.21 
 
On the morning of 21 October, 1/6 Cheshires (21 Brigade, 30th Division) had captured 
the hamlet of Helghin (Helchin): 
 
Civilians were occupying the farms and houses in the area through which we 
had advanced and our troops were warmly welcomed everywhere. Belgium 
flags were flying and bells ringing half an hour after the enemy had been 
forced to evacuate each place. The casualties amongst the civilians were 
promptly attended to by our medical staff.22 
 
During the period 20-26 October ‘more than twelve villages were liberated from the 
enemy…’ by 124 Brigade.23 Troops now viewed the battered landscape through the 
eyes of its besieged civilians: 
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 TNA WO95/1771/4/5, War Diary of 27 Infantry Brigade, Narrative of Operations 28th September-28
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 TNA WO95/2330, War Diary of 1/6
th
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A few days ago we marched through a town which was once in German 
hands; it is a fearful mess now, nothing but one vast heap of bricks and timber 
and scarcely a wall standing.24 
 
This destruction had not taken place everywhere, as 2/South Lancs noted: 
 
The country through which the battalion marched, and which had been 
evacuated by the enemy, offered a marked contrast to that in which it had 
been operating for so long. Villages were more or less intact, the country 
showed little sign of war in comparison to what we had been accustomed for 
so long, and a number of civilians were seen… All villages through which the 
battalion marched were decorated with the Belgian flag and the inhabitants 
were most enthusiastic. Traces of fighting could be seen here and there and 
occasional shell holes were noticed on the roads.25 
 
The same battalion was received with even greater enthusiasm the following month, 
on Armistice Day: 
 
During the march great enthusiasm was shown by the inhabitants and on 
arrival in Flobecq the people were much excited and gave the troops an 
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 From the letters of D. E. Griffin, 2/1
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extraordinary welcome. The Band of the Battalion performed in the Square of 
the town much to the satisfaction of the inhabitants.26 
 
During these final stages of the campaign there are various references within unit 
diaries to the warm welcome given by Belgian civilians to the British soldiers. 
Stationed for a time in reserve at Herseaux, the senior command of 41 Brigade 
attended a banquet given in honour of the brigade by the Burgomaster and local 
representatives: 
 
In a short speech the Burgomaster gave a hearty welcome to the B.G.C. and 
the troops under his command and thanked them as liberators.27 
 
A few days later a team from Brigade HQ played a team of civilians at football; the 
result was ‘a walk over’ (presumably for the British). 
 
121 Brigade recorded on 24 October 1918: 
 
At 16.30 the Mayor and Council of CROIX attended at Brigade Headquarters 
for the purpose of presenting the Brigadier-General Commanding with an 
address of thanks for freeing the inhabitants of ROUBAIX and CROIX from the 
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Germans. They also intimated that they had made the Brigade Commander a 
free Citizen of CROIX.28 
 
The address fills a side of paper, with an initial paragraph describing the sufferings of 
the civilian population under German rule. The list includes forced labour, deportation 
for work purposes, loss of property, the taking of hostages and other deprivations and 
restrictions. The document goes on to praise the ‘valour and bravery of the… British’ 
for freeing the town and its people from the ‘boche’; ending with the bold: 
 
Vive la 121st Brigade! Vive son General! 29 
 
On 25 October, bands from the British army, including105 Brigade (35th Division) had 
performed for the citizens of Courtrai.30 Two days later, 90 Brigade (30th Division) 
recorded that: 
 
At the request of the inhabitants a detachment of one Officer and 25 Other 
Ranks from each Battalion attended a thanksgiving service in Aelbeke Church, 
to celebrate their deliverance from the enemy.
31
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 TNA WO95/2614, War Diary of 121 Infantry Brigade. 
29
 TNA WO95/2614, War Diary of 121 Infantry Brigade, AN ADDRESS to Brigadier-General G.C. Stubbs, 
D.S.O. commanding the 121
st
 Brigade of Infantry, CROIX, October 24
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of the Ville de Croiz’. 
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Arrangements were not always quite so formal. Troops from 5/Cameron Highlanders 
had the opportunity to bathe and ‘get cleaned up’, prior to being paid and proceeding 
‘to fraternize with the people they had liberated a week before’.32 
 
Where enemy resistance had caused troops to assault a town or village, then the 
opportunity of being liberated was potentially a very dangerous experience for 
civilians, as well as the soldiers. Second Army took steps to emphasise the 
importance of minimising the risk of casualties amongst the local population resulting 
from its operations. However, the defensive fire from German positions as British 
forces moved forward did not always discriminate between soldiers and civilians: 
 
[At Wattrelos] there was street fighting before the town was cleared of enemy 
rear guards, and casualties were inflicted on the advancing troops and civilians 
from the heavy bombardment of gas and high-explosive shells to which the 
town was subjected.33 
 
There were also instances when war and peace co-existed – daily life rolled on as 
normal while the war passed it by: 
 
A curious feature of this period of the operations was the attitude of the Belgian 
farmers who lived within range of the enemy’s fire. Apparently oblivious to the 
dangers that surrounded them, they continued to occupy their farms, and to till 
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their lands from sunrise to sunset, indifferent (at any rate outwardly) to the 
efforts of their allies to restore to them the freedom of their native land.34 
 
As the advance proceeded, increasing efforts were made to interview civilians in 
order to obtain intelligence on German troop dispositions, movement and the morale 
of the enemy troops. The war diary of 14th Division included a list of individual civilians 
interviewed during October.35 The report states that several civilians were questioned, 
most reporting that the Germans intended to withdraw immediately to their frontier. It 
also refers to the Mayor of Herseaux, who had been released from prison ten days 
previously after seven months confinement for an unknown crime.36  
 
As the liberation of Flanders gathered pace, allied forces moved into formerly 
occupied territories while an increasing number of civilians sought to make their way 
through the enemy lines. Army Intelligence Officers were taking steps to obtain 
information about the enemy from these civilians, while the Germans were attempting 
to forcibly evacuate civilians from areas in the path of the advance. The enemy was 
preparing new defensive lines in order to create the time and space for a planned 
withdrawal in the direction of the German frontier; an allied advance along the coast 
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 Nicholson et al, East Lancs, p. 558. 
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could outflank the withdrawal and threaten the cohesion of the German armies. The 
morale of German troops was not good; obviously effected by the series of reverses 
along the Western Front, and made worse by news (and some first-hand experience 
of soldiers on leave) of the conditions being experienced by their families and 
neighbours back in Germany. 
 
A report by the CO of 23/Middlesex suggests that there was a residue of ill-feeling by 
some German troops towards the Belgian people. On 25 October, a report on 
operations by the battalion records that the German artillery had fired gas shells into a 
village and, as villagers moved away into the open, they were subject to machine gun 
fire. There is no further comment on the incident and neither the village nor any 
witnesses are named - there is no other information to confirm the incident. One can 
only speculate on what factors, if the description of the event is correct, could have 
caused what would now be called a war crime. There may have been some particular 
circumstances which had led to animosity from the Germans, not that there could 
have been any just cause for the action.37 Earlier, on 17 October, following its capture 
that day by British forces, the Germans had used gas at the Cuerne. The town was 
‘full of civilians who had no masks’, this being considered ‘one more instance of the 
kind of enemy we have to deal with’.38 
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Arrangements were required for the Army to be able to direct civilians to sources of 
support and to have authorities available to take responsibility for their welfare. The 
following orders were issued by 36th Division, which had spent much of its campaign 
operating alongside French and Belgian forces: 
 
Civilians 
The Divisional Belgian Liaison Officer, Lieut. R.G. KRIEGLINGER, who will be 
located at Advanced Divisional Headquarters, and the D.A.P.M. [Deputy 
Assistant Provost Marshal] will be informed at once if any civilians are found. 
The D.A.P.M. will make the necessary arrangements for escorting civilians.39 
 
The risk to local Belgians remained as the fighting moved eastwards. On 6 
November, 41 Brigade noted that ‘DOTTIGNIES shelled during the afternoon, 3 
civilians killed and 2 soldiers wounded’.40 
 
One of the practical problems presented to Second Army was that of refugees moving 
to liberated areas without having anywhere to live; often taking up accommodation 
needed for troops. These problems had occurred as early as 15 September, with the 
success of the initial attacks east of Ypres. 14th Division was deployed south east of 
Ypres: 
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Difficulty in accommodation will be overcome when Belgian Refugees are 
moved from Billets allotted to Troops. Tents will be drawn… and returned as 
billets become available.41 
 
Once the Armistice came into force then the movement of civilians, amidst concerns 
for their welfare, became a priority for the Army; 41st Division noted that on 12 
November: 
 
Posts were established at bridge-heads within [124] Brigade boundaries, and 
the main roads leading from the North and East, for the examination of civilians 
and refugees passing through our lines.42 
 
There are various references within unit war diaries to the praise paid to Second 
Army by the Belgians, and by their King. On 5 November, 9th Division attended a 
parade at Hulste Aerodrome, where its troops were inspected by King Albert together 
with the Queen and II Corps Commander Jacobs. In his address to the assembled 
soldiers the King paid tribute to the achievements of the Division (which had operated 
for much of the campaign along the right flank of the Belgian Army); he stated that he 
had prior knowledge of the Division: 
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 … [having] followed the career of the 9th Scottish Division since the Battle of 
Loos… during recent operations the 9th Division had worked in closest liaison 
with his army in recovering a vast stretch of his beloved country… [he] hoped 
that members of 9th Division would return happily to his country after a 
victorious peace.43 
 
It being Flanders it is perhaps no surprise that the event took place in wet weather. 
However ‘…in spite of rain the inspection was a great success’.44 
 
Fall Out: The Ending of the Groupe d’Armées des Flandres 
 
… Wartime cooperation [is] continually fraught with tension and mutual 
suspicion. The economic theory of coalitions emphasizes the incentives for 
each country to hold back and wait for its partners to do the job in hand.45 
 
Less than two months previously Douglas Haig had been pleased to see Second 
Army join the coalition army group under King Albert; however, by the end of October, 
he became demonstrably exasperated with the delay in returning Second Army to the 
BEF and his command.46 While the five British Armies had now advanced to form a 
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coherent forward line ‘…Haig only controlled four of them’.47 Foch’s desire was to see 
King Albert enter Bruges at the head of a joint coalition force, only to be met by Haig’s 
insistence that Second Army had fulfilled its agreed task. There have been various 
reasons put forward for Haig’s insistence on bringing Second Army out of the GAF 
coalition at this time, including from Haig himself; but these have not explained the 
absolute determination with which he pursued this goal, even to the point of 
threatening to resign his command of the BEF unless his demand was complied with. 
There were a number of factors influencing Haig’s thinking at the time, which 
combined to cause him to engage in brinkmanship with Foch. Undoubtedly the level 
of stress under which this man was operating was immense. To fully understand his 
motives it is necessary to consider the argument within the context of the German 
attempts to secure an armistice, and the discussions on this within the allied military 
and political leaderships.48  
 
Following the ceasefire agreed with Bulgaria on 29 September, the German 
leadership had begun a process to seek a ceasefire, initially through an approach to 
President Wilson of the USA. At a meeting of the European leaders on 8 October, 
Foch provided a note on the essential terms which he believed the ceasefire 
agreement should contain. These included liberation of the occupied territories 
including Alsace-Lorraine; allied occupation of the left bank of the Rhine (as security 
for the demand for reparations) and bridgeheads across the river to prevent any 
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resumption of hostilities by the Germans; plus various requirements regarding the 
retention and safeguarding of materiel and infrastructure consequent upon the 
withdrawal of the German Army. Foch showed his paper to Haig on 10 October who 
recorded his views in his diary: 
 
I remarked that the only difference between his (Foch’s) conditions and a 
general surrender is that the German Army is allowed to march back with its 
rifles, and officers with their swords…49 
 
Haig’s CGS, General Lawrence, was concerned that the Germans still retained the 
ability to counter-attack; the British Army would have to shoulder the main response 
and could expect little assistance from the French. On this subject Haig remained 
optimistic, doubting the enemy’s ability to launch a strong attack and confident that 
the allies were facing a beaten army; no reference is made regarding the French 
Army. It should also be noted that Haig had wired Foch the previous evening making 
reference to British Second Army, recommending to the Marshal: 
 
… my advance on the battle front should now be between the Scheldt and 
Sambre with the object of joining hands with my Second Army and the other 
troops under King of the Belgians…50 
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While the meaning is somewhat ambiguous regarding whether control of Second 
Army resides with Haig or King Albert, this choice of words displays no obvious 
concerns about the command arrangements existing at that time. Four days later, the 
Battle of Courtrai opened. Haig wrote in his diary: 
 
[15 October] 
The Second Army did very well today… The French divisions now in Flanders 
are reported not to be fighting. The Belgians, on the other hand, have done 
splendidly. 
 
[16 October] 
General Cavendish [attached to King Albert’s staff] writes last night that French 
troops in Flanders are not fighting at all. They take no interest in ‘Flanders for 
the Belgians!’ Also the King now seems only anxious to stop his offensive and 
rest on his laurels.51 
 
Suddenly it seems that Haig had developed two concerns regarding the deployment 
and disposition of Second Army: it had taken the lead in the fighting undertaken by 
the GAF, without the expected strength of support from the French;52 while he 
acknowledged that the Belgian Army was proving an effective force, he had doubts 
(which were not new) about Albert’s commitment to a sustained offensive. 
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On 18 October Haig telephoned Foch to make his request that Second Army should 
now be returned to his command.53 That same day he travelled to London for a 
meeting of the British War Cabinet, having had a further discussion with Lawrence 
about the terms of an armistice. The latter had given Haig a note which argued that 
the conditions should not be too demanding because it was in Great Britain’s interest 
to bring the war to a conclusion. Throughout, Haig had been convinced that the war 
could and should be ended in 1918, and he argued this at the meeting on 19 October 
when asked by Lloyd George for his views on the armistice terms: 
 
I replied that they must greatly depend on the answers we give to two 
questions: 
1. Is Germany now so beaten that she will accept whatever terms the Allies 
may offer? 
2. Can the Allies continue to press the Enemy sufficiently vigorously during the 
coming winter months as to cause him to withdraw so quickly that he cannot 
destroy railways, roads, etc.? 
 
The answer to both is in the negative. The German Army is capable of retiring 
to its own frontier, and holding that line if there should be any attempt to touch 
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the honour of the German people, and make them fight with the courage of 
despair.54 
 
Haig then gave his opinion of the state of the allied armies. While the British Army 
was more efficient than it had ever been, the hard fighting meant it faced issues 
around the reinforcements needed for its losses, such that morale could be at risk. He 
was concerned that the French Army was ‘worn out and has not been fighting 
latterly’.55 In conclusion he pointed out that the French and American Armies were not 
capable of taking part in the immediate allied offensive (to take advantage of the 
fading capabilities of the enemy at that particular time) which would be needed to 
defeat the German Army in the field. In his subsequent diary entry, Haig summarised 
the views he presented on the British forces: 
 
The British alone might bring the enemy to his knees. But why expend more 
British lives – and for what?  
 
…The British Army has done most of the fighting latterly, and everyone wants 
to have done with the war, provided we get what we want. I therefore advise 
that we only ask in the armistice for what we intend to hold, and that we set our 
faces against the French entering Germany to pay off old scores. In my 
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opinion, under the supposed conditions, the British Army would not fight keenly 
for what is not really its own affair.56 
 
It was against this background that Haig returned to France. Foch had now set out his 
view of the strategic priorities for all the allied forces in a letter ‘Directive No. 4925’ to 
Army Commanders dated 19 October.57 This would presumably have been waiting for 
Haig’s attention when he arrived at GHQ.  
 
The letter required the GAF (including Second Army) to ‘march in the general 
direction of Brussels… forcing the major river lines: ESCAUT – DENDER’. To the 
south, the four British Armies (with French First Army) were to maintain their current 
objectives which would also ‘assist the advance of the Flanders Army Group’ through 
‘action on the flank’. These orders suggest that Foch saw the ongoing operations of 
the remaining British Armies aiding the drive through Belgium.58 
 
It was with this confirmation of Foch’s aims that Haig attended a subsequent meeting 
with the Generalissimo on 24 October. He was now deeply suspicious of French 
motives. Furthermore, he believed that the excessive demands of the French 
regarding armistice terms would mean a continuation of the fighting, the brunt of 
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which would have to be borne by his troops.59 The most obvious practical illustration 
of Haig’s nightmare was occurring now in Flanders – with British Second Army 
fronting an army group in which the French formations appeared to be failing and the 
Belgian King seemed increasingly reluctant to commit his own forces because of the 
risks of heavy casualties and the impact of the fighting on his people and the fabric of 
the country. Now, Foch’s objectives for the GAF and Second Army went beyond the 
original line of the Lys. Haig was also bolstered in his opinions on the armistice 
proposals by a meeting on 23 October with General Pershing, commander of the 
American forces in France. In Haig’s opinion, Pershing agreed with his views on the 
‘state of Enemy, and state of allied Armies, and as to what our demands should be’.60 
The Army Council in the War Office also shared Haig’s opinions.61 
 
Having already made an initial request the previous week, the issue was pursued by 
Haig at a meeting with Foch on 24 October, prior to a conference of the 
Commanders-in-Chief the following day. The meeting was primarily to discuss the 
terms of an armistice with the Germans but Haig also used the opportunity to ask for 
the immediate return of Second Army to his command. On the former matter, Haig 
perceived Foch’s reasoning in support of the occupation of German territory as 
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‘political not military’,62 and he remained concerned that the Allies would demand 
conditions that they could not enforce.63 
 
His request regarding Second Army was met with a refusal by Foch and, after 
discussion, an agreement between them to refer the matter to the British 
Government.64 Haig recorded an outline of the argument and the reasoning for his 
request in his diary: 
 
We then dealt with the question of the Second Army which I asked last week 
should be again placed under my orders. On the 9th September I agreed that it 
should co-operate under the King of the Belgians for a specific purpose, 
namely, to cover the right of the Belgian Army on the River Lys, and enable the 
Belgians, supported by the French, to advance on Bruges and Ghent. That 
phase of the operation is over, and all the five Armies of which the BEF is 
composed are either along or approaching the line of the Scheldt and are 
confronted with the same problem, viz., the passage of that river. The manner 
in which the line of the Scheldt can most easily be forced is to cross it in its 
upper course where my Fourth, Third and half of the First Armies have already 
crossed it. From Oudenaarde downwards the minimum number of troops 
should be employed as a menace. To force a passage there, in the face of 
hostile opposition, would be most costly. 
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Foch declines to return the Second Army to me because he says of the 
political value of having the King of the Belgians in command of an Allied 
Army, when he re-enters his capital, Brussels! His real object is to use the 
British Second Army to open the way for the ‘dud’ divisions (of which the rest 
of the King’s Army is composed) and ensure that they get to Brussels. France 
would then get credit for clearing Belgium and putting the King back in his 
capital. De Goutte is nominally Chief of Staff to King Albert: really he is the 
Army Commander.  
 
I explained the military reason why the Second army must now be under my 
orders. If there were political reasons requiring the Second Army to remain 
under King Albert, then the British Government must direct me on the subject. 
Until I was so informed, I must continue to view the situation from a military 
standpoint, and insist on the return of the Second Army without delay. Foch 
asked me to submit my request in writing… 
 
I am disgusted at the almost underhand way in which the French are trying to 
get hold of a part of the British Army – and so ungenerous too, because in the 
first instance, I handed over all the troops of that Army at once to operate 
under the French Staff of the King of the Belgians, without raising the smallest 
difficulty… I told [Foch and Weygand] a few ‘home truths’… the British Army 
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has defeated the Germans this year and I [alone] am responsible to the British 
Government for the handling of the British troops not Foch.65 
 
On 25 October Haig wrote two letters setting out his arguments for the return of 
Second Army to his command.66 In his short letter to Foch, Haig summarised the 
terms of his agreement to the deployment of Second Army in Flanders, this being the 
employment of two divisions ‘under the command of His Majesty the King of the 
Belgians’ to cover the flank of the GAF in its eastern advance; and the use of Second 
Army to exploit any resulting successes. As we have seen, there had been no 
secondment or similar of any British Divisions to the GAF; rather, Second Army had 
operated as part of a combined Army Group, recognising its responsibilities for the 
Belgian right flank, and co-operating in the achievement of agreed strategic objectives 
(although Plumer had reserved for himself the decisions on Army operations 
consistent with these).  
 
Haig pointed out that with the heavy commitment of his other British Armies,  
 
It was well understood that… the Second Army was not to be committed to any 
other operation than that of clearing the ground up to the LYS River. The whole 
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scope of the operation had as its objective the ‘clearing of the Belgian coast 
and the country between the coast and the River LYS’. 
 
Haig must have known that by this time, Second Army was up to ten miles beyond 
the Lys and preparing to tackle the Scheldt. His letter concluded: 
 
This has now been accomplished and I request that the Second Army be 
forthwith returned to my command. If, as I understand, further operations by 
the Army of Flanders have as their objective the capture of BRUSSELS, this 
can be equally attained by the co-operation of all the British Armies including 
the Second Army operating under my control. 
 
The reference here to ‘Army of Flanders’ indicates that Haig was well aware of 
Second Army’s increased role within the Army Group. His comments also 
demonstrate his concern that if Plumer continued to remain with the GAF then the 
critical British role in the further liberation of Belgium would overlooked, while credit 
went to King Albert and the French.  
 
This interpretation is confirmed by Haig’s second letter, a longer letter to the War 
Cabinet, enclosing copies of his letter to Foch and the 19 October ‘Directive No. 4925’ 
from the latter.67 Haig proceeds to restate his commitment to co-operation with 
French forces, giving examples of temporary detachments he has made of British 
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units, ‘on the AISNE in May and on the MARNE in July’.68 Such arrangements were 
‘of a purely temporary nature’ and the units were ‘to be returned on the completion of 
the specific operation in hand’; this agreement had also applied to Second Army and 
the GAF. 
 
He then reviews the achievements of Second Army,69 pointing out that it had 
‘successfully’ provided flank protection and secured the left bank of the River Lys, 
taking ‘the heaviest share of the work in driving the enemy back’ and incurring ‘some 
22,000 casualties’. He also highlights the ‘considerable casualties’ resulting from the 
‘series of important attacks [by First, Third and Fourth British Armies] on a wide front 
against positions of vital importance to the enemy’ held by ‘a considerable number of 
his best troops’.  Haig then emphasises the main point of his letter to Foch, namely, 
that the drive of Second Army to force the Rivers Scheldt and Dendre ‘can be equally 
well undertaken under my [Haig’s] control’; and so allow him to ‘balance the 
casualties so that their incidence may not fall unduly on the British forces’. 
 
This is Haig’s central concern. As his penultimate paragraph describes, he sees that 
‘the brunt of the offensive operations has fallen on the British troops’ and ‘Owing to 
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our lack of effectives this cannot be allowed to continue much longer’. Crucially, 
regarding the position of Second Army, 
 
It is therefore most necessary that I should exercise the greatest care in 
engaging the five Armies of which the British Expeditionary Force is 
composed. The responsibility for this can alone rest on me, and ought not in 
the case of any portion of the British forces to be delegated to any foreign 
Commander, of no matter how high a rank.70 
 [My emphasis.] 
 
Thus Haig sought the support of the War Cabinet in bringing Second Army back 
under his command – allowing him to manage all the remaining resources of the BEF, 
particularly its troops, as effectively as possible. Importantly, the letter does state his 
commitment to carrying out Foch’s overall aims and ‘instructions’ in the latter’s 19 
October letter.71 This is evidence that Haig continued to hold respect for Foch’s 
position and his direction, crucial to the eventual resolution of this particular 
disagreement between the two men. 
 
Haig’s concerns were taken up by Sir Henry Wilson as CIGS. An internal covering 
note 28 October 1918, attached to Haig’s letters, records that: 
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No action on this to be taken at present. 
CIGS has gone to discuss it & has a copy.72 
 
Haig was apparently unaware of this action. On 26 October Haig met the Earl of 
Derby, Britain’s Ambassador in Paris, and asked him to try and intercede via the 
French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau. He emphasised his strength of feeling 
through the threat of resignation. If his government would not support him then Haig 
intended ‘to be asked to be relieved of his command’.73 
 
27 October Haig wrote formally to Foch in terms which turned the argument into one 
which was directly linked to his authority – that the refusal to return Second Army 
directly undermined his position as Commander of the BEF.74 His letter was no doubt 
also influenced by the outcomes from the conference of allied commanders on 25 
October. There he had been a dissenting voice, as the final armistice proposals were 
in accord with the views of Foch, supported by the other commanders: ‘nothing less 
than unconditional surrender, but without actually using that phrase’.75 
 
Haig’s reasoning continued to be heavily influenced by his belief that the British Army 
was carrying the weight of the fighting and making most progress; that the French 
forces were not pulling their weight; that the increased casualty rates resulting from 
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the open and offensive warfare being waged, would mean increased complaints from 
London and exacerbate the problem of reinforcements. Elizabeth Greenhalgh has 
attributed Haig’s strength of feeling to ‘… resentment [over the British Army carrying 
the main weight of the fighting], pessimism over casualties, and jealousy [over King 
Albert making a triumphal entry into Bruges] – together with, perhaps, pique at the 
memory of having had the French First army removed from his command in August.76 
This assessment is unjustly harsh on Haig. He had shown genuine concern at the 
disproportionate share of the fighting being undertaken by British forces, which was 
increasingly evident in Second Army’s changed role within the GAF. He was also 
worried about the consequences of the casualty rate and believed that he could 
manage this more efficiently if he reassumed command of all the British Armies. This 
was also why he did not support the submission of ceasefire proposals which the 
Germans would feel unable to accept, thereby prolonging the war. The evidence of 
personal jealousies or a desire for the limelight influencing his views is limited – 
Haig’s actions and demeanour following his return to Britain after the Armistice do not 
indicate that this was a factor in his dispute with Foch. He had confirmed in writing his 
agreement to the overall authority and direction set by Foch. There were also plenty 
of times during the Hundred Days when Haig could have chosen to lead a triumphal 
British Army through a liberated major town or city. If his personal feelings were a 
contributory factor – and this is perfectly possible – then this was more likely linked to 
his perception that the British Government, and the Prime Minister in particular, 
attached more weight to Foch’s opinions and views than they did to those of Haig. For 
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example, his reaction to the faint praise in the telegram from Lloyd George on 9 
October, which was written following Foch’s report to the Prime Minister of the British 
Army’s recent victories.77  
 
With regard to Haig’s pessimism concerning the fighting abilities of the French Army, 
Greenhalgh acknowledges that while ‘relations between Degoutte and Plumer were 
said to be of the best… the Belgians were critical of the French units who were not 
fighting well’.78 
 
The degree of feeling in the dispute that arose between Haig and Foch over the 
question of Second Army can seem disproportionate unless the broader context of 
the proposed terms for the armistice is considered, alongside Haig’s assessments of 
the allied armies. Although he makes no mention of the armistice terms in his 25 
October letters,79 the crucial issue was that Second Army’s position within the GAF 
and the circumstances in Flanders, represented in microcosm Haig’s broader 
concerns about the situation on the Western Front and the state of play regarding the 
armistice discussions at that particular time.  
 
Some blame for the dispute has been directed at the GHQ staff, and CGS Lawrence, 
given the latter’s pessimistic views on continuing the war, the pressures on British 
forces, and the state of the German Army. ‘Lawrence was reported as intending to 
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oppose ‘with all his force’ the retention of Second Army under Albert’s command’.80 
Sheffield refers to Haig ‘ascribing to Foch devious political motives for keeping 
Plumer under the command of the King of the Belgians’81; he quotes Haig as viewing 
Foch’s refusal to transfer Second Army back to the BEF command as striking ‘at the 
very foundation of my [Haig’s] position’.82  
 
On 27 October, Lord Derby met at breakfast with CIGS, General Henry Wilson, and 
Secretary of State for War, Viscount Milner. The latter was able to report that the 
Cabinet supported the return of Second Army to Haig’s command and that the issue 
was to find a method acceptable to all parties for arranging this. That morning, at his 
meeting with Clemenceau, Lord Derby pursued Haig’s request. Despite confiding that 
he and Foch ‘were not on the best of terms’, Clemenceau had expressed his support 
for Haig and undertook to discuss the issue with Foch at a meeting that afternoon.83 
Haig was sceptical: 
 
[Clemenceau] would settle the question if Foch was in a reasonable mood! It 
seems that Clemenceau and Foch are not on good terms. Foch is suffering 
from a swelled head and thinks himself another Napoleon! So Clemenceau 
has great difficulties with him now.84 
                                                                                                                                                                                
79
 The letters were written on the same day as the conference of allied commanders, at which Haig had appeared 
isolated in his concerns at setting armistice terms which were close to an unconditional surrender (and which the 
Germans might therefore feel compelled to reject). 
80
 Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, p. 255. 
81
 Sheffield, The Chief, p. 332. 
82
 Sheffield, The Chief, p. 332, reference Haig’s manuscript diary 24 October 1918; Haig to Foch, 27 October 
1918, Haig’s papers 132. 
83
 Dutton, ed., Paris 1918, p. 297, diary entry for 27 October 1918. 
84
 Sheffield and Bourne, Douglas Haig War Diaries, p. 481-2. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams  
357 
 
 
Haig’s doubts reflect Derby’s conversation that morning with Clemenceau – and the 
latter duly reported back to Derby that Foch had proved to be ‘immovable’ on the 
issue.85 Foch had also complained that Haig had not supplied his reasons for the 
return of Second Army. Derby saw this point as a possible way of allowing the 
Generalissimo to maintain his authority while agreeing to Haig’s request – which now 
had the crucial support of the British government. That evening Derby and Wilson 
persuaded Haig to write ‘a private and conciliatory letter to Foch’ setting out his case 
(though Haig complained that this he had already done).86  
 
The responsibility for finally resolving the dispute is claimed by the CIGS, Henry 
Wilson, who met with Foch on 28 October to deliver Haig’s letter. Terraine describes 
how: 
 
In the end it fell to Foch’s old friend, Sir Henry Wilson, to persuade the 
Generalissimo. They met… at Foch’s headquarters. Wilson recorded: ‘I had 
rather a stormy meeting with Foch, but I think I was able to put my case 
strongly but quietly’.87 
 
Greenhalgh also believes that the ‘stormy words’ between Wilson and Foch were the 
turning point.88 In his biography of Plumer however, Powell credits Milner with 
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bringing ‘pressure to bear upon Clemenceau’ which then led to Foch conceding.89 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Haig’s subsequent report to Derby suggested that it was 
Haig’s own meeting with Foch which had delivered a ‘satisfactory’ conclusion.90  
 
Their meeting on 28 October had proved to be a cordial coming together over ‘tea 
and cakes’ initiated by Foch (though Haig pointed out that he never ‘took tea’!). The 
agreement was for Second Army to complete its pending operation to advance to the 
Scheldt, at which point command would transfer back to Haig. Despite the strong 
feelings displayed by Haig, in the end the issue was perhaps one of a lower priority 
for Foch.91  
 
In a note back to London on 29 October, Wilson, in his own inimical style, 
summarised the resolution of the dispute: 
 
The little trouble about 2nd Army is completely removed and we are sailing in a 
summer sun with steady fair and gentle breezes.92 
 
This message was relayed that same day to the War Cabinet.
93
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The one person’s views missing from this narrative are those of the Commander of 
Second Army. None of the texts make any mention of Plumer’s opinion given that 
there are no personal papers to refer to. No-one, including Haig, seems to have 
thought to consult him directly. Given his pragmatic approach to his responsibilities, 
and his loyalty to his Commander-in-Chief, it is probable that Plumer simply got on 
with the job in hand. In practical terms, the Second Army completed its drive to the 
Scheldt and then continued with preparations to assault the enemy across the river 
(offset by the German’s retirement 8-10 November). Greenhalgh concludes: ‘It is 
unlikely that Plumer’s Second Army would have done anything differently if it had 
remained under King Albert’s command in the GAF’.94  
 
Plumer had not been present at the conference of British Army commanders held on 
31 October; Second Army returned to Haig’s command four days later. 
 
At 1 p.m. on the 4th November, one hour after the Second Army had reverted 
to the command of Sir Douglas Haig, General Plumer visited him at G.H.Q. 
and received his orders to reconnoitre actively, follow the Germans with 
advanced guards if they withdrew, and be prepared to attack and cross the 
Schelde on or about the 11th November, by which date the commander of the 
Second Army said he could be ready.95 
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On 6 November Haig met with Degoutte, who was still operating as Chief of Staff to 
King Albert. The meeting discussed Haig’s proposal to force the passage of the 
Scheldt:  
 
… by my Fifth and Second Armies  on Monday next [11 November]… 
 
De Goutte quite agreed with me, and said he would co-operate on the same 
day.96   
[My emphasis]. 
 
Second Army was back within the BEF and under Haig’s command. 
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Conclusion 
 
British Second Army, on its own initiative, took the lead in the Liberation Offensive in 
Flanders in the Hundred Days. 
 
Its formations systematically assaulted a series of positions defended by well-sited 
machine guns and artillery. In part, this application of heavy weaponry reflected the 
lower number of troops available to the Germans, although the problem of units 
operating below their theoretical fighting strength also applied to Second Army.  
Similarly, both sides possessed troops of variable quality, which had implications for 
tactics and organisation. Together with the nature of the terrain being defended, the 
Germans were forced to position their defenders well forward. Previously they had 
adopted a series of defensive lines, with the British attackers forced to enter a ‘killing 
ground’ beyond a thinly-manned first line of defence. The changed situation certainly 
helped Second Army. The artillery support allowed its infantry, upon breaking through 
the first and main line of defence, to enter into open ground. It was only when the 
Germans were able to execute planned retirements that the defenders could block 
the British advance – hence the persistent emphasis in the orders issued by Plumer 
for the retreating troops to be harassed by every means possible. There are constant 
references in the British operational reports of the Germans withdrawing and of 
resistance stiffening. In this the Germans were helped considerably by the terrain. 
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The nature of the Flanders’ geography was ideally suited to defence. The Germans 
generally held higher ground with clear sight lines, particularly at the start of the 
campaign, and made very effective use of available cover and buildings. The clever 
use of demolitions also proved to be a stumbling block for attacking troops. Initially, 
the British were attacking over ground destroyed by earlier fighting. This terrain, pock-
marked by shell craters and war debris, hindered forward movement and caused 
delays in transport, supplies and supporting artillery. It provided excellent 
opportunities for creating defensive positions quickly and successfully, providing 
ample sites for machine gun nests and snipers. 
 
As the advance progressed, the British troops entered ground with which they were 
unfamiliar. Maps varied in their availability and quality; RAF reconnaissance was 
hindered by variable flying conditions. The terrain was divided by canals and rivers, 
obstacles which aided the defensive yet had to be crossed by the attackers. There 
are many examples within unit diaries and histories of river and canal crossings, 
either via careful pre-planning or hasty improvisation. In either case the actual method 
of getting troops across the water was complemented by effective tactics and 
deployment in order to secure and defend an initial bridgehead. A short example of a 
battalion operation is given in the regimental history of the Loyal North Lancs 
Regiment: 
 
At 9.30 on the 17th [October 1918] ‘B’ Company of the [2nd Battalion, Loyal 
North Lancs] crossed the river [Lys] near Royal Farm – one man at a time – by 
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means of an improvised raft, and established posts in a semi-circle covering 
the crossing place. An hour later ‘D’ Company was ordered to cross and 
advance on Lauwe, supported by Lewis Gun fire by ‘A’ [Company]; and by 
2pm Lauwe was occupied, and on the arrival of ‘C’ company a defensive flank 
was formed facing north-east between the Courtrai and Arbeke roads.1 
 
Reliable intelligence on the strength and position of the enemy, and whether the 
resistance came from retreating forces or through an established defence line, was 
also variable. The valuable ability of RAF reconnaissance to assist was regularly 
undermined by poor weather conditions – particularly significant in Flanders. Here the 
problems of rain and fog, exacerbating the difficulties of transport and 
communications, were acute on a number of occasions. What the Official History calls 
‘the usual difficulties of the supply of advancing troops’ were exacerbated by the 
Flanders terrain and climate, creating major challenges for the GAF and British 
Second Army. The roads in Flanders, already poor in terms of both quality and 
quantity, became virtually impassable in bad weather. These were totally inadequate 
for the transport requirements of Second Army, but the supply of forward troops was 
in general maintained throughout the advance, as one regimental history makes 
clear, referring to the ‘wonderful work’ of the transport services: 
 
The railhead was far behind, the roads were bad, every bridge had been 
destroyed, and he distances that had to be covered to reach [the battalion] 
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increased almost daily by about ten miles. Yet on no single occasion did the 
supply of daily rations fail to arrive.2 
 
As noted, there was heavy use of gas shells by both sides during the fighting in 
Flanders, creating a further cause for transport delay: 
 
During offensive operations, it was often necessary to cross contaminated 
ground, with all the inherent hazards such activity entailed…3 
 
Plumer’s attention to the problems of logistics led to innovative forward planning. 
Effective use was made of railway lines with these extended forward towards the new 
front line at the earliest opportunity. Units were encouraged to consider flexible 
arrangements for ensuring lines of supply, including the use of mules where 
appropriate. The supply by air of advance units cut off from support was a particular 
innovation used. 
 
Maginniss has summarised the successful logistic support of the British Army during 
the Hundred Days as ‘robust and innovative… capable of supporting an advance 
equating to an average of twenty eight miles per month’.4 These terms reflect the best 
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performance of Second Army formations, with Maginness noting that ‘… between 8-
10 November, Second Army advanced an amazing twenty-two miles’.5 
 
The pace of the advance brought its own problems. One was the fatigue of the front 
line units. British Second Army made a number of changes in troop disposition during 
the advance, in order to try and maintain a degree of freshness in its attacking forces. 
There was much emphasis upon training and in particular, being aware of the 
implications of the changed nature of the fighting taking place. However the fighting 
did fall disproportionately upon units, demonstrated by the casualty figures in the 
tables below: 
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Summary of weekly battle casualties - by Corps   
The Final Advance in Flanders 
Compiled from weekly operations reports produced by Second Army HQ  
- Source: WO 158/218 
 
Week 
commencing 
 
21 Sept 
 
28 Sept 
 
5 Oct 
 
12 Oct 
 
Formation 
 
O      OR 
 
O      OR 
 
O      OR 
 
O       OR 
Army troops - 1 - 1 1 5 1 13 
II Corps 4 145 154 1874 90 3190 95 2271 
X Corps 14 183 30 627 19 425 54 868 
XV Corps 7 168 72 1179 19 382 23 249 
XIX Corps 29 332 47 711 95 2807 46 306 
Total 54 829 303 4392 224 6869 219 3707 
 
 
Week commencing 
 
19 Oct 
 
26 Oct 
 
2/9Nov 
 
Formation 
 
O      OR 
 
O      OR 
 
O      OR 
Army troops - - 1 3 - 7 
II Corps 104 2423 81 1314 46 763 
X Corps 24 564 20 229 10 102 
XV Corps 10 164 14 93 14 232 
XIX Corps 64 1632 55 1133 46 754 
Total 212 4679 172 2772 116 1958 
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Summary of total battle casualties – Second Army 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
Compiled from weekly operations reports produced by Second Army HQ  
- Source: WO 158/218 
 
 
Formation 
Total battle casualties 
21 Sept – 15 November 1918 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
 O OR 
Army Corps 3 30 
II Corps 574 11980 
X Corps 171 2998 
XV Corps 159 2467 
XIX Corps 382 7675 
TOTAL 1289 25150 
 
 
The units serving under II Corps, operating on the left wing of the Army and alongside 
Belgian or French forces, bore the heaviest load. The following message was sent to 
the 36th Division, by Lieutenant-General Jacob of II Corps, following the Battles of 
Ypres and Courtrai: 
 
The 36th (Ulster) Division has been fighting continuously since the 28th 
September in the operations in FLANDERS. The spirit, dash and initiative 
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shown by all ranks have been splendid and beyond all praise. The leadership 
displayed by… Commanders could not have been better. The conditions under 
which the men have had to fight have been and still are very trying, but nothing 
seems to stop [the] Division...6 
 
This particular role of II Corps was also recognised at an even higher level, reflecting 
the importance of the contact point during operations between Second Army and the 
Belgian or French forces to its left: 
 
Marshal FOCH visited the Army Commander today and asked him to send his 
congratulations to the II Corps and to the 9th, 29th and 36th Divisions for their 
splendid work in the operations since the 14th October…7 
 
The variable strength on paper of the units comprising Second Army, and issues such 
as the reconstituted divisions and the nature of the replacement troops,8 has been 
described in Chapter Two. However, it is also evident that the three divisions which 
fought under II Corps for the two principal battles, 9th (Scottish), 36th (Ulster) and 29th 
(the one Regular Army Division), were of proven ability. Terraine described them as 
                                                         
6
 Written into: TNA WO95/2504, War Diary of 108 Infantry Brigade, 23
rd
 October; the message continues: When 
the history is written of what the Division has done in FLANDERS during the past month it will prove to be a 
record of magnificent fighting and wonderful progress, for during this period an advance has been made of about 
25 miles over the worst of the country and under the heaviest machine gun fire ever experienced in this war. This 
advance has entailed constant fighting but the 36
th
 Division has overcome every obstacle and has proved itself 
one of the best fighting divisions in the Army, well commanded and well staffed. 
7
 Written into: TNA WO95/2504, War Diary of 108 Infantry Brigade, 23
rd
 October. 
8
 Writing a few years after the end of the war, G.A.B. Dewar pointed out that ‘… the six British divisions which 
took the main part in the Flanders offensive on the British side had suffered in the period between March 21 and 
July 15, 1918, an average of 6250 casualties per division’: Dewar, Haig’s Command Vol. II, p. 337, note 1. 
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‘…three very good divisions indeed’.9 It was by design that these formations bore the 
brunt of the fighting at the centre of the coalition force and proved capable of 
punching through the main centre of German resistance east of Ypres and 
subsequently through Courtrai. 
 
It has been calculated that the ten divisions of Second Army registered an average 
success rate of 55.7 per cent for opposed attacks during the Final Advance in 
Flanders. For comparison purposes, the success rates during the Hundred Days for 
the British divisions in Third (seventeen) and Fourth (nine) Armies were 64.4% and 
70.7% respectively. The lower rate for Second Army can be explained by the 
identified problems for logistics and artillery support as a consequence of the weather 
and terrain; together with the strength of enemy resistance associated with the 
strategic importance of the Channel coast for the German command. Allowance 
should also be made for the overall weaker composition of Second Army at the start 
of the campaign, although two of the Divisions rebuilt from cadre (30th and 34th) were 
amongst its most successful. It should also be noted that of the seven British 
Divisions which had an outright failure rate of 25% or more, only one (41st Division) 
was with Second Army.
10
 
 
                                                         
9
 Terraine, To Win A War, p. 203. 
10
 For an analysis of the performance of British Divisions during the Hundred Days, and the supporting 
methodology for the calculation of ‘success rates’, see P. Simkins, ‘Co-Stars or Supporting Cast?: British 
Divisions in the ‘Hundred Days’, 1918’, in P. Griffith, ed., British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London: 
Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 50-69. The same author has highlighted the turnaround in the performance of the 35
th
 
Division, which was one of the more successful Second Army Divisions during the final campaign, despite a 
previous history of problems and failures – key to this was the opportunity to plan and carry out a series of 
attacks as a complete Division (P. Simkins, ‘Each One A Pocket Hercules: The Bantam Experiment and the Case 
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Within Second Army, the average success rate was equalled or bettered by the 30th, 
34th, 35th and 36th Divisions and, most notably, by the remarkable 9th (Scottish) 
Division; the latter was shown to have had a success rate of 93% against opposition, 
making it the third most successful of all the British Divisions on the Western Front.11 
It is notable that these five Divisions were deployed across the Second Army front 
and not concentrated in one or two Corps. 
 
Second Army also made the best use of the troop resources available to it. Hence the 
solid performance of 40th Division, a scratch formation made up from Garrison Guard 
Battalions, deemed ‘semi-mobile’, and initially only capable of holding a quiet sector 
of the line. For most of the campaign it secured the Army’s right flank, ensuring that 
touch was maintained with 59th Division, Fifth Army. While not involved in a major set-
piece attack, its patrols and advance guards continually harassed the retreating 
Germans, and took every opportunity to push forward through weakening defences 
up to and eventually beyond the Scheldt. As part of XV Corps, it helped provide the 
firm pivot for Second Army to swing round upon the enemy’s defence line. 
 
The issue of the high casualty rates in the Hundred Days campaign, affecting all the 
British armies involved including Second Army, should be placed in context. The 
nature of the fighting is that of a modern war, a war of movement with the killing being 
carried out by a plethora of large and small machines, dwarfing the exposed 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of the 35
th
 Division’, in Sanders Marble, ed., Scraping The Barrel: The Military Use of Substandard Manpower 
1860-1960 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), pp. 79-104). 
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infantryman. In considering the high troop losses, the common perception re-emerges 
of failings by senior commanders; comparison is also made with the lower overall 
British casualty figures for the Second World War. On closer examination a different 
picture emerges. Max Hastings points out that: 
 
Much-diminished Western allied losses [in 1939-45] reflected not better 
leadership than that of the earlier conflict [1914-18], but the fact that the 
second time around, the Russians bore the overwhelming burden of necessary 
sacrifice. On the only occasion that a large Anglo-American army went head to 
head with the Wehrmacht on a limited front, in Normandy in 1944, some 
infantry rates of loss were briefly comparable with those of 1916, until the 
German line was broken and Eisenhower’s armies could exploit their terrific 
mobile capacity, such as did not exist in World War I.12 
 
The different character of the two Wars, as experienced by the British Army, is 
explored by Corrigan: 
 
From beginning to end of the First war, the bulk of the British army was fighting 
the main enemy in the main theatre of war (the Western Front)…  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
11
 This 93% success rate for 9
th
 Division was greater than the average success rate for the Dominion divisions: 
72.5%, (four Canadian Divisions), 70.7% (five Australian Divisions), 64.5% (New Zealand Division). Simkins, 
‘British Divisions’, p.56. 
12
 M. Hastings, Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War in 1914 (London: William Collins, 2013), pp. 551-2. 
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In terms of men deployed, and in the intensity of the fighting, the British army 
was far less involved in the Second War… 
 
Hence British army casualties between 1939 and 1945 were considerably less 
than those between 1914 and 1918, and miniscule compared to those of the 
Russian army, which spent most of the Second War fighting the main enemy 
on land.13 
 
John Ellis has shown that when allowance is made for the smaller share of British 
troops in World War II who were deployed in combat units, compared with the 
situation in World War I, the casualty rates for each War become very similar.14  
 
…Most fighting in World War II [by British and USA forces] was done by a 
remarkably small proportion of troops whose casualties were very high…  
 
If you were an officer, the outlook was even bleaker…  
… in World War II [officer casualties] tended to be proportionately higher than 
in World War I.
15
 
 
                                                         
13
 Corrigan, Mud, Blood, p.70; he points out that between the evacuation of the British Army from Europe in 
1940 and the Normandy invasion of 1944, British forces were deployed in theatres such as North Africa, Crete 
and the Far East, where they did not face the main body of the German Army. In this section of his book, pp. 52-
72, he seeks to debunk the common myth of  ‘the lost generation’ resulting from the casualty figures for the First 
World War. 
14
 J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World War II (London: David & Charles, 1980), pp. 156-
169; Ellis also lists key actions and battles during World War II which involved very high casualty rates for the 
British combat units involved – examples include certain actions at the Battle of El Alamein, assaults during the 
Italian campaign and at the Anzio beachhead. 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams 
373 
 
Second World War casualty rates were also reduced through advances in medical 
science.16 
 
In general it can be shown that: 
 
Being issued with a rifle and being told to close with the enemy was about as 
dangerous during World War II as during World War I.17 
 
As Sheffield concludes: 
 
In 1945, as in 1918, high intensity warfare took a fearful toll of soldiers’ lives.18 
 
Most Second Army units were not at effective strength. The end of month figures for 
12th Battalion Norfolk Regiment (31st Division) are one example:19 
   Officers   Other Ranks 
30 June  36  780 
31 July  40  956 
31 August  29  786 
30 September 36  784 
31 October  42  800 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
15
 Ellis, The Sharp End, pp. 162-4. 
16
 Ellis, The Sharp End, pp. 170-2; the key areas of  medical progress were antibiotics (penicillin and sulpha-
drugs) and the use of blood transfusions. 
17
 S. Bungay, Alamein (London: Aurum Press, 2003; original hardback edition, 2002), p. 199. 
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This study has looked at the quality of the troops making up the formations in Second 
Army. In the event their performance seems to have surprised and impressed their 
commanders, given many of them were young conscripts or men re-classified as fit 
for front line duty from other deployments. Brigadier-General Pereira (GOC, 43 
Brigade), in his subsequent report on the opening day of the Battle of Ypres, referred 
to: 
 
… the fine fighting spirit of the men. Although looked down on before the fight 
as ‘B’ men, of an inferior type to the ‘A’ men they showed all the energy, 
keenness and fighting spirit of ‘A’ men, and though they may not be physically 
capable of undergoing the same hardships for a long strain, I feel the utmost 
confidence in them, and that, if some allowance is made for physical 
disabilities by giving them more rest than the ‘A’ men they will hold their own 
with the latter when it comes to fighting.20 
 
In 1927 one writer commented: 
 
In view of the results attained [by Second Army during the final campaign] the 
spirit, the fitness, and the power of endurance of all ranks had proved to be 
remarkable. The more remarkable when we remember that the forces had 
                                                                                                                                                                                
18
 Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 230. 
19
 Records of 31
st
 Division, TNA WO95/2366. 
20
 42 Brigade, Report on Operations September 28
th
 1918 (from TNA WO95/1876 War Diary of 14
th
 Division: 
General Staff). 
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been bled white five months before, and the ranks were filled up with recruits, 
many being mere boys.21 
 
In his study of a particular draft of conscripts, Tim Lynch has shown that,  
 
There is a tendency to assume that by this stage of the war the ranks were 
filled with war-weary volunteers and reluctant conscripts waiting only for the 
end of the war but, with no end in sight, the men arriving at the front could still 
show high levels of motivation.22 
 
Lynch concludes that: 
 
… the war-winning army of 1918 was largely made up of teenage conscripts 
who formed the largest force Britain had ever put into the field and, at that 
time, the most professional and capable army it had ever known. Despite 
devastating losses, battalions of soldiers who in 1917 would have been 
regarded as too young to serve formed and re-formed to keep pressing home 
the attack and never lost cohesion, never followed the examples of the French, 
Russian and German armies by mutinying, and never lost their motivation to 
fight.23 
 
                                                         
21
 Brice, The Battle Book of Ypres, p. 49. 
22
 T. Lynch, They Did Not Grow Old: Teenage Conscripts on the Western Front, 1918 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: 
Spellmount (The History Press), 2013), p. 202. 
23
 Lynch, Teenage Conscripts, p. 230. 
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Corrigan has concluded that the conscripts ‘made a vital contribution to the war’.24 
There does not appear to have been any conflict between the existing troops and the 
new arrivals, despite the different origin of their service: 
 
As men arrived in their units the exigencies of war, shared by all, volunteer and 
conscript alike, soon welded men together into one battalion family…25  
 
The scrutiny of war diaries for this study supports these conclusions on the 
performance of British troops in 1918. The records show that field commanders had 
mastered the necessary tactics to harness the potential of the combined arms 
available to them – and that their troops, volunteer or conscript, veteran or teenager, 
had the training and commitment to make the model work on the battlefield. 
 
Second Army troops also had to cope with unfamiliar terrain and adapt to a type of 
warfare with which they were unfamiliar. As the advance proceeded, the increasing 
number of civilians in the area, liberated and remaining in situ, or taking the 
opportunity to move to other areas, hindered the operation of artillery (due to the risk 
of civilian casualties) and exacerbated the problems of movement on the roads. It 
was also necessary to bring forward additional supplies for the many civilians who 
faced starvation.26 
 
                                                         
24
 Corrigan, Mud, Blood, p.74. 
25
 Corrigan, Mud, Blood, p.74. 
26
 Falls, 36
th
 (Ulster) Division, p. 279. 
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British Second Army had no tanks (though use was made of French tanks towards 
the end of October), and therefore relied heavily upon the effectiveness of its artillery. 
The use of a creeping and/or rolling barrage, linked to counter-battery neutralisation 
of enemy artillery sites, and the targeting of key defensive positions and 
communications links, were all regular features of attacks. For the British forces in the 
GAF, there was rarely any preliminary bombardment, in order to maximise the 
potential of surprise. Second Army Artillery Instructions No 1, 20 September 1918, 
authored by Lt-Col C R Newman, referred to the importance of preserving secrecy, 
and gave as an example, the successful attack on the Clercken-Paschendaele ridge 
in September 1918. 
 
Attacks usually took place before dawn, to take advantage of early mist as a means 
of evading the full impact of enemy machine guns. Plumer frequently insisted upon 
the use of smoke shells as a means to provide as much screening as possible for his 
infantry. Gas shells were used to disorientate the defenders. Feint attacks were 
staged in order to try and identify enemy positions and forecast the likely response to 
an assault. 
 
The range of the original artillery barrage often limited the length of the initial 
advance. We regularly see Second Army making contingency plans to bring forward 
supporting artillery with the initial attack, in order that advance forces can 
subsequently push onto second and third objectives during the course of a day. 
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The war diary of 7/Seaforth Highlanders for 25 October includes words of praise for 
the field artillery of 9th Division, highlighting the: 
 
accurate and effective  shooting… always come as far forward as possible… 
[enthusing the infantry by] coming into action beside them.27 
 
However the German policy of putting the majority of its defenders in the front line did 
mean that once this was broken through then the attackers could then manoeuvre 
over more open ground. We then see the application of small unit tactics, with local 
commanders using their initiative to exploit the initial breakthrough. Increasingly the 
nature of the fighting became localised to individual farms and villages. British troops 
became engaged in forms of what can be termed ‘street-fighting’ more familiar in 
subsequent conflicts. The British were able to deploy their sections of infantry, 
equipped with rifles, grenades, Lewis guns and small mortars, to good effect.  
 
The evidence presented in this study has shown various examples of the infantry 
unit’s art of attack. Lynch provides a very clear picture of assault tactics in operation: 
 
In order to make the best use of the firepower available to them, every section 
needed to be able to work together to concentrate their fire at the same time. 
Once in position, the men would open with a fierce volley of all weapons to try 
to gain fire superiority over the defenders. Usually this would lead to an equally 
fierce response followed by a slackening of the fire by both sides as the initial 
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shock wore off, then by bursts from one side, then the other. It was up to the 
platoon commander to judge the level of fire coming from the defenders so that 
when he felt that their response was slackening (because of casualties or 
weapons failures, for example), he would order the riflemen into the final 
assault as the Lewis gunners and rifle bombers kept up covering fire. If the 
attack was successful, it would be necessary to regroup and make ready to 
defend against a possible counter-attack, and to be aware of what was 
happening to the platoons to either side and be prepared to assist them if 
necessary.28 
 
Much of the campaign was of a stop-start nature, with British units pursuing a 
withdrawing enemy to the point where the latter would turn and attempt to halt the 
advance, mainly through machine gun fire and artillery barrages. This pattern of 
manoeuvre can be termed ‘staccato’,29 to reflect the stop-start rhythm of the advance 
as troops met apparently unlinked and unpredictable points of resistance. The result 
was the frequent pauses made by the advance troops of Second Army, before fire 
support or flank deployments could be carried out. The following comments are from 
a summary of the campaign by 107 Brigade (36
th
 Division, II Corps), covering the 
period 28 September to 28 October 1918: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
27
 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders. 
28
 Lynch, Teenage Conscripts, pp. 180-1. 
29
 Staccato… with each sound or note sharply detached or separated from the others (Concise Oxford  
Dictionary). 
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The operations were of a trying and exhausting nature. Opposition chiefly met 
was machine gun fire, against which our Infantry showed courage and fighting 
qualities of a high order. 
The constant movement, entailing ‘digging in’ in many cases, was a test of 
endurance of a severe nature, and all ranks ‘carried on’ in a manner indicative 
of a high morale and confidence in our superiority over the enemy.30 
 
The need for devolved command was crucial in this more fluid type of warfare. 
Second Army continually emphasised the need to keep close up to the enemy as he 
retreated: 
 
[The Army had the] policy of harassing the Germans without intermission, even 
though the main advance might be temporarily held up owing to the difficulty of 
getting supplies forward across the devastated regions in the wake of the 
pursuers, and the desire to avoid needless casualties. These harassing tactics, 
in the conditions of open warfare now prevailing, gave ample scope for 
initiative and skill on the part of company and platoon commanders…31 
 
Other steps taken to support the infantry included the forward use of field guns, taking 
on machine gun nest over open sights. This was only possible due to the effective 
neutralisation of enemy artillery, and through the exercise of initiative on the ground 
                                                         
30
 TNA WO95/2502/1, War Diary of 107 Infantry Brigade,  Narrative of Operations carried out by the 107
th
 Inf. 
Bde. 28.9.1918. to 28.10.1918., (signed off by the Brigade Commander). 
31
 Whalley-Kelly, Ich Dien, p. 66. 
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by Battalion and Company commanders. Peter Simkins has emphasised the obvious 
point that: 
 
The BEF’s ability in the ‘Hundred Days’ to overcome such a wide variety of 
tactical obstacles and challenges – ranging from set-piece operations to street 
fighting and canal crossings on improvised rafts – would simply not have been 
possible without good junior leadership.32  
 
These ‘obstacles and challenges’ had confronted Second Army, requiring variations 
in the tactics adopted. In his study of Third Army,33 also made up of British formations 
(plus the New Zealand Division), Jonathan Boff concludes that it was ‘diversity and 
flexibility, rather… than a set ‘formula for success’’ which led to that Army’s 
achievements.34 While there are many common features to the successful attacks 
made by Second Army during the Flanders offensive, its front line officers also had to 
make immediate and practical decisions in response to changing circumstances.35  
 
The campaign also saw close co-ordination between the arms of infantry, artillery and 
RAF. This was not always successful, mainly due to the impact of weather and 
terrain, and frustrated by the limited technical developments in communications. 
                                                         
32
 Simkins, ‘British Divisions’, p.65. 
33
 J. Boff, ‘Combined Arms During the Hundred Days Campaign, August-November 1918’, War in History, 
2010, 17(4), pp. 459-477, online at  http://wih.sagepub.com/content/17/4/459. 
34
 Boff, ‘Combined Arms’, p. 477. 
35
 It should be noted that there were some particular differences between the circumstances of Second and Third 
Armies, requiring of a longer and more considered discussion. Briefly, Third Army (the largest of the British 
Armies) was twice the size of Second Army; it had regular access to support from the Tank Corps (when Second 
Army units had support from French tanks this was largely a success); there were some variations over the course 
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When this co-operation could take place the results were a successful attack, and 
fewer casualties. The numerical superiority enjoyed by the RAF was a significant 
advantage, when the weather allowed. Writing to Plumer after the Battle of Ypres, 
Gillain emphasised the valuable support provided to the Belgian Army by Second 
Army artillery and the ‘glorious and fruitful exploits’ of the RAF.36  
 
Advance infantry units were frequently reinforced by sections of support weapons to 
provide direct fire support when facing strengthened enemy positions. This combined 
arms approach was a regular feature of operation by Second Army and the other 
formations within the BEF; it would be commonplace in the Second World War. The 
exact arrangements and the command and control structures to manage the 
deployment were varied between different battalions, brigades or divisions. The most 
radical organisation was that of ‘Brigade Groups’, implemented by 30th Division during 
the Battle of Courtrai. Each group comprised the brigade’s three infantry battalions 
together with units drawn from division support arms; under the overall command of, 
and named for, the brigade commander. Such a formation would subsequently be 
more commonly recognised and described as a Battlegroup. A more typical 
arrangement was to deploy one or more support weapons’ teams with a company or 
battalion for a particular operation or period of time; with orders detailing the 
respective command and reporting responsibilities of the infantry and support units’ 
commanders. For instance, in the same battle, 120 Brigade had a Stokes mortar 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of both Armies’ campaigns with regard to the terrain features encountered and the consequent organisation of the 
German defences.  
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team attached to each of its battalions;37 there are many similar examples quoted 
throughout this study. 
 
As part of an Army Group, and officially subordinate to Belgian (or, in practice, 
French) control, Plumer was not able to operate independently. However, despite its 
initial role of flank guard, the performance of the Second Army was such that it 
subsequently became the strike force for the GAF. In this the Army was not assisted 
by the command arrangements – it became clear very quickly that Plumer had no 
confidence in Degoutte, the French Chief of Staff, and looked to follow his own 
informed instincts in plotting the deployment and operations of his Army; while ever 
mindful of securing outcomes that supported the coalition forces operating to his left. 
During the Battle of Ypres, Powell comments that ‘The fatuous orders that emanated 
from Degoutte’s headquarters continued to plague Plumer’.38 Despite this, the 
evidence indicates that King Albert developed a strong confidence in his British ally, 
much of this due to the assistance provided to the Belgian Army at both operational 
and planning levels. The British forces impressed their allies at both command level 
and in the field. 
 
Within the war diary of 15/West Yorkshires (31st Division) there is a copy of a letter 
passed down from HQ Second Army via brigade, for the attention of all troops. Dated 
3 October 1918, it is from Major-General Gillain, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army, to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
36
 Letter from Chief of Staff, Belgian Army to General Plumer, British Second Army, 3 October 1918; a copy is 
included with the War Diary of 15
th
 Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment (Prince Of Wales’ Own Regiment of 
Yorkshire Museum). Translated into English from the original French. 
37
 TNA W095/2610, War Diary of 120 Infantry Brigade, Brigade Instructions No. 3, 7
th
 October 1918. 
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General Plumer, following the cessation of the Battle of Ypres.39 It is quite long, the 
type fills an A4 page, and it pays warm tribute to the performance of the British forces 
during the battle. The cooperation between II Corps (on the Belgian right flank) and 
the Belgian forces is acknowledged and General Jacob is named. The support of 
British artillery and the RAF is also acknowledged. The length and tone of the letter 
goes well beyond that required for the sake of formality. It suggests genuine feelings 
of gratitude and respect from the Belgians for their British allies and their leader. 
 
Philpott has praised the success of the coalition: 
 
Although the Flanders offensive was not without friction in the field and behind 
the lines, after four years’ experience this was easily overcome, and in 
comparison with what had gone before the offensive must be seen as a model 
of allied military cooperation.40 
 
When considering the strength and quality of the enemy facing Second Army and the 
GAF, there are conflicting factors to consider. In general, the advantages presented 
by the weather and terrain to troops on the defensive, allied to the heavy small arms 
and artillery available, offset to a considerable degree the disadvantages of variable 
troop quality and lower troop numbers of the German forces in Flanders. It is 
important to stress that British Second Army was itself beset with problems of troop 
                                                                                                                                                                                
38
 Powell, Plumer, p. 275. 
39
 Letter from Chief of Staff, Belgian Army to General Plumer, British Second Army, 3 October 1918; a copy is 
included with the War Diary of 15
th
 Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment (Prince Of Wales’ Own Regiment of 
Yorkshire Museum). Translated into English from the original French. 
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quality and the rate of casualties during the campaign meant that obtaining 
replacements was a continual headache. The problems of transport and supply, and 
the ongoing challenge of attempting to move artillery forward to support infantry 
attacks further beset the Army. At the strategic level, the Army had to conform to 
coalition requirements, and to plan and pace its advance with its allied neighbours. All 
this, whilst adjusting to a new form of warfare. Casualty lists were high but this does 
not appear in general to result from failures in planning or command. This was a 
product of the firepower available to the armies of this time, and the lack of 
technology to counter this.  
 
We know that Haig was firm in his view that the opportunity to agree an armistice 
should be seized. He believed that German resistance would only stiffen as the Allies 
approached the borders of Germany, with consequent loss of life for allied troops; not 
to mention the destruction that warfare leaves in its wake. It is unlikely that Second 
Army could have sustained its advance, not least because of the high casualty rate 
and the likelihood of increasing logistical difficulties as winter weather approached. 
Progress would have required the close co-operation of the fresher Belgian Army, as 
the latter became more familiar with the tactical and operational demands of open 
warfare in 1918. However, King Albert would not have been prepared to allow the 
increasing death toll of soldiers, and civilians too, alongside the laying waste of much 
of his country as enemy defence solidified in advance of the borders of Germany. The 
World War II experience would support such conclusions. 
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 W. J. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front 1914-18 (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1996), p. 159. 
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However, it is to Second Army’s credit that it found various ways of addressing or 
coping with the majority of the problems which confronted it during the Hundred Days. 
In early 1918 Plumer is quoted as complaining that his troops ‘are untrained, with 
indifferent officers and although as brave as possible they simply don’t know their 
business’.41 This was not the case during the final months of the war. During this 
period the techniques and set-piece operations of Second Army became routinely 
successful - its advance progressed in an almost irresistible manner. There is no 
doubt that, as Peter Simkins concludes: 
 
The circumstances in Flanders in the autumn of 1918 allowed ‘a rolling series 
of limited-objective and all-arms attacks to be conducted on an almost daily 
basis. As a leading proponent and practitioner of [such tactics], Plumer surely 
deserves considerable credit for his contribution to the BEF’s ‘learning curve’ 
and his part in the eventual German defeat’.42  
 
David Stevenson notes that the success of the ‘Flanders offensive’, within the series 
of allied attacks at the end of September, was ‘particularly impressing’ to the German 
military command.43 Nick Lloyd points out that the breakthrough at Ypres on 28 
September, following allied victories to the south, was the final blow for the German 
Chief of Staff, Ludendorff. He finally came to recognise that the German Army faced 
defeat and that an armistice must be actively pursued: 
                                                         
41
 Wilson, Diary, 17 April 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM. 
42
 Simkins, Herbert Plumer, p. 159. 
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The heavy British attacks around Cambrai and the crossing of the Canal du 
Nord were bad enough, but now his northern flank had been broken and there 
seemed little in the way to prevent the Allies from liberating all of Belgium… 
 
The breakthrough in Flanders seems to have been the point at which 
Ludendorff’s will broke.44 
 
Terraine has pointed out the strategic importance of the taking of Courtrai and the 
wheel eastwards of Second Army’s right flank, which offered the prospect of taking 
the key city of Lille (but with the French Government seriously concerned at the 
prospect of the city suffering the devastation of a fight to take it):  
 
The good progress of the Second Army now made possible a further advance 
by… Fifth Army, which linked King Albert’s Army Group in Flanders to Haig’s in 
the centre… Plumer’s success on the 14th [October] carried the Second Army 
well past the Lille fortifications, and Prince Rupprecht at once authorized 
withdrawal…45 
 
The Battle of Courtrai, whilst virtually ignored in the historiography of the Hundred 
Days, delivered a number of strategic gains both for the GAF and the allied armies 
generally, making a wider contribution towards the winning of the war. On 17 October, 
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British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918           Dennis Williams 
388 
 
Second Army liberated the important industrial towns of Turcoiing and Roubaix 
(north-east of Lille). On the same day, the Belgian Army cleared the port of Ostend, a 
place of symbolic importance to its country, which also released an important new 
route for the delivery of supplies (though the harbour was found to be blocked and 
port installations damaged). Two days later, Second Army took Courtrai itself, while 
the Belgians finally secured Bruges. This victory, together with the capture that day of 
Zeebrugge, meant that the northern coastline was finally liberated.46 Terraine has 
written vividly of the scale of the achievement: 
 
The great goal of the Flanders offensive of 1917 was gained, the U-boat bases 
were abandoned, and the Allied left could rest upon the Dutch frontier, which 
was, in fact, reached next day. More than 12,000 prisoners and 550 guns had 
been taken by King Albert’s Group since 14 October – about half of the 
prisoners and over 200 guns by the British Second Army. Belgium was 
becoming a country again, and the raptures of the people of Bruges when their 
king returned revealed the failure of the German attempt to exploit the divisions 
of Flemings and Walloons…47 
 
There is another dimension regarding Plumer’s handling of the campaign that is 
worthy of note. Much has been written regarding the influence of Haig on the planning 
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and management of operations by his Army commanders throughout the war.48 
Bidwell and Graham summarise the position as: 
 
Haig insisted that the commander at each level was entirely responsible for 
making tactical plans within the framework of his [Haig’s] own general 
scheme… The channel of communication between GHQ and the Armies that it 
directed was further impeded by Haig’s tendency to be inarticulate in 
describing his plans and to overawe not only his subordinate commanders by 
brusqueness but also his own staff.49 
 
Chapter Two referred to Haig’s refusal to support Plumer’s initial plan to attack 
directly towards Wytschaete and Messines. However, once placed within the Army 
Group and subject to a different chain of command, Plumer was able to carry out his 
planning, strategy and tactics, largely free from the influence of Haig. Such 
opportunities had not been possible during Messines and the subsequent battles of 
Autumn 1917; or in the resistance to the German assault in Spring 1918. The 
evidence is that he welcomed and exploited this freedom, particularly once he felt 
confident in the abilities of his troops. Given his dissatisfaction with the leadership and 
staff work within the GAF, these feelings of independence allowed Plumer to direct 
his part of the campaign along strategic lines that he had determined. He was also in 
the position of believing himself able to fall back upon the support of Haig, given 
                                                         
48
 There is not the space to open the debate here and it would have to include a very long list of commentators; 
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Haig’s suspicion of both the French and Belgian priorities for the campaign in 
Flanders, should there be any significant challenge to his approach. Thus it can be 
concluded that the achievements of Second Army, in terms of strategy and tactics, 
were very much the result of Plumer’s leadership. 
 
Summarising Second Army performance during the October phase of operations, 
Gary Sheffield acknowledges that while ‘Plumer’s role was to protect the flank of the 
Belgians… the French proved sluggish…’ whereupon: 
 
Plumer interpreted his orders liberally and drove on over the Lys, eventually 
taking Courtrai on the 19th. This helped trigger a German retreat to the south… 
Orders were given [by Ludendorff] to hold on to the Belgian coast… as 
bargaining chips in negotiations to end the war… 
With that hope dashed, Ludendorff ordered the evacuation of these areas, 
suddenly no longer militarily tenable. The German decision to abandon the 
coast meant that Britain had achieved one of the principal aims for which it had 
gone to war in the first place.50          [My emphases]. 
 
The victories of Second Army during the Hundred Days were far, far more than the 
beating of an already defeated enemy. They represent successes which should rank 
as some of the finest within the annals of the British Army. 
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British Army acronyms and abbreviations used in this paper 
 
Note: For numbering the different units of the British Army I have in general applied the convention of alternating 
at each level between ordinal and integer numbers, with roman numerals for corps, full spelling for armies, i.e. 1
st
 
Battalion, 2 Brigade, 3
rd
 Division, IV Corps, Fifth Army. I may slip from this convention on occasion, for example 
when quoting from a source. 
 
AA  Anti-Aircraft 
AADC  Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander 
AA and QMG Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General 
ADC  Aide de Camp 
AD Signals Assistant Director Signals 
ADVS  Assistant Director Vetinary Services 
ASC  Army Service Corps 
BGGS  Brigadier General General Staff 
BGRA  Brigadier General Royal Artillery 
CE  Chief Engineer 
CHA  Commander Heavy Artillery 
CinC  Commander in Chief 
DA and QMG Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General 
DDMS  Deputy Director Medical Services 
DDOS  Deputy Director Ordnance Services 
DDR  Deputy Director Remounts 
DDS  Deputy Director Signals 
DDST  Deputy Director Supply and Transport 
DMS  Director of Medical Services 
DDVS  Deputy Director Veterinary Services 
GAF  Groupe d’Armees des Flandres (Army Group, Flanders) 
GHQ  General Headquarters 
GOC  General Officer Commanding 
HQ  Headquarters 
MGGS  Major General General Staff 
MGRA  Major-General Royal Artillery 
MT  Mechanical Transport 
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer 
RA  Royal Artillery 
RE  Royal Engineers 
RGA  Royal Garrison Artillery 
RHA  Royal Horse Artillery 
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A1 British Second Army Order of Battle: The German Offensive in Flanders  
The Battles of the Lys: 09 – 29 April 1918 
 
GOC     General Sir H C O Plumer* 
 
Major-General General Staff Major-General J S J Percy 
 
  IX Corps 
 
  XV Corps 
 
  XXII Corps 
 
  4 Tank Brigade – 4th, 5th and 13th Tank Battalions (Lewis Guns) 
 
  French XXXVI Corps 
 
  French II Cavalry Corps  
 
* From 13 November 1917 until 10 March 1918 Plumer was CinC of British forces in Italy; General Sir H S 
Rawlinson was CinC of Second Army during this period. Second Army was designated Fourth Army on 20  
December 1917. Plumer resumed command on 13 March 1918 and it was redesignated Second Army on 17 March 
1918.  
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(1) The Battle of Messines 1918: 10 – 11 April 1918 
 
  
 
IX Corps 
 
  9
th
 Division     19
th
 Division 
 
  25
th
 Division*     49
th
 Division   
   
  62
nd
 Brigade (21
st
 Division) 
 
  88 Brigade (29
th
 Division) 
 
  100 Brigade (33
rd
 Division) (11 April) 
 
  108 Brigade (36
th
 Division) 
 
 
  * less 74 Brigade 
 
 
   
(1A) The Loss of Hill 63: 10 – 11 April 1918 
 
IX Corps 
 
7 Brigade (25
th
 Division) 
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(2) The Battle of Hazebrouck: 12 - 15 April 1918 
 
IX Corps 
 
  33
rd
 Division     34
th
 Division** 
 
XV Corps* 
 
31
st
 Division     34
th
 Division** 
 
40
th
 Division     50
th
 Division** 
 
1
st
 Australian Division** 
 
86, 87 Brigades (29
th
 Division) 
 
Composite Brigade (39
th
 Division) 
- composite force (Schools, Pioneers, Entrenching, Refit Battalions) 
 
2
nd
 Cavalry Division (Reserve) 
 
*Transferred from First Army to Second Army with effect from noon 12 April 1918 
 
**0800 on 12 April 1918: 50th Division transferred from XV Corps to XI Corps, First Army 
     1800 on 12 April 1918: 34
th
 Division transferred from XV Corps to IX Corps 
     12 and 13 April 1918: 1
st
 Australian Division transferred from Fourth Army to XV Corps 
 
 
 
(2A) The Defence of Nieppe Forest: 12 - 15 April 1918 
 
XV Corps 
 
29
th
 Division      31
st
 Division   
   
1
st
 Australian Division 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918                Dennis Williams  
Appendix A    Orders of Battle:       British Second Army: 13 March – 11 November 1918  
                                                            Belgian, French and German forces: September-November 1918 
 
9 
 
(3) The Battle of Bailleul: 13 - 15 April 1918 
 
IX Corps 
 
  19
th
 Division      25
th
 Division 
 
  34
th
 Division     49
th
 Division 
 
  59
th
 Division 
 
  71 Brigade (6
th
 Division) 
 
  South African Brigade (9
th
 Division) 
   
  88 Brigade (29
th
 Division) 
 
  100 Brigade (33
rd
 Division) 
 
  108 Brigade (36
th
 Division) 
 
XXII Corps 
 
  9
th
 Division 
   
  62 Brigade (21
st
 Division) 
   
  4 Tank Brigade – 5th Tank Battalion (Lewis Guns) 
 
 
(3A) Tactical Incident: The Defence of Neuve Eglise 
 
 
IX Corps 
 
 100 Brigade (33
rd
 Division) 
 
 148 Brigade (49
th
 Division) 
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(4) The First Battle of Kemmel Ridge: 17 - 19 April 1918 
 
 
IX Corps 
 
  19
th
 Division      25
th
 Division  
 
33
rd
 Division     34
th
 Division  
 
49
th
 Division (less 146
th
 Brigade)  59
th
 Division 
 
  71 Brigade (6
th
 Division) 
   
  89 Brigade (30
th
 Division) 
 
  108 Brigade (36
th
 Division) 
 
  Wyatt’s Force 
- under Brigadier General L J Wyatt (116 Brigade, 34th Division) 
- approximately 1500 strong (1400 rifles and 12 machine guns) 
- hastily formed from various units (IX Corps Details) from 13 April 
 
James’ Force 
- under Brigadier General C H L James (177 Brigade) 
- approximately 2,000 strong, from 59th Division 
- served from 16-19 April under 49th Division 
 
XXII Corps 
 
  9
th
 Division     21
st
 Division  
 
  Composite Brigade (39
th
 Division) 
 
  146 Brigade (49
th
 Division) 
 
  4 Tank Brigade – 4th, 5th and 13th Tank Battalions (Lewis Guns) 
 
French 28
th
, 34
th
 and 133
rd
 Divisions 
 
French Cavalry 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 6
th
 Divisions 
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(5) The Second Battle of Kemmel Ridge: 25 - 26 April 1918 
 
 
XXII Corps 
 
  9
th
 Division      21
st
 Division  
 
25
th
 Division*     49
th
 Division   
   
  71 Brigade (6
th
 Division) 
 
  89 Brigade (30
th
 Division) 
 
  Composite Brigade (39
th
 Division) 
 
  XXII Corps mounted troops 
 
 
*Although at rest, the 25
th
 Division was ordered to assist the French when the French 28
th
 Division was driven 
off Mont Kemmel – the 25th was transferred from IX Corps to XXII Corps on 26 April 
 
 
 4 Tank Brigade – 4th, 5th and 13th Tank Battalions (Lewis Guns) 
 
 
Detachement d’Armee du Nord (French Army) 
(had taken over the IX Corps front by the morning of 21 April) 
 
CinC    General de Mitry 
 
II Cavalry Corps 
 
3
rd
 Cavalry Division    6
th
 Cavalry Division 
 
28
th
 Division     154
th
 Division 
 
XXXVI Corps 
 
2
nd
 Cavalry Division    34
th
 Division 
 
133
rd
 Division 
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(6) Battle of the Scherpenberg: 29 April 1918 
 
 
XXII Corps 
 
  6
th
 Division      21
st
 Division  
 
25
th
 Division     39
th
 Division   
   
49
th
 Division 
 
  9
th
 Division – South African Brigade 
 
  30
th
 Division – 89 Brigade 
 
 
  4
th
 Tank Brigade – 4th, 5th and 13th Tank Battalions (Lewis Guns) 
 
 
 
Detachement d’Armee du Nord (French Army) 
 
II Cavalry Corps 
 
2
nd
 Cavalry Division    3
rd
 Cavalry Division  
   
39
th
 Division     154
th
 Division 
 
XXXVI Corps 
 
34
th
 Division     133
rd 
Division 
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Subsequent Actions 
 
The Action of La Becque: 28 June 1918 
 
 
First Army 
 
XI Corps – 5th Division 
 
Second Army 
 
XV Corps – 31st Division* 
 
 
*31st Division placed under XI Corps, First Army for this operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Capture of Meteren: 19 July 1918 
 
 
Second Army 
 
XV Corps – 9th Division 
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A2 British Second Army Order of Battle: The Advance in Flanders 
Operations 18 August – 6 September 1918 
 
30 June    XIX Corps relieved French XIV Corps 
8 July   X Corps relieved French XVI Corps 
 
On the 18 August 1918 the Second Army held a front of 19 miles, from south of Vieux Berquin to north-east of 
Ypres 
 
18 August Capture of Outtersteene Ridge XV Corps 
29
th
 Division – 87 Brigade 
 
18 August Capture of Hoegenacher Ridge XV Corps 
       9
th
 Division 
 
1 September Capture of Neuve Eglise  X Corps 
       30
th
 Division - 89 Brigade 
 
2 September Capture of Wulwweughn  X Corps 
       30
th
 Division – 21 Brigade 
 
4 September  Capture of Ploegsteert and Hill 43 XV Corps 
      29
th
 Division – 86 and 88 Brigades 
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GOC     General Sir H C O Plumer 
 
Major-General General Staff Major-General J S J Percy  
 
II Corps 
Lieutenant General Sir C W Jacob 
 
  14
th
 Division     34
th
 Division* 
 
  35
th
 Division **    49
th
 Division*** 
 
  American 30
th
 Division**** 
 
 * Transferred to XIX Corps between 28-30 August 
**Transferred to II Corps from XIII Corps on 1 September 
*** Left the Corps on 27 August 
**** Left the Corps on 1 September 
 
X Corps* 
Lieutenant General R B Stephens 
 
  30
th
 Division     36
th
 Division 
 
*X Corps had remained in the back area since the conclusion of the battle of Ypres 1917; on 8 July 1918 with 30th, 
35
th
 and 36
th
 Divisions, it took over part of the Second Army front, relieving the French XVI Corps 
 
XV Corps 
Lieutenant General Sir B deLisle 
 
  9
th
 Division     29
th
 Division 
 
  31
st
 Division     40
th
 Division 
 
XIX Corps* 
Lieutenant General Sir H E Watts  
 
  6
th
 Division**     41
st
 Division 
 
  American 27
th
 Division***   34
th
 Division**** 
 
     * On 30 June 1918 XIX Corps (6th and 41st Divisions), then with Fourth Army, took over part 
          of the Second Army front, relieving the French XIV Corps 
    ** Left the Corps on 1 September 
  *** Left the Corps on 4 September 
**** Transferred from II Corps between 28-30 August 
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A3 British Second Army Order of Battle: The Final Advance in Flanders 
28 September – 11 November 1918 
 
By September 1918, the British Second Army held a sixteen mile front line in Flanders. This ran from west of 
Armentieres, at a junction with the River Lys, stretching northwards to just above the town of Ypres; there it linked 
to the right of the Belgian Army 
 
GOC     General Sir H C O Plumer 
 
Major-General General Staff Major General J S J Percy  
 
II Corps 
Lieutenant General Sir C W Jacob 
 
  9
th
 Division     29
th
 Division 
 
  36
th
 Division  
 
X Corps 
Lieutenant General R B Stephens 
 
  30
th
 Division     34
th
 Division 
 
XV Corps 
Lieutenant General Sir B deLisle 
 
  14
th
 Division      31
st
 Division   
   
40
th
 Division 
   
XIX Corps 
Lieutenant General Sir H E Watts  
 
  35
th
 Division     41
st
 Division 
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28 September   Battle of Ypres II Corps 
– 2 October 1918    9th, 29th, 36th Divisions 
X Corps 
30
th
, 34
th
 Divisions 
XV Corps 
31
st
, 40
th
 Divisions 
XIX Corps 
14
th
, 35
th
, 41
st
 Divisions 
 
14 – 19 October Battle of Courtrai II Corps 
1918      9
th
, 29
th
, 36
th
 Divisions 
X Corps 
30
th
, 34
th
 Divisions 
XV Corps 
14
th
 Division 
XIX Corps 
35
th
, 41
st
 Divisions 
 
 
25 October  Action of Ooteghem  II Corps 
1918       9
th
, 36
th
 Divisions 
X Corps 
34
th
 Division 
XIX Corps 
41
st
 Division 
 
31 October  Action of Tiegham  II Corps 
1918       XIX Corps 
 
During the final stages, there were a number of changes in the order of Divisions under Corps HQ: 
 
From 9 – 11 November, preparations were in hand to assault the Schelde – actions included the seizing of Leuze 
and Lessines, and of passages across the Dendre – X and XIX Corps with 3rd Cavalry Division 
 
When the Armistice began at 1100 on 11 November, Second Army held a ten mile front from Lessines to Voorde, 
occupied by the X and XIX Corps 
 
Since the final advance began on 18 August, Second Army had fought two major battles plus supporting actions, 
and advanced 53 miles into Belgium in 86 days 
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A4 Order of Battle: Groupe d’Armees des Flandres  – Battle of Courtrai 
 
GOC   Albert, King of the Belgians 
 
Chief of Staff  General Degoutte (France) 
 
 
 British Second Army   French II Cavalry Corps 
 General Plumer    General Robillot 
 4 Corps / 10 Divisions   3 Divisions 
 
 
 Belgian Southern Groupement  Belgian Northern Groupement 
 Lieutenant-General Biebuyck   Lieutenant-General Michel 
3 Belgian Divisions    3 Belgian Divisions 
 1 French Division (164
th
)   1 Belgian Cavalry Division 
 
 
 French VII Corps*    French XXXIV Corps* 
 General Massenet    General Mudant 
 French VII Corps    French XXXIV Corps 
 2 Divisions     3 Divisions 
 
 
plus 
 2 Belgian Divisions holding Yser defences from Dixmude 
 4 Belgian Divisions resting behind the Yser 
 
*On 19 October, the new French Sixth Army under General de Boissoudy entered the line. This consisted of VII 
and XXXIV Corps plus XXX Corps (5
th
 and 132
nd
 Divisions, under General Peney)  
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918                Dennis Williams  
Appendix A    Orders of Battle:       British Second Army: 13 March – 11 November 1918  
                                                            Belgian, French and German forces: September-November 1918 
 
19 
 
 
4.1 Order of Battle: British Corps 1918 
   Edmonds, Official History Vol. V   
 
Headquarters 
Corps cavalry 
Headquarters Corps Heavy Artillery 
Heavy Trench Mortar Battery RGA 
Cyclist Battalion 
Sharpshooters Group 
Corps Signal Troops: 
 Corps Signal Company 
 Air-Line Sections, Motor, 2 
 Cable Sections, 2 
Corps M T Column: 
Corps Troops MT Company 
Divisional MT Companies, 4 
Heavy Artillery ASC Company 
Medium Ordnance Mobile Workshop 
Light Ordnance Mobile Workshop 
Area Employment Company
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4.2 Order of Battle: British Division 1918 
   Edmonds, Official History Vol. V   
   Becke, Orders of Battle   
 
 
Headquarters 
Infantry Brigades   3 
 Each of 3 Battalions 
 With 36 Lewis Guns per Battalion 
Trench Mortar Battalion  
 3 Batteries   
 8 x 3” Stokes Mortars per Battery 
Artillery Brigades   2 
 Each of 3 x 18-pounder and 1 x 4.5-inch howitzer batteries 
Trench Mortar Batteries, RA  2 
 6 x 2” Trench Mortars per Battery 
Ammunition Column 
Field Companies, RE   3 
Signal Company 
Pioneer Battalion 
 With 12 Lewis Guns 
Machine Gun Battalion 
4 Companies 
 Each with 16 Vickers Heavy Machine-Guns 
ASC     4 
Field Ambulances   3 
Mobile Veterinary Section 
Employment Company 
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4.3 Composition of a Battalion: British Army 1918 
 
In March 1918 when Plumer returned to the Western Front, the British Army was completing the required 
reorganisation of Divisions following manpower restrictions; briefly, Divisions would be made up of ten 
Battalions, one of which would be its Pioneer Battalion; the remainder were deployed as three Brigades of three 
Battalions (previously, a Division was composed of four Brigades). 
 
Battalion Headquarters 
Commanding Officer:  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Second-in-Command:  Major 
Adjutant:   Lieutenant or Captain 
Quartermaster:  Lieutenant or Captain 
 
Officer of Royal Army Medical Corps 
 
Regimental Sergeant-Major 
 
Sergeants: Quartermaster 
  Orderly Room Clerk 
  Drummer 
  Cook 
  Pioneer 
  Shoemaker 
  Transport 
  Signaller 
  Armourer (Ordnance Corps) 
 
Corporal/Privates: Royal Army Medical Corps 
   Medical Orderlies 
   Signallers 
   Pioneers 
   Drivers 
   Stretcher-bearers 
   Officers’ Batmen 
 
4 Companies    (Major or Captain) 
of 4 Platoons   (Subaltern: Lieutenant or Second Lieutenant) 
 of 4 Sections  (each of an NCO plus 12 men) 
   
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918                Dennis Williams  
Appendix A    Orders of Battle:       British Second Army: 13 March – 11 November 1918  
                                                            Belgian, French and German forces: September-November 1918 
 
22 
 
4.4 British Second Army: Troops  
(September – November 1918) 
 
Artillery: 
Heavy Batteries: 16 (6, 60-pounder guns per battery = 96 guns) 
Brigades RGA: Mobile, 3 Mixed, 5 8-inch, 3 
   9.2-inch, 4 Army, 2 
Siege Batteries: 
Guns Batteries Total 
Guns 
6-inch howitzer 36 198 
6-inch gun 7 28 
8-inch howitzer 8 48 
9.2-inch howitzer 9 52 
9.2-inch gun 1.5 3 
12-inch howitzer 9 18 
15-inch howitzer 1 1 
TOTAL 71.5 348 
 
Total: 87.5 heavy and siege batteries; 444 heavy guns and howitzers 
 
Anti-Aircraft:  18 sections of 13-pounder guns,  
6 sections of 3-inch guns = 48 guns 
 Field Artillery Brigades: 8 
 
Engineers: 
 Special Projector Companies    6 
 Mortar Corps      1 
Army Troops Companies             10 
Siege Company     1 
Tunnelling Companies    4 
Electrical & Mechanical    1 
Boring Section (Water)    1 
Army Workshop Company    1 
Field Survey Battalion: 
 Sound ranging Sections   5 
 Observation Groups    5 
AA Searchlight Sections                        10 
AA Searchlight Company    1 
Pontoon Park        1 
Advanced RE Parks     2 
Transportation (Works) Company   1 
Signal Service: 
 Cable Sections    2 
 Air Line Sections    3 
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Light Railway Signal Company  1 
Signal Construction Company  1 
Area Signal Detachments   7 
Pigeon Service: 
 Mobile Lofts (1 motor)           14 
 Fixed lofts             12 
 
Infantry: 
 Battalions      3 
 Machine-Gun Battalions    4 
 
Military Police: Traffic Control Units: 
 Company 1  Squadron 1 
  
Army Service Corps: 
Pontoon Park (MT)     1 
Army Troops MT Company   1 
Auxiliary (Petrol) Company    1 
Mobile Repair Unit (MT)    1 
Workshop for AA guns    1 
Water Tank Company    1 
 
Medical: 
Motor Ambulance convoys    4 
Casualty Clearing Stations             12 
Advanced Medical Stores Depots   3 
Mobile Laboratories  4 Mobile X-Ray Units  2  
Mobile Dental Unit  1 Stationary Hospital  1 
Sanitary Sections          12 Sanitary Squads  5 
Veterinary:  
Evacuating Stations     3 
 
Ordnance: 
Mobile Workshops (heavy, medium, light)  3 
Gun Park 1    Officers’ Clothing Depot 1 
Forestry Units: 
Companies      2 
Labour Corps: 
Companies              31 
Area Employment Companies           12 
Area Employment (artisan) Companies  2 
Chinese companies              14 
Army Printing and Stationery Services: 
 Advanced Photographic Section   1 
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4.5 British Second Army 1918: Headquarters 
 
Note: All the entries below for British Second Army and its constituent units describe its composition from 
13 March 1918 onwards (when General Plumer resumed as GOC). Details of unit postholders are listed for 
the period of the attachment of their unit to Second Army during 1918 and the unit’s involvement in the 
main actions which Second Army fought. 
‘Fourth Army’ was redesignated as Second Army on 17 March 1918 
 
GOC      General Sir H C O Plumer  
 
Major-General General Staff  Major General C H Harington* 
From 29 April 1918 Major-General J S J Percy  
 
Deputy-Adjutant and Quartermaster-General     Major General A A Chichester* 
 
Major-General Royal Artillery  Major General C R Buckle* 
 
Chief Engineer    Major General Sir F M Glubb* 
  
Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander Lieutenant General H W Hill 
 
Deputy Director Signals   Colonel A B R Hildebrand* 
            From October 1918 Colonel H C Smith  
 
Deputy Director Supply and Transport Brigadier General F M Wilson** 
 
Deputy Director Ordnance Services Colonel H S Bush** 
 
Director of Medical Services  Major General R Porter 
From 8 April 1918 Major General S G Moores 
 
Deputy Director Veterinary Services Colonel F W Hunt** 
 
Deputy Director Remounts   Colonel W E Matchem** 
 
GHQ:  13 March 1918  Cassel 
14 April 1918   Blendecques (2½ miles S by E of St Omer) 
1 September 1918   Cassel 
  23 October 1918  Chateau Ternynck, Roubaix 
 
 
* Transferred with Plumer to Italy and returned with him to the Western Front. 
 
** From Fourth Army. 
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SECOND ARMY ARTILLERY [Major General Buckle] 
By November 1918 almost all corps artillery had been concentrated at army level. 
11 Army Brigade RFA 83 84 85 D Batteries 
23 Army Brigade RFA 107 108 C D Batteries 
28 Army Brigade RFA A 123 124 65 Batteries 
38 Army Brigade RFA A 24 72 D Batteries 
64 Army Brigade RFA A B C D Batteries 
96 Army Brigade RFA 407 408 409 410 Batteries 
113 Army Brigade RFA A B C D Batteries 
119 Army Brigade RFA A B C D Batteries 
2 Brigade RGA 177 250 352 66 Batteries 
3 Brigade RGA 48 112 88 268 152 21 Batteries  
4 Brigade RGA 131 2/1N Midland 223 301 261 129 Batteries 
6 Brigade RGA 109 114 111 245 227 42 Batteries 
10 Brigade RGA 150 159 113 226 Batteries 
33 Brigade RGA 31 279 298 221 Batteries 
36 Brigade RGA 140 151 155 353 1Aust 2Aust Batteries  
43 Brigade RGA 147 190 351 154 Batteries 
59 Brigade RGA 37 335 350 30 Batteries 
64 Brigade RGA 100 101 102 61 Batteries 
65 Brigade RGA 115 202 21 118 Batteries  
70 Brigade RGA 282 285 405 151 Batteries 
77 Brigade RGA 9 26 116 119 286 191 Batteries 
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86 Brigade RGA 141 1/1Wx 203 324 Batteries 
87 Brigade RGA 154 156 194 219 Batteries 
99 Brigade RGA 15 157 217 12 Batteries  
HQ 25 Brigade RGA 
HQ 72 Brigade RGA 
7 Siege Battery RGA (4 x 6"guns) 
29 Siege Battery RGA  
187 Siege Battery RGA 
193 Siege Battery RGA 
479 Siege Battery RGA 
526 Siege Battery RGA 
528 Siege Battery RGA 
546 Siege Battery RGA 
45 Siege Battery RGA (2 x 9.2" railway guns) 
Section 53 Siege Battery RGA (1 x 9.2" railway gun) 
85 Siege Battery RGA (2 x 12" howitzers) 
375 Siege Battery RGA 
2 Battery Royal Marine Artillery 
22 Siege Battery RGA (2 x 12" railway howitzers) 
63 Siege Battery RGA 
82 Siege Battery RGA 
104 Siege Battery RGA 
359 Siege Battery RGA 
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381 Siege Battery RGA 
4 Siege Battery RGA (1 x 15" howitzer) 
The Bermuda RGA 
H AA Battery RGA 
J AA Battery RGA 
R AA Battery RGA 
T AA Battery RGA 
U AA Battery RGA 
  
SECOND ARMY ENGINEERS [Major General Glubb] 
By November 1918 all Corps engineers had been brought under army command. 
6 Siege Company R Mon RE 
20 Army Troops Company RE 
134 Army Troops Company RE 
136 Army Troops Company RE 
138 Army Troops Company RE 
141 Army Troops Company RE 
145 Army Troops Company RE 
167 Army Troops Company RE 
214 Army Troops Company RE 
235 Army Troops Company RE 
236 Army Troops Company RE 
245 Army Troops Company RE 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918                Dennis Williams  
Appendix A    Orders of Battle:       British Second Army: 13 March – 11 November 1918  
                                                            Belgian, French and German forces: September-November 1918 
 
28 
 
289 Army Troops Company RE 
554 Army Troops Company RE 
556 Army Troops Company RE 
557 Army Troops Company RE 
573 Army Troops Company RE 
171 Tunnelling Company RE 
173 Tunnelling Company RE 
184 Tunnelling Company RE 
255 Tunnelling Company RE 
3 Canadian Tunnelling Company RCE 
Section, 196 Land Drainage Company RE 
354 Electrical & Mechanical Company RE 
2 Advanced RE Park 
3 Advanced RE Park 
10 Advanced RE Park 
2 Army Workshop Company RE 
4 Field Survey Battalion RE 
7 Pontoon Park 
220 Transportation (Works) Company RE 
AA Searchlight Sections-1 11 24 28 31 40 64  
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4.6 British Second Army 1918: Corps  
 
II Corps 
 
Operations: The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
 
GOC   Lieutenant General C W Jacob 
 
BGGS   Brigadier General S H Wilson 
   From 27 October 1918 Brigadier General C Bonham-Carter 
 
DA and QMG Brigadier General R M Foot 
 
BGRA   Brigadier General A D Kirby 
 
CHA   Brigadier General D F H Logan 
 
CE   Brigadier General C Godby 
 
AD Signals  Lieutenant Colonel C V Monier-Williams 
   From 27 August 1918 Lieutenant Colonel E de W H Bradley 
 
DDMS  Colonel S G Moores 
   From 1 April 1918 Colonel G St C Thom 
 
ADVS   Lieutenant Colonel J J Griffith 
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IX Corps 
 
Operations: The Battles of the Lys 
 
GOC   Lieutenant General A Hamilton Gordon 
   until 13 September 1918, with temporary replacements 
   16-21 July 1918 Major General Sir R D Whigham 
   22-29 July 1918 Major General H W Higginson 
   10-12 September 1918 Major General E P Strickland 
 
BGGS   Brigadier General W J Maxwell-Scott  
 
DA and QMG Brigadier General J C Harding Newman 
 
BGRA   Brigadier General G Humphreys 
 
CHA   Brigadier General G B Mackenzie 
 
CE   wef 6 April 1918 Brigadier General G S Cartwright 
 
AD Signals  Lieutenant Colonel H W Edwards  
 
DDMS  Colonel J B Wilson 
    
ADVS   Lieutenant Colonel E B Bartlett 
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X Corps 
 
Operations: The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
 
GOC   Lieutenant General Sir T L N Morland 
   wef 15 April 1918 Lieutenant General Sir W N Congreve (temp) 
   wef 15 April 1918 Lieutenant General Sir W E Peyton 
   wef 15 April 1918 Lieutenant General R B Stephens 
 
BGGS   Brigadier General A R Cameron 
   wef 2 July 1918 Brigadier General W J Maxwell-Scott (temp) 
   wef 13 July 1918 Brigadier General C Evans 
 
DA and QMG Brigadier General W K Legge 
 
BGRA   Brigadier General G Gillson 
   wef 12 September 1918 Brigadier General W P Monkhouse 
 
CHA   Brigadier General H O Vincent 
   wef 11 July 1918 Brigadier General A H Ollivant 
 
CE   Brigadier General G H Boileau 
 
AD Signals  Lieutenant Colonel F A Iles 
   wef 12 May 1918 Lieutenant Colonel R F B Naylor 
 
DDMS  Colonel R L R MaCloud 
    
ADVS   Lieutenant Colonel G P Knott 
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XV Corps 
 
Operations: The Battles of the Lys 
The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
 
GOC   wef 12 April 1918 Lieutenant General Sir H de B De Lisle 
 
BGGS   Brigadier General H H S Know 
   wef 12-24 August 1918 Brigadier General G H N Jackson (temp) 
 
DA and QMG Brigadier General G R Frith 
 
BGRA   Brigadier General B R Kirwan 
 
CHA   Brigadier General C W Collingwood 
 
CE   Brigadier General C W Singer 
 
AD Signals  Lieutenant Colonel N Harrison  
 
DDMS  Colonel G A Moore 
    
ADVS   Lieutenant Colonel E M Percy 
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XIX Corps 
 
Operations: The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
 
On 30 June 1918 XIX Corps (6
th
 and 41
st
 Divisions) took over part of the Second Army front, relieving the French 
XIV Corps 
 
GOC   Lieutenant General H E Watts 
 
BGGS   Brigadier General C N MacMullen 
    
DA and QMG Brigadier General A G Moir 
 
BGRA   Brigadier General W B R Sandys 
 
CHA   Brigadier General C G Pritchard 
   wef 15 April August 1918 Brigadier General F A Wynter 
 
CE   Brigadier General A G Bremner (wounded 22 March 1918) 
   wef 24 March 1918 Brigadier General H Biddulph 
   wef 6 June 1918 Brigadier General E N Stockley 
 
AD Signals   
 
DDMS  Colonel H J Pocock 
   wef 7 June 1918 Colonel J D Alexander 
 
ADVS   Lieutenant Colonel C E Steel 
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XXII Corps 
 
Operations: The Battles of the Lys 
 
GOC   Lieutenant General Sir A J Godley 
 
BGGS   Brigadier General C W Gwynn 
    
DA and QMG Brigadier General A E Delavoye 
 
BGRA   Brigadier General E W M Powell 
 
CHA   Brigadier General A S Jenour 
 
CE   Brigadier General A E Panet 
 
AD Signals  Lieutenant Colonel W T Dodd 
 
DDMS  Colonel C M Begg 
 
ADVS   Lieutenant Colonel A W Mason 
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A5 British Second Army: Divisions March – November 1918 
 
The Divisions highlighted in bold type belonged to the Second Army which fought through the 
Hundred Days. 
 
6
th
 Division 
9
th  
(Scottish) Division 
14
th 
(Light) Division 
19
th 
(Western) Division  
21
st 
Division 
25
th 
Division 
29
th 
Division 
30
th 
Division 
31
st 
Division 
33
rd 
Division 
34
th 
Division
 
35
th 
Division 
36
th 
Division
 
39
th 
Division 
40
th 
Division 
41
st 
Division 
49
th 
Division 
50
th
 Division 
59
th 
Division  
 
1
st
 Australian Division 
 
American 27
th 
Division 
American 30
th 
Division 
 
4
th
 Tank Brigade 
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6
th
 Division 
(Regular Army Division) 
 
Major General T Marden 
 
The Battle of Bailleul 71 Brigade (under 25
th
 Division on 13 April 1918, then 
49
th
 Division, IX Corps, Second Army) 
The First Battle of Kemmel 71 Brigade (under 49
th
 Division, IX Corps, Second Army) 
The Second Battle of Kemmel (XXII Corps, Second Army) 
The Battle of the Scherpenberg  (XXII Corps, Second Army) 
The Advance to Victory  (Fourth Army) 
Battles of the Hindenburg Line (IX Corps, Fourth Army) 
The Final Advance in Picardy (IX Corps, Fourth Army) 
 
16 Brigade 
1
st
 Battalion, the Buffs 
1
st
 Battalion, the King’s (Shropshire Light Infantry) 
2
nd
 Battalion, the York and Lancaster 
16
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
18 Brigade 
1
st
 Battalion, the West Yorkshires 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Essex 
2
nd
 Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry 
18
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
71 Brigade 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Norfolks 
1
st
 Battalion, the Leicesters 
2
nd
 Battalion, the Sherwood Foresters 
71
st
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
Division troops 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion (Midland Pioneers), the Leicesters 
No 6 Machine Gun Battalion  
II Brigade, RFA  
XXIV Brigade, RFA  
6th Divisional Ammunition Column 
X.6, Y.6 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA  
12
th
, 459
th
, 509
th
 Field Companies 
6
th
 Signals Company 
16
th
, 17
th
, 18
th
 Field Ambulances 
6
th
 Divisional Train ASC (17, 19, 23, 24 Companies) 
209
th
 Divisional Employment Company 
6
th
 Mobile Veterinary Section 
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9
th
 (Scottish) Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
From 4-12 March, 16-24(1400 hours) March 1918 (Acting)  
Major-General H H Tudor 
From 13-15, 24(1400 hours)-27 March 1918  
Major-General C A Blacklock 
From 28 March 1918  
Major-General H H Tudor 
 
The Battle of Messines 
The Battle of Bailleul   
The First Battle of Kemmel   
The Second Battle of Kemmel  
The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
The Battle of Courtrai 
 
On 26-27 October, the Division was relieved by 31
st
 Division and moved back to reorganise. 
 
26 Brigade   Brigadier-General J Kennedy 
    From 27 July 1918  
Brigadier-General Hon. A G A Hore-Ruthven, VC 
    From 5 November 1918 
    Brigadier-General H G Hyslop 
        
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Black Watch     
7
th
 (Service) Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders    
5
th
 (Service) Battalion, Cameron Highlanders    
26
th
 Trench Mortar Company  
    
27 (Lowland) Brigade Brigadier-General W D Croft    
   
11
th
 (Service) Battalion, Royal Scots      
12
th
 (Service) Battalion, Royal Scots     
6
th
 (Service) Battalion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers  
27
th
 Trench Mortar Battery   
    
28 Brigade*   Brigadier-General J L Jack 
     
2
nd
 Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers (joined September 1918)     
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) (returned September 1918)   
1
st
 Royal Newfoundland Regiment (joined September 1918)**   
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South African Brigade***  
2
nd
 Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers (April-September 1918) 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) (April-September 1918) 
1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
 Battalions, South African Infantry 
   
Division troops 
9
th
 (Service) (Pioneers) Seaforth Highlanders   
No 9 Machine Gun Battalion          
No 11 Motor Machine Gun Battery**** 
L, LI Brigades RFA           
X9, Y9 Medium Mortar Batteries           
9
th
 Ammunition Column  
63
rd
, 64
th
, 90
th
 Field Companies           
9
th
 Signals Company            
27
th
, 28
th
, South African (up to 13 September 1918), 2/1
st
 East Lancs (from 20 September 1918) 
Field Ambulances           
9
th
 Divisional Train ASC (104, 105, 106, 107 Companies)      
212
th
 Divisional Employment Company  
21
st
 Mobile Veterinary Section           
    
 
* The Brigade was broken up on 6 May 1916 and reformed on 11 September 1918 
** The Battalion joined the 28 Brigade on 13 September 1918, having been attached to GHQ since 29 April 1918; 
this was initially a temporary attachment because as late as 15 September 1918, Brigadier-General Jack was still 
expecting 10
th
 Battalion, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders to be placed with the Brigade 
*** The Brigade reported to 9
th
 Division from 22 April 1916 to 13 September 1918. On 24 April 1918, due to 
heavy casualties, 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 4
th
 Battalions were amalgamated – forming the South African (Composite) Regiment; 
they were reformed by 1 September 1918. The 9
th
 (Service) Battalion, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) was 
transferred to the Brigade in April 1918 to bring it up to strength; it was restored to 28 Brigade in September 1918 
**** Joined Division from 7 October to 7 November 1918 
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14
th
 (Light) Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
Major-General V A Couper 
From 22 March 1918 
Major-General W H Greenly 
From 27 March 1918 
Major-General Sir V A Couper 
From 31 March 1918 
Major-General P C B Skinner 
 
In the Battle of St Quentin and the Battle of the Avre, actions forming part of the first Battles of the Somme 1918, 
the Division suffered very severe casualties, losing almost 6,000 troops. XLVI and XLVII Brigades, RFA, lost all 
their guns. The Division was withdrawn from the line and placed on the construction of a new defensive line in the 
rear. On 26 April, the infantry battalions were reduced to a training cadre. Various units were temporarily attached, 
before the Division was moved to England for re-establishment, on 17 June 1918, before returning to France. The 
Division joined Second Army 2-6 July 1918. Placed under XIX Corps, it transferred to XV Corps from 2 October 
1918. 
 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
 
41 Brigade   Brigadier-General P C B Skinner 
From 31 March 1918 
Lieutenant-Colonel B J Curling (Acting) 
From 3 April 1918 
Brigadier-General C R P Winser 
From 3 September 1918 
Brigadier-General W F Sweny    
  
18
th
 (Service) Battalion, the York and Lancaster (joined June 1918)  
29
th
 (Service) Battalion, Durham Light Infantry (joined June 1918)         
33rd (City of London) Battalion, London Regiment (joined June 1918)   
41
st
 Trench Mortar Battery  
    
42 Brigade   Brigadier-General G N B Forster (killed 4 April 1918) 
    From 5-7 April 1918 
Brigadier-General C R P Winser (41 Brigade, Acting) 
From 7 April 1918 
Brigadier-General H T Dobbin 
     
6
th
 (Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry) Battalion, the Wiltshires (joined as a cadre June 1918)  
16
th
 (Service) (1
st
 City) Battalion, the Manchesters (joined as a cadre June 1918)   
14
th
 (Service) Battalion, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (joined April 1918)  
42
nd
 Trench Mortar Battery  
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43 Brigade   Brigadier-General R S Tempest 
    From 16 September 1918 
    Brigadier-General G E Pereira 
   
12
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Suffolks (joined May 1918)     
20
th
 (Service) (Shoreditch) Battalion, the Middlesex (joined as a cadre June 1918) 
10
th
 (Service) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry (joined as a cadre June 1918, became 10
th
 
Battalion June 1918)         
43
rd
 Trench Mortar Battery  
    
Division troops 
15
th
 (Service) Battalion, Loyal North Lancs (joined June 1918)  
XLVI, XLVII Brigades RFA 
X14, Y14 Trench Mortar Batteries 
14
th
 Ammunition Column 
61
st
, 62
nd
, 89
th
 Field Companies    
14
th
 Signals Company             
105
th
, 106
th
, 107
th
 Field Ambulance 
14
th
 Divisional Train ASC (100, 101, 102, 103 Companies)    
215
th
 Employment Company     
26
th
 Mobile Veterinary Section          
41
st
 Divisional Workshops 
No 14 Machine Gun Battalion (created March 1918, disbanded 11 April 1918) 
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19
th
 (Western Division) 
 (New Army Division) 
 
Major-General G Jeffreys 
 
The Advance in Flanders 
 
56 Brigade       
1/4
th
 (Service) Battalion, the KSLI (joined February 1918) 
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the North Staffords (joined February 1918)   
   
56
st
 Trench Mortar Battery (broken up 5
th
 February 1918, reconstructed 6
th
 March 1918) 
    
57 Brigade      
10
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Royal Warwicks   
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Royal Gloucesters 
3
rd
 Battalion, the Worcesters (joined June 1918) 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Worcesters (left as a cadre June 1918) 
42
nd
 Trench Mortar Battery  
    
58 Brigade      
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Cheshires  
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
2
nd
 Battalion, the Wiltshires (joined May 1918) 
6
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Wiltshires (left as a cadre June 1918) 
58
th
  Trench Mortar Battery  
    
Division troops 
5
th
 (Service) Battalion (Pioneers), the South Wales Borderers 
No 19 Machine Gun Battalion     
81
st
, 82
nd
, 94
th
 Field Companies    
19
th
 Signals Company             
57
th
, 58
th
, 59
th
 Field Ambulance 
19
th
 Divisional Train ASC (154, 155, 156, 157 Companies)    
220
th
 Employment Company     
31
st
 Mobile Veterinary Section           
LXXXVII, LXXXVIII Brigades RFA 
X19, Y19 Trench Mortar Batteries 
19
th
 Ammunition Column 
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21
st
 Division 
 (New Army Division) 
 
Major General G Campbell 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The Battle of Messines 1918 – 62nd Brigade 
The Second Battle of Kemmel 
 
62 Brigade 
12
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Northumberland Fusiliers  
13
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Northumberland Fusiliers 
3/4
th
 Battalion (TF), the Queen's  
1
st
 Battalion, the Lincolns  
2
nd
 Battalion, the Lincolns  
62
nd
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
64 Brigade 
1
st
 Battalion, the East Yorkshires 
2
nd
 Battalion, the South Lancashire (joined June 1918, left same month) 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the KOYLI  
15
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry  
64
th
 Trench Mortar Battery (formed by 19 June 1916) 
 
110 Brigade 
6
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Leicesters  
7
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Leicesters  
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Leicesters (left June 1918) 
1
st
 Battalion, the Wiltshires (joined June 1918) 
110
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
Division troops 
14
th
 (Service) Battalion (Pioneers), the Northumberland Fusiliers 
No 21 Machine Gun Battalion  
XCIV Brigade, RFA  
XCV Brigade, RFA  
21
st
 Divisional Ammunition Column 
X.21, Y.21 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA  
97
th
, 98
th
, 126
th
, 94
th
 Field Companies 
21
st
 Signals Company 
63
rd
, 64
th
, 65
th
 Field Ambulances 
21
st
 Divisional Train ASC (182, 183, 184, 185 Companies) 
222
nd
 Divisional Employment Company 
33
rd
 Mobile Veterinary Section 
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25
th
 Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
Major General E Bainbridge 
From 4 August 1918  
Major General J Charles 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The First Battle of Kemmel 
The Second Battle of Kemmel 
 
74 Brigade 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Yorkshire (joined September 1918) 
2/7
th
 Battalion, the Lancashire Fusiliers (joined June 1918, disbanded July 1918) 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Lancashire Fusiliers (disbanded August 1918) 
3
rd
 Battalion, the Worcesters (left June 1918) 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Sherwood Foresters (joined September 1918) 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Loyal North Lancs (left June 1918) 
21
st
 (Service) Battalion (Islington), the Middlesex (joined as a cadre June 1918) 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry (joined September 1918) 
74
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
  
75 Brigade 
On 9 September 1918 the Brigade was renumbered as 236, for service in North Russia (leaving the Division). A 75 
Brigade was reformed within the Division, on 17 September 1918. 
1/8
th
 Battalion, the Royal Warwicks (joined September 1918) 
17
th
 (Service) Battalion, the King's (Liverpool) (joined June 1918) 
6
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Yorkshire (joined June 1918) 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Yorkshire (joined June 1918) 
1/6
th
 Battalion, the Cheshires (joined May 1918, left July 1918) 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Cheshires (left as a cadre June 1918) 
1/8
th
 Battalion, the Worcesters (joined September 1918) 
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Border (left June 1918) 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion (1st South Down), the Royal Sussex (joined as a cadre June 1918) 
2
nd
 Battalion, the South Lancashire (left June 1918) 
75
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
7 Brigade 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Devons (joined September 1918) 
10
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Cheshires (left as cadre July 1918) 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion (Wandsworth), the East Surreys (joined as cadre, June 1918, disbanded 
November 1918) 
4
th
 (Extra Reserve) Battalion, the South Staffordshire (left June 1918) 
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Loyal North Lancs  
1
st
 Battalion, the Wiltshires (left June 1918) 
20
th
 (Service) Battalion (5th City), the Manchesters (joined September 1918) 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918                Dennis Williams  
Appendix A    Orders of Battle:       British Second Army: 13 March – 11 November 1918  
                                                            Belgian, French and German forces: September-November 1918 
 
44 
 
21
st
  (Service) Battalion (6th City), the Manchesters (joined September 1918) 
7
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
Division troops 
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Leicesters (joined as a cadre June 1918) 
6
th
 (Service) Battalion (Pioneers), the South Wales Borderers (left July 1918) 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion (St.Helens Pioneers), the South Lancashire (joined as a cadre June 
1918, became Pioneers October 1918) 
No 25 Machine Gun Battalion (left 23 July and returned 19 October 1918) 
No 100 (Warwicks and South Notts Yeomanry) Machine Gun Battalion (joined 2 October and 
left 19 October 1918) 
(The Divisional Artillery remained in France when the rest of the Division returned to England for re-fit after 
severe casualties, in June 1918) 
CX Brigade, RFA (between 26 May 1918, and 4 June 1918, attached to 8th Division) 
CXII Brigade, RFA (between 26 May 1918, and 21 June 1918, attached to 21st Division) 
25
th
 Divisional Ammunition Column  
X.25, Y.25 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA 
105
th
, 106
th
, 130
th
 Field Companies 
25
th
 Signals Company 
75
th
, 76
th
, 77
th
 Field Ambulances 
25
th
 Divisional Train ASC (182, 183, 184, 185 Companies) 
225
th
 Divisional Employment Company 
37
th
 Mobile Veterinary Section 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918                Dennis Williams  
Appendix A    Orders of Battle:       British Second Army: 13 March – 11 November 1918  
                                                            Belgian, French and German forces: September-November 1918 
 
45 
 
29
th
 Division 
(Regular Army Division) 
 
From 12 March 1918 
Brigadier-General R M Johnson (Acting) 
From 10-24 August 1918 
Brigadier-General H H S Knox (Acting) 
From 19 March 1918 
Major-General D Cayley 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
(The Battle of Estaires - first phase of the Battles of the Lys – under First Army) 
The Battle of Messines, 1918 (88 Brigade, with 25
th
 Division 10 April 1918, 34
th
 Division, 11 
April 1918, IX Corps, Second Army) 
The Battle of Hazebrouck (less 88 Brigade) including Defence of Nieppe Forest 
The Battle of Bailleul (88 Brigade, with 34
th
 Division) 
The First Battle of Kemmel (88 Brigade) 
The Advance in Flanders 
Action of Outtersteene Ridge (87 Brigade) 
Capture of Ploegsteert and Hill 63 (86 and 88 Brigades) 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
The Battle of Courtrai 
 
The Division was withdrawn to rest on 24 October 1918. On 7 November 1918 it transferred (via XV Corps) from 
II Corps to X Corps. 
 
86 Brigade    Brigadier-General G R H Cheape 
 
2
nd
 Battalion, Royal Fusiliers 
1
st
 Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers 
1
st 
Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
86
th
 Trench mortar Battery 
 
87 Brigade   Brigadier-General G H N Jackson 
 
2
nd
 Battalion, South Wales Borders 
1
st
 Battalion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers 
1
st
 Battalion, the Border 
87
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
88 Brigade   Brigadier-General B C Freyberg VC 
 
4
th
 Battalion, the Worcesters 
2
nd
 Battalion, the Hampshire 
2
nd
 Battalion, the Leinster* 
88
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
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Division troops 
1/2
nd
 (Pioneer) Battalion, the Monmouthshire 
No 29 Machine Gun Battalion 
455
th
, 497
th
, 510
th
 Field Companies 
1
st
 London Signals Company 
87
th
, 88
th
, 89
th
 Field Ambulance 
29
th
 Divisional Train ASC (225, 226, 227, 228 Companies) 
226
th
 Divisional Employment Company 
18
th
 Mobile Veterinary Section 
XV Brigade RHA,  XVII Brigade RFA 
X29, Y29 Medium Mortar Batteries 
29
th
 Ammunition Column 
 
 
* The Battalion joined the Brigade on 23 April 1918 from 47 Brigade, 16
th
 Division 
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30
th
 Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
Major-General W Williams 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
First Battle of Kemmel (89 Brigade) 
The Second Battle of Kemmel (89 Brigade) 
The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
The Battle of Courtrai 
 
    
21 Brigade   Brigadier-General G D Goodman   
    
7
th
 Battalion, (South Irish Horse) Royal Irish  
1/6
th
 Battalion, Cheshire Regiment 
2/23
rd
 Battalion, (County of London) London Regiment  
21
st
 Trench Mortar Battery  
    
89 Brigade   Brigadier-General Hon. F C Stanley 
    From 11 April 1918 
Lieutenant-Colonel G Rollo (Acting) 
From 12 April 1918 
Brigadier-General R A M Currie 
From 27 August 1918 
Lieutenant-Colonel R A Irvine (Acting) 
From 15 September 1918 
Brigadier-General R A M Currie 
          
7/8
th
 Battalion, (Service) Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers   
2
nd
 Battalion, South Lancashire     
2/17
th
 Battalion, (County of London) London Regiment  
89
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
     
90 Brigade (‘The Grey Brigade’) Lieutenant-Colonel H S Poyntz (Acting) 
From 26 March 1918 
Brigadier-General G A Stevens 
From 11 August 1918 
Lieutenant-Colonel R J L Ogilby (Acting) 
From 18 August 1918 
Brigadier-General G A Stevens 
   
2/14
th
 Battalion, (County of London) (London Scottish) London Regiment  
2/15
th
 Battalion, (County of London) (Prince of Wales’ Own Civil Service Rifles) London 
Regiment*    
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2/16
th
 Battalion, (County of London) (Queen’s Westminster Rifles) London Regiment  
90
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
    
Division       
6
th
 (Service) (Pioneers) Battalion, South Wales Borderers  
No 30 Machine Gun Battalion    
201
st
, 202
nd
, 203
rd
 (County Palatine) Field Companies      
30
th
 Signals Company     
96
th
, 97
th
, 98
th
 Field Ambulance           
30
th
 Divisional Train ASC (186, 187, 188, 189 Companies)     
227
th
 Divisional Employment Company  
40
th
 Mobile Veterinary Section    
30
th
 Divisional Workshops     
CXLIX, CXLVIII Brigades RFA    
X30, Y30 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA   
30
th
 Ammunition Column     
 
*The Battalion travelled from Egypt in June 1918, joining the Division at the start of July. 
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31
st
 Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
Major-General R Wanless O’Gowan 
From 21 March 1918 
Major-General R J Bridgford 
From 6 May 1918 
Major-General J Campbell 
 
With XV Corps for the Final Advance in Flanders, the Division transferred to II Corps for The Action of Tiegham 
(31 October). On 3 November the Division was transferred into Army Reserve. On 5 November it was placed 
under XIX Corps. 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
(The Battle of Estaires - first phase of the Battles of the Lys – under First Army) 
 The Battle of Hazebrouck – including the Defence of Nieppe Forest 
The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
The Action of Tieghem 
 
 
92 Brigade*   Brigadier-General O De L Williams 
   
10
th
 (Service) (1
st
 Hull) Battalion, East Yorkshires   
11
th
 (Service) (2
nd
 Hull) Battalion, East Yorkshires   
11
th
 (Service) (Accrington) Battalion, East Lancashire  
92
nd
 Trench Mortar Battery         
   
93 Brigade*  Brigadier-General J D Ingles (sick, 27 March 1918) 
From 27 March 1918 
    Lieutenant-Colonel G H Gurney (Acting) 
From 27 March 1918 
Lieutenant-Colonel R D Temple (Acting) 
From 5 April 
Brigadier-General S C Taylor  
(wounded 1 October 1918, died 11 October 1918) 
From 1 October 1918 
Lieutenant-Colonel A V Nutt (Acting) 
From 1 October 1918 
Lieutenant-Colonel A W Rickman (Acting) 
From 4 October 1918 
Brigadier-General G B F Smyth 
   
15
th
 (Service) (1
st
 Leeds) Battalion, the West Yorkshires      
18
th
 (Service) (1
st
 County) Battalion, Durham Light Infantry 
13
th
 (Service) (1
st
 Barnsley) Battalion, York and Lancaster  
93
rd
 Trench Mortar Battery 
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94 (Yeomanry) Brigade** Brigadier-General A Symons (sick, 3 November 1918) 
From 3 November 1918 
    Lieutenant-Colonel J Sherwood-Kelly VC (Acting) 
From 12 November 
Brigadier-General Hon L J P Butler  
     
12
th
 (Norfolk Yeomanry) TF Battalion, the Norfolks  
12
th
 (Ayr & Lanark Yeomanry) TF Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers     
24
th
 (Denbighshire Yeomanry) TF Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
94
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
    
Division      
12
th
 (Service) (Miners) (Pioneers) Battalion, King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
No 31 Machine Gun Battalion    
210
th
, 211
th
, 212
th
 (Leeds) Field Companies     
31st Signals Company     
93
rd
, 94
th
, 95th Field Ambulance          
31st Divisional Train ASC (221, 222, 223, 279 Companies)    
228
th
 Divisional Employment Company    
41
st
 Mobile Veterinary Section    
CLXV, CLXX Brigades RFA   
X31, Y31 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA   
31
st
 Ammunition Column     
 
* 92 Composite Brigade: On 16 April 1918 it was decided that, due to the heavy casualties recently sustained, the 
92 and 93 Brigades would be temporarily amalgamated and called the 92 Composite Brigade. It was broken up two 
days later, and the 92 and 93 Brigades were reconstituted soon after. 
 
** 94 Brigade (originally 115 Brigade) was broken up between 11-17 February 1918 and replaced by 4 Guards 
Brigade; on 20 May 1918, this Brigade was transferred to GHQ Reserve. 94 Brigade was reformed on 30 May 
1918 and joined 31
st
 Division the following day. The Brigade was reconstituted on 21 June 1918 with three 
Battalions from 74
th
 (Yeomanry) Division (the Broken Spur Division) and designated 94 (Yeomanry) Brigade. 
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33
rd
 Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
Major General P Wood 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The Battle of Messines, 1918 (100
th
 Brigade) 
The Battle of Hazebrouck  
The Battle of Bailleul (100
th
 Brigade) including the Defence of Neuve Eglise 
The First Battle of Kemmel including the recapture of Ridge Wood 
 
98 Brigade 
4
th
 (Extra Reserve) Battalion, the King's (Liverpool)  
1
st
 Battalion, the Middlesex  
2
nd
 Battalion, the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders  
98
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
100 Brigade 
16
th
 (Service) Battalion (Church Lads Brigade), the King's Royal Rifle Corps  
2
nd
 Battalion, the Worcesters  
1/9
th
 Battalion (Glasgow Highlanders), the Highland Light Infantry  
100
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
19 Brigade 
1
st
 Battalion, the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)  
5
th
/6
th
 Battalion, the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)  
1
st
 Battalion, the Queen's  
19
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
Division troops 
18
th
 (Service) Battalion (1st Public Works Pioneers), the Middlesex 
CLVI Brigade RFA  
CLXII Brigade RFA 
33
rd
 Divisional Ammunition Column 
X.33, Y.33 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA  
212
th
, 222
nd
, 11
th
,  Field Companies RE (Tottenham)  
33
rd
 Signal Company RE (Tottenham)  
19
th
, 99
th
, 101
st
  Field Ambulance  
33
rd
 Machine Gun Battalion MGC  
33
rd
 Divisional Train ASC (170, 171, 173, 8 Companies) 
43
rd
 Mobile Veterinary Section AVC  
230
th
 Divisional Employment Company  
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34
th
 Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
Major-General C L Nicholson 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The Battle of Estaires  
The Battle of Messines, 1918 (102
nd
 Brigade) 
The Battle of Bailleul  
The First Battle of Kemmel 
 
The Division suffered very severe casualties during its part in the defence of Kemmel, and was withdrawn and 
reorganised. In mid-May 1918 the Divisional infantry was reduced to a training cadre, and used for training 
American troops. Many reduced units were attached for short periods at this time. It was reconsituted as a full first-
line Division late in June 1918 
 
(The Battle of the Soissonnais and of the Ourcq, the Capture of Beugneux Ridge – attached to 
French XXX Corps) 
 
The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
The Battle of Courtrai 
The Actions of Ooteghem and Tieghem 
 
On 1 November the Division was withdrawn into Corps Reserve. 
 
101 Brigade  Brigadier-General R G Gore (killed, 14 April 1918) 
From 14 April 1918 
    Lieutenant-Colonel A Stephenson (Acting) 
From 23 April 
Brigadier-General W J Woodstock 
 
15
th
 (Service) Battalion (1st Edinburgh) , the Royal Scots (left May 1918) 
16
th
 (Service) Battalion (2nd Edinburgh) , the Royal Scots (left May 1918) 
2/4
th
 Battalion (TF), the Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment) (joined June 1918) 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Suffolks (left May 1918)  
2
nd
 Battalion, the Loyal North Lancs (joined June 1918) 
4
th
 Battalion, Royal Sussex 
101
st
 Trench Mortar Battery (broken up 16 May 1918 and reformed 2 July 1918)  
 
102 Brigade (Tyneside Scottish) Brigadier-General N A Thomson 
 From 21 May 
 Brigadier-General E Hilliam 
 
22
nd
 (Service) Battalion , the Northumberland Fusiliers (left June 1918) 
23
rd
 (Service) Battalion , the Northumberland Fusiliers (left June 1918) 
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25
th
 (Service) Battalion , the Northumberland Fusiliers (left June 1918) 
1/4
th
 Battalion, the Lincolns (joined June 1918, left June 1918) 
1/4
th
 Battalion, the Cheshires (joined July 1918) 
1/7
th
 Battalion, the Cheshires (joined July 1918) 
7/8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (joined June 1918 as a cadre, left June 1918) 
1/1
st
 Battalion, the Herefordshire (joined June 1918) 
102
nd
 Trench Mortar Battery (broken up 16 May 1918 and reformed 10 July 1918)  
 
103 Brigade (Tyneside Irish) Brigadier-General J G Chaplin 
 From 31 August 
 Brigadier-General R I Rawson 
 
10
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Lincolns (left June 1918) 
1/5
th
 (Dumfries and Galloway) Battalion, the King's Own Scottish Borderers (joined June 1918) 
1/8
th
 Battalion, the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) (joined June 1918) 
6
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (joined and left June 1918) 
1
st
 Battalion, the East Lancashire (left May 1918) 
1/5
th
 (Renfrewshire) Battalion, the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (joined June 1918) 
103
rd
 Trench Mortar Battery (broken up 16 May 1918 and reformed 1 July 1918)  
 
Division troops 
18
th
 (Service) Battalion , the Northumberland Fusiliers (left June 1918) 
2/4
th
 Battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry (joined June 1918) 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Yorkshire (joined and left as a cadre, June1918) 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion (Wandsworth), the East Surreys (joined and left as cadre, June 1918) 
2/5
th
 Battalion, the Sherwood Foresters (joined and left as a cadre June 1918) 
21
st
 (Service) Battalion (Islington), the Middlesex (joined and left as a cadre June 1918) 
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the King's Royal Rifle Corps (joined and left as a cadre June 1918) 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the King's Royal Rifle Corps (joined and left as a cadre June 1918) 
1/5
th
 Bn, the North Staffords(joined and left as a cadre June 1918) 
10/11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry(joined and left as a cadre June 1918) 
14
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry(joined and left as a cadre June 1918) 
6
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Connaught Rangers (joined and left as a cadre June 1918) 
6
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Leinster (joined and left June 1918) 
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Rifle Brigade (joined and left June 1918) 
No 34 Machine Gun Battalion 
207
th
, 208
th
, 209
th
 (Norfolk) Field Companies 
34
th
 Signals Company 
102
nd
, 103
rd
, 104
th
 Field Ambulance 
34
th
 Divisional Train ASC (229, 230, 231, 232 Companies) 
231
st
 Divisional Employment Company 
44
th
 Mobile Veterinary Section 
34
th
 Divisional Workshops 
CLII, CLX Brigades RFA 
 X34, Y34 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA 
34
th
 Ammunition Column 
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35
th
 Division 
(New Army Division – originally a bantam formation) 
 
Major-General G McK Franks 
Temporary from 27 March 1918; permanent from 7 April 1918 
Major-General A Marindin  
 
 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
The Battle of Courtrai 
The Action of Tieghem 
 
 
104 Brigade   Brigadier-General J W Sandilands 
 
17
th
 (Service) Battalion (1
st
 South-East Lancs), Lancashire Fusiliers* 
18
th
 (Service) Battalion (2
nd
 South-East Lancs), Lancashire Fusiliers* 
19
th
 (Service) Battalion (2
nd
 County), Durham Light Infantry* 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Northumberland Fusiliers (left May 1918) 
104
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
105 Brigade Brigadier-General A H Marindin 
From 26 March 1918 
    Lieutenant-Colonel W A W Crellin (Acting) 
From 7 April 
Brigadier-General A Carton de Wiert  
(Wounded 20 April 1918) 
From 20 April 1918 
    Lieutenant-Colonel L M Stevens (Acting) 
From 7 April 
Brigadier-General A J Turner 
 
15
th
 (Service) Battalion (1
st
 Birkenhead), the Cheshires* 
15
th
 (Service) Battalion (Nottingham), Sherwood Foresters* 
4
th
 (Extra Reserve) Battalion, North Staffords 
105
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
106 Brigade   Brigadier-General J H W Pollard 
 
17
th
 (Rosebery) Battalion, Royal Scots 
12
th
 (Service) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry 
18
th
 (Service) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry* 
106
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
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Division troops 
19
th
 (Service) Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers** 
No 35 Machine Gun Battalion 
203, 204, 205 Field Companies 
35
th
 Signals Company 
105
th
, 106
th
, 107
th
 Field Ambulance 
35
th
 Divisional Train ASC (233, 234, 235 and 236 Companies) 
CLVII (Aberdeen), CLVIX (Glasgow) Brigades RFA 
X35, Y35 Medium Mortar Batteries 
35th Divisional Ammunition Column (British Empire League) RFA 
   
* These were the original Bantam Battalions  making up the  Brigades and Division since their formation 
** Though not a Bantam formation, the 19/Northumberland Fusiliers had been Pioneers for the Division since its 
formation 
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36
th
 (Ulster) Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
Major-General O Nugent 
From 6 April 1918 
Major-General C Coffin VC 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The Battle of Messines, 1918 (108 Brigade) 
The Battle of Bailleul (108 Brigade) 
The First Battle of Kemmel (108 Brigade) 
The Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
The Battle of Courtrai 
 
On 28 October the Division was relieved of frontline duty and transferred from II Corps to X Corps. 
On 9 November the Division was transferred to XV Corps. 
 
107 Brigade   Brigadier-General W M Withycombe  
From 30 April 1918 
Brigadier-General E I de S Thorpe 
(Wounded 13 September 1918) 
From 14 September 1918 
    Lieutenant-Colonel R H MacKenzie (Acting) 
From 28 September 1918 
Brigadier-General H J Brock 
 
1
st
 Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles 
2
nd
 Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles 
15
th
 (Service) Battalion (North Belfast), Royal Irish Rifles  
107
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
108 Brigade   Brigadier-General C R J Griffith  
From 21 May 1918 
Brigadier-General E Vaughn 
 
12
th
 (Service) Battalion (Central Antrim), Royal Irish Rifles 
1
st
 Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers 
108
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
109 Brigade   Brigadier-General W F Hessey 
    (Injured 16 April 1918) 
From 16 April 1918 
Lieutenant-Colonel J E Knott (Acting) 
From 21 April 1918 
Brigadier-General E Vaughn (Temporary) 
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From 17 May 1918 
Brigadier-General W F Hessey 
 
1
st
 Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
2
nd
 Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
9
th
 (Service) Battalion (County Tyrone), Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
109
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
Division troops 
16
th
 (Service) Battalion (2
nd
 County Down) (Pioneers), Royal Irish Rifles 
No 36 Machine Gun Battalion 
121
st
, 122
nd
, 150
th
 Field Companies 
36
th
 Signals Company 
108
th
, 109
th
, 110th Field Ambulance 
36
th
 Divisional Train ASC (251, 252, 253 and 254 HT Companies) 
223rd Divisional Employment Company 
36
th
 Divisional Workshops 
CLIII, CLXXIII Brigades RFA 
X36, Y36 Medium Mortar (6x6inch) Batteries RFA 
36
th
 Ammunition Column 
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39
th
 Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
From 20 August 1917 until killed in action on 29 March 1918; he is buried in Picquigny British Cemetery 
Major General E. Feetham 
From 30 March 1918 to August 1918 
Major General C Blacklock 
A number of Brigadiers General took acting or temporary command: 
From 7-18 March 1918, when he was killed in action; he is buried in Peronne Communal Cemetery Extension 
Brigadier General G Cape 
From 18-23 March 1918 
Brigadier General M. Hornby 
29-30 March 1918 
Brigadier General W. Thompson 
 
The Battles of the Lys  
The First Battle of Kemmel  
The Second Battle of Kemmel  
As a consequence of the Division’s losses after the Spring 1918 fighting, it was not reconstituted as a fighting unit, 
and became a training formation for American troops arriving in France 
 
Only those units involved in the Battles of the Lys are listed below 
 
116 Brigade 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion (1st South Down), the Royal Sussex (left as a cadre June 1918) 
13
th
 (Service) Bn (3rd South Down), the Royal Sussex (left as a cadre June 1918) 
1/1
st
 Battalion, the Hertfordshire (left 9 May 1918) 
116
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
117 Brigade 
16
th
 (Service) Battalion (Chatsworth Rifles), the Sherwood Foresters (left as a cadre 16 August 
1918) 
17
th
 (Service) Battalion (British Empire League), the King's Royal Rifle Corps (left as a cadre 
16 August 1918) 
16
th
 (Service) Battalion (St. Pancras), the Rifle Brigade (left as a cadre August 1918) 
117
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
118 Brigade 
1/6
th
 Battalion, the Cheshires (left 28 May 1918) 
4/5
th
 Battalion, the Black Watch*  
1/1
st
 Battalion, the Cambridgeshire (joined 29 February 1916, left 9 May 1918) 
118
th
 Trench Mortar Battery (formed from two existing TM Sections that had existed since 7 
April 1916, by 1 July 1916) 
 
* This Battalion resulted from the amalgamation of 1/4
th
 and 1/5
th
 Battalions in March 1916; it became 1/4
th
 again 
6 May 1918, left 14 May 1918) 
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39
th
 Division Composite Brigade 
Formed on 10 April 1918 under the command of Brigadier General A Hubback after the Division suffered heavy 
losses - fought in the battles of the Lys, attached to XXII Corps - returned to the Division and the troops deployed 
to former units by 6 May 1918 
1
st
 Battalion (formed from remnants of 11
th
 Royal Sussex and 1/1
st
 Hertfordshire) 
2
nd
 Battalion (formed from remnants of 13
th
 Gloucestershire and 13
th
 Royal Sussex) 
3
rd
 Battalion (formed from remnants of 117 Brigade) 
4
th
 Battalion (formed from remnants of 118 Brigade) 
5
th
 Battalion (formed from remnants of all three Brigades) 
118
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
No 4 (287) Company, 39th Divisional Train ASC 
 
Division troops 
13th (Service) Battalion (Forest of Dean) (Pioneers), the Gloucesters (left as a cadre by 6 May 
1918) 
CLXXIV, CLXXXVI (H) Brigades, RFA 
39th Divisional Ammunition Column RFA 
X.39, Y.39 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA  
132
nd
, 133
rd
, 134
th
 Field Ambulance 
225
th
, 227
th
, 234
th
 Field Company (Stockton-on-Tees 
39
th
 Divisional Signal Company (Empire)  
39
th
 Divisional Train (284, 285, 286, 287 Companies ASC)  
236
th
 Divisional Employment Company  
50
th
 Mobile Veterinary Section, AVC  
No 39 Machine Gun Battalion (Left for 40th Division 11 September 1918) 
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40
th
 Division 
(New Army Bantam Division)* 
 
Major General J Ponsonby 
From 3 July 1918 
Major General Sir W E Peyton 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The Battle of Estaires 
The Battle of Hazebrouck  
Following losses in this battle the Division was reduced to a training cadre - a major reorganisation took place, 
with battalions that had been Garrison Guard units joining and being converted to fighting units. Orders on 14 June 
1918 stated that the formation would be a ‘Garrison Division’ (semi-mobile) and ‘required to hold a quiet sector of 
the line’, with training focused on that role.   
Note: On 13 July, via a Divisional Order, each Garrison battalion in the Division had the word deleted from its title 
with immediate effect. 
The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
 
During the night of 10-11 November, 29
th
 Division (II Corps, Second Army) and 59
th
 Division (Fifth Army) linked 
up in front of XV Corps, assuming responsibility for the line – XV Corps including 40th Division was withdrawn 
into Reserve. 
 
119 Brigade (Welsh Bantams) Brigadier-General F P Crozier 
 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion (Wandsworth), the East Surreys (left as cadre June 1918) 
18
th
 (Service) Battalion (2
nd
 Glamorgan), the Welsh (left as a cadre May 1918) 
21
st
 (Service) Battalion (Islington), the Middlesex (left as a cadre May 1918) 
12
th
 (Service) Battalion, the North Staffords (joined June 1918 as 12
th
 (Garrison) Battalion) 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion, East Lancashire (joined 1918 as 8th Garrison Guard Battalion) 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion, Inniskilling 
119
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
120 Brigade Brigadier-General Hon. C S Heathcote-Drummond-Willoughby 
From 15 March 1918 
  Lieutenant-Colonel R F Forbes (Acting) 
From 23 March 1918 
Brigadier-General C J Hobkirk 
From 18 October 1918 
Brigadier-General Hon. W P Hore-Ruthuen 
 
2
nd
 Battalion, the Royal Scots Fusiliers (joined April 1918, left April 1918) 
10/11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry (left as a cadre June 1918) 
14
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry (left as a cadre June 1918) 14
th
 (Service) 
Battalion, the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (left April 1918) 
10
th
 (Service) Battalion, the King's Own Scottish Borderers (joined June 1918)** 
15
th
 (Service) Battalion, the KOYLI (joined June 1918) 
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11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Cameron Highlanders (joined as 6
th
 Garrison Guard Battalion June 
1918) 
120
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
121 Brigade Brigadier-General J Campbell 
From 27 April 1918 
  Lieutenant-Colonel L Lloyd (Acting) 
From 6 May 1918 
Brigadier-General W B Garnett 
From 17 September 1918 
Brigadier-General G C Stubbs 
 
12
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Suffolks (left May 1918)  
13
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Yorkshire (left June1918)*** 
20
th
 (Service) Battalion (Shoreditch), the Middlesex (left as cadre May 1918) 
23
rd 
TF Battalion, the Cheshires (joined as a Garrison Battalion, June 1918) 
10
th
 Battalion, the Worcesters (joined as a training cadre June 1918, absorbed July 1918) 
23
rd
 Battalion, the Lancashire Fusiliers (joined as 23
rd
 Garrison Battalion, June 1918)  
8
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Royal Irish (joined as 2
nd
 Garrison Battalion, June1918)**** 
121
st
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
Division troops 
12
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Yorkshire (left June 1918) 
17
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Worcesters (joined as a Garrison Battalion in June 1918) 
 No 40 Machine Gun Battalion (created March 1918, disbanded May 1918) 
No 104 Machine Gun Battalion (joined 24 August 1918, left 16 September 1918) 
No 39 Machine Gun Battalion (joined 11 September 1918) 
224
th
, 229
th
, 231
st
 Field Companies 
40
th
 Signals Company 
135
th
, 136
th
, 137
th
  Field Ambulance 
40
th
 Divisional Train ASC (292, 293, 294, 295 Companies) 
237
th
 Divisional Employment Company 
51
st
 Mobile Veterinary Section 
CLXXVIII (Howitzer) Brigade RFA 
CLXXXI Brigade RFA 
X40, Y40 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA 
40
th
 Ammunition Column 
 
 
* Although in order to make it ready for deployment to the Western Front in 1916, it included four ‘non-Bantam’ 
Battalions  
** The Battalion was formed as 9
th
 Garrison Battalion, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers; it was designated as the 
10
th
 Battalion on 15 June 1918 
*** The 8th (Service) Battalion, the Sherwood Foresters merged with 13th Yorkshire in April 1916 
**** The Battalion was designated as 8
th
 Battalion, the Royal Irish on 15 July 1918 
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41
st
 Division 
(New Army Division) 
 
Major-General S T B Lawford 
 
The Advance in Flanders 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
The Battle of Ypres 1918 
The Battle of Courtrai 
The Action of Ooteghem. 
 
On 26-27 October the Division was relieved from front line duty and moved to rest around Courtrai. On 1 
November the Division reoccupied part of the front line under XIX Corps; on 9 November the Division carried out 
a passage of the Schelde, establishing outposts on the eastern bank. 
 
122 Brigade   Brigadier-General F W Towsey 
From 8 June 1918 
Brigadier-General S V P Weston 
 
12
th
 (Service) Battalion, (Bermondsey) East Surreys 
15
th
 (Service) Battalion, (2
nd
 Portsmouth) Hampshire 
18
th
 (Service) Battalion (Arts and Crafts), King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
122
nd
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
123 Brigade   Brigadier-General E Pearce Serocold 
From 23 June 1918 
Brigadier-General M Kemp-Welch 
 
11
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Queen’s (Royal West Surrey Regiment) 
10
th
 (Service) Battalion (Kent County), Royal West Kents 
23
rd
 (Service) (2
nd
 Football) Battalion, Middlesex 
123
rd
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
124 Brigade   Brigadier-General W F Clemson 
From 21 June 1918 
Brigadier-General R L Aldercron 
 
10
th
 (Service) Battalion, Queen’s 
26
th
 (Service) Battalion, Royal Fusiliers 
20
th
 (Service) Battalion (Wearside), Durham Light Infantry 
124
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
 
Division 
19
th
 (Service) (Pioneers) (2
nd
 Public Works) (Pioneers) Battalion, the Middlesex 
No 41 Machine Gun Battalion 
228
th
 (Barnsley), 233
rd
 (Ripon), 237
th
 (Reading) Field Companies 
41
st
 Signals Company 
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138
th
, 139
th
, 140
th
 Field Ambulance 
41
st
 Divisional Train ASC (296, 297, 298, 299 Companies) 
52
nd
 Mobile Veterinary Section 
41
st
 Divisional Workshops 
CLXXXIII, CLXXXVII Brigades RFA 
X41, Y41 Trench Mortar Batteries 
41st Ammunition Column 
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49
th
 (West Riding) Division 
(Territorial Force Division) 
 
Major General N Cameron  
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The Battle of Messines, 1918  
The Battle of Bailleul including the Defence of Neuve Eglise 
The First Battle of Kemmel 
The Second Battle of Kemmel  
 
146 (West Riding) Brigade 
1/5
th
 Battalion, the West Yorkshires  
1/6
th
 Battalion, the West Yorkshires  
1/7
th
 Battalion, the West Yorkshires  
146
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
147 (2
nd
 West Riding) Brigade 
1/4
th
 Battalion, the Duke of Wellington's  
1/6
th
 Battalion, the Duke of Wellington's  
1/7
th
 Battalion, the Duke of Wellington's  
147
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
  
148 (3
rd
 West Riding) Brigade 
1/4
th
 Battalion, the KOYLI  
1/4
th
 (Hallamshire) Battalion, the York and Lancaster  
1/5
th
 Battalion, the York and Lancaster  
148
th
 Trench Mortar Battery (formed 12 June1916) 
 
Division Troops  
19
th
 (Service) Battalion (3rd Salford) (Pioneers) , the Lancashire Fusiliers  
No 49 Machine Gun Battalion  
CCXLV (I West Riding), CCXLVI (II West Riding) Brigades, RFA  
49
th
 (West Riding) Divisional Ammunition Column 
X.49, Y.49 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA 
57
th
 , 56
th
 (renamed from 2nd (West Riding) Field Company), 458
th
 (renamed from 2/1st (West Riding) Field 
Company) Field Companies 
49
th
 Divisional Signal Company (renamed from 1st West Riding Divisional Signal Company) 
1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 (West Riding) Field Ambulance 
49
th
 Divisional Train ASC (463, 464, 465, 466 Companies) ( redesignated from the 1st West Riding 
Divisional Train) 
243
rd
 Divisional Employment Company  
1
st
 West Riding Mobile Veterinary Section  
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50
th
 (Northumbrian) Division 
(Territorial Force Division) 
 
Major General H Jackson 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The Battle of Estaires 
The Battle of Hazebrouck 
The Division was subsequently withdrawn and sent to IX Corps, then on the Aisne, as this was believed to be a 
much quieter area - this was not the case and the Division was hit by a surprise enemy attack – after  
suffering particularly heavy casualties during the Battle of the Aisne, 1918, the Division was substantially 
reorganised. 
Only those units involved in the Battles of the Lys are listed below 
 
149 (Northumberland) Brigade 
1/4
th
 Bn, the Northumberland Fusiliers  
1/5
th
 Bn, the Northumberland Fusiliers  
1/6
th
 Bn, the Northumberland Fusiliers  
149
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
150 (York and Durham) Brigade 
1/4
th
 Bn, the East Yorkshires 
1/4
th
 Bn, the Yorkshire  
1/5
th
 Bn, the Yorkshire  
150
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
151 (Durham Light Infantry) Brigade 
1/5
th
 Bn, the Durham Light Infantry  
1/6
th
 Bn, the Durham Light Infantry  
1/8
th
 Bn, the Durham Light Infantry  
150
th
 Trench Mortar Battery  
 
Division troops 
1/7
th
 Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry  
No 50 Machine Gun Battalion 
CCL (I Northumbrian), CCLI (II Northumbrian) Brigades RFA  
50
th
 (Northumbrian) Divisional Ammunition Column 
X.50, Y.50 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA 
7th Field Company (joined June 1915) 
446
th
 (renamed from 1st (Northumbrian) Field Company), 447
th
 (renamed from 2nd (Northumbrian) Field 
Company) Field Company 
50
th
 Divisional Signal Company (renamed from 1st Northumbrian Divisional Signal Company) 
1
st
, 3
rd
, 2/2
nd
 (Northumbrian) Field Ambulance  
50
th
 Divisional Train ASC (redesignated from the 1st Northumbrian Divisional Train) (467, 468, 469, 
470 Companies) 
244
th
 Divisional Employment Company  
1
st
 Northumbrian Mobile Veterinary Section  
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59
th
 (2
nd
 North Midland) Division 
(2
nd
 Line Territorial Force Division) 
 
Major General C Romer 
 From 26 January1918 
Brigadier General C James  
From19 June 1918  
Major General Sir R Whigham  
From 28 August 1918 
Major General N Smyth VC 
 
The Battles of the Lys 
The Battle of Bailleul  
The First Battle of Kemmel*  
 
In early May 1918, the infantry and pioneer battalions, brigade trench mortar batteries and machine-gun battalion 
were reduced to training cadre establishment. All surplus men were sent to the Base or drafted to other units. The 
Division was reconstituted as a 2nd-Line unit and made up to strength with Garrison Guard battalions. It was 
placed on rear defence construction during June 1918. The 59th was then again reconstituted as a Garrison 
Division, and underwent training to enable it to hold a sector of front line again. The Division took over a sector on 
25th July 1918. 
 
The Battle of Albert (the Second Battles of the Somme 1918) 
The Final Advances in Artois and Flanders (XI Corps, Fifth Army) 
 
176 Brigade (2
nd
 Staffordshire) 
25
th
 TF Battalion, the King's (Liverpool) (joined June 1918) 
4
th
 Provisional Garrison Battalion , the Lancashire Fusiliers (joined May 1918, left as 23rd 
Garrison Battalion, June 1918 ) 
4
th
 Garrison Guard Battalion, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (joined May 1918, became 26
th
 
Battalion July 1918) 
17
th
 (Garrison) Battalion, the Royal Sussex (joined May 1918, became 17
th
 (Service) Battalion 
July 1918) 
2/6
th
 Battalion, the South Staffordshire (left as a cadre May 1918) 
1/5
th
 Battalion, the North Staffords(left as a cadre May 1918) 
2/6
th
 Battalion, the North Staffords(left as a cadre May 1918) 
176
th
 Trench Mortar Battery (disbanded 8 May 1918, reformed 11 July 1918) 
 
177 Brigade (2
nd
 Lincoln and Leicester) 
1/4
th
 Battalion, the Lincolns (left June 1918) 
2/5
th
 Battalion, the Lincolns (left May 1918) 
11
th
 Battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry (joined May 1918) 
2/4
th
 Battalion, the Leicesters (left May 1918) 
13
th
 (Garrison) Battalion, the Duke of Wellington's (joined May 1918, left June 1918) 
15
th
 TF Battalion, the Essex (joined May 1918) 
2/6
th
 Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry (joined as Garrison Guard Bn May 1918) 
177
th
 Trench Mortar Battery (disbanded 8 May 1918, reformed 17 August 1918) 
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178 Brigade (2
nd
 Notts & Derby) 
35
th
 TF Battalion , the Northumberland Fusiliers, (joined May 1918) 
8
th
 Garrison Battalion, the Royal Irish (joined as 2nd (Home Service) Garrison Battalion, April 
1918, left June1918) 
11
th
 TF Battalion, the Royal Scots Fusiliers (joined May 1918) 
23
rd
 TF (Garrison Guard) Battalion, the Cheshires (joined May 1918, left June 1918) 
13
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Duke of Wellington's (joined June 1918 as 13th (Garrison) 
Battalion) 
1/7
th
 (Robin Hood) Battalion, the Sherwood Foresters (left as a cadre May 1918) 
2/5
th
 Battalion, the Sherwood Foresters (left as a cadre June 1918) 
2/6
th
 Battalion, the Sherwood Foresters (left as a cadre May 1918) 
178
th
 Trench Mortar Battery (disbanded 7 May 1918, reformed 24 June1918) 
 
Division Troops 
6/7
th
 (Service) Battalion, the Royal Scots Fusiliers (left as a cadre June 1918) 
25
th
 (Service) Battalion (Pioneers), the King's Royal Rifle Corps (joined May 1918) 
No 59 Machine Gun Battalion (created 7 March 1918, reduced to cadre and eventually 
disbanded May 1918) 
No 25 Machine Gun Battalion (joined 23 July 1918, left 19 Oct 1918) 
CCXCV, CCXCVI Brigades RFA  
59
th
 Divisional Ammunition Column 
X.59, Y.59 Medium Mortar Batteries RFA  
467
th
 (renamed from 1/3rd (North Midland)), 469
th
 (renamed from 2/2nd (North Midland)), 
470
th
 (renamed from 3/1st (North Midland)) Field Companies 
59
th
 Divisional Signal Company (renamed from 2/1st (North Midland) Field Company) 
2/1
st
, 2/2
nd
, 2/3
rd
 North Midland Field Ambulance  
59
th
 Divisional Train ASC (513, 514, 515, 616 Companies) 
250
th
 Divisional Employment Company 
59
th
 Mobile Veterinary Section  
 
 
* James’ Force (around 2,000 troops of 59th Division) served from 16-19 April 1918, with 49th Division, IX 
Corps, Second Army 
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A6 Second Army: Supporting and Attached Units 
 
3
rd
 Cavalry Division 
Major General Harmon 
(Joined Second Army on 9
th
 November 1918) 
 
The Final Advance in Flanders 
 
6 Cavalry Brigade [Brigadier General E Paterson] 
3
rd
 Dragoon Guards 
Royal Dragoons 
10
th
 Hussars 
C Battery RHA 
6 Cavalry Brigade Machine Gun Squadron  
6 Signal Troop 
 
7 Cavalry Brigade [Brigadier General Burt] 
6
th
 Inniskilling Dragoons 
7
th
 Dragoon Guards 
17
th
 Lancers 
K Battery RHA 
7 Cavalry Brigade Machine Gun Sqn 
7 Signal Troop 
 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade [Brigadier General R Paterson] 
Royal Canadian Dragoons 
Lord Strathcona’s Horse 
Fort Garry Horse  
Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Brigade 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Machine Gun Sqn 
 
IV Brigade RHA and Ammunition Column 
3 Field Squadron RE  
3 Signal Troop 
6
th
, 7
th
, 8
th
 Canadian Field Ambulances 
13
th
, 14
th
 ‘A’ Canadian Mobile Vetinary Sections 
773 Divisional Employment Company 
81 (Horse Transport) Divisional ASC 
73 (Mechanical Transport) Supply Column 
576 Divisional Auxiliary Company 
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4
th
 Tank Brigade – 4
th
, 5
th
 and 13
th
 Tank Battalions (Lewis Guns)  
 
XXII Corps mounted troops 
 
1
st
 Australian Division  
 
American 27
th
 Division 
 
American 30
th
 Division  
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A7 French Army: Flanders, October 1918 
 
Detachement d’Armee du Nord (French Army) 
 
CinC  General de Mitry 
 
French 164
th
 Division (deployed as reserve to Belgian Army Southern Groupement) 
 
French II Cavalry Corps General Robillot 
2
nd
 Cavalry Division 
3
rd
 Cavalry Division  
6
th
 Cavalry Division 
 
French VII Corps General Massenet  
5
th
 Division 
41
st
 Division 
     
French XXXIV Corps General Mudant  
70
th
 Division 
77
th
 Division 
128
th
 Division (Reserve) 
 
On 19 October, the new French Sixth Army under General de Boissoudy entered the line. This 
consisted of VII and XXXIV Corps plus XXX Corps (5
th
 and 132
nd
 Divisions), under General 
Peney)  
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A8 Belgian Army 
 
By the end of 1914, the Belgian army was exhausted and decimated: only 85000 of the original 117000 soldiers of 
the field army and the 80000 Troupes de Forteresse reached the river Yser. Regiments that had been split on 
mobilisation to form a second unit had to be merged to maintain their strength. The army was desperately in need 
of new recruits. In a first appeal (26 October 1914) King Albert asked every Belgian male between the age of 18 
and 30 to volunteer. The government in exile decided on March 1 1915, that every male between the age of 18 and 
25 and living in Belgium, France or England was obliged to enlist (although there were also volunteers from 
Belgians living abroad); on 21 July 1916 this was extended up to the age of 40.  
In addition many Belgians living in occupied territory, made the risky journey across the Belgian - Dutch border to 
enlist. This journey was extremely dangerous and many were shot by German patrols. Eventually the Germans 
erected electrified fences on the entire length of the border, although many Belgians still made the attempt. From 
Holland they went to England and to training camps in France. 
In January 1918 the Belgian Army was reorganised: the initial brigades were abolished and each of the 6 'divisions 
d'armée' was to be composed of 2 'divisions d'infanterie' (each comprising 3 regiments). The cavalry division had 3 
brigades with each 2 regiments, 1 group 'd'auto-canons mitrailleuses' , 2 battalions of cyclists, 3 batteries of 7.5 cm 
canons, 1 company of engineers and a platoon of 'télégraphistes sur cycles'. 
 
In 1918, the Belgian army had 
170000 soldiers 
5700 officers 
38000 horses 
850 artillery pieces (not including trench mortars) 
(A further 30000 troops were employed in factories, hospitals etc) 
 
On 28 September 1918 each 'division d'armée' was composed of : 
Quartier Général   
2 divisions d'infanterie   
1 groupement léger   
1 régiment d'artillerie   
1 régiment du génie (2 bataillons)   
1 compagnie de télégraphistes   
1 peloton de projecteurs   
1 peloton de T.S.F.   
1 peloton de fontainiers   
1 corps de transport 
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The Belgian Army 28 September 1918 
Commander    H.R.H. King Albert I 
Ministre de la Guerre  Lieutenant Général Baron de Ceuninck 
Chef d'Etat-major   Lieutenant Général C. Gillain 
Sous-Chef d'Etat-major  Général Maglinse 
Inspecteur de l'Artillerie  Lieutenant Général Arnould 
Inspecteur du Génie   Lieutenant Général Baron Greindl 
Inspecteur du Service de Santé Lieutenant Général Mélis 
 
1’ Division d'Armée    Lieutenant Général Bernheim 
2’ Division d'Armée    Lieutenant Général Drubbel 
3’ Division d'Armée    Lieutenant Général Jacques 
4’ Division d'Armée    Lieutenant Général Michel 
5’ Division d'Armée    Lieutenant Général L Rucquoy 
6’ Division d'Armée    Lieutenant Général Biebuyck 
Division de Cavalerie   Lieutenant General Lemercier 
 
Note: For the attack on 28 September, the Army was deployed in two ‘groupements’ or 
corps: 
North Groupement   Lieutenant Général Bernheim 
South Groupement   Lieutenant Général Biebuyck 
 
Troupes auxiliaires  
Corps de troupes auxiliaires du Génie, (3 groupes, 46 compagnies)   
Troupes d'étapes   
Section de camouflage   
Groupe de batteries de parc   
 
Troupes non endivisionnées   
Brigade d'Artillerie Lourde (2 régiments) 
Bataillon Chemin de fer   
Aviation militaire (11 escadrilles)   
Aérostations militaire (3 compagnies)   
Bataillon des Pontonniers   
Compagnie des Projecteurs   
Equipage de ponts (hipo et auto) 
Groupement des colonnes automobiles auxiliaires   
Service des routes   
 
Brigade d'Artillerie Lourde 
1’ Régiment d'artillerie Lourde   
2’ Régiment d'artillerie Lourde   
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1 Division d'Armée  
Lieutenant Général Bernheim 
 
1’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Lambert   
4’ Régiment de Ligne    Colonel Ouwerx   
23’ Régiment de Ligne     
24’ Régiment de Ligne  Colonel Vanniesbecq   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
1’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
7’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Van Acker   
2’ Régiment de Ligne   
3’ Régiment de Ligne   
22’ Régiment de Ligne   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
7’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
Groupement léger 
1 groupe du 3’ Régiment de Lanciers (2 escadrons)   
1 compagnie de cycliste  
3 autos-mitrailleuses    
 
13’ régiment d'artillerie   
1’ régiment du génie (2 bataillons)   
1 compagnie de télégraphistes   
1 peloton de projecteurs   
1 peloton de T.S.F.   
1 peloton de fontainiers   
1 corps de transport 
 
 
 
2’ Division d'Armée  
Lieutenant Général Drubbel 
 
2’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Cabra   
5’ Régiment de Ligne     
6’ Régiment de Ligne     
15’ Régiment de Ligne   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
2’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
8’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Detail   
7’ Régiment de Ligne   
16’ Régiment de Ligne   
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17’ Régiment de Ligne   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
8’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
Groupement léger 
1 groupe du 3’ Régiment de Lanciers (2 escadrons)   
1 compagnie de cycliste  
3 autos-mitrailleuses    
 
14’ régiment d'artillerie   
2’ régiment du génie (2 bataillons)   
1 compagnie de télégraphistes   
1 peloton de projecteurs   
1 peloton de T.S.F.   
1 peloton de fontainiers   
1 corps de transport 
 
3’ Division d'Armée  
Lieutenant Général Jacques 
 
3’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Joostens   
9’ Régiment de Ligne     
11’ Régiment de Ligne     
12’ Régiment de Ligne   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
3’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
9’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Baltia   
14’ Régiment de Ligne   
1’ Régiment de Ligne   
4’ Régiment de Ligne   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
9’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
Groupement léger 
1 groupe du 2’ Régiment de Lanciers (2 escadrons)   
1 compagnie de cycliste  
3 autos-mitrailleuses    
 
15’ régiment d'artillerie   
3’ régiment du génie (2 bataillons)   
1 compagnie de télégraphistes   
1 peloton de projecteurs   
1 peloton de T.S.F.   
1 peloton de fontainiers   
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1 corps de transport
 
4’ Division d'Armée  
Lieutenant Général Michel 
 
4’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Dechesne  
8’ Régiment de Ligne     
10’ Régiment de Ligne    Colonel Deisser 
18’ Régiment de Ligne   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
4’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
10’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Flebus  
13’ Régiment de Ligne   
19’ Régiment de Ligne   
20’ Régiment de Ligne   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
10’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
Groupement léger 
1 groupe cavalerie du 1’ Régiment de Lanciers (2 escadrons)   
1 compagnie de cycliste  
3 autos-mitrailleuses    
 
16’ régiment d'artillerie   
4’ régiment du génie (2 bataillons)   
1 compagnie de télégraphistes   
1 peloton de projecteurs   
1 peloton de T.S.F.   
1 peloton de fontainiers   
1 corps de transport 
 
5’ Division d’Armée 
Lieutenant Général L Rucquoy 
 
5’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Collyns  
1’ Régiment de Ligne     
21’ Régiment de Ligne     
2’ Régiment de Chasseurs a pied   
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
5’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
11’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Coppejans  
3’ Régiment de Ligne   
5’ Régiment de Ligne   
6’ Régiment de Ligne    Colonel Hoonaert 
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1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
11’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
Groupement léger 
1 groupe cavalerie du 1’ Régiment de Lanciers (2 escadrons)   
1 compagnie de cycliste  
3 autos-mitrailleuses    
 
17’ régiment d'artillerie   
5’ régiment du génie (2 bataillons)   
1 compagnie de télégraphistes   
1 peloton de projecteurs   
1 peloton de T.S.F.   
1 peloton de fontainiers   
1 corps de transport 
 
 
6’ Division d'Armée  
Lieutenant Général Biebuyck 
 
6’ Division d'Infanterie    Général J Collyns  
1’ Régiment de Carabiniers      Colonel B E M Brenrer    
2’ Régiment de Carabiniers        
3’ Régiment de Carabiniers        
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
6’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
12’ Division d'Infanterie    Général Lotz  
4’ Régiment de Carabiniers        
1’ Régiment de Grenadiers       
2’ Régiment de Grenadiers       
1 Bataillon de renfort et d'instruction   
12’ Régiment d'artillerie (3 groupes)   
 
Groupement léger 
1 groupe cavalerie du 2’ Régiment de Lanciers (2 escadrons)   
1 compagnie de cycliste  
3 autos-mitrailleuses    
 
18’ régiment d'artillerie   
6’ régiment du génie (2 bataillons)   
1 compagnie de télégraphistes   
1 peloton de projecteurs   
1 peloton de T.S.F.   
1 peloton de fontainiers   
1 corps de transport 
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Division de Cavalerie 
Lieutenant General Lemercier 
 
1’ Brigade de Cavalerie   Général Baron Buffin   
1’ Régiment de Guides   
2’ Régiment de Guides    Colonel du Roy de Blicquy   
 
 
 
2’ Brigade de Cavalerie   
4’ Régiment de Lanciers   
5’ Régiment de Lanciers   
 
 
3’ Brigade de Cavalerie   
1’ Régiment de Chasseurs à cheval   
2’ Régiment de Chasseurs à cheval   
 
 1’ Bataillon Carabiniers cycliste  
 2’ Bataillon Carabiniers cycliste  
Groupe Artillerie a cheval 
1 Compagnie du Génie  
1 peloton de télégraphistes sur cycles 
Corps de Transport   
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A9 German Army 
 
Sources:  Edmonds, Official History Vol. V  
TNA WO157/128, Second Army Intelligence Summaries, September-November 1918  
 
FAR Field Artillery Regiment   Co Company 
IR Infantry Regiment    RGR Reserve Grenadier Regiment 
RIR Reserve Infantry Regiment   MW Trench Mortar (Minen Werfer) 
RP Reserve Pioneers/Engineers   Ldw Landwehr 
 
The GAF was opposed principally by German Fourth Army (General Friedrich Bertram von 
Armin), which was part of Crown Prince Rupprecht’s Army Group (together with Seventeenth 
and Sixth Armies). As of 26 September 1918, Fourth Army was deployed from north of 
Armentieres to the coast, comprising ten front line divisions and five reserve divisions. 
 
German Divisions facing British Second Army: Battle of Ypres 
28 September 1918 
 
 
Division 
 
Units 
 
 
Location 
 
Comments 
12
th
 Bavarian 26
th
 Bavarian I R 
27
th
 Bavarian I R 
28
th
 Bavarian I R 
 
East of Ypres 
(Mainly opposite the 
Belgians) 
Largely rested 
6
th
 Bavarian Reserve 25
th
 Bavarian I R 
20
th
 Bavarian RI R 
16
th
 Bavarian RI R  
West of  
Wytschaete-Messines 
Fought near 
Bapaume in August 
40
th
 Bavarian Reserve 181
st
 IR 
134
th
 IR 
South of Ypres-
Comines canal 
Involved in 18 July 
offensive 
11
th
 Reserve (Fourth 
Army) 
22
nd
 IR 
156
th
 IR 
10
th
 RIR 
 
Ploegsteert 
Largely rested 
56
th
 118
th
 IR 
186
th
 IR 
88
th
 IR 
 Largely rested 
4
th
    Largely rested 
Believed to be a good 
division 
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Additional Divisions brought forward after 28 September 
 
 
Division 
 
 
Units 
 
Location 
 
Comments 
 
52
nd
 Reserve Division 238
th
 RIR 
239
th
 RIR 
240
th
 RIR 
52
nd
 FAR 
Molenhock 
Becelaere 
Moorslede 
Moved into line on 
28 September 
 
13
th
 Reserve Division 
 
100
th
 Res. Grenadier R   
 
 
 
Moved into line on 
or after  
29 September 
 
23
rd
 Reserve Division 
 
  
39
th
 Division 
 
132
nd
 IR 
126
th
 IR 
172
nd
 IR 
East of  
Gheluvelt 
6
th
 Dismounted Cavalry 
Division 
13
th
 Hussars 
7
th
 Reserve Dragoons  
9
th
 Uhlans 
2
nd
 Cuirassiers 
Ledeghem 
40
th
 Division 
 
243
rd
 RIR Ypres-Menin 
Road 
Reported in line 30 
September 
1
st
 Bavarian Reserve 
Division 
1
st
 Bavarian RIR 
2
nd
 Bavarian RIR 
Ledeghem Moved into line 2 
October 
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German Divisions facing British Second Army: Battle of Courtrai 
 
 
Division 
 
 
Units 
 
Location 
 
Comments 
 
1
st
 Bavarian Reserve 
Division 
1
st
 Bavarian RIR 
2
nd
 Bavarian RIR 
3
rd
 Bavarian RIR 
201
st
 MW Co 
1
st
 Bavarian RP Co 
Ledeghem  
 15
th
 RIR 
100
th
 RGR 
Dadizeele  
39
th
 Division 
 
132
nd
 IR 
126
th
 IR 
172
nd
 IR 
38
th
 Bearer Co 
80
th
 FAR 
Gheluwe  
40
th
 Division 
 
181
st
 IR 
104
th
 IR 
134
th
 IR 
Gulleghem 
& Wevelghem 
Reported as 
reinforcements from 
14 October 
6
th
 Bavarian Reserve 
Division 
 
25
th
 Bavarian IR 
20
th
 Bavarian RIR 
16
th
 Bavarian RIR 
Wervicq  
6
th
 Cavalry Division 12
th
 Hussars 
2
nd
 Dragoons 
3
rd
 Uhlans 
9
th
 Uhlans 
170
th
 Ldw Brigade 
Heule 
& Gulleghem 
Reported as 
reinforcements from 
14 October 
11
th
 Reserve Division 
 
22
nd
 IR 
156
th
 IR 
10
th
 RIR 
Deulemont  
7
th
 Cavalry Division 25
th
 Dragoons  Reported as 
reinforcements from 
16 October 
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Map 1: The Allied Advance, 1918 
(Harris , Amiens to the Armistice) 
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Map 2: The Liberation of the Belgian Coast, 28 September – 25 
October 1918 
(Banks , A Military Atlas) 
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Map 3: The GAF Offensive in Flanders, 28 September – 2 
October 1918 
(Edmonds , Official History Vol. V) 
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Map 4: British Second Army: The Battle of Ypres, 28 
September 1918 
(Edmonds , Official History Vol. V) 
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Map 5: British Second Army: The Battle of Ypres, 29 
September – 3 October 1918 
(Edmonds , Official History Vol. V) 
 
 
 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918                Dennis Williams  
Appendix B     Maps 
8 
 
Map 6: British Second Army: The Battle of Courtrai, 14-16 
October 1918 
(Edmonds , Official History Vol. V) 
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Map 6A: The Battle of Courtrai, 14-15 October 1918 
(Dewar, Haig’s Command Vol. II) 
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Map 7: British Second Army: The Battle of Courtrai, 16-19 October 1918 
(Edmonds , Official History Vol. V) 
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Map 8: The GAF Offensive in Flanders, 4-30 October 1918 
(Edmonds , Official History Vol. V) 
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Map 9: British Second Army Operations, 20-27 October 1918 
(Edmonds , Official History Vol. V) 
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Map 10: The Offensive in Flanders: Allied Forces, 31 October – 11 November 1918 
(Edmonds , Official History Vol. V) 
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Map 11: German Defences in Flanders 18 September 1918 
(TNA WO157/128 Second Army Intelligence Summaries: September 1918) 
NB Lines in red show former British trench lines 
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Map 12A: German Supply System: Flanders, 23 September 
1918 - Key 
(TNA WO153/508 Second Army: Enemy Organisation 1918) 
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Map 12B: German Supply System: British Second Army Front, 
23 September 1918 
(TNA WO153/508 Second Army: Enemy Organisation 1918) 
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Map 13A: German Order of Battle, 21 September 1918 - Key 
(TNA WO157/128 Second Army Intelligence Summaries: September 1918) 
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Map 13B: German Order of Battle: Second Army Front, 21 
September 1918  
(TNA WO157/128 Second Army Intelligence Summaries: September 1918) 
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Map 14: The Ypres Salient and Principal Battlegrounds 1915-1917 
(M. Brown, intro., The Wipers Times: The Complete Series of the Famous Wartime Trench Newspaper (London: Little Books Ltd., 2006)) 
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Terminology and Abbreviations 
 
I have sought to apply the following conventions regarding terms, acronyms and 
abbreviations used in the text and accompanying notes; I may slip from this 
convention on occasion, for example when making a first reference in a chapter 
(despite having made a previous reference earlier in the study); or to give a better 
flow to the text. 
 
a. For numbering the different units of the British Army I have in general applied 
the convention of alternating at each level between ordinal and integer 
numbers, with roman numerals for corps, full spelling for armies, i.e. 1st 
Battalion, 2 Brigade, 3rd Division, IV Corps, and Fifth Army.  
 
b. For the names of battalions I normally use the full name for the first reference 
in the study, including any particular title or nickname: 
 
For example, 7th Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders; 12th (Norfolk Yeomanry) 
Battalion, The Norfolk Regiment; 12th (Miners) Battalion, The King’s Own 
Yorkshire Light Infantry. 
 
For most and all subsequent references, I have used the Battalion’s number 
and description, incorporating any popular abbreviation: 
For example, 7/Seaforth Highlanders; 12/Norfolks; 12/KOYLI. 
 
c. Within notes and references, I have retained all the titles and terms from the 
original source; together with the original spellings and abbreviations (where 
appropriate, I have provided descriptions or explanations). 
 
d. Where a term or title has a commonly used abbreviation or acronym then, for 
the first reference, the full wording is used with the abbreviation given in 
brackets; the abbreviation may then be used for future references, with an 
allowance made for the flow of the text, for example, Commander, Royal 
Engineers (CRE). 
 
e. For dates and times I have used integer dates and the 24 hour clock, for 
example 18 July 1918 at 2215 hours. 
 
f. The spelling of place names is that used by the source, whether memoir, 
diary, Official History, or secondary text; where a difference occurs I have 
usually opted for the spelling used in the Official History and noted the 
discrepancy. In some cases, alternative spellings may be used by different 
sources, for example River Scheldt, River Schelde.  
 
It should be noted that many locations in Flanders have alternative French 
and Dutch names, which can cause some confusion; for example River 
L’Escaut, River Scheldt. I have generally opted for the name used within the 
particular source or reference supporting that particular point in the study. 
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Common Abbreviations 
 
– used in the text and in references 
 
AA   Anti-Aircraft 
AADC   Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander 
AA and QMG Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General 
AASC   Anti-Aircraft Searchlight Company 
AASS   Anti-Aircraft Searchlight Section 
ACC   Army Cyclist Corps 
ACME   Assistant Chief Mechanical Engineer 
ADC   Aide de Camp 
ADGT   Assistant Director-General of Transportation 
ADL   Assistant Director of Labour 
ADMS   Assistant Director Medical Services 
ADOS   Assistant Director Ordnance Services 
ADS   Advanced Dressing Station 
AD Signals  Assistant Director Signals 
ADTn   Assistant Director Transportation 
ADVS   Assistant Director Veterinary Services 
AEF   American Expeditionary Force 
AMO   Assistant Medical Officer 
APM   Assistant Provost Marshal 
Arty   Artillery 
ASC   Army Service Corps 
AVC   Army Veterinary Corps 
Bde   Brigade 
BEF   British Expeditionary Force 
BGGS   Brigadier General General Staff 
BGRA   Brigadier General Royal Artillery 
Battn   Battalion 
Bn   Battalion 
Cdr   Commander 
CE   Chief Engineer 
CGS   Chief of the General Staff 
CHA   Commander Heavy Artillery 
CIGS   Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
CinC   Commander in Chief 
CMG   Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George 
CO   Commanding Officer 
Coy   Company 
CRA   Commander, Royal Artillery 
CRE   Commander, Royal Engineers 
DA and QMG Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General 
DAPM   Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal 
DDMS  Deputy Director Medical Services 
DDOS   Deputy Director Ordnance Services 
DDR   Deputy Director Remounts 
DDS   Deputy Director Signals 
DDST   Deputy Director Supply and Transport 
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DDVS   Deputy Director Veterinary Services 
DHQ (Div Hd Qrs) Divisional Headquarters 
Div   Division 
DLI   Durham Light Infantry 
DMS   Director of Medical Services 
DR   Director of Remounts 
DR   Dispatch Rider 
DSO   Distinguished Service Order 
EA   Enemy aircraft 
ELR   East Lancashire Regiment 
EYR   East Yorkshire Regiment 
FA   Field Artillery 
FOO   Forward Observation Officer (Artillery) 
GAF   Groupe d’Armees des Flandres (Army Group, Flanders) 
GB    Garrison Battalion 
GGB   Garrison Guard Battalion 
GHQ   General Headquarters 
GOC   General Officer Commanding 
GQG   Grand Quartier Général (French High Command) 
GSO   General Staff Officer (three grades) 
GSO1   General Staff Officer (Lieutenant Colonel) 
GSO2   General Staff Officer (Major) 
GSO3   General Staff Officer (Captain) 
HA   Heavy artillery 
HE   High explosive (shell) 
HQ   Headquarters 
Hrs   Highlanders 
IB   Infantry Brigade 
Inf Bde  Infantry Brigade 
KOSB   King’s Own Scottish Borderers 
KOYLI  King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
KRRC   King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
LG   Lewis gun 
Lieut   Lieutenant 
Lt   Lieutenant 
Lt-Col   Lieutenant Colonel 
LTM   Light Trench Mortar 
LTMB   Light Trench Mortar Battery 
MG   Machine gun 
MGC   Machine Gun Corps 
MGGS  Major General General Staff 
MGRA  Major-General Royal Artillery 
MT   Mechanical Transport 
NCO   Non-Commissioned Officer 
OC   Officer Commanding (followed by a unit or section) 
OHL   Oberste Heeresleitung (German High Command) 
OR   Other ranks (i.e. NCOs and private soldiers) 
PA   Personal ammunition 
PM   Provost Marshal 
QF   Quick firing 
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QM   Quartermaster 
RA   Royal Artillery 
RAF   Royal Air Force 
RAMC  Royal Army Medical Corps 
RAP   Regimental Aid Post 
RE   Royal Engineers 
RFA   Royal Field Artillery 
RGA   Royal Garrison Artillery 
RHA   Royal Horse Artillery 
RWS    Royal West Sussex (Queen’s) Regiment 
SAA   Small Arms Ammunition (i.e. for infantry weapons) 
SMLE   Short Magazine Lee Enfield (the rifle of the British infantryman) 
SMO   Senior Medical Officer 
TM   Trench mortar 
TMB   Trench Mortar Battery 
Y&L   York and Lancaster Regiment 
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PERSONAL and SECRET 
Commander in Chief  
of Allied Armies 
     --------       G.Q.G.A., 19
th
 October 1918. 
General Staff HQ. 
     -------- 
1
st
 Section.     
3
rd
 Office.   GENERAL DIRECTIVE 
    -------------------------------- 
No. 4925. 
In order to press the advantages we have made, the Allied Armies must take action as follows: 
1. The Flanders Army Group will march in the general direction of Brussels; its right side 
towards HAL, approaching l’ESCAUT at PECQ, - la DENDER at LESSINES. 
On this march, forcing the major river lines: ESCAUT - DENDER… must be combined, 
when necessary, with action on the flank to turn back these lines, to be carried out by the 
British Armies. 
 
2. The British Armies (5th, 1st, 3rd, 4th) will advance to the South of the PECQ – LESSINES – 
HAL line, their right side advancing through FROIDCHAPPELLE PHILLIPEVILLE onto 
AGIMONT (North of GIVET). 
The British Armies’ main objective remains to turn back enemy forces on the ARDENNES 
massif which is difficult to penetrate, and to cut their main supply lines; - and at the same 
time, to assist the advance of the Flanders Army Group, enabling them to cross the major 
river lines: ESCAUT, DENDER …. This would otherwise prevent their advance. 
- They themselves will be supported by the 1st French Army. 
 
3. The French Armies (1st, 10th, 5th, 4th) and the 1st American Army will operate to the South of 
the afore-mentioned line. 
Their role consists in: 
- For the 1st French Army: to support the British Armies’ attack by marching towards la 
CAPELLE, CHIMAY – GIVET, and manoeuvring to the right, to turn back enemy 
resistance on the SERRE – SISSONNE line; 
- For the 5th, 4th French Armies and the 1st American Army: to reach the MEZIERES - 
SEDAN region and the upper reaches of the MEUSE, moving down the AISNE line in a 
two-sided manoeuvre: - on the left wing (5
th
 French Army) in the direction of 
CHAUMONT – PORCIEN; - on the right wing (4th French Army & 1st American Army) 
in the direction of BUZANCY – LE CHESNE. 
 
(Sd).  F.   FOCH 
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 Appendix E1 Text of Letter from Haig to Foch, 25 October 1918 
             2 
                                                                                                                   SECRET. 
O.A.D. 946. 
                                                                                                      25
th
 October, 1918. 
From:-                            
The Commander-in-Chief, 
                                          British Armies in France. 
 
TO:-                    
                              The Commander-in-Chief, 
                                          Allied Forces in France. 
 
My dear Marshal, 
                    I would point out that at the meeting at CASSEL on the 9
th
 September, it was agreed by 
me that two divisions of the Second Army should be employed under the command of His Majesty 
the King of the Belgians for the purpose of covering the flank of the Army of Flanders operating in 
an easterly direction. It was further agreed that the whole of the  Second  Army  should  be used in 
the event of the enemy retiring from the MESSINESS Ridge, to exploit any success which might be 
obtained by following and pressing  the  German  forces.      It was  well  understood  that  in  view  
of  the  fact  that  my  other Armies were committed  to  large  offensive operations further south,  the 
Second Army was not to be committed to any other operation  than  that  of  clearing  the ground up 
to the LYS River.  The whole scope of the operation had as its objective the “clearing [of] the 
Belgian coast and the country between the coast and the   River LYS”. 
  
                  This has not been accomplished and I request that the Second Army be forthwith returned 
to my command.   If, as I understand,  further operations by the  Army  of  Flanders  have as their 
objective  the capture of  BRUSSELS,  this can be equally  attained  by  the  co-operation of all the 
British Armies including the Second Army operating under my command. 
                                                      
                                                                                       Yours very truly, 
                                      
                                                                                             (Sd)  D.  HAIG.                                                                    
     
                                                                                                      Field-Marshal    
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Appendix E2 Text of Letter from Haig to the War Office, 25 October 1918 
                                                                                                                          SECRET. 
No.  O.A.D. 947. 
 
[Stamped: ‘War Office Received 27 OCT 1918’]  
 
            GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 
                                                                   BRITISH ARMIES IN THE FIELD, 
                                                                                                             25
th
 October, 1918 
Sir, 
 I have the honour to forward for the information of the War Cabinet a copy of a letter, No. 
O.A.D. 946, dated 25
th
 October, 1918, which I have addressed to Marshal Foch, requesting that the 
Second British Army should revert forthwith to my command. 
 
 This request was made by me by telephone on the 18
th
 instant and again verbally to the 
Marshal on the 24
th
 instant for the reasons given below, but he was not willing to accede to my 
demand and insisted that the Second Army should remain under the command of the King of the 
Belgians and continue to operate in Belgium under the latter’s orders in accordance with the 
Directive No. 4925, of the 19
th
 October, of which a copy is attached. 
 
 I have always recognised the necessity of making temporary detachments from the British 
Armies to operate with the French, and I have invariably complied with the demands of the Marshal 
in this respect, provided the military reasons were sufficient to justify this action. For example, 
during the fighting on the AISNE in May and on the MARNE in July, I detached four or five 
divisions on each occasion to operate with the French, and, in order to carry out a combined 
operation in FLANDERS, I acquiesced on the 9
th
 September in the temporary detachment of the 
Second Army under the King of the Belgians. On each occasion the detachment was regarded as of a 
purely temporary nature, and was to be returned on the completion of the specific operation in hand. 
  
In the case of the Second Army, this detachment was made on the 11
th
 September, and, in accordance 
with Marshal Foch’s instructions, two divisions were to make the initial attack in conjunction with 
the Belgian Army, while the whole of the Second British Army, in combination with the Belgians 
and a detachment of French Troops, was to exploit any success gained, and subsequently protect the 
flank of the Franco-Belgian forces by securing positions along the left bank of the River LYS. The 
Second British Army carried out these operations successfully, and in fact took the heaviest share of 
the work in driving the enemy back. I have not hitherto pressed for the return of this Army to my 
command while the operations to secure BRUGES and the line of the River LYS were in progress. 
This phase, however, is now completed, and the operations naturally are entering a new phase, that of 
forcing the passage of the River SCHELDT. The Second Army during the course of these operations 
has already incurred some 22,000 casualties.                                   
   
 
 
 
The Secretary 
War Office 
London, S.W.1                              In/ 
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 In the meantime the First, Third and Fourth British Armies have been carrying out a series of 
important attacks on a wide front against positions of vital importance to the enemy and to hold 
which he is utilising a considerable number of his best troops. These operations, though highly 
successful and productive of far-reaching effects, must necessarily involve considerable casualties. 
  
 The operations of the Second Army are now entering on the phase of forcing the passage of 
the Rivers SCHELDT and DENDRE to enable the allied troops in FLANDERS to cross those rivers 
in the lower reaches and facilitate an advance on BRUSSELS. I maintain that these operations can be 
equally well undertaken under my control and that I can thus balance the casualties so that their 
incidence may not fall unduly on the British forces. In this connection I would draw your attention to 
Directive No.4925, dated 19
th
 October, 1918, by Marshal Foch, which shews that there is an 
expectation of the British attacks on the LE CATEAU front producing results which will facilitate 
the operations of the allies both on the south in CHAMPAGNE and on the north in FLANDERS. 
 
 While I am anxious to carry out Marshal Foch’s wishes and instructions to the full, at the 
same time I feel compelled to consider the condition of the British Armies as a whole and generally 
to control the operations of those Armies in respect of the casualties incurred. So far the brunt of the 
offensive operations has fallen on the British troops. Owing to our lack of effectives this cannot be 
allowed to continue much longer. It is therefore most necessary that I should exercise the greatest 
care in engaging the five Armies of which the British Expeditionary Force is composed. The 
responsibility for this can alone rest on me and ought not in the case of any portion of the British 
forces [to] be delegated to any foreign Commander, of no matter how high a rank. 
 
 I wish to refer this matter to the War Cabinet as I do not consider that Marshal Foch’s action 
is in accordance with the spirit of the instructions issued to me by the Secretary of State in his letter 
No.121/France/2357, dated 21
st
 June, and I am of [the] opinion that such action is prejudicial to the 
welfare of the British Armies in France. 
   
      I have the honour to be, 
       Sir, 
            Your obedient Servant 
 
                [signed ‘D. Haig’] 
 
          Field-Marshal, 
                  Commanding-in-Chief, 
                            British Armies in France. 
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Outtersteene Ridge 18 August: Preparations for attack 
 
The chart below lists the key features of the plan of attack.1 
 
 
 Main attack: XV Corps: 9th Division, supported by 29th Division 
 One section of machine guns attached to each attacking battalion of 9th 
Division 
 Creeping barrage 
 First round: smoke shells – to be fired at Z-1 minute* 
 Infantry to advance at Z+3 minutes* 
* The timings were subsequently changed to Z+1 minute for the opening of the barrage, with 
troops leaving the trenches after counting to ten from the opening of fire – this was due to 
captured German documents which reported lessons from a previous successful attack by 
Second Army troops using an initial smoke barrage; therefore as soon as a smoke barrage was 
applied, the British front line was to be hit by artillery and machine gun fire – hence XV Corps 
decided on the slight alterations in timing 
 Second round onwards: 25% smoke, 75% high explosive 
 Advance of 50 yards per minute 
 To halt as a protective barrage 200 yards beyond first objective (until advance 
resumed) 
 Four companies of machine guns to fire enfilade and creeping barrages 
 On the left flank, smoke barrage to hide attack from enemy observation 
 On the right flank, an enfilade barrage 
 plus a rolling barrage across the front of 9th Division, from right to left 
 XV Corps heavy artillery (57 guns and howitzers) to target specific enemy 
points 
 plus put down a final protective barrage 
 Z-hour set as 1100, with the aim of surprise 
 To conceal the assembled troops, trenches were covered with cocoa matting, 
with a black band painted on to represent the shadow of the trench 
 A rehearsal of the attack (27th Brigade) was carried out beforehand 
 Each battalion advanced on a two company frontage 
 Each company adopted a two platoon frontage 
 First wave in extended order 
 Subsequent waves in file 
 Achievement of the objective to be signalled by blue smoke rifle grenades 
 Red flares to be used to signal achievement of the objective to RAF patrols 
 
 
 
                                                             
1
 This summary is taken from Edmonds,  Official History Vol. IV  – plus archive sources: TNA WO95/2303, War Diary 
of 87
 
Infantry Brigade 
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Gas Warfare in Flanders, 1918 
 
A striking feature of the war diaries from Second Army formations is the commonplace 
reference to the use of gas as one of the components of both sides’ weaponry. This should 
not be a surprise, given that more than half of the recorded use of gas occurred during the 
final year of the war, and around half of the fatalities resulting from exposure to gas on the 
Western Front occurred in 1918.1  
 
It was in operations in Flanders, in the Ypres Salient in the Spring of 1915, that the 
Germans had been the first to make use of chemical warfare. However the British then also 
adopted gas as a weapon, becoming the leaders in gas warfare, such that ‘the Germans 
never regained their early advantage’.2 In his chapter on the application of chemical warfare 
from his book on the impact of chemistry on the war,3 Michael Freemantle discusses the 
development of the weapon and its effectiveness. He quotes the conclusion of Albert 
Palazzo that ‘gas [became] ‘the most effective method’ of neutralising the enemy’s guns 
and achieving fire supremacy. It also lowered the morale of the enemy and reduced their 
ability to resist.4 
 
Nick Lloyd describes how the deployment of gas as a weapon had become commonplace 
in 1918: 
 
… The allied armies had to operate in a terrible and dangerous chemical 
environment… gas evoked a fear that was unlike any other weapon and had a 
significant effect on how the war was fought… 
 
By 1918 all sides had incorporated gas into their battle tactics, with both front and 
rear sectors regularly being deluged with gas, which poisoned the ground and 
caused a constant trickle of casualties.5 
 
Gas was an important feature of the fighting in Ypres and Flanders. In a lecture to troops, a 
Divisional Gas Officer is recorded as ‘… reminding his audience that the YPRES Sector has 
always been the enemy’s gas experimental ground’.6 
 
Peter Hart, writing on the warfare in 1918, summarises the gases and gas shells used by 
the German Army: 
 
The Germans were using a mixture of gases including Blue Cross, Green Cross and 
Yellow Cross. The Blue Cross was... a truly deadly weapon – if it had worked 
properly. It contained an arsenic-based compound that acted as a powerful [irritant 
on] the nasal and repertory passages to cause coughing, sneezing and sometimes 
vomiting… When the… victim tore off his mask in an effort to breathe he would then 
be exposed to the deadly Green Cross shells that contained phosgene, a lung irritant 
sixteen times more lethal than the chlorine gas used in 1915… [but] the German 
Blue Cross shells were one of the biggest failures of the war as the detonation of the 
shell on landing proved inadequate to properly disperse the powder… 
Far more dangerous was the menace of the Yellow Cross mustard gas. Exposure to 
this unpleasant substance severely burnt the skin and had a terrible effect on the 
eyes… [It] took some time to disperse and thereby rendered areas virtually 
impassable for long periods.7 
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Lloyd points out that: 
 
…Mustard gas… was used in increasing amounts by the German artillery. As the 
retreat [by the German forces] gathered momentum, German gunners fired 
thousands of these shells at their pursuers, using it as an area denial weapon, 
through which the Allies could not advance, or at least not without difficulty.8 
 
He quotes the findings of Tim Cook: 
 
German gunners simply blocked out map grids and fired shells to saturate the whole 
sector, thereby eliminating that area from the front.9 
 
Despite the dangers from gas, the references within the War Diaries of Second Army units 
indicate that it was dealt with as part of the routine of the front line. Given the relative 
inexperience of many units making up Second Army, from their first time in the front line, 
men had to be able to cope with the gas shells delivered as part of enemy bombardments. 
On 17 August 1918 (on the first morning of only the second spell for the Battalion on front 
line duty), the war diary of 11/Cameron Highlanders records that ‘In the early morning Lt. 
G.S. Young and four men were gassed and two men wounded’.10 On 24 September, 104 
Brigade records that ‘Gas, especially Blue Cross, being used very extensively by the 
enemy’.11 
 
Within the war diaries of Second Army units there are constant references to the use of gas 
shells by the German artillery. This could affect both front and support lines. There is no 
particular importance attached to these references – it was obviously viewed as part and 
parcel of front line duty and the ongoing harassment from the enemy: 
 
[5/Cameron Highlanders] 
18 August Meteren Heavy gas concentration put down over our  
    whole front line. 
22 August Meteren Enemy threw over a few Gas shells during  
   Night.
12
 
 
The use of gas shells in enemy artillery fire was a commonplace feature for the men on duty 
in the front line trenches. The following extracts are from the war diary of 120 Brigade while 
on a tour of duty at the front during August 1918: 
 
22/23 August [Enemy artillery carried out] continuous shelling of sector with 
H.E. mixed with gas shells (’Mustard’). 
23/24 August Some heavy-calibre gas shells fell near VERT RUE, also 6 or 8 
fell [nearby]. 
25/26 August Between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. [the enemy fired] over 100 rds. 10.5 
c.m. phosgene gas … [other areas nearby] also received a few 
rounds of gas… 
26/27 August During the night a few gas shells were mixed with H.E… 
28/29 August Our patrols of the Right Company were successful in gaining an 
entrance into BOWERY COTTAGES… but due to a heavy 
enemy barrage mixed with gas… they were unable to 
advance.13 
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There are later references which give more details of the types of gas used; for example: 
 
18/19 September … heavily shelled with sneezing gas and Yellow Cross shells… 
6 October … a heavy barrage of mustard gas mixed with H.E. was put 
down on our support lines… 
10/11 October … Lachrymatory Gas… Mustard Gas mixed with H.E…14 
 
Precautions were necessary when men came into contact with materials present during a 
gas attack. In July 1918, 120 Brigade’s war diary makes reference to gas being introduced 
into a dugout through the use of sandbags which has previously been in an area fired on by 
the German artillery, the barrage including gas shells.15 As well as concern for their 
immediate health, the men’s clothing could also be contaminated by gas. The following is 
from 120 Brigade’s instructions issued in August 1918: 
 
Gassed Clothing Such men as have been affected with Yellow Cross gas will be 
sent to the Divisional Main Dressing Station with a certificate 
signed by an officer stating that their clothing has been affected, 
when fresh clothing will be issued.16 
 
Hence there was a clear threat to troops when making contact with other soldiers who had 
themselves been subject to a gas attack. This and other concerns were addressed in 
guidance issued to the units of 40th Division in September 1918; the aim was to ensure all 
possible steps were taken to minimise the risk of injury through exposure to the after-effects 
of gas shelling, and to put in place arrangements for disinfection: 
 
1. As a result of recent experiments it has been found that Chlorine gas destroys 
Yellow Cross and its use as an external disinfectant has given very satisfactory 
results in treating clothing and equipment contaminated with this gas, thus saving 
‘gas’ casualties among men who have not actually been in contact with the gas 
itself, but who came into contact later with men who have. 
In an Army on our right many ‘gas’ casualties have been saved in this way. 
2. A small chlorine gas chamber will therefore be established and maintained at the 
Advanced Dressing Station… under arrangements to be made between the 
A.D.M.S. and 40th Division Gas Officer: all personnel who have been in contact 
with Yellow Cross gas and are therefore likely to be contaminated with it, will be 
despatched as soon as possible to the A.D.S.  and there passed through the 
chamber: this treatment should be carried out, if possible, before the men are 
allowed to congregate in any contained space. A period of 10 minutes in a 
concentration of about 1:1000 is sufficient. 
3. When their condition permits of it, wounded men who are contaminated, and 
Yellow Cross gas casualties should also be passed through the chamber. 
4. It has also been found that shell holes and inhabited localities such as dugouts, 
huts, gun positions, etc. that are contaminated with Yellow Cross Gas can be 
disinfected by being sprayed with Chlorine Gas: 40th Division Gas Officer will 
therefore arrange as soon as possible for the Gas N.C.O.’s of all units to receive 
instruction in this and they are in possession of the necessary equipment to carry 
out this disinfection process as soon as possible in any locality which may have 
become contaminated…17 
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By this time in the war the British Army was also making regular use of gas as part of its 
artillery fire plans, and outpacing the enemy in this form of warfare: 
 
Chemical warfare developed from a novelty in 1915 to an approved component of 
the British method of waging war by 1916… it made a significant contribution to the 
eventual British victory in 1918.18 
 
Army and Corps HQ had the post of Chemical Adviser on their staff; information on the use 
of gas by British forces and its effects was an important part of intelligence gathering. 
Prisoner interviews were the most common source, with questions designed to assess the 
impact of British gas shells and gas operations on enemy troops. Air photographs could 
show areas of bleached or contaminated ground.19 
 
There are various references within the unit records of Second Army to the use of gas by 
British forces. This applied during periods of relative inactivity, as well as in support of an 
offensive. The following order is recorded in the war diary of 121 Brigade: 
 
121 Brigade: Order No. 30 
 
600 gas bombs will be fired by ‘L’ Special Company, R. E. on the night of the 
30th/31st July, or the first subsequent night when favourable weather conditions 
admit, from projectors [target details follow]… 
Code words: SNIP  Conditions favourable for gas discharge 
  REMNANT Conditions unfavourable, 
     operation postponed 24 hours 
Troops to be clear of designated areas… box respirators to be worn. 
31st Division artillery will co-operate. 
31st Battalion Machine Gun Corps will fire some bursts of fire after the gas 
discharge.20 
 
Gas operations by Second Army were part of normal routine. Where these were noted in 
unit War Diaries they were not afforded any particular comment, it was no different from the 
regular exchanges of artillery fire, as this example from 42 Brigade shows: 
 
[9th September 1918] 
280 Gas cylinders were discharged on Halfway House. Railway Wood and Dormy 
House. No Retaliation. 
 
[11th September 1918] 
200 Gas Cylinders were successfully discharged on MILL COTS. and THE 
STABLES.21 
 
The Army’s use of gas as an offensive weapon also meant that British troops needed 
guidance on their response when approaching ground which has been subject to a gas 
bombardment by their own artillery; although much of the general advice and training 
provided on anti-gas measures also applied. This example is from instructions issued by XV 
Corps in October 1918: 
 
OUR OWN GAS SHELL BOMBARDMENTS 
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In an advance following our own gas shell bombardments Divisions will issue 
suitable instructions to the troops to prevent gas casualties while passing over the 
late target. 
While the length of time during which such an area is dangerous, unless respirators 
are worn, depends to a great extent on the weather conditions, the following figures 
are issued for guidance: 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Gas.  Ground dangerous Remarks 
______________ for_________________________________________ 
 
With C.G. ½-2 hours  No under surface persistency 
With N.C. ½-15 hours  Digging may not be possible  
for 24 Hours 
With H.E. 48-60 hours  Under surface may remain dangerous  
     for weeks 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
NOTE 
The persistence of the liquid of [in] the ground is diminished by heavy rain, by 
sunshine or strong wind. During frosty and dull weather the persistency is 
increased.22 
 
 
Freemantle also makes clear that the value of the gas weapon lay in its psychological 
impact; it was more likely to cause soldiers to leave the field of battle, or be far less effective 
on it, than to be killed by it.23 
 
It was therefore important for British troops to take appropriate steps in order to issue 
warnings as early as possible of a forthcoming gas attack and to take steps to protect 
themselves. At the beginning of August, 121 Brigade was issued with three closely typed 
pages of ‘Anti-Gas Instructions’, which also referred the reader to SS534 (March, 1918) 
where ‘full details of Gas Defence’ could be found.24 The key elements of the ‘Anti-Gas 
Instructions’ included: 
 
2. In the LA MOTTE Divisional Sector the Gas Zones are as follows: 
ALERT ZONE –  East of the Hazebrouck-Morebecgue Railway. 
READY ZONE –  East of a line joining BELLINGHEM & 
BLARINGHEK 
3. A supply of Strombos Horns, Rattles, Gongs, and Fans may be obtained on 
application to Brigade… 
4. All Formations and Units within the ALERT ZONE will prepare at their 
Headquarters and at such other places as Commanding Officers may find 
necessary ‘WIND DANGEROUS’ Boards, and will make arrangements for 
displaying them at appropriate times. 
 ‘WIND SAFE’ Boards will not be used, and any such boards now in existence 
will be destroyed. 
5. The following points should be brought frequently to the notice of all ranks: 
a) Gas will often hang for a long time in woods, valleys, and villages, and 
may be dangerous after several days have elapsed. 
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b) It is not safe to rely on the degree of detonation as a means of 
recognising gas shell, because H.E. shell often contains Gas. 
6. The following is a précis of the various forms of gas attack, the warnings given 
in each case, and the duties of various Headquarters and Units on receiving 
the warning… 
A. GAS CLOUD ATTACK 
B. HEAVY GAS SHELLING OR GAS PROJECTOR SHOOTS 
C. LIGHT GAS SHELLING 
[Under each heading the arrangements in place and the action to be taken are 
detailed].25 
 
On 14 August, while out of the line, the troops of 5/Cameron Highlanders had experience in 
the ‘Gas Chamber’ – an arrangement designed to provide soldiers with first-hand 
experience of being gassed. The intention of the Army was for all units to spend a session 
in the chamber as part of their training and preparation for front line operations.26 
 
Despite such measures, there was ongoing concern at the number of casualties resulting 
from enemy gas attacks. Second Army wrote to its Corps Commanders at the start of 
September 1918 to place its concerns on record; this followed a period during which the 
Army had been advancing its line to take advantage of German withdrawals and a policy of 
probing attacks and harassment of the enemy: 
 
The gas casualties during the past month have been unusually high. 
In order to combat these excessive casualties the Army Commander wishes Corps 
Commanders to go thoroughly into this question and to ensure that the 
responsibilities of the General Staff of formations and of all Commanders for 
successful anti-gas measures is fully realised. 
C.O.s should be constantly reminded that they are responsible for casualties 
occurring in their units which prove to be the result of lack of training in defensive gas 
measures in accordance with the orders which have been issued on the subject from 
time to time.27 
 
In its response, on 11 September XV Corps referred the instruction to its Divisions: 
 
Forwarded. 
Attention has been drawn frequently to the importance of this subject. 
Arrangements will be made to have further 1 day courses for C.Os and Second-in-
Command. 
The question is, however, largely one of discipline; the strictest gas discipline is 
always to be enforced.
28
 
 
40th Division then looked to emphasise the practical measures which units should have in 
place, to be supported and enforced through the Divisional Gas Officer: 
 
The G.O.C. is confident that the most careful attention will be given to this matter by 
all concerned and the strictest supervision exercised in the anti-gas training of all 
units, both in the knowledge of all anti-gas precautions and in the care and upkeep of 
anti-gas equipment. In order to assist formations and units in this connection, the 
Divisional Gas Officer will make the following arrangements: 
a) In the case of the Infantry Brigade in rest: 
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i) To inspect all box respirators and anti-gas equipment at least once 
during the period the Brigade is out. 
ii) To hold a short refresher course for all Battn and Coy Gas N.C.Os 
during the period of rest, to ensure their being up to date and efficient 
in anti-gas measures. 
He will make similar arrangements regarding the resting company of the 
39th M.G.Bn. taking each Coy. in turn as it comes into Reserve. 
b) In the case of other units he will arrange direct with the units concerned, to 
carry out similar inspections and refresher courses for the Gas N.C.Os so that 
each unit will receive periodically his assistance and attention. 
c) On the completion of his inspection of each unit, he will render to Div. Hd. Qrs. 
a report on the state of the anti-gas training and equipment in that unit.29 
 
The incentive for units is to avoid the prospect of a critical report being passed to Division 
HQ. What these instructions imply is the scale of the ongoing threat posed by the German 
use of gas on a regular basis, and the resulting concern of Second Army commanders to 
manage the consequences of this. There is a clear concern to minimise the resulting 
number of casualties by attaching a very high importance to the range of anti-gas measures 
available to units. 
 
One week later, XV Corps issued some amendments to its Anti-Gas Instructions, reflecting 
particular concerns at that time. In part it is possible to detect a perceived casual approach 
by troops to gas shelling, perhaps a result of the frequency of this type of artillery fire, or the 
reaction of ‘old hands’ believing in their own ability to decide how to respond following a gas 
attack; troops also disliked wearing the respirators which were uncomfortable and restricted 
the visibility, and therefore the movement, of the wearer: 
 
1) … Gas casualties are frequently caused by neglect of proper precautions 
being taken after a gas shell bombardment. Mustard Gas will persist for long 
periods after a bombardment and respirators must be worn and  protective 
clothing and gloves put on where available, by all troops in the affected area, 
as long as the smell of gas, no matter how faint, can be detected. 
2) As the persistency of the mustard Gas may extend under suitable conditions 
over several days, units in the forward area will select alternative positions to 
which, in the event of a gas bombardment, they can move if the tactical 
situation permits. 
The exchange of positions, either to the alternative or back to the original 
position, should not be made until a Gas N.C.O. has reported the area which 
is to be occupied is free from gas. 
3) Enemy gas bombardments should invariably be reported, and it is important 
that any new gas or projectile should be investigated at once. 
4) All ranks should be warned that the recognition of gas shell by degree of 
detonation is not to be relied upon.30 
 
As the Flanders offensive gathered pace during the second half of 1918, the new danger 
was that of gas contained within booby traps left behind by the withdrawing German 
soldiers. XV Corps instructions stated: 
 
TRAPS 
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1) The enemy has on several occasions, before retreating, infected cellars, 
dugouts, etc., with Mustard Gas, and therefore such places lately vacated by 
him should be entered with caution. His usual method is either to scatter the 
liquid gas about or else to open a shell, thereby allowing the contents to leak 
into the ground. 
2) Water from shell holes must on no consideration be used either for washing, 
cooking, or drinking purposes. 
Wood must not be handled or burnt if there are any signs of gas shelling or 
gas in the vicinity.31 
 
Gas remained a prime concern for Second Army throughout the Hundred Days. In 
instructions issued after the Battle of Courtrai, the command of XV Corps stated that it was 
considered probable that the Germans would ‘make considerable use of gas’ during the 
retreat. Cloud gas attacks were considered unlikely and the main threat would be from gas 
shells delivered using HE. It was acknowledged that with the ongoing advance causing 
‘frequent changes of positions’ then units would not be able to receive the same amount of 
supervision from senior Anti-Gas personnel and would have to rely principally upon their 
own trained soldiers. Frequent inspections of respirators were to be carried out together 
with the maintenance of anti-gas appliances such as respirators, containers and rattles.32 
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Air Warfare in Flanders, 1918 
 
The growth in importance of air power and the ability to defend against it is illustrated by the 
post of Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander on the Army General Staff. The rank of the 
officer, Lieutenant-Colonel, reflects both the newness of the role and that the available 
technology meant the full potential of air power was yet to be realised. Nevertheless, 
ground troops could expect to be observed and, of greater immediate concern to them, to 
be attacked by enemy aircraft. Air bombing raids upon troops and key strategic points were 
also increasingly common, although by the final phase of the war the allied aircraft 
outnumbered their German counterparts. While it was in reconnaissance that the aeroplane 
continued to make its most important contribution, Plumer had come to realise the potential 
of air power in the new warfare.  
 
Referring to the battles of April 1918, Sir John Lessor, a future Marshall of the Royal Air 
Force, wrote that Plumer ‘pressed urgently for concentrated bombing of vital points of the 
German supply system to help slow down the enemy advance… [he] was emphatic that an 
essential condition of success was the concentration of all available aircraft continuously on 
the minimum number of points where the greatest dislocation could be produced’.1  
 
The deployment of the RAF was an automatic component within the planning and 
operations of Second Army in 1918. 
 
The table below shows a summary of RAF activity during the final weeks of the war in 
Flanders:  
 
 
Summary of RAF activity during the Final Advance in Flanders 
 
Week commencing 21 Sept 28 Sept 5 Oct 12 Oct 19 Oct 26 Oct 2/9 Nov Total 
Enemy aircraft 
destroyed 
13 51 36  
Severe 
weather  
2  52 38 642 
RAF machines lost to 
enemy 
10 30 12 10 18 10 90 
Enemy balloons 
burnt 
1 8 2 0 8 5 24 
RAF balloons burnt 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 
 
Bombing Summary 
 
Bombs 
dropped 
Other  31 54 27 20 9 0 0 113 
112lbs 272 534 240 152 113 84 117 1512 
25lbs 2071 6365 2820 1825 581 2256 1403 17321 
Total 2374 6953 3087 1997 703 2340 1520  
 
SAA rounds fired at 
ground targets 
 
- 
 
42068 
 
6500+ 
 
1670 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Photos taken 
 
1848 
 
- 
 
- 
 
300 
 
- 
 
- 
 
578 
 
Compiled from the weekly operations reports produced by Second Army HQ 
Source: TNA WO158/218 
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The operational planning and training by units of Second Army included co-operation with 
the RAF as a common feature. Attack orders issued by 89 Brigade in August 1918 included 
reference to the RAF dropping supplies to forward troops: 
 
RAF: ammunition and stores as follows will be dropped by aeroplane at [map 
reference]… 
20 Boxes SAA 
2 SAA Boxes filled with VERY Lights 
1 SAA Box filled with Special S.O.S. Signal 
30 coils of barbed wire 
2nd Battalion S Lancs Regt. will detail a party under a N.C.O. to collect these stores 
as they are dropped and issue them as required to troops of 89th and 90th Infantry 
Brigades. This party will mark the dropping ground by two white letters ‘N’.2 
 
An attack on 19 July to capture the village of Meteren, by 26 Brigade and the South African 
Brigade (9th Division) was given cover by the RAF: 
 
Six of our planes hovered over our front from dawn to ZERO, and denied aeroplane 
observation to the enemy.3 
 
Even during quieter periods, the war in the air was a common feature of the daily routine for 
the soldiers at the front, and for the aircrews: 
 
One enemy aeroplane dropped a few light bombs on our front line doing little 
damage. Considerable aerial activity on part of the enemy. Two of our planes 
brought down by enemy squadron behind our lines.4 
 
The control of the air space above the opposing forces was an important factor in the allied 
advance. The RAF, together with its French and Belgian counterparts, enjoyed a numerical 
superiority during the campaign; the success that this led to is shown by the high number of 
enemy aircraft destroyed in this period. This control of the skies – when the weather 
permitted – gave a significant advantage to coalition troops. It allowed effective 
reconnaissance of German troop activity and positions, including artillery, plus the crucial 
details of the new terrain over which the troops would be advancing. French and RAF 
planes also carried out regular bombing of enemy communications, headquarters and 
transport, thereby disrupting German command and movement. A further feature of air 
operations was the dangerous task of direct attacks at low level upon German troops. 
 
The much smaller Belgian Air Corps, around 150 craft, also played its part; primarily in 
observation and reconnaissance, but also via its fighter squadrons, which had been 
reorganised at the start of the year.5 On 17 October pilots of the Groupe de Chasse Jacquet 
(Fighter Group Jacquet) landed in Oostende to become the first members of the Belgian 
armed forces to enter the town after German occupation. 
 
Communications with aircraft by advancing troops relied almost entirely upon visual aids. 
The normal practice was an agreed system of coloured flares. For example, during an 
action by advance platoons of 31st Division on 18 September 1918 (described in an earlier 
chapter)6, a ‘Contact Aeroplane’ was identified to ‘co-operate with the attack’. Troops 
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carried SOS flares: red smoke by day, green over green over red by night; plus white Very 
lights: three to be fired when a platoon reached its objective. 
 
The RAF was also a regular feature in the advance planning by Second Army. Orders 
issued by 89 Brigade in August 1918 included reference to the RAF dropping supplies to 
forward troops.7 An attack on 19 July to capture the village of Meteren, by 26 Brigade and 
the South African Brigade (9th Division) was given air cover by six RAF planes circling the 
front before the attack and preventing enemy observation.8 
 
The preparations for the forthcoming Battle of Ypres give a good example of requirements 
for the various units of the RAF to undertake specific missions in support of the attacking 
infantry. The priority, through the use of ‘contact aeroplanes’, was to track the progress of 
the attack in order to inform HQ.9 Another important role was that of the ‘counter attack 
aeroplane’, used to identify possible counter-attacks by the enemy and to signal for a 
defensive barrage by artillery.10 
 
The reference to ‘wireless’ in such orders would most likely be through a code signal; for 
example, the arrangements for 88 Brigade refer to an ‘LL’ or ‘GF’ call.11 These 
arrangements also illustrate the increasing importance of wireless communications; while 
the existing equipment was too heavy and bulky for advancing units to utilise, it could be 
fitted to an aircraft with suitable adaptations.12 The main HQ of Corps, Division, and 
increasingly Brigade, would have access to wireless receivers. It was crucial for the forward 
infantry to be able to indicate that an objective has been taken and, as required, to signal 
for the necessary materiél or other forms of support in order to protect the gains made; 
reconnaissance aircraft made an important contribution to the various means of 
communication employed by advance formations. However there was concern at the ability 
of the enemy to access wireless communications. 
 
The initial planning for the Battle of Ypres, arranged at Divisional and Brigade levels, also 
included what at the time was the novel proposal to use aircraft to deliver supplies, 
principally ammunition, to forward troops. The system depended upon the ability of the 
advance troops to display the required layout of strips of white cloth, along with the firing of 
a white flare. Parachutes (to be collected and returned to Division) were employed to 
prevent the weighty packages from just falling directly to the ground (with unfortunate 
consequences for any nearby troops).13 
 
By the following Battle of Courtrai, the scope of such operations had been extended to 
include the dropping of food and rations (plus messenger pigeons) as well as small arms 
and machine gun ammunition. Each of these had a different arrangement of ground sheets 
by which advance units could indicate the type of supplies required; with the attention of the 
contact aeroplane attracted by the firing of a white very light or the lighting of a white flare.14 
 
All units were now required to take the necessary steps to protect themselves from attack 
from the air, normally co-ordinated at Brigade level. In the front line the main emphasis was 
upon the deployment of Lewis Guns.15 By 1918 defence against attack from the air had 
become an important component of operations, offensive and defensive. In November 
1918, British Second Army had five anti-aircraft batteries and two sections of 13-pounder 
guns for anti-aircraft defence.16 
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The preparations for the forthcoming Battle of Ypres give a good example of requirements 
for the various units of the RAF to undertake specific missions in support of the attacking 
infantry. The priority, through the use of ‘contact aeroplanes’, was to track the progress of 
the attack in order to provide intelligence to senior command: 
 
. CONTACT AEROPLANES 
a) The most forward troops will carry RED FLARES, American Cloth on 
Box Respirators, and Vigilant periscopes for the purpose of signalling 
to Contact Aeroplanes. 
b) These, and every other means of signalling their position, will be used 
by the attacking troops at: 
ZERO plus 2 hours 15 minutes 
and at 
ZERO plus 4 hours 
and at such other times as called for by the Contact Aeroplane. 
c) Contact Aeroplanes will call for Signals from the attacking troops by 
sounding the Klaxon Horn and dropping WHITE Lights. 
d) Contact Aeroplanes will be marked with two BLACK RECTANGULAR 
FLAGS (2 feet by 1 foot 6 inches) attached to and projecting from the 
lower plane on each side of the fuselage. Each contact plane will also 
have a TRAILING STREAMER. 
All troops will be warned how to recognise contact aeroplanes.17 
 
Another important role was that of the ‘counter attack aeroplane’, used to identify possible 
counter-attacks by the enemy and to signal for a defensive barrage by artillery: 
 
COUNTER ATTACK AEROPLANE 
A counter attack aeroplane will be in the air on II Corps Front [west of Ypres] from 
Zero plus one hour onwards for the purpose of giving warning of an impending 
hostile attack. 
On perceiving hostile infantry moving to attack the counter attack aeroplane will call 
for annihilating artillery fire by Wireless and will also signal the fact that a hostile 
attack is impending by dropping a RED SMOKE PARACHUTE VERY LIGHT.18 
 
The reference to ‘wireless’ would most likely be through a code signal; for example, the 
arrangements for 88 Brigade refer to an ‘LL’ or ‘GF’ call.19 These arrangements also 
illustrate the increasing importance of wireless communications; while the existing 
equipment was too heavy and bulky for advancing units to utilise, it could be fitted to an 
aircraft with suitable adaptations.  
Hence this further example from 88 Brigade: 
 
Aeroplane fitted with Wireless Telephone 
From time to time an aeroplane fitted with a wireless telephone will patrol the II 
Corps Front. Receiving Stations to take down messages from this aeroplane are 
being arranged for at YPRES, and GOLDFISH Chateau. 
It is to be remembered, however, that all messages sent by this machine can be 
intercepted by receiving stations and on no account whatever will any messages 
referring to the positions of our troops be sent ‘in clear’ by this means.20 
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The main HQ of Corps, Division, and increasingly Brigade, would have access to wireless 
receivers. It was crucial for the forward infantry to be able to indicate that an objective has 
been taken and, as required, to signal for the necessary materiél or other forms of support 
in order to protect the gains made; reconnaissance aircraft made an important contribution 
to the various means of communication employed by advance formations. However there 
was concern at the ability of the enemy to access wireless communications. 
 
The initial planning for the Battle of Ypres, arranged at Divisional and Brigade levels, also 
included what at the time was the novel proposal to use aircraft to deliver supplies, 
principally ammunition, to forward troops. The system depended upon the ability of the 
advance troops to display the required layout of strips of white cloth, along with the firing of 
a white flare. Parachutes (to be collected and returned to Division) were employed to 
prevent the weighty packages from just falling directly to the ground (creating the likelihood 
of unfortunate consequences for any nearby troops). The following is a typical example of 
the arrangements made: 
 
DROPPING OF AMMUNITION FROM AEROPLANES 
a) Arrangements have been made with the R.A.F. to drop ammunition from 
aeroplanes, if required. 
b) Two kinds of ammunition will be dropped: 
a) bundle packed S.A.A.    
b) M.G. Ammunition packed in belts (4 belts per  
box) 
The ammunition prepared for dropping will be in the proportion of two of 
bundle packed ammunition to one of M.G. Ammunition in belts. 
c) Infantry will signal that ammunition is wanted as follows: 
[‘N’ shaped layout] Machine Gun Post requiring M.G. Ammunition. 
[‘triangle’ layout] Bundle packed ammunition required. 
Each signal will be made up of strips of white cloth 12 feet by 1 foot and in 
each case attention will be called to the signal by the firing of a white flare 
from the ground. Two strips per Battalion and one per Machine Gun Co. will 
be carried. 
The Brigade Signalling Officer will make arrangements for supplying them.  
d) The aeroplanes will be ready to drop ammunition from ZERO plus two hours 
onwards and will continue to do so as long as the ground signals are 
displayed.  
Once the signals are removed no more ammunition will be sent by aeroplane 
unless a report is received from a contact machine that more is required.  
e) It is probable that each ammunition dropping aeroplane will be able to drop 
about two boxes of ammunition per hour and possibly at the outside three 
machines can be made available for the purpose on the Divisional Front. 
It will not be practicable that these aeroplanes will continue dropping 
ammunition for a longer period than about four hours and during the day it is 
calculated that the maximum number of boxes which can be dropped will be 9 
boxes of mg Ammunition and 16 boxes of bundle packed ammunition. 
f) It is of very great importance, therefore, that ammunition should not be called 
for except when really required. Platoon and Company Commanders will 
make every endeavour to collect enemy rifles, machine guns and ammunition 
and bring them into use against the enemy. 
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g) As many parachutes as practicable must be recovered and returned to 
Division.21 
 
As seen, the prime objective of these arrangements for the forthcoming Battle of Ypres was 
to deliver additional supplies of ammunition. However, a few weeks later, during the 
planning for the Battle of Courtrai, the scope of the operation had been extended. The 
dropping of supplies now included food and rations, plus pigeons, as well as small arms 
and machine gun ammunition. Each of these had a different arrangement of ground sheets 
by which advance units could indicate the type of supplies required; with the attention of the 
contact aeroplane attracted by the firing of a white very light or the lighting of a white flare.22 
 
All units were now required to take the necessary steps to protect themselves from attack 
from the air, normally co-ordinated at Brigade level. In the front line the main emphasis was 
upon the deployment of Lewis Guns. In August 1918 the following Divisional orders were 
issued to units in 121 Brigade (40th Division): 
 
Anti-Aircraft Defence 
All units are responsible for their own protection against attacks from the air, and 
should ensure that they are complete in A.A. small arms, sights and mountings, 
according to establishment. 
[Chief considerations for the defence of the area include]: 
a) Fire will be opened on low flying aeroplanes by rifles and Lewis Guns, but in 
every case the sentry in front line posts will continue to watch the front. 
b) Lewis Guns told off for anti-aircraft purposes in the line should not be placed 
at greater intervals than 500 yds. Positions may be changed, but changes 
should be reported to Brigade Headquarters so that anti-aircraft defence may 
be co-ordinated. 
c) Most implicit orders are necessary to ensure that no Lewis Gun or rifle is to 
fire unless the ‘CROSS’ on the hostile plane can be clearly seen with the 
naked eye. It is useless to fire at a range greater than 1,300 yards. This is to 
be made clear to every Lewis Gunner, and steps will be taken to deal with 
those who fire wildly at aeroplanes obviously out of range. 
d) Anti-aircraft Lewis Guns will, as far as possible, be placed in groups of 4, or in 
pairs. If in groups of 4, they will be under an officer, or if in pairs, under 
N.C.O.’s to be supervised by an officer. 
 
Fire at night will not be opened unless: 
i) The hostile aircraft can be seen against the sky. 
ii) The struts of the planes can be distinguished in the beams of a 
searchlight.
23
 
 
Subsequently the orders were added to: 
 
An order board is to be provided at every post. Units will also arrange that the ‘Letter 
and Colours of the Day’ (particularly the latter) are communicated to each of their 
posts and understood by them. 
 
The Letters and Colours change daily at 12 noon and are to be communicated daily 
to A.A. Lewis Guns as if they were passwords. 
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An additional reason for the restriction of A.A. Lewis Gun fire at night, particularly in 
back areas, is that the A.A. defences depend largely on listening for the location of 
hostile aeroplanes and that this is made more difficult if Lewis Guns fire 
unnecessarily… 
 
… copies of a paper of orders for A.A. Lewis Gunners have been forwarded for 
distribution to each gun… This paper should be pasted to a board of [or] piece of tin 
and tied to the mounting or some part of the emplacement of the gun.24 
 
By 1918 defence against attack from the air had become an important component of 
operations, offensive and defensive. In November 1918, British Second Army had five anti-
aircraft batteries and two sections of 13-pdr guns for anti-aircraft defence. In total this 
provided: 
 
 12 x 3-inch anti-aircraft guns 
 42 x 13-pdr guns.25 
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British Army Medical Categories1 
 
Category A 
- fit for 
general 
service 
 
A1 Men for despatch overseas in all respects, as regards training, physical and 
mental qualifications 
A2 Recruits who should be A1 on completion of their training 
 
A3 Returned Expeditionary Force men who should be A1 once ‘hardened’ 
 
A4 Men under 19 years of age who should become A1 or A2 once they reach that 
age 
Category B 
- fit for service 
abroad, but not 
general service 
B1 In Garrison or Provisional units 
 
B2 In Labour units or on garrison or regimental outdoor employment 
 
B3 On sedentary work as clerks or store men only 
 
Category C 
- fit for home 
service only 
 
C1 In Garrison or Provisional units 
 
C2 In Labour units or on command, garrison or regimental outdoor employment 
C3 On sedentary work as clerks, storemen, batmen, cooks, orderlies, sanitary 
duties, etc. 
Category D 
- temporarily 
unfit for 
service, but 
likely to 
become so 
within six 
months 
D1 In command depots 
 
D2 In regimental depots 
 
D3 In any unit or depot under or awaiting medical or dental treatment, on completion 
of which will re-join their original medical category 
Category E 
- unfit for service, and not likely to become fit within six months 
Notes: 
 In October 1917, following recommendations made in the report of Lieutenant General H. M. Lawson 
at the start of the year, under ACI 1606/17, Category C was abolished; men listed within this 
category were recategorised in the corresponding Category B subdivision 
 In addition, the following categories were applied in France and Flanders: 
Class A – fit for general service 
Class TB (Temporary Base) – temporarily unfit for general service 
Class PB (Permanent Base) – unfit for general service at the Front, but fit for service on the lines 
of communication and in army corps areas and capable of being regraded Class A 
Class PU (Permanently Unfit) – those in class PB who are never likely to become Class A, but 
employed in the same way as Class PB 
 
 
 
                                                         
1
 The information in the table is taken from C. Messenger, Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-18  (London: Cassell, 
2006), Appendix Two, pp. 521-2; the sources are: Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great 
War 1914-1920 (War Office, 1922; reprinted by Naval & Military Press, 1999); TNA WO32/5093, Lawson Report, The 
Number and Physical Categories of Men Employed out of the Fighting Area in France. 
 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918             Dennis Williams      
Appendix J    British Second Army, Flanders, 1918: Training and Deployment 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
British Second Army and 
Coalition Warfare in 
Flanders in the Hundred 
Days, 1918 
 
 
 
 
 University of Birmingham 
Centre for First World War Studies 
PhD (Part-time) 
 
  
Appendix J 
 
The Operational Readiness of 
Second Army: 
Training and Deployment 
  
 
  
Dennis Williams 
 
 
 
British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the Hundred Days, 1918             Dennis Williams      
Appendix J    British Second Army, Flanders, 1918: Training and Deployment 
2 
 
The Operational Readiness of Second Army: Training and Deployment 
 
Training was of crucial importance given the number of reconstituted units within Second 
Army and the large number of new conscripts and re-designated men. The examples set 
out below represent Second Army’s practical implementation of the processes outlined in 
the British Army’s principal operational doctrine, SS 135: The Training and Employment of 
Divisions (issued in January 1918).  
 
14th Division was one of the reconstituted divisions, put together during June 1918 before 
joining Second Army in July. There was therefore a very heavy emphasis upon training for 
the officers and men making up the battalions and supporting arms. For the units in 41 
Brigade, the training programme throughout that summer included such topics as: 
- Gas drill 
- Time on the firing range 
- Small tactical schemes for platoons 
- Company and patrol work 
- Tanks 
- ‘Duties of the RAF and the difficulties’  
(a lecture attended by 200 soldiers) 
- ‘Fire discipline and fire control’  
(for officers and NCOs) 
- Troop deployment: extended order, artillery formation.1 
 
The range of the subject matter is very broad, from basic marksmanship through to co-
operation with tanks and the RAF. What this list suggests is the ongoing need for the new 
formations, at all levels, to receive training in some of the more elementary aspects of their 
role. Having moved up into the front line on 28 August, the Brigade concluded a few days 
later that ‘Units [were] lacking in knowledge of elementary trench duties’.2 
 
43 Brigade, also part of 14th Division, had been reconstituted in England, comprising the 
three battalions, 12/Suffolks, 20/(Shoreditch) The Middlesex, and 10/Highland Light 
Infantry; the latter two battalions had themselves been rebuilt from cadre in June 1918. The 
Brigade returned to France on 4-5 July 1918.3 The War Diary of 43 Brigade contains the 
details of a Tactical Exercise for training purposes carried out on specified days in the 
middle of July 1918, shortly after the units re-grouped. The memo gives an insight into the 
tactical thinking at this point in the war, which had to be married to the priority of preparing 
relatively raw troops for the new offensive realities presented to Allied forces on the 
Western Front. Over four days, tactical exercises at battalion level gradually increased the 
number of troops involved, ending with a brigade level exercise. The main manoeuvre 
involved the theoretical capture and consolidation of a position by one battalion; followed by 
the passing through of this battalion and the capture of a secondary objective by another 
battalion. Key elements in the training included the pushing forward of Lewis Guns to 
support the attack with enfilade fire; the supporting fire offered by light trench mortars; the 
deployment of Vickers heavy machine guns for covering fire and for taking on ‘floating’ 
targets; means of ammunition supply; and application of the principle of ‘no movement 
without fire’.4 
 
Within these manoeuvres one can identify the features of a modern style of warfare: 
references to what can be summarised as ‘fire and movement’; effective use of infantry 
support weapons; enfilade fire and flanking movement. These elements are subsequently 
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incorporated within the planning and execution of Second Army operations at brigade and 
battalion levels. 
 
The importance of learning lessons was widely recognised, with senior officers present to 
provide commentary and feedback. On 7 September a tactical exercise by 26 Brigade (9th 
Division) was viewed by the Brigade and Division commanders. Some main points of the 
feedback included: 
 
 The importance of the prompt conveyance of orders from HQ to junior 
commanders 
 Soldiers should be trained to use the Lewis Gun and rifles at long range, not 
waiting until the enemy is within 200-300 yards 
 …The best way to kill retreating Boche was not to bayonet individuals 
(however enjoyable that process may be) but to bring rapid and effective 
controlled fire to bear on them 
 Unless the infantry are well supported by artillery, they will not advance as 
rapidly as they might do with the guns behind them – There was no reason 
why the Field Artillery should not always support the infantry as they were 
quite as mobile as if not more so than them 
 A smoke screen is a valuable aid when attacking 
 [a discussion on the relative merits of the ‘snake’ and other formations when 
attacking]… it was decided to adopt a more open formation than the ‘snake’ in 
future operations.5 
 
There are interesting points to note here. The move away from the bayonet to the use of 
controlled fire indicates a major shift in doctrine. The comments on the field artillery, 
particularly with regard to expecting the guns to keep pace with the advancing infantry, 
would prove to be a challenge, particularly in the early stages of the campaign when the 
terrain was comprised of former battlefields, made worse by severe rain. The need for 
troops to deploy in open order when assaulting, adopting a looser formation than even that 
represented by the ‘snake’ profile, suggests a growing confidence in the initiative and ability 
of the individual soldiers. Such deployment could make it more difficult for NCOs and 
officers to maintain command and control during the attack. There is an implicit trust in the 
commitment of the troops to continue to manoeuvre forward, making maximum use of 
covering fire and available ground cover. In a later exercise the same unit practised 
‘advancing over rough ground’ with regard to the pace of the advance, to provide a useful 
guide when considering the timing for a creeping barrage, or plans for subsequent 
defensive fire. ‘The average pace of advance was found to be 100 [yards] in 3 minutes and 
it was found impossible to maintain ‘blob’ formation’.6 This latter view reinforces the need to 
allow troops to adopt a more open formation, although it would be crucial to maintain touch 
with a creeping barrage. 
 
Having only been brought together in June 1918, with many men transferred from Labour 
Companies, 10/KOSB spent most of that month, July and the first half of August undergoing 
training; this included some time in support trenches (West Hazebrouck, 3-7 July 1918). 
The unit was finally put into front line positions in the third week in August; on 21 August it 
received orders to follow up a withdrawal by opposing enemy forces. Two days later the 
Battalion attacked German positions and was met by machine gun fire and a defensive 
barrage; the attack was only ‘partially successful’ in consequence.7 
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Research of the war diaries of the battalions, with original notes and diaries of the 
participants, illustrates that throughout the Final Advance, the units maintained regular army 
routines and procedures. For example, despite the speed of the advance and the problems 
created for communications, the troops of 31st Division underwent a number of moves from 
front line duty to time out of the line in reserve or support occupations, or to undertaking 
further training. The latter was largely the responsibility of the Battalion commander and 
could reflect his priorities or particular points arising from battle experience. During 
September 1918, 11/East Yorkshires spent time in reserve and received  training sessions 
under the headings of ‘NCOs’, ‘Lewis Gunners’, ‘Signalling’, ‘Observers’, ‘Scouts’, and 
‘Stretcher Bearers’. On 21 September Captain C J Casey (Intelligence Corps) gave a 
lecture on ‘The Work of the RAF and its use to infantry’.8 This record is a very good 
reflection of the changed nature of the British Army by this stage of the war, and the 
developments in its fighting, weaponry and tactics. The influence of Lieutenant-General Ivor 
Maxse, in his new role with responsibility for training across the British Army, would be in 
evidence by this time. On 9 August 1918, senior officers from Second Army attended one of 
his lectures on ‘The Training of Infantry’.9 
 
On 23 and 24 September, 1/18/Durham Light Infantry, perhaps reflecting optimism or 
prescience, ran a lecture on ‘Education After the War’.10 
 
The value of some of the training and lectures offered to troops was sometimes called into 
question. The following critical reviews were recorded in the War Diary of 41 Brigade: 
 
10 August Lecture on ‘Aeroplane Photography’ by Second Army Photographic 
Officer [attended by over 100 soldiers] 
- An interesting subject badly treated. 
 
14 August Lecture on ‘Duties of Counter Batteries’ 
- A dull subject after a hard day’s work.11 
 
Units and troops also changed line responsibilities on a number of occasions, with time 
spent travelling (by rail, lorries, and on foot) between different points of the front. When out 
of the front line or support positions, units or contingents of soldiers could be involved in 
training, recreation or labouring. This situation appears to derive from the desire of the 
senior command in Second Army to ensure that no group of soldiers endured an overlong 
period in the front line of the advance. The arrangement was designed to keep the fighting 
forces as fresh as possible, though success in this was to become a relative term given the 
subsequent pace of the advance, the problems of transport and supply, and the determined 
resistance by the enemy at particular defensive points.  
 
During July 1918, the record of 5/Cameron Highlanders (26 Brigade, 9th Division) 
demonstrates the variety of deployments and activities which troops could expect to be 
engaged in. This breadth of experience does not compare with the common perception now 
held of the common soldier’s daily routine amidst the trench warfare of the Western Front 
and the First World War. The following is a brief summary of the Battalion’s deployment 
over the course of the month: 
 
1-4 July Battalion stationed in the Reserve Line. 
Troops involved in work parties (One officer, 50 other ranks): for 
example, deployed as a ‘carrying party’ for the 3rd Canadian Tunnelling 
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Company. Six other ranks spent time filling in shell holes under the 
supervision of the 64th Field Company RE. 
Some units also underwent training: for example, Reserve Company 
Lewis Gunners. 
4-7 July Battalion relieved 7/Seaforth Highlanders in the ‘right front sub sector’. 
There is shelling by the enemy on a daily basis plus machine gun fire at 
night. 
Patrols are sent out each night: for example, four other ranks (no 
officer) from B Company ordered to search for the location of enemy 
machine gun posts. 
7-12 July Battalion based in Brigade Support. Training includes ‘artillery 
formations and the attack’, followed by a practice rehearsal which is 
watched by both Brigade and Division COs. 
13-18 July Battalion deployed back to the front line.  
During the relief there is an attack by a German raiding party on an 
advance post but this is repulsed. 
Regular periods of enemy shelling 
An enemy sniper is proving to be very active – the likely location is 
shelled by artillery and three hits observed. 
The Battalion HQ suffers heavy shelling and the Battalion Adjutant, 
Captain M.C. Muir, is wounded; Stoic Farm is evacuated as a 
consequence, this taking place during a ‘violent thunderstorm’ and 
heavy rain. 
On 18 July a raiding party of 20 other ranks led by Lieutenant A.L. 
Wilson attacked an enemy machine gun post; the action failed, due in 
part to the covering smoke shells falling short, and the troops were 
beaten back by machine gun fire. Six soldiers were reported as 
missing, including Lieutenant Wilson. 
The Battalion was informed that on 19 July it would take part in an 
attack on the village of Meteren, in conjunction with 8/Black Watch and 
units from the South African Brigade. The aim is to capture the village 
and prevent its use for observation purposes by the enemy. 
19-24 July Front line and support operations: attack on Meteren.12 
25-30 July Battalion based in Corps Reserve. 
31 July… Battalion moved up into the Support Line (Meteren) and on the 
following day took over the Brigade’s section of the front line. Two 
German carrier pigeons were shot down – more importantly, the 
messages being carried were retrieved.13 
 
At the end of the first week in August, 35
th
 Division, deployed in the Locre Sector, was 
relieved by 30th Division. Accordingly, 90 Brigade of 30th Division replaced 105 Brigade in 
line, with the latter moving back to billets in the area of Sylvestre Cappel. A range of training 
and work duties were undertaken by the troops of 105 Brigade, much of the content in 
preparation for offensive action:  
 
August 9th … One platoon from each Battalion, detailed for work in the forward 
area under No. 1. Foreways Company… 
10th The Units of the Brigade spent the day re-organizing and refitting. 
12th Orders were issued relating to a practice attack on the TERDEGHEM 
SWITCH by 15th. Sherwood Foresters and the 4th. North Staffordshire 
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Regiment, to take place on Wednesday, 14th. August. Only Signallers 
on Brigade Headquarters and of each Unit to take part – assisted by a 
contact aeroplane of 53rd. Squadron R.A.F. 
 [An exercise demonstrating the crucial need for effective 
communications during an assault – and the importance of this within 
Second Army preparations.] 
Battalions carried out training according to programme. 
[15th Cheshires ordered to undertake] 4 days Range Practice. 
[Brigadier-General Turner went on a short leave to England.] 
13th  The 105th. Brigade Headquarters Staff… attended a Lecture… on 
‘Counter-Battery Work’. A closer co-operation between Infantry and 
Artillery was advocated, and facilities for more immediate action were 
promised. 
[This could have been in part a response to the number of casualties 
being caused to the troops manning front line positions – and the 
concerns of their immediate commanders.] 
14th  [Practice attack on the TERDEGHEM SWITCH by Signal troops carried 
out.] The object of the practice exercise was to improve the efficiency of 
Signal Personnel in the use of the ‘T’ POPHAM PANEL’ and other 
means of communication (without cable). Communication between 
Headquarters of Assaulting Battalions and Headquarters of 105th. 
Infantry Brigade was satisfactorily established and maintained by 
means of (a) ‘T’ POPHAM PANEL’, (b) Visual and (c) Runner. 
 
On 15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, and 27 August, the Diary refers to ‘Training continued’. On 22 
August the ‘Second Army Commander visited 15/Cheshires and 15/Sherwood Foresters 
and inspected them while training,14 evidence of Plumer’s interest in, and attention to, 
training for his men. 
 
These extracts show the range of activities in which units would be engaged during the 
period when they were withdrawn from the line. It is suggestive of what might now be 
termed ‘a learning organisation’ and presents a positive picture of Second Army’s 
commitment to training. There is very little reference to troops being used for work duties 
such as road repairs or similar; nor any record of recreational activities such as inter-unit 
sports competitions. The emphasis appears to be very much on improving the skills of the 
soldiers while there is time and opportunity to do so. Reflecting the time spent behind the 
lines, the monthly casualties’ report showed no soldiers killed or missing; two officers and 
20 men were recorded as wounded. 
 
Extracts from the War Diary of 5/Cameron Highlanders, when out of the line during August 
and September 1918, provide a further snapshot of the range of activities which were 
arranged for the troops, recreational and educational. These included the Brigade and 
Battalion Horse Shows, Bathing parades and Gas Chamber exercises, a demonstration of 
message carrying rockets (no comments are recorded), and on 9 September, the Brigade 
Sports Day.15 
 
Maintaining the men in healthy condition was another important factor with regard to the 
organisation of a unit’s routine of duties. The war diary of 7/Seaforth Highlanders notes on 8 
July 1918 that, after a long spell of trench duties (33 days), the men had a bath and were 
issued with clean underclothing; the Medical Officer, following inspection and 
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acknowledging the length of time spent in front and support positions, ‘remarked on the 
clean condition [of the troops]’.16 In the circumstances of the trenches the risk of infection 
was ever-present; a later note from the same source records that ‘the prevalence of 
diarrhoea was very marked during this tour and was attributed largely to the water supply’.17 
 
Recreation was a regular feature of time out of the lines, officers making arrangements to 
promote sports competitions between units, with men taking part or as spectators. This was 
a means of ensuring healthy activity as well as providing entertainment for the troops. 
Appended to the war diary of 120 Brigade there is the programme, with cover page cartoon, 
for the Brigade’s Sports Day, 7 September 1918. There are a mix of events including 
athletic races, horse jumping, tug-of-war, sack race, mule race (‘no saddlery, spurs or stick’) 
and bicycle tortoise race (‘last man in wins’). An entrance fee of 10 francs is to go to the 
General Fund.18 
 
On 9 July 1918, 7/Seaforth Highlanders held a Battalion football tournament with inter-
company matches; the following day its Division (9th) held a football match with a team from 
31st Division (the result is not recorded – perhaps the officer writing up the diary was not a 
soccer fan).19 Football also brought allies together; On the evening of 17 September, C 
Company of 7/Seaforth Highlanders played a football match against a Belgian team with the 
latter winning by two goals to one.20  
 
There is other evidence of sport bringing together Belgian and British troops. ‘Belgian Fete 
Day’ is recorded as taking place on 21 July 1918 – at this event there were two sporting 
competitions for teams from the Belgian Army and British Second Army, with prizes 
provided by Princess Philippa of Caraman-Chimay.21 
 
On 3 July, 36th Division held its Horse Show at Proven, with Belgian guests of demonstrable 
ability: 
 
Upon this the officers of the neighbouring Belgian Cavalry Division, including an 
Olympic competitor, descended like wolves on the fold, giving a remarkable display 
of skill and horsemanship, and taking practically all the prizes for jumping events.
22
 
 
As late as 10 September, just two weeks before the Battle of Ypres began, a football match 
took place between British and Belgian teams, from 18/York & Lancaster and 2nd Belgian 
Grenadier Regiment; the latter winning by two goals to one, ‘the Belgians being slightly the 
better team’.23 
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 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade 
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 This raid is described in more detail later in this study. 
13
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 Battalion, Cameron Highlanders 
14
 TNA WO95/2486, War Diary of 105 Infantry Brigade 
15
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 Battalion, Cameron Highlanders 
16
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th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, 8
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19
 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, 9
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20
 TNA WO95/1765, War Diary of 7
th
 Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders; the Battalion belonged to 9
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 (Scottish) Division, 
the northernmost of the Second Army divisions, and deployed next to the Belgian Army 
21
 TNA WO95/2299, War Diary of 86 Infantry Brigade, Administrative Order, 29
th
 Division, No. 160/136, 1
st
 July, 1918. 
The briefing note from 29
th
 Division continues: 
The CARAMAN-CHIMAY CUP, to be competed [for] annually, and 11 medals, for the winning Divisional Association 
Football Team, from the two Armies. 
8 Medals for a Cross Country Run of 10 kilometres. Open to 8 runners from each of the [Belgian and British Second] 
Armies. Further information is being asked for, as to whether this is a team or individual event… 
It is thought that the best way of selecting a Divisional Team, as time is so short, will be to find out the best Battalion or 
other Unit team by an eliminating tournament and then give that Unit the choice of playing in the Corps tournament with 
the team as then constituted, or of selecting one or more men from any other Unit for inclusion in their team…Brigades 
and Divisional Artillery will select 8 men and all other Divisional Units… 4 men to represent them in a race to be 
arranged by Divisional H.Qrs over a 10 Kilometre course. The first 8 men in will represent the Division… 
22
 C. Falls, A History of the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division (London: Constable, 1996; first published Belfast: McCraw, Stevenson, 
1922) 
23
 TNA WO95/1894/6, War Diary of 41 Infantry Brigade 
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